Timeline of U.S. Sanctions

October 11, 2010
Jason Starr and Helia Ighani
 
Since 2005, the United States has designated Iranian individuals, companies, and organizations for involvement in nuclear proliferation, ballistic missile development, support for terrorist groups, and human rights abuses. These designations have been made under the following presidential executive orders and pieces of legislation:
 

Executive Order 13224 was issued on September 23, 2001. It applies to entities accused of supporting terrorism.

Executive Order 13382 was issued on June 28, 2005. It applies to entities accused of supporting Iran’s nuclear proliferation and missile-related activities.

Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act was issued on July 1, 2010. It amends the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.

Executive Order 13553 was issued on September 29, 2010. It applies to Iranian officials responsible for serious human rights abuses.

Executive Order 13574 was issued on May 23, 2011. It applies further sanctions to entities under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.

Executive Order 13590 was issued on November 21, 2011. It authorizes the Secretary of State to impose sanctions on persons involved in certain activities in Iran’s energy and petrochemical sectors.

Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2012 was issued on December 31, 2011. It imposes unilateral sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran.

Executive Order 13599 was issued on February 6, 2012. It blocks the property of the Government of Iran and all Iranian financial institutions.

Executive Order 13606 was issued on April 23, 2012. It blocks the property and suspends the entry into the United States of certain persons involved in grave human rights abuses via information technology.

Executive Order 13608 was issued on May 1, 2012. It prohibits certain transactions with and suspends entry into the United States of Iran sanctions evaders. It authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to impose certain measures on a foreign person violating sanctions on Iran.

Executive Order 13622, or the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act,was issued on July 30, 2012. It builds on Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2012. It sanctions private or public entities for knowingly conducting transactions for the acquisition of Iranian oil.
 
The Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Human Rights Act of 2012 (H.R. 1905) was issued by Congress on August 1, 2012 and signed into law by the President on August 10, 2012. It targets companies conducting business with Iran’s national oil company and tanker fleet, such as insurers and shippers.
 
Executive Order 13628 was issued on October 9, 2012. It implements certain sanctions set forth in Executive Order 13622 and adds additional sanctions on Iran.
 
June 28, 2005 (Executive Order 13382)

Military for involvement in Iran's ballistic missile development
  • Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
  • Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group
  • Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group
 
Nuclear for operating Iran's nuclear facilities
  • Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
January 4, 2006 (Executive Order 13382)

Nuclear
  • Novin Energy Company: Transferred millions of dollars on behalf the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) to entities associated with Iran's nuclear program.
  • Mesbah Energy Company: AEOI Subordinate and procurer for Iran's heavy water project.
 
July 18, 2006 (Executive Order 13382)

Construction, Engineering, and Technology
  • Sanam Industrial Group: Subordinate of Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). Purchased millions of dollars worth of equipment from entities associated with missile proliferation.
  • Ya Mahdi Industries Group: Subordinate of Iran’s AIO. Made international purchases of missile-related technology and goods for Iran.
 
January 9, 2007 (Executive Order 13882)

Banks
  • Bank Sepah/Bank Sepah International Plc (UK): State-owned bank. U.S. Treasury alleges Bank Sepah provides support to entities affiliated with Iran’s nuclear program.
 
Individuals
  • Ahmad Derakhshandeh: Chairman and Director of Bank Sepah.
 
February 16, 2007 (Executive Order 13382)
 
Construction, Engineering, Industry and Technology
  • Kalaye Electric Company: Affiliated with centrifuge research and development through the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).
  • Kavoshyar Company: Wholly-owned by AEOI.
  • Pioneer Energy Industries Company: Provides technical support services to AEOI.
 
March 30, 2007 (Executive Order 13382)
 
Military
  • Defense Industries Organization (DIO): Controlled by Iran's Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics. Involved in Iran’s nuclear and missiles programs.
 
June 8, 2007 (Executive Order 13382)
 
Construction, Engineering, Industry and Technology
  • Pars Tarash (Pars Trash Co.): Affiliated with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).
  • Farayand Technique: Affiliated with the AEOI.
  • Fajr Industries Group (Industrial Factories of Precision Machinery): Affiliated with Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO).
  • Mizan Machine Manufacturing Group: Affiliated with AIO.
 
June 15, 2007 (Executive Order 13382)
 
Individuals
  • Ali Hajinia Leilabadi: Agent of Mesbah Energy Company. Involved in Iran’s heavy water development.
  • Mohammad Qannadi: Agent of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.
 
October 25, 2007 (Executive Order 13382 and Executive Order 13224)

Banks
  • Bank Melli Iran (Executive Order 13382): Iran's largest bank. Provides services to entities involved in nuclear and ballistic missile programs, Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and Qods Force.
  • Bank Mellat (Executive Order 13382): Provides banking services to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and Novin Energy Company.
  • Bank Saderat Iran (Executive Order 13224): Has approximately 3,200 branch offices. U.S. Treasury alleges Iranian Government uses the bank to channel funds to terrorist organizations.
 
Petroleum and Petrochemicals
  • Oriental Oil Kish (Executive Order 13382): Owned or controlled by the IRGC.
 
Construction, Engineering, Industry and Technology (Executive Order 13382)
  • Khatam al-Anbya Construction Headquarters: Engineering arm of IRGC. Involved in construction of streets, highways, tunnels, water conveyance projects, agricultural restoration projects, and pipelines.
  • Ghorb Nooh: Owned or controlled by the IRGC or its leaders. Affiliate of Khatam al-Anbya.
  • Sahel Consultant Engineering: Owned or controlled by IRGC.
  • Ghorb-e Karbala: Owned or controlled by IRGC.
  • Sepasad Engineering Co.: Owned or controlled by IRGC. Specializes in earth and concrete dam construction, road construction, and tunneling.
  • Omran Sahel: Owned or controlled by IRGC.
  • Hara Company: Owned or controlled by IRGC. Reportedly building a tunnel facility in northeast Tehran for use in nuclear weapons research and development.
  • Gharargahe Sazandegi Ghaem: Owned or controlled by IRGC.
 
Military (Executive Order 13382)
  • Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): Elite branch of Iran’s military. Involved in nuclear and ballistic missiles programs.
  • Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL): Iran’s ministry of defense. It has ultimate authority over Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). AIO was designated on June 28, 2005.
  • IRGC-Qods Force (Executive Order 13224): Branch of IRGC. The United States alleges that Qods Force provides material support to terrorist organizations.
 
Individuals (Executive Order 13382)
  • Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi: Head of Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO).
  • Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar: Head of Finance & Budget Department, AIO.
  • Reza-Gholi Esmaeli: Head of Trade and International Affairs Dept., AIO.
  • General Hosein Salimi: Commander of the Air Force, IRGC.
  • Brigadier General Morteza Rezaie: Deputy Commander of the IRGC.
  • Vice Admiral Ali Akhbar Ahmadian: Then Chief of IRGC Joint Staff.
  • Brigadier Gen. Mohammad Hejazi: Then Commander of Basij resistance force, IRGC.
  • Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani: Commander of the Qods Force, IRGC.
 
March 12, 2008 (Executive Order 13382)
 
Banks
  • Future Bank, B.S.C.: Investment bank operating in Iran and Persian Gulf States. Joint venture of Bank Saderat Iran, Bank Melli Iran, and Ahli United Bank (Bahrain) with branches and in Bahrain and a representative office in Tehran.

  • July 8, 2008 (Executive Order 13382)

  • Construction, Engineering, Industry and Technology
  • Parchin Chemical Industries: Imports and exports chemical goods throughout the world as a subsidiary of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO). DIO was designated on March 30, 2007.
  • 7th of Tir: DIO subsidiary involved in Iran's nuclear centrifuge development program.
  • Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group: DIO subsidiary and parent of 7th of Tir.
  • Shahid Sattari Industries: Manufacturing and maintains ground support equipment for Shahid Bakeri Industries Group (SBIG). SBIG was designated on June 28, 2005 for its role in Iran’s missile program.
  • TAMAS Company: A nuclear fuel production company.
 
Individuals
  • Dawood Agha-Jani: Affiliated with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). Head of Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, Iran's main uranium enrichment facility.
  • Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi: Director of nuclear program at Iran's Center for Readiness and New Defense Technology and former head of Iran's Physics Research Center.
  • Moshen Hojati: Affiliated with Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), the overall manager of Iran's missile program.
  • Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi: Head of Shahid Bakeri Industries Group (SBIG).
  • Naser Maleki: Oversees work on the Shahab-3 ballistic missile program. Head of Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). SHIG was designated on June 28, 2005 for its role in Iran’s ballistic missile program.
  • General Yahya Rahim-Safavi: Armed forces advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei and former IRGC commander.

August 12, 2008 (Executive Order 13382)

Nuclear
  • Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center: Uranium fuel conversion facility for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).
  • Jabber Ibn Hayan: Performs nuclear research, development, and laboratory services on the nuclear fuel cycle for the AEOI.
  • Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine: Research component of AEOI.
  • Joza Industrial Company: Procurement front company for Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). SHIG was designated on June 28, 2005.
  • Safety Equipment Procurement Company (SEP Co.): Procurement front company for Aerospace Industries Organization of Iran (AIO).

September 10, 2008 (Executive Order 13382)

Shipping
  • Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL): State-owned shipping company. Transports sanctioned missile-related and proliferation-related military cargo for Iran’s government.
  • Asia Marine Network PTE (IRISL Asia PTE) Ltd./CISCO Shipping Co. Ltd. (IRISL Korea Co. Ltd.)/ Iran o Hind Shipping Company/ Iran o Misr Shipping Company/Irinivestship, Ltd./IRISL Benelux NV/IRISL China Shipping Co., Ltd./IRISL Europe GMbH/IRISL (Malta) Limited/IRISL Marine Services & Engineering Company/IRISL Multimodal Transport Co./IRISL (UK) Ltd./IRITAL Shipping SRL Company/ Khazar Sea Shipping Lines/South Shipping Line Iran/ Shipping Computer Services Company/ Valfajr 8thShipping Line Co. SSK: Foreign and domestic subsidiaries of IRISL.
  • Oasis Freight Agencies: Joint venture between IRISL and Sharaf Shipping Company (UAE).
     
September 17, 2008 (Executive Order 13382)
 
Construction, Engineering, Industry and Technology
  • Armament Industries Group: Manufactures weapons and weapons systems. Subsidiary of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO).
  • Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA): Aircraft manufacturing and assembly company. Provides support to IRGC. Owned or controlled by Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). MODAFL was designated on October 25, 2007.
  • Farasakht Industries: HESA subsidiary. Manufactures aerospace tools and designed aeronautical equipment.
  • Iran Electronics Industries (IEI): Wholly-owned subsidiary of MODAFL. Largest manufacturer of electronic and communication equipment in Iran. Manufactures components for Iranian weapons systems.
  • Iran Communications Industries: IEI subsidiary. Procurement company owned or controlled by MODAFL.
  • Shiraz Electronics Industries: IEI subsidiary. Produces radars, electronic equipment for military.

October 22, 2008 (Executive Order 13882)
 
Banks
  • Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI): Provides financial services to Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).
  • Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, C.A.: Venezuela-based bank owned or controlled by EDBI.
  • EDBI Exchange Company/EDBI Stock Brokerage Company: Owned or controlled by EDBI.
     
December 17, 2008 (Executive Order 13382)
 
Banks
  • ASSA Co. Ltd./ASSA Corporation: Controlled by Bank Melli. Established as shell companies for Bank Melli to disguise the bank’s 40 percent ownership interest in the 650 Fifth Avenue Company in New York City. ASSA Corp. the subsidiary of ASSA Co. Ltd.

March 3, 2009 (Executive Order 13382)
Banks
  • Bank Melli Iran Investment Company/BMIIC International General Trading Co.: Owned or controlled by Bank Melli, designated October 25, 2007 for providing services to entities linked to Iran’s nuclear program.
  • Bank Melli Printing and Publishing Co.: Owned or controlled by Bank Melli. Responsible for printing for domestic branches of Bank Melli.
  • First Persian Equity Fund: Owned or controlled by Melli Investment Holding International (MEHR) and Bank Melli Iran Investment Company (BMIIC).
  • MEHR Cayman Ltd.: Cayman Islands-based. Owned or controlled by MEHR and BMIIC.
  • Melli Investment Holding International: Dubai-based. Wholly-owned by BMIIC.
 
Construction, Engineering, Industry and Technology (Executive Order 13382)
  • Cement Investment and Development Co. (CIDCO): Owned or controlled by BMIIC. Founded to manage BMIIC’s holdings in cement industry in 2004.
  • Mazandaran Cement Company: Owned or controlled by CIDCO.
  • Mazandaran Textile Company: Owned or controlled by Bank Melli Iran Investment Company (BMIIC).
  • Melli Agrochemical Company PJS: Pesticide company established in 1986. Owned or controlled by BMIIC.
  • Shomal Cement Company: Owned or controlled by CIDCO.

April 7, 2009 (Executive Order 13382)
 
Construction, Engineering, Industry and Technology
  • Amin Industrial Complex: Owned or controlled by Defense Industries Organization (DIO). DIO was designated on March 30, 2007.
  • Kaveh Cutting Tools Company: Owned or controlled by DIO. Produces centrifuge components for Iran's nuclear centrifuge program.
  • Khorasan Metallurgy Industries: Owned or controlled by DIO. Subsidiary of Ammunition Industries Group. Produces centrifuge components.
  • Niru Battery Manufacturing Company: DIO subsidiary. Manufactures power units for Iranian missile systems.
  • Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries: Produces large caliber items and cartridge cases. Produces components for improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
  • Yazd Metallurgy Industries: Ammunition Industries Group (AMIG) subsidiary owned or controlled by DIO.
 
Individuals
  • Ali Divandari: Chairman of Bank Mellat.

November 5, 2009 (Executive Order 13382)
 
Banks
  • First East Export bank, P.L.C.: Malaysian subsidiary of Bank Mellat. Bank Mellat was designated on October 25, 2007 for providing financial services for Iran's nuclear program.
 
February 10, 2010 (Executive Order 13382)
 
Construction, Engineering, Industry and Technology
  • Fater Engineering Institute: Subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbya Construction Headquarters, the engineering arm of the IRGC.
  • Imensazen Consultant Engineers Institute: Subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbya. Supports IRGC mining and engineering projects.
  • Makin Institute: Subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbya. Supports IRGC mining and engineering projects.
  • Rahab Institute: Subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbya. Supports IRGC mining and engineering projects.
 
Individuals
  • General Rostam Qasemi: IRGC General. Commander of Khatam al-Anbya Construction Headquarters.
 
June 16, 2010 (Executive Order 13382)
 
Shipping
  • Hafiz Darya Shipping Co.: Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) front company. Used for IRISL containerized shipping operations beginning in 2009.
  • Safiran Payan Darya Shipping: IRISL front company. Used for IRISL bulk and cargo operations beginning in April 2009.
  • Soroush Sarzamin Asatir Ship Management Co.: IRISL front company. Performs ship management for IRISL.
  • Seibow Limited/Seibow Logistics Limited: Hong Kong-based IRISL front companies.
 
Military
  • IRGC Air Force: In charge of deployment and operations of Iran’s ballistic missile program.
  • IRGC Missile Command: In charge of deployment and operations of Iran’s ballistic missile program.
  • Naval Defense Missile Industry Group: Owned or controlled by AIO.
 
Individuals
  • Mohammad Ali Jafari: Commander-in-Chief, IRGC since September 2007.
  • Javedan Mehr Toos: Procurement broker for Kalaye Electric Co. Kalaye was designated on February 16, 2007 for its affiliation with Iran’s nuclear program.
  • Mohammad Reza Naqdi: Head of IRGC Basij Resistance Force since October 2009.
  • Javad Karimi Sabet: Affiliated with the AEOI as head of Novin Energy Company.
  • Ahmad Vahidi: Iran’s Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics since September 2009.
 
Banks
  • Post Bank: Provides financial services to Bank Sepah and acts on its behalf. Bank Sepah was designated on January 9, 2007 for providing services to Iran’s nuclear program.
 
Construction, Engineering, Industry and Technology
  • Rah Sahel Institute: Owned or controlled by Khatam al-Anbya. Khatam al-Anbya was designated on October 25, 2007 for its affiliation with the IRGC. Rah Sahel has served as a contractor for Iran’s natural gas plant project in Tombak.
  • Sepanir Oil and Gas Engineering Co.: Owned or controlled by Khatam al-Anbya. Sepanir is a major contractor for Iran’s petroleum industry.
 
July 1, 2010 (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act)
This act amends the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, which requires sanctions to be imposed or waived for companies that are determined to have certain investments in Iran’s energy sector.
 
August 3, 2010 (Executive Order 13224)
 
Organizations Supporting Terrorist Organizations
  • Iranian Committee for the Reconstruction of Lebanon: Channels Iranian material and financial support for Hezbollah.
  • Imam Khomeini Relief Committee (IKRC) Lebanon Branch: Helped fund Hezbollah youth training camps to recruit future Hezbollah members and operatives. Hezbollah leaders acknowledge IKRC is funded by Iran.
 
Individuals
  • Hushang Allahdad: IRGC-Qods Force financial officer. Oversees distribution of funds to Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
  • Hossein Musavi: Qods Force General and Commander of Ansar Corps. Provides financial and material support to the Taliban.
  • Hasan Mortezavi: Qods Force Colonel. Provides financial and material support to the Taliban.
  • Mohammad Reza Zahedi: Qods Force commander in Lebanon. Acted as liaison to Hezbollah and Syrian intelligence services.
  • Hessam Khoshnevis: Director of the Iranian Committee for the Reconstruction of Lebanon. Provides financial, material, and technological support to Hezbollah.
  • Ali Zuraik: Director of the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee Lebanon branch. Provides financial and material support to Hezbollah.
  • Razi Musavi: Syria-based Iranian official. Provides financial and material support to Hezbollah.

September 29, 2010 (Executive Order 13553)
 
Human Rights abuses: Individuals
  • Mohammad Ali Jafari: Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (previous designated under E.O. 13382).
  • Sadeq Mahsouli: Minister of Welfare and Social Security, former Minister of the Interior and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces for Law Enforcement.
  • Qolam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei: Prosecutor-General of Iran, former Minister of Intelligence.
  • Saeed Mortazavi: Head of Iranian Anti-Smuggling Task Force, former Prosecutor-General of Iran.
  • Heydar Moslehi: Minister of Intelligence.
  • Mostafa Mohammad Najjar: Minister of the Interior and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces for Law Enforcement.
  • Ahmad-Reza Radan: Deputy Chief of the National Police.
  • Hossein Taeb: Deputy Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander for Intelligence, former Commander of the Basij Forces.
 
December 21, 2010
 
  • Nuclear (Executive Order 13382)
  • Bonyad Taavon Sepah: Linked to IRGC.
  • Ansar Bank: Linked to IRGC.
  • Mehr Bank: Linked to IRGC.
  • Moallem Insurance Company: Provided marine insurance to IRISL vessels.
 
Terrorism (Executive Order 13224)

Liner Transport Kish: Linked to Hezbollah and the IRGC.

 
February 17, 2011 (Executive Order 13382)
 
Banks
  • Bank Refah: Linked to MODAFL and ran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company

May 23, 2011 (Executive Order 13574)
This executive order creates further prohibitions of financial transactions with sanctioned individuals under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by CISADA.
 
November 21, 2011 (Executive Order 13590)
This executive order gives the Secretary of State authority to impose sanctions on persons that knowingly engage in a number of activities in Iran’s energy and petrochemical sectors.
 
Individuals
  • Javad Rahiqi: Linked to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).
  • Neka Novin: Linked to the AEOI.
  • Parto Sanat: Linked to the AEOI.
  • Paya Partov: Linked to the AEOI.
 
Nuclear
  • Nuclear Reactors Fuel Company: Played a role in Iran’s nuclear procurement networks.
  • Noor Afzar Gostar Company: Played a role in Iran’s nuclear procurement networks.
  • Fulmen Group: Played a role in Iran’s nuclear procurement networks.
  • Yasa Pact: Played a role in Iran’s nuclear procurement networks.
  • Modern Industries Technique Company: Linked to the AEOI.
  • Simatic: Linked to the AEOI.
  • Iran Centrifuge Technology Company: Linked to the AEOI.

December 31, 2011 (Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2012)

This act calls for sanctions on foreign financial institutions that knowingly conduct or facilitate significant financial transactions with Iran. But it also allows the U.S. government to issue 180-day waivers for countries that significantly reduce their Iranian imports. Waivers can be extended for further reductions.
 
February 6, 2012 (Executive Order 13599)
 
Banks
  • Government of Iran (and all its agencies).
  • Central Bank of Iran (and all other financial institutions).

April 23, 2012 (Executive Order 13606)
 
Human Rights abuses: Entities
  • Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps: The IRGC’s Guard Cyber Defense Command includes a special department called the Center for Inspecting Organized Crimes, which ensures the regime’s cyber security.
  • Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security: Monitored opposition activities and responsible for beatings, sexual abuse, prolonged interrogations, and coerced confessions of prisoners following the June 2009 presidential elections in Iran.
  • Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Arrested many bloggers and activists through advanced monitoring systems after the 2009 post-election protests.
  • Datak Telecom: Iranian Internet service provider. Provided information to the government on individuals trying to circumvent official Internet censorship and facilitated surveillance of emails.
 
May 1, 2012 (Executive Order 13608)

This executive order increases penalties on Iranian-sanction evaders, including restrictions on certain transactions and visa bans to the United States.
 
June 28, 2012 (Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2012)
This act allows the president to sanction foreign banks that conduct financial transactions for Iranian oil and petroleum products.
 
July 12, 2012 (Executive Order 13382 and Executive Order 13599)
 
Defense and Aerospace (Executive Order 13382)
  • Electronic Components Industries Co.: Linked to Iran Electronics Industries.
  • Information Systems Iran: Linked to Iran Electronics Industries.
  • Advanced Information and Communication Technology Center: Has provided support to Information Systems Iran.
  • Digital Media Lab and Value-Added Services Laboratory: Linked to Advanced Information and Communication Technology Center.
  • Ministry of Defense Logistics Export: Linked to the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.
  • International General Resourcing FZE: Provided material support for the Aerospace Industries Organization.
  • Malek Ashtar University: Owned or controlled by the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.
 
Shipping (Executive Order 13382)
  • Good Luck Shipping: Located in the UAE, but acts on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line (IRISL). Good Luck Shipping was established to replace Great Oceans Shipping Services, which was a designated entity by Executive Order 13382.
  • 57 vessels affiliated with IRISL and 7 vessels as blocked property in which IRISL has an interest.
 
Nuclear (Executive Order 13382)
  • Pentane Chemistry Industries: Linked to the development of Iran’s weapons of mass destruction programs.
  • Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation: Facilitates procurement and technology transfer from the science community to the military services.
 
Individuals (Executive Order 13382)
  • Hamid Reza Rabiee: Founder and current director of the Advanced Information and Communication Technology Center.
  • Daniel Frosch: Provided material support for the Aerospace Industries Organization and is the owner of International General Resourcing FZE.
  • Ali Fadavi: IRGC Navy Commander.
  • Hossein Tanideh: A procurement agent for Iran’s nuclear program through late 2011.
 
Energy (Executive Order 13599)
  • Suisse Intertrade Company SA: alleged front company for Iran's national oil company.
  • Hong Kong Intertrade Company: alleged front company for Iran's national oil company.
  • Noor Energy (Malaysia) Ltd.: alleged front company for Iran's national oil company
  • Petro Energy Intertrade Company: alleged front company for Iran's national oil company.
  • National Iranian Tanker Company: alleged front company for Iran's national oil company.
 
Preventing the Circumvention of International Sanctions (Executive Order 13599)
  • Exposing front companies involved in Iran’s oil trade.
  • 20 Iranian financial institutions.
  • 58 National Iranian Tanker Company Vessels and 27 of its affiliated entities.
 
February 6, 2013 (Executive Order 13628)
 
Cyber
  • Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB): Denied free flow of information to or from the Iranian people.
  • Ezzatollah Zarghami: Director of IRIB.
  • Iranian Cyber Police: Denied free flow of information to or from the Iranian people.
  • Communications Regulatory Authority: Denied free flow of information to or from the Iranian people.
  • Iran Electronics Industries: Denied free flow of information to or from the Iranian people. Offered services related to jamming, monitoring, and eavesdropping.
 
March 14, 2013 (Executive Order 13599)
 
Individual
Dimitris Cambis: Greek businessman who evaded sanctions through multiple shipping companies. President of Impire Shipping.
 
Entities
  • Central Insurance of Iran: For providing insurance or reinsurance to the National Iranian Tanker Company.
  • Asia Energy General Trading: Dubai
  • Kish Protection & Indemnity: Iranian
  • Polinex General Trading LLC: Dubai
  • Sima General Trading Co FZE: Dubai
  • Synergy General Trading FZE: UAE
 
Shipping
  • Blue tanker Shipping SA: Greek
  • Garbin Navigation LTD: Greek
  • Hercules International Ship: Greek
  • Hermis Shipping SA
  • Impire Shipping Company
  • Jupiter Seaways Shipping
  • Koning Marine Corp
  • Libra Shipping
  • Monsoon Shipping LTD
 
Vessels
  • Glaros Crude Oil Tanker: Liberia flag
  • Leycothea Crude Oil Tanker: Panama flag
  • Nereyda Crude Oil Tanker: Panama flag
  • Ocean Nympth Crude Oil Tanker: Panama flag
  • Ocean Performer Crude Oil Tanker: Liberia flag
  • Seagull Crude Oil Tanker: Liberia flag
  • Ulysses 1 Crude Oil Tanker: Liberia flag
  • Zap Crude Oil Tanker: Liberia flag
 
Visa Bans
  • Dimitris Cambis: President of Impire Shipping
  • Mohammad Reza Mohammadi Banaei: Managing Director of Kish Protection & Indemnity
  • Seyed Mohammad Karimi – President of Central Insurance of Iran
  • Rahim Mosaddegh – Vice President of Central Insurance of Iran
  • Mina Sadigh Noohi – Vice President of Central Insurance of Iran
  • Esmaeil Mahdavi Nia – Vice President of Central Insurance of Iran
  • Seyed Morteza Hasani Aghda – Superintendent of Central Insurance of Iran
 
April 11, 2013 (Executive Order 13882)
 
Individuals
  • Babak Morteza Zanjani
  • Madhat Mursi Al-Sayyid Umar: Deletion of Egyptian individual
 
Entities
  • Kont Kosmetik: Turkey
 
Banks
  • First Islamic Investment Bank LTD: Malaysia
  • Sorinet Commercial Trust Bankers: Dubai and Kish Island, Iran
 
Oil
  • International Safe Oil: Malaysia
 
April 30, 2013 (Counter Narcotics, Counter Terrorism, and Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations Removals)
 
Individuals deleted from Specially Designated Nationals List
  • Luz Marina Moreno Bernal: Colombia
  • Jose Ricuarte Diaz Herrera
  • Pedro Nicholas Arboleda Arroyave
  • Herbeth Gonazlo Rueda Fajardo
  • Hernan Cueca Villaraga
  • Maria Consuelo Duque Martinez
  • Tiberio Fernandez Luna
  • Jose de Jesus Naizaque Puentes
  • Luis Carlos Ramirez Suarez
  • Rosalba Vega
  • Alexander Celis Perez
  • Diego Fernando Duque Martinez
  • Norma Lucero Gamez Cifuentes
  • Stella Perez Gomez
  • Rosa Elena Pacheco
  • Hessam Khoshnevis
 
Entities deleted from Specially Designated Nationals List
  • Promotora Hotelera LTDA: Colombia
  • Comercial Promoteles
 
May 9, 2013
 
Nuclear (Executive Order 13382)
 
Entities
  • Aluminat Production and Industrial Company
  • Pars Amayesh Sanaat Kish
  • Pishro Systems Research Company
 
Individuals
  • Parviz Khaki
 
Bank (Executive Order 13882)
  • Iranian-Venezuelan Bi-National Bank

Shipping (Executive Order 13559)
  • Sambouk Shipping FZC: UAE
 
Vessels (Executive Order 13559)
  • Atlantis Crude Oil Tanker: Tanzania flag
  • Badr: Iran flag
  • Demos Crude Oil Tanker: Tanzania flag
  • Infinity Crude Oil Tanker: Tanzania flag
  • Justice Crude Oil Tanker: None/Unidentified flag
  • Skyline Crude Oil Tanker: Tanzania flag
  • Sunrise LPG Tanker: None/Unidentified flag
  • Younes Platform Supply Ship: Iran flag
 
May 15, 2013 (Executive Order 13882)
 
Nuclear
  • Al Fida International General Trading: Dubai
  • Al Hilal Exchange: Dubai
 
May 17, 2013 
 
Bank
  • Elaf Islamic Bank, Iraq: removed
 
May 23, 2013
 
Individuals
  • Masoud Bahadori
  • Farzad Bazargan
  • Ahmad Ghalebani
  • Seifollah Jashnsaz
  • Ali Mahdavi
  • Reza Mozaffarinia
  • Mahmoud Nikousokhan
  • Farhad Ali Parvaresh
  • Hashem Pouransari
  • Hossein Nosratollah Vaziri
  • Bahareh Mirza Hossein Yazdi

Entities
  • Aban Air
  • Andisheh Zolal
  • DFS Worldwide FZCO (multiple locations)
  • Energy Global International: Dubai
  • Everex Global Carrier and Cargo: Iran, Dubai, UK
  • Global Sea Line Co LTD: Singapore
  • Petro Green: Malaysia
  • Zolal Iran Company
 
May 30, 2013
 
Human Rights (Executive Order 13553)
  • Asghar Mir-Hejazi: Security Deputy of Supreme Leader, member of the Leader’s Planning Chamber, Head of Security of Supreme Leader’s Office, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Supreme Leader’s Office
 
Cyber (Executive Order 13628)
  • Committee to Determine Instances of Criminal Content
  • Ofogh Saberin Engineering Development Company
 
May 31, 2013
 
Individuals
Hamid Arabnejad
Mihael Karner (Slovenia)
Lidia Kim (Krygyzstan)
Rodrigue Elias Merhej (Lebanon)
Haji Kotwal Noorzai (Pakistan or Afghanistan, unclear)
Luis Fernando Sanchez Arellano (Mexico)
 
Entities (Executive Order 13608)
 
Entities (Executive Order 13382)
 
Entities (Executive Order 13224)
 
Oil/Nuclear (Executive Order 13599)
  • Bandar Imam Petrochemical Company
  • Bou Ali Sina Petrochemical Company
  • Jam Petrochemical Company
  • Mobin Petrochemical Company
  • Nouri Petrochemical Company
  • Pars Petrochemical Company
  • Shahid Tondgooyan Petrochemical Company
  • Shazand Petrochemical Company
  • Tabriz Petrochemical Company
  • Ferland Company Limited (Cyprus, Ukraine)
  • Krygyz Trans Avia (Krygyzstan)
  • Los Caballeros Templarios (Mexico)
  • Los Cachiros (Honduras)
  • Los Urabenos (Colombia, Honduras, Panama)
  • Niksima Food and Beverage JLT (Dubai)
  • Pryvatne Aktsionerne Tovarystvo Aviakompaniya Bukovyna (Ukraine)
  • Sirjanco Trading LLC (Dubai)
  • Ukrainian-Mediterranean Airlines
 
Aircraft
  • Pryvatne Aktsionerne Tovarystvo Aviakompaniya Bukovyna (Ukraine)
  • UR-BHJ
  • UR-BXN
  • UR-CIX
  • UR-CIY
  • UR-CJA
  • UR-CJK
  • Unknown/Unidentified Company
  • UR-CJW
  • Mahan Air
  • UR-CKF
  • UR-CKJ
  • UR-CKY
  • Ukrainian-Mediterranean Airlines
  • UC-CKX
  • UR-CKZ
 
June 3, 2013: (Executive Order13645)
 
The U.S. Treasury Department imposes sanctions on Iran’s currency, the rial.
 
June 4, 2013
 
Entities
  • The Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order: An international financial network consisting of 37 Iranian and other international companies.
 
December 12, 2013 (Executive Order 13645)
 
Individuals
  • Vitaly Sokolenko- the General Manager of Ferland Company Limited
 
Oil:
  • Mid Oil Asia
  • Singa Tankers
  • Siqiriya Maritime
  • Ferland Company Limited
 
(Executive Order 13382)
 
Individuals
  • Negin Parto Khavar
  • Iradj Mohammadi
  • Mahmoud Mahammadi Dayeni
  • Neka Novin Aliases
  • Reza Amidi
  • Fan Pardazan
  • Ertebat Gostar Novin
 
Entities
  • Eyvaz Technic Manufacturing Company
  • The Exploration and Nuclear Raw Materials Production Company
  • Maro Sanat Company
  • Navid Composite Material Company
  • Qods Aviation Industries
  • Iran Avaiation Industruis Organization
 
August 29, 2014 (WMD-related actions under Executive Order 13382)
State Department
 
Entities
  • Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research
  • Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute
  • Jahan Tech Rooyan Pars
  • Mandegar Baspar Kimiya Company
 
Treasury Department
 
Individuals
  • Muhammad Javad Imanirad
  • Arman Imanirad
  • Sazeh Morakab
  • Ali Gholami
  • Marzieh Bozorg
 
Entities
  • Naferiti Shipping
  • Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group Alias: Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company
  • Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group Alias: Ardalan Machineries Company
 
(Energy-related designations under Executive Order 13645)
 
Individuals
  • Abdelhak Kaddouri- Financial chief of U.S.-sanctioned NICO Sarl and owner and manager of U.S.-sanctioned Swiss Management Services Sarl.
  • Muzzafer Polat- Is the founder, director general, and manager of Petro Royal FZE.
  • Seyedeh Hanieh Seyed Nasser Mohammad Seyyedi- The daughter of previously designated Seyed Seyyedi, is Faylaca Petroleum’s Managing Director
 
Entities
  • Faylaca Petroleum
  • Lissome Marine Services LLC
 
(Sanctions for Material Support to the Central Bank of Iran or the Purchase or Acquisition of U.S. Dollar Bank Notes by the Government of Iran under Executive Order 13622)
 
Banks:
  • Asia Bank
(Identification of additional Iranian banks under Executive Order 13599)
 
Banks:
  • Khavarmianeh Bank
  • Ghavamin Bank
  • Gharzolhasaneh Resalat Bank
  • Kish International Bank
  • Kafolatbank         
  • (New and updated counter-terrorism-related designations under Executive Order 13224)
 
Individuals:
  • Sayyed Jabar Hosseini
 
Airlines:
  • Meraj Air
  • Caspian Air
  • Yas Air Alias: Pouya Air
 
February 6, 2014 (Executive Order 13608)
 
Individuals:
  • Pourya Nayebi
  • Houshang Hosseinpour
  • Houshang Farsoudeh
 
(Executive Order 13382)
 
Individuals:
  • Ali Canko
  • Ulrich Wippermann       
 
Entities:
  • Tiva Sanat Group
  •  Advance Electrical
  • Industrial Technologies
  • Pere Punti
  • DF Deutsche Forfait Aktiengellschaft
  • DF Deutsche Forfait Americas Inc.
 
(Executive Order 13224)
 
Entities:
  • Blue Sky Aviation Co FZE
  • Avia Trust FZE
  • Hamidreza Malekouti Pour
  • Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard
  • Gholamreza Mahmoudi
 
(Executive Order 13224)
 
Individuals:
  • Sayyed Kamal Musavi
  • Alireza Hemmati
  • Akbar Seyed Alhosseini
  • Mahmud Rashidi
 
Entities:
  • Olimzhon Adkhamovich Sadikov- Iran-based Islamic Jihad Union facilitator Olimzhon Adkhamovich Sadikov (also known as Jafar al-Uzbeki and Jafar Muidinov)
 
April 29, 2014 (Executive Order 13382)
 
Entities:
  • Al Aqili Group LLC
  • Sinotech Industry Co., Ltd.
  • MTTO Industry and Trade Limited
  • Success Move Ltd.      
  • Sinotech Dalian Carbon and Graphite Manufacturing Corporation
  • Dalian Zhongchuang Char-White Co., Ltd.
  • Karat Industry Co., Ltd.
  • Tereal Industry and Trade Limited
  • Dalian Zenghua Trading Co., Ltd.
 
Individuals: (Executive Order 13645)
  • Anwar Kamal Nizami
  • Mohamed Saeed Al Aqili
 
January 16, 2016
President Obama issued an executive order lifting sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program. Implementation Day was triggered by the U.N. nuclear watchdog’s certification that Iran has fulfilled its obligations under the nuclear agreement. As a result, Iran is to receive relief from nuclear-related U.S., E.U. and U.N. sanctions. U.S. sanctions on Iran for support for terrorism, human rights abuses, and missile activities, however, will remain in effect. The following is the full text of Obama’s executive order.
 
EXECUTIVE ORDER
- - - - - - -
REVOCATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS 13574, 13590, 13622, AND 13645 WITH RESPECT TO IRAN, AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13628 WITH RESPECT TO IRAN, AND PROVISION OF IMPLEMENTATION AUTHORITIES FOR ASPECTS OF CERTAIN STATUTORY SANCTIONS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF U.S. COMMITMENTS UNDER THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION OF JULY 14, 2015
 
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172) (50 U.S.C. 1701 note), the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-195) (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-158), the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (subtitle D of title XII of Public Law 112-239) (22 U.S.C. 8801 et seq.) (IFCA), section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,
 
I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, have determined that Iran's implementation of the nuclear-related measures specified in sections 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of July 14, 2015 (JCPOA) between the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States), the European Union, and Iran, as verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency, marks a fundamental shift in circumstances with respect to Iran's nuclear program. In order to give effect to the United States commitments with respect to sanctions described in section 4 of Annex II and section 17.4 of Annex V of the JCPOA, I am revoking Executive Orders 13574 of May 23, 2011, 13590 of November 20, 2011, 13622 of July 30, 2012, and 13645 of June 3, 2013, and amending Executive Order 13628 of October 9, 2012, by revoking sections 5 through 7 and section 15. In addition, in section 3 of this order, I am taking steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995, to provide implementation authorities for aspects of certain statutory sanctions that are outside the scope of the U.S. commitment to lift nuclear-related sanctions under the JCPOA.
 
This action is not intended to, and does not, limit the applicability of waiver determinations or any renewals thereof issued by the Secretary of State, or licenses issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, to give effect to sanctions commitments described in sections 17.1-17.3 and 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA, or otherwise affect the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, which shall remain in place, or any Executive Order issued in furtherance of that national emergency other than Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, 13628, and 13645.
 
I hereby order:
 
Section 1. Revocation of Executive Orders. The following Executive Orders are revoked:
 
(a) Executive Order 13574 of May 23, 2011 (Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as Amended);
 
(b) Executive Order 13590 of November 20, 2011 (Authorizing the Imposition of Certain Sanctions With Respect to the Provision of Goods, Services, Technology, or Support for Iran's Energy and Petrochemical Sectors);
 
(c) Executive Order 13622 of July 30, 2012 (Authorizing Additional Sanctions With Respect to Iran); and
 
(d) Executive Order 13645 of June 3, 2013 (Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 and Additional Sanctions With Respect To Iran).
 
Sec. 2. Amendment of Executive OrderExecutive Order 13628 of October 9, 2012 (Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 and Additional Sanctions with Respect to Iran), is amended by:
 
(a) Revoking current sections 5 through 7 and 15;
 
(b) Revising current section 4 by removing "section 5 of Executive Order 13622 of July 30, 2012," in subsection (a), replacing "section 12" with "section 9" in subsection (a), and replacing "section 12" with "section 9" in subsection (b);
 
(c) Revising current section 8 by inserting "and" between "2(a)," and "3(a)" and removing ", and 7(a)(iv)";
 
(d) Revising current section 9 by inserting "and" between "2(a)," and "3(a)" and removing ", and 7(a)(iv)";
 
(e) Revising current section 14 by inserting "and" between "2(a)," and "3(a)" and removing ", and 7(a)(iv)";
 
(f) Renumbering current sections 8 through 14 as sections 5 through 11, respectively; and
 
(g) Renumbering current sections 16 through 19 as sections 12 through 15, respectively.
Sec. 3. Provision of Implementation Authorities for Sanctions Outside the Scope of the JCPOA.
 
(a)(i) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to impose on a person the measures described in subsection (a)(ii) of this section upon determining, pursuant to authority delegated by the President and in accordance with the terms of such delegation, that sanctions shall be imposed on such person pursuant to section 1244(c)(1)(A) of IFCA for knowingly providing significant financial, material, technological, or other support to, or goods or services in support of any activity or transaction on behalf of or for the benefit of persons described in section 1244(c)(2)(C)(iii) of IFCA.
 
(ii) With respect to any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with this subsection to meet the criteria set forth in subsection (a)(i) of this section, all property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person (including any foreign branch) of such person are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.
 
(iii) The prohibitions in subsection (a)(ii) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the date of this order.
 
(b)(i) When the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to authority delegated by the President and in accordance with the terms of such delegation, has determined that sanctions shall be imposed on a person pursuant to sections 1244(d)(1)(A), 1245(a)(1), or 1246(a)(1) of IFCA (including in each case as informed by section 1253(c)(2) of IFCA) for engaging in transactions or activities outside the scope of the waiver determinations as to IFCA issued by the Secretary of State to give effect to sanctions commitments described in sections 17.1-17.3 and 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA, and any renewals thereof, such Secretary may select one or more of the sanctions set forth below to impose on that person, and the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall take the following actions where necessary to implement the sanctions selected and maintained by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury:
 
(A) prohibit any United States financial institution from making loans or providing credits to the sanctioned person totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-month period, unless such person is engaged in activities to relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided for such activities;
 
(B) prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States and in which the sanctioned person has any interest;
 
(C) prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and involve any interest of the sanctioned person;
 
(D) block all property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person (including any foreign branch) of the sanctioned person, and provide that such property and interests in property may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in;
 
(E) prohibit any United States person from investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a sanctioned person;
 
(F) restrict or prohibit imports of goods, technology, or services, directly or indirectly, into the United States from the sanctioned person; or
 
(G) impose on the principal executive officer or officers, or persons performing similar functions and with similar authorities, of a sanctioned person the sanctions described in subsections (b)(i)(A)-(F) of this section, as selected by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury, as appropriate.
 
(ii) The prohibitions in subsection (b)(i) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the date of this order.
 
(c)(i) All property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person (including any foreign branch) of the following persons are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in: any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with or at the recommendation of the Secretary of State:
 
(A) to have engaged, on or after January 2, 2013, in corruption or other activities relating to the diversion of goods, including agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices, intended for the people of Iran;
 
(B) to have engaged, on or after January 2, 2013, in corruption or other activities relating to the misappropriation of proceeds from the sale or resale of goods described in subsection (c)(i)(A) of this section;
 
(C) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the activities described in subsection (c)(i)(A) or (c)(i)(B) of this section or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection (c)(i) of this section; or
 
(D) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection (c)(i) of this section.
 
(ii) The prohibitions in subsection (c)(i) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the date of this order.
 
Sec. 4. DonationsI hereby determine that, to the extent section 203(b)(2) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2)) may apply, the making of donations of the types of articles specified in such section by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order would seriously impair my ability to deal with the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, and I hereby prohibit such donations as provided by subsections 3(a)(ii), 3(b)(i)(D), and 3(c)(i) of this order.
 
Sec. 5. ProhibitionsThe prohibitions in subsections 3(a)(ii), 3(b)(i)(D), and 3(c)(i) of this order include but are not limited to:
 
(a) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; and
 
(b) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
 
Sec. 6. Entry into the United StatesI hereby find that the unrestricted immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens who are determined to meet one or more of the criteria in subsections 3(a)(i) and 3(c)(i) of this order would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and I hereby suspend the entry into the United States, as immigrants or nonimmigrants, of such persons as of the date of this order. Such persons shall be treated as persons covered by section 1 of Proclamation 8693 of July 24, 2011 (Suspension of Entry of Aliens Subject to United Nations Security Council Travel Bans and International Emergency Economic Powers Act Sanctions).
 
Sec. 7. General AuthoritiesThe Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order, other than the purposes described in section 6 of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government consistent with applicable law.
 
Sec. 8. Evasion and Conspiracy(a) Any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.
 
(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.
 
Sec. 9. Definitions. For the purposes of this order:
 
(a) the term "entity" means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization;
 
(b) the term "financial institution," as used in subsection 3(b) of this order, includes:
 
(i) a depository institution (as defined in section 3(c)(1) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act) (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)(1)), including a branch or agency of a foreign bank (as defined in section 1(b)(7) of the International Banking Act of 1978) (12 U.S.C. 3101(7));
 
(ii) a credit union;
 
(iii) a securities firm, including a broker or dealer;
 
(iv) an insurance company, including an agency or underwriter; and
 
(v) any other company that provides financial services;
 
(c) the term "Government of Iran" includes the Government of Iran, any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including the Central Bank of Iran, and any person owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, the Government of Iran;
 
(d) the term "Iran" means the Government of Iran and the territory of Iran and any other territory or marine area, including the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, over which the Government of Iran claims sovereignty, sovereign rights, or jurisdiction, provided that the Government of Iran exercises partial or total de facto control over the area or derives a benefit from economic activity in the area pursuant to international arrangements;
 
(e) the term "person" means an individual or entity;
 
(f) the term "sanctioned person" means a person that the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to authority delegated by the President and in accordance with the terms of such delegation, has determined is a person on whom sanctions shall be imposed pursuant to section 1244(d)(1)(A), 1245(a)(1), or 1246(a)(1) of IFCA (including in each case as informed by section 1253(c)(2) of IFCA) for engaging in transactions or activities outside the scope of the waiver determinations as to IFCA issued by the Secretary of State to give effect to sanctions commitments described in sections 17.1-17.3 and 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA, and any renewals thereof, and on whom the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury has imposed any of the sanctions in subsection 3(b) of this order;
 
(g) the term "United States financial institution" means a financial institution as defined in subsection (b) of this section (including its foreign branches) organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States or located in the United States; and
(h) the term "United States person" means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States.
 
Sec. 10. NoticeFor those persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States, I find that because of the ability to transfer funds or other assets instantaneously, prior notice to such persons of measures to be taken pursuant to this order would render those measures ineffectual. I therefore determine that for these measures to be effective in addressing the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, there need be no prior notice of an action taken pursuant to subsection 3(a)(ii), 3(b)(i)(D), or 3(c)(i) of this order.
 
Sec. 11. Direction to AgenciesAll agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order.
 
Sec. 12. RightsThis order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
 
Sec. 13. Effect on Actions or ProceedingsPursuant to section 202 of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1622), the revocation of Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645 and the amendments to Executive Order 13628 as set forth in sections 1 and 2 of this order, shall not affect any action taken or proceeding pending not finally concluded or determined as of the date of this order, or any action or proceeding based on any act committed prior to the date of this order, or any rights or duties that matured or penalties that were incurred prior to the date of this order.
 
Sec. 14. Relationship to Algiers AccordsThe measures taken pursuant to this order are in response to actions of the Government of Iran occurring after the conclusion of the 1981 Algiers Accords, and are intended solely as a response to those later actions.
 
 

December 1, 2016

President Obama allowed the Iran Sanctions Extension Act without his signature after it passed 99-0 in the Senate. Senate Republicans initially sought a wider-ranging bill to sanction Iran recent ballistic missile tests. Democrats countered that they would only support an extension of the law originally passed in 1996. Supporters of the legislation from both parties said the extension would allow Washington to quickly re-instate sanctions if Tehran violates the 2015 nuclear deal.

 

February 3, 2017

The U.S. Treasury announced new sanctions on 13 individuals and 12 entities for supporting Iran’s ballistic missile program and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). “Iran’s continued support for terrorism and development of its ballistic missile program poses a threat to the region, to our partners worldwide, and to the United States,” said John E. Smith, acting director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control. The new sanctions come less than a week after Iran tested a medium-range ballistic missile. Washington condemned the launch and officially put Iran “on notice” on February 1. National Security Advisor Flynn added on February 3 that the “international community has been too tolerant of Iran’s bad behavior.”

 

March 17, 2017

The U.S. State Department sanctioned two Bahrainis with ties to Iran for supporting terrorism. One was affiliated with the al Ashtar Brigades, which has received funding and support from the Iranian government and carried out attacks in Bahrain. Iran’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Bahram Qassemi, however, dismissed the allegations as political. In the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring protests, Shiite Bahrainis held mass demonstrations against the Sunni-dominated government.

 

March 21, 2017

The United States imposed sanctions on 11 entities and individuals for “transfers of sensitive items to Iran’s ballistic missile program.” Washington considers Tehran’s missile program a threat to regional security. Since Iran tested a medium-range ballistic missile in January 2017, the U.S. Treasury has also sanctioned individuals and entities for supporting the program. The latest measures were part of a wider move under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act. 

 

May 17, 2017

The Treasury Department blacklisted three individuals and four entities, including a China-based network, for supporting Iran’s ballistic missile program. The Treasury Department worked in conjunction with the State Department, which released a semi-annual report to Congress on Iran’s human rights abuses. On the same day, President Trump clarified that the United States would not pursue efforts to reduce Iran’s sale of crude oil, consistent with U.S. commitments as part of the nuclear deal. 

 

July 18, 2017

The State Department announced new sanctions on “18 entities and individuals supporting Iran’s ballistic missile program and for supporting Iran’s military procurement or Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as well as an Iran-based transnational criminal organization and associated persons.” Additionally, the Treasury Department “designated seven entities and five individuals for engaging in activities in support of Iran’s military procurement or the IRGC, as well as an Iran-based transnational criminal organization and three associated persons.”

 

August 2, 2017

President Trump signed a bipartisan bill imposing sanctions on Iran and Russia. It also increased the President’s ability to sanction individuals connected to North Korea. Congress had voted overwhelmingly to pass the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, which includes a provision known as the Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017. The bill directs the President to impose sanctions against Iran’s ballistic missile or WMD programs, the sale or transfer to Iran of military equipment or related technical or financial assistance, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The bill passed through the House of Representatives on July 25 with a 419-3 vote. On July 27, the Senate voted 97-2 in favor of the bill.

 

September 14, 2017

The U.S. Treasury sanctioned 11 entities and individuals for supporting Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps or networks responsible for cyber-attacks against the United States. “These sanctions target an Iranian company providing material support to the IRGC’s ballistic missile program, airlines that support the transport of fighters and weapons into Syria, and hackers who execute cyber-attacks on American financial institutions,” said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. The move by the Treasury Department came on the same day that the administration extended sanctions waivers for Iran as part of the nuclear deal.

 

November 20, 2017

The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned a wide network of individuals of entities that were helping Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Qods Force “counterfeit currency to support its destabilizing activities.” The U.S. government has accused the Qods Force of meddling in the affairs of Iran’s neighbors and supporting terror. 

 

January 4, 2018

The U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned five Iran-based entities for ties to the country's ballistic missile program. The United States said the organizations were owned or controlled by an industrial firm responsible for developing and producing Iran's solid-propellant ballistic missiles. The sanctions froze any U.S. property the entities hold and prohibited Americans from engaging with them.

 

January 12, 2018

The United States took an increasingly hard stance on Tehran’s human rights violations and its controversial missile program. The decision followed widespread protests in Iran over economic hardships in which more than 3,000 were arrested and at least 22 were killed. In an unprecedented move, the Treasury sanctioned the head of Iran’s judiciary, Sadegh Amoli Larijani, along with 13 others in connection with human rights abuses and censorship or weapons proliferation. In a briefing, a senior administration official said that the designations go to the top of the regime and are intended to send a strong message that the United States will not tolerate Iran’s continued violations of the rights of its citizens.

 

March 23, 2018

The United States issued sanctions and criminal indictments against an Iranian hacker network that targeted hundreds of U.S. and foreign universities, dozens of U.S. companies and government agencies and the United Nations. The U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned one Iranian entity and 10 individuals for theft of intellectual property and data. The Department of Justice indicted nine Iranians for conducting a massive cyber theft campaign on behalf of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

"The IRGC outsourced cyber intrusions to The Mabna Institute, a hacker network that infiltrated hundreds of universities to steal sensitive data," said Treasury Under Secretary Sigal Mandelker. “We will not tolerate the theft of U.S. intellectual property, or intrusions into our research institutions and universities." It is one of the largest state-sponsored hacking campaigns ever prosecuted by the Justice Department. 

 

May 10, 2018

The United States and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) moved to disrupt an extensive currency exchange network that helped fund Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force (IRGC-QF), the elite unit responsible for operations abroad. The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned nine Iranian individuals and entities. “The Treasury Department thanks the UAE for its close collaboration on this matter. Countries around the world must be vigilant against Iran’s efforts to exploit their financial institutions to exchange currency and fund the nefarious actors of the IRGC-QF and the world’s largest state sponsor of terror,” said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. 

 

May 15, 2018

The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned four individuals and one bank for moving millions of dollars on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to the Lebanese militia and political movement Hizballah. One of the individuals was Valiollah Seif, Iran’s Central Bank Governor. Seif “covertly funneled millions of dollars on behalf of the IRGC-QF through Iraq-based al-Bilad Islamic Bank to enrich and support the violent and radical agenda of Hizballah,” said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. The bank and individuals were branded Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Seif has faced criticism from Iranian lawmakers, including calls for his dismissal, for not preventing the devaluation of the rial in April 2018. 

 

May 16, 2018

The U.S. Treasury Department partnered with seven member states of the Terrorist Financing and Targeting Center to designate Hezbollah senior leadership, including Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. “Under the dictates of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), Secretary General and head of the Shura Council Hasan Nasrallah is prolonging the human suffering in Syria, fueling the violence in Iraq and Yemen, putting the Lebanese state and the Lebanese people at risk, and destabilizing the entire region," said Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin. 

 

May 17, 2018

The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Hezbollah's financing network, its third action in a week against individuals with ties to Iran and its Central Bank. The Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Hezbollah financier Mohammad Ibrahim Bazzi and his Iranian representative Abdallah Safi al Din. “This action highlights the duplicity and disgraceful conduct of Hizballah and its Iranian backers.  Despite Nasrallah’s claims, Hizballah uses financiers like Bazzi who are tied to drug dealers, and who launder money to fund terrorism,” Secretary Mnuchin said.

 

May 22, 2018

The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned five Iranians for providing ballistic missile-related technical expertise or transferring weapons to the Houthis, a Zaydi Shiite movement that has been fighting Yemen’s Sunni-majority government since 2004. The five individuals were associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force, an elite unit responsible for operations outside of Iran.

 

May 24, 2018

The Treasury Department designated nine individuals and entities that were procuring "export-controlled, U.S.-origin goods for sanctioned Iranian airlines." The sanctions also targeted procurement networks based in Turkey. "The deceptive practices these airlines employ to illegally obtain services and U.S. goods is yet another example of the duplicitous ways in which the Iranian regime has operated," said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. This was the second set of sanctions issued since Secretary of State Pompeo threatend to apply severe economic and military pressure on Tehran if it did not make sweeping changes in its foreign and nuclear policies. 

 

May 30, 2018

The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned three Iranian entities and six individuals for committing human rights abuses and censorship activities on behalf of Iran's government. “Iran not only exports terrorism and instability across the world, it routinely violates the rights of its own people," said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. "The Iranian regime diverts national resources that should belong to the people to fund a massive and expensive censorship apparatus and suppress free speech.” 

 

June 27, 2018

The U.S. Treasury issued updated guidance on Iran sanctions related to the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) revoked two general licenses, including the one that had allowed the export of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran. 

 

July 9, 2018

The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Mahan Travel and Tourism Sdn Bhd, a Malaysia-based sales agent that worked for, or on behalf of, Mahan Air, a blacklisted airline. “Mahan Air is the airline of choice for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force, facilitating its support to terrorism across the Middle East,” said Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin. “Our action against an independent company providing General Sales Agent services to Mahan makes clear to all in the aviation industry that they urgently need to sever all ties and distance themselves immediately from this airline.” 

 

July 10, 2018

The U.S. State Department designated al Ashtar Brigades (AAB), an Iran-backed group committed to overthrowing Bahrain’s government, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. As a result, the all of AAB’s property and interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction were blocked. “From Africa, Europe, North America, Asia, and the Gulf, Iran is using terrorist proxies to extend its malevolent influence and upend international peace and stability. Al-Ashtar is yet another in a long line of Iranian sponsored terrorists who kill on behalf of a corrupt regime. Today’s designation serves notice that the United States sees plainly what Iran is trying to do to Bahrain through its proxy, the terrorist group Al-Ashtar,” said Coordinator for Counterterrorism Nathan A. Sales. 

 

August 6, 2018

President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order reimposing sanctions on Iran. The move was consistent with his May 8 announcement of the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal and the reimposition of nuclear-related sanctions. “These actions include reimposing sanctions on Iran’s automotive sector and on its trade in gold and precious metals, as well as sanctions related to the Iranian rial,” Trump said. He urged all nations “to make clear that the Iranian regime faces a choice: either change its threatening, destabilizing behavior and reintegrate with the global economy, or continue down a path of economic isolation.” The measures will take effect on August 7, while the rest of the sanctions will be reimposed on November 5. The remaining sanctions will be more biting since they target Iran’s lucrative oil exports and transactions by foreign financial institutions with the Central Bank of Iran. 

President Trump also emphasized his willingness to negotiate a new deal with Iran. “As we continue applying maximum economic pressure on the Iranian regime, I remain open to reaching a more comprehensive deal that addresses the full range of the regime’s malign activities, including its ballistic missile program and its support for terrorism,” he said. 

 

September 14, 2018

The U.S. Treasury sanctioned Thailand-based My Aviation Company Limited for acting for or on behalf of Mahan Air, an Iranian airline previously blacklisted for support for terrorism. “Treasury is cutting off yet another service provider acting on behalf of Mahan Air, a sanctioned airline that transports soldiers and supplies to [Syrian President Bashar] Assad and fuels terrorist activities across the region,” said Secretary of the Treasury Steven T. Mnuchin. Mahan Air was designated in October 2011 for providing financial, material, or technological support for or to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force, which is responsible for operations abroad. 

 

October 16, 2018

The U.S. Treasury sanctioned a network of 20 businesses for providing financial support to the Basij Resistance Force, a paramilitary under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). “The Bonyad Taavon Basij network is an example of how the IRGC and Iranian military forces have expanded their economic involvement in major industries, and infiltrated seemingly legitimate businesses to fund terrorism and other malign activities. This vast network provides financial infrastructure to the Basij’s efforts to recruit, train, and indoctrinate child soldiers who are coerced into combat under the IRGC’s direction,” said Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin. 

 

October 23, 2018

The U.S. Treasury sanctioned nine individuals associated with the Taliban, including Iranian supporters. The United States acted in partnership with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, the other member states of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC), established in mid-2017. “The TFTC has again demonstrated its tremendous value to international security by disrupting and exposing key Taliban members who are involved in suicide attacks, and other lethal activities.  We are also targeting key Iranian sponsors providing financial and material support to the Taliban,” said Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin. “Iran’s provision of military training, financing, and weapons to the Taliban is yet another example of Tehran’s blatant regional meddling and support for terrorism,” he added.  

 

November 5, 2018

The U.S. Treasury reimposed sanctions on Iran that had been lifted or waived in January 2016 under the nuclear deal. The Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned more than 700 individuals, entities, aircraft, and vessels — its largest ever single-day action targeting the Iranian regime. The targets included banks, including Iran’s Central Bank, the Iranian oil company, and many other key economic actors. “Treasury’s imposition of unprecedented financial pressure on Iran should make clear to the Iranian regime that they will face mounting financial isolation and economic stagnation until they fundamentally change their destabilizing behavior. Iran’s leaders must cease support for terrorism, stop proliferating ballistic missiles, end destructive regional activities, and abandon their nuclear ambitions immediately if they seek a path to sanctions relief,” said Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin. 

 

November 13, 2018

The U.S. State Department offered rewards of up to five million dollars each for information on one Hamas leader and two Lebanese Hezbollah leaders. Both groups have received weapons, training and funding from Tehran for years. Hamas leader Salih al Aruri “is currently living freely in Lebanon, where he is reportedly is working with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force,” said Assistant Secretary of Diplomatic Security Mike Evanoff at a press briefing. The first wanted Hezbollah member, Khalil Yusif Mahmoud Harb, is an advisor to the group’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah. The second member, Haytham Ali Tabatabai, is a key military leader who commanded Hezbollah special forces in both Syria and Yemen. “The actions we’re announcing today are one more step in our campaign to build the toughest sanctions regime ever imposed on Iran. More sanctions are coming, and they will continue until Iran and its proxies change their behavior,” said Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism Nathan Sales.

On the same day, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned four Hezbollah-affiliated individuals who coordinate the group's activities in Iraq. ““Treasury’s concerted actions aim to deny Hezbollah’s clandestine attempts to exploit Iraq to launder funds, procure weapons, train fighters, and collect intelligence as a proxy for Iran,” said Sigal Mandelker, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. 

 

November 20, 2018

The U.S Treasury sanctioned six individuals and three entities for providing millions of barrels of oil to the Syrian regime. The Office of Foreign Assets Control said that Russia facilitated the delivery of Iranian oil to Syria. The Assad government then transferred money to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force, which forwarded funds to Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas. “Central Bank of Iran officials continue to exploit the international financial system, and in this case even used a company whose name suggests a trade in humanitarian goods as a tool to facilitate financial transfers supporting this oil scheme,” said Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin. “Today’s sanctions, in conjunction with economic, diplomatic, and other strategic initiatives, are part of the U.S. government’s long-term maximum pressure campaign to counter the Iranian regime’s influence and destabilizing regional activities, to deny it the funds it uses to bankroll terrorist and militant proxies, and to secure the removal of all Iranian forces from Syria,” the State Department added.

 

March 5, 2019

On March 5, the U.S. State Department and Treasury sanctioned Harakat al Nujaba, an Iran-backed militia in Iraq, and its leader, Akram Abbas al Kabi. The State Department designated them as Specially Designated Global Terrorists. “These designations demonstrate the United States’ unwavering commitment to isolate and deny funding to the Iranian regime’s terrorist proxies,” said the State Department.

 

March 22, 2019

The U.S. State Department and Treasury sanctioned 31 Iranian entities and individuals linked to the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, also known by its Persian acronym, SPND. The organization was founded by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who allegedly headed Iran’s pre-2004 nuclear weapons program, in 2011. “SPND has employed as many as 1500 individuals – including numerous researchers associated with the Amad plan, who continue to carry out dual-use research and development activities, of which aspects are potentially useful for nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery systems,” according to the State Department. The designations serve as a “warning to individuals and entities considering dealing with the Iranian regime’s defense sector in general, and SPND in particular: by engaging in sanctionable activity with designated Iranian persons, you risk professional, personal, and financial isolation,” said the Treasury.

 

March 26, 2016

The United States sanctioned a network of front companies that evaded U.S. sanctions to provide support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran’s Ministry and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). “With this action today we are increasing our pressure even further on the Iranian regime,” said the Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook. 

The Treasury Department designated 25 individuals and entities, including a network of companies based in Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey, for transferring over a billion dollars and euros to the IRGC and MODAFL as well as procuring millions of dollars’ worth of vehicles for MODAFL. “The IRGC, MODAFL, and other malign actors in Iran continue to exploit the international financial system to evade sanctions, while the regime funds terrorism and other destabilizing activities across the region,” said Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin.

 

April 8, 2019

The United States announced the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), effective April 15. The IRGC is Iran’s most powerful military and security organization as well as a key economic player. “This unprecedented step, led by the Department of State, recognizes the reality that Iran is not only a State Sponsor of Terrorism, but that the IRGC actively participates in, finances, and promotes terrorism as a tool of statecraft,” said President Donald Trump. He noted that it was the “first time that the United States has ever named part of another government as a FTO.” In response, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council designated U.S. Central Command forces as terrorists and the U.S. as a “sponsor of terrorism.”

 

April 22, 2019

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States will stop providing sanctions exemptions to countries that import Iranian oil. “We will continue to apply maximum pressure on the Iranian regime until its leaders change their destructive behavior, respect the rights of the Iranian people, and return to the negotiating table,” said Pompeo. He noted that oil sales account for up to 40 percent of Iran’s revenue. The Trump administration's stated goal is to bring Iranian exports down to zero. 

Eight countries received exemptions in November, which will expire on May 2. Three countries – Greece, Italy and Taiwan – have already reduced their Iranian imports to zero. China, India, Turkey, Japan, and South Korea will need to do the same or risk running afoul of U.S. sanctions. 

 

May 3, 2019

The State Department outlined a new list of sanctionable actions related to Iran’s nuclear program. Washington warned that “assistance to expand Iran’s Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant beyond the existing reactor unit will be exposed to sanctions.” Additionally, “any involvement in transferring enriched uranium out of Iran in exchange for natural uranium will now be exposed to sanctions.” The restrictions are the latest expression of the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure campaign” to change Iran’s behavior and persuade it to negotiate a new agreement that would address its nuclear and missile programs, human rights abuses, support for terror, and other issues.

The United States, however, will permit certain ongoing nonproliferation projects to continue “for a renewable duration of 90 days.” For example, the Arak reactor is currently being redesigned to ensure that it cannot produce weapons-grade plutonium. 

 

May 8, 2019

President Donald Trump signed an executive order to impose sanctions on Iran’s iron, steel, aluminum, and copper sectors. The White House statement noted that those metals are “the regime’s largest non-petroleum-related sources of export revenue,” some 10 percent. The metals and mining industry has historically been an important source of employment as well. As of January 2018, some 620,000 people were working in the sector, according to the Boston-based consultancy Arthur D. Little. In May 2019, the Associated Press published a breakdown of the industry: steel mills employ some 50,000 workers, steel exports have been on the rise for more than five years, and metal-related industries employ about 2.2 million workers or 10 percent of the workforce, according to a report by Iran’s parliament. Trump warned that “Tehran can expect further actions unless it fundamentally alters its conduct.”

 

June 7, 2019

The U.S. Treasury sanctioned Iran’s largest petrochemical holding group, Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (PGPIC), for supporting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The U.S. had designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization on April 8. The Office of Foreign Assets Control said that PGPIC provided financial support to Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, the engineering arm of the IRGC. The PGPIC conglomerate manages 40 percent of Iran’s petrochemical production capacity and accounts for 50 percent of Iran’s total petrochemical exports. The Treasury also sanctioned 39 of PGPIC’s subsidiary petrochemical companies and foreign-based sales agents. “By targeting this network we intend to deny funding to key elements of Iran’s petrochemical sector that provide support to the IRGC,” said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. “This action is a warning that we will continue to target holding groups and companies in the petrochemical sector and elsewhere that provide financial lifelines to the IRGC.” 

 

June 12, 2019

The U.S. Treasury sanctioned an Iraqi company, South Wealth Resources Company (SWRC), for trafficking hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of weapons to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force. The United States had designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization on April 8. The Qods Force is an elite branch of the IRGC responsible for foreign operations and often serves as the link between proxy forces and Tehran.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control said that SWRC and two of its Iraqi associates, who were also sanctioned, had covertly facilitated Qods Force access to the Iraqi financial system to evade U.S. sanctions. The Treasury said the company’s smuggling network also benefited previously-sanctioned Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, an Iraqi advisor to Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani. “Treasury is taking action to shut down Iranian weapons smuggling networks that have been used to arm regional proxies of the IRGC Qods Force in Iraq, while personally enriching regime insiders,” said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. “The Iraqi financial sector and the broader international financial system must harden their defenses against the continued deceptive tactics emanating from Tehran in order to avoid complicity in the IRGC’s ongoing sanctions evasion schemes and other malign activities.” 

 

June 24, 2019

President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order imposing sanctions on the office of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. “The Supreme Leader of Iran is one who ultimately is responsible for the hostile conduct of the regime. He is respected within his country. His office oversees the regime’s most brutal instruments,” said Trump. The designation was a significant escalation in tensions between Washington and Tehran. 

But Trump also held out the prospect of diplomacy. “America is a peace-loving nation. We do not seek conflict with Iran or any other country. I look forward to the day when sanctions can be finally lifted and Iran can become a peaceful, prosperous, and productive nation. That can go very quickly; it can be tomorrow. It can also be in years from now,” he said. “So I look forward to discussing whatever I have to discuss with anybody that wants to speak.”

After Trump signed the Executive Order, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin announced sanctions on eight senior commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). He said the move would lock up billions of dollars in Iranian assets and affect others in the chain of command. Mnuchin charged that the commanders “are responsible for the Iranian regime’s provocative attacks orchestrated in internationally recognized waters and airspace, as well as Iran’s malign activities in Syria.” Mnuchin added that the Treasury was preparing to designate Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif later in the week. The announcements followed the downing of a U.S. surveillance drone by Iran on June 20 and attacks on tankers in May and June that Washington attributed to Iranian forces. 

 

July 18, 2019

The U.S. Treasury sanctioned seven companies and five individuals linked to an international procurement network that provided Iran with sensitive materials for its nuclear program. The companies and individuals designated were based in Iran, Belgium, and China. The Treasury said the network provided Iran’s Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) with materials needed to produce centrifuges for Tehran’s uranium enrichment program. “Treasury is taking action to shut down an Iranian nuclear procurement network that leverages Chinese- and Belgium-based front companies to acquire critical nuclear materials and benefit the regime’s malign ambitions.  Iran cannot claim benign intent on the world stage while it purchases and stockpiles products for centrifuges,” said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin.  “The U.S. government is deeply concerned by the Iranian regime’s uranium enrichment and other provocative behaviors, and will continue to target all who provide support to Iran’s nuclear program.”

 

July 31, 2019

The U.S. Treasury sanctioned Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif for acting on behalf of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The United States had already designated Khamenei on June 24. The Treasury accused Zarif of implementing the regime’s “reckless agenda” by disseminating its propaganda throughout the world. In a statement, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said, "Iran’s Foreign Ministry is not merely the diplomatic arm of the Islamic Republic but also a means of advancing many of the Supreme Leader’s destabilizing policies."

 

August 28, 2019

The U.S. Treasury sanctioned two procurement networks linked to the Iranian regime and its military organizations. The designation included two Iranian men and several companies accused of providing ten million dollars of materials for Tehran’s WMD program. One network used a front company in Hong Kong to evade sanctions and obtain U.S. technology and components for individuals connected to the Iranian regime and IRGC. The second network procured aluminum alloy products for companies controlled by Iran’s defense ministry. “As the Iranian regime attempts to use complex schemes to hide its efforts to bolster its WMD program, the U.S. government will continue to thwart them at every turn," said Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Sigal Mandelker. "We urge governments worldwide to recognize the extraordinary lengths to which the regime in Tehran will go to conceal its behavior, and to ensure that their companies and financial institutions are not facilitating Iran's proliferation activities.”

 

August 29, 2019

The U.S. Treasury sanctioned four individuals responsible for transferring tens of millions of dollars between Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hamas in Gaza. Muhammad Sarur, Kamal Abdelrahman Aref Awad, Fawaz Mahmud Ali Nasser, and Muhammad Kamal are accused of funneling money to Hamas’s operational arm, Izz-Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades, through Hezbollah’s sanctioned bank, Bayt al-Mal. “These facilitators funneled tens of millions of dollars from Iran’s Qods Force through Hizballah in Lebanon to HAMAS for terrorist attacks originating from the Gaza Strip.  HAMAS’s continued violent campaign against innocent civilians and the state of Israel is to the great detriment of the people in Gaza,” said Sigal Mandelker, Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.  “This Administration will not falter to hold HAMAS and its Iranian leaders accountable for their violence.  Treasury will continue to disrupt terrorist networks by targeting those who generate funds to carry out the Iranian regime’s violent agenda.”

 

September 3, 2019

The United States imposed new sanctions on Iran’s space program for supporting ballistic missile development. The move came after Iran’s failed attempt to launch a space vehicle on August 29. “Iran’s civilian space launch vehicle program allows it to gain experience with various technologies necessary for development of an ICBM – including staging, ignition of upper-stage engines, and control of a multiple-stage missile throughout flight,” warned the State Department. The United States sanctioned the Iran Space Agency and two of its research institutes. “These designations should serve as a warning to the international scientific community that collaborating with Iran’s space program could contribute to Tehran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon delivery system,” said Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

 

September 3, 2019

The U.S. Treasury sanctioned the Iranian oil tanker, the Adrian Darya-1, which it accused of transporting 2.1 million barrels of Iranian crude oil on behalf of the IRGC. The ship, formerly named the Grace 1, was detained by Britain off the coast of Gibraltar on July 4 for attempting to smuggle oil to Syria in violation of E.U. sanctions. Treasury also designated the ship’s captain, Akhilesh Kumar, for providing support to a terrorist organization. “Vessels like the Adrian Darya 1 enable the IRGC-QF to ship and transfer large volumes of oil, which they attempt to mask and sell illicitly to fund the regime’s malign activities and propagate terrorism,” said Sigal Mandelker, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. “Anyone providing support to the Adrian Darya 1 risks being sanctioned.  The path to relief is to change course and not allow the IRGC-QF to profit from illicit oil sales.”

 

September 4, 2019

The U.S. Treasury designated an “oil for terror” network accused of aiding the IRGC in funding its terrorist operations. The network consisted of 25 entities and individuals and 11 vessels involved in hundreds of millions of dollars in illicit oil sales. Brian Hook, the U.S. special envoy for Iran, said the United States would offer up to $15 million for any information that disrupts IRGC financial operations. “Today’s announcement is historic. It’s the first time that the United States has offered a reward for information that disrupts a government entity’s financial operations,” Hook said. “We have taken this step because the IRGC operates more like a terrorist organization than it does a government.”

 

September 20, 2019

President Trump announced sanctions on Iran’s central bank. “We’ve never done it at this level,” he told reporters in the Oval Office. “It’s too bad what’s happening with Iran. It’s going to hell.” Trump added, “They are broke and they could solve the problem very easily. All they have to do is stop with the terror.” Trump had directed the Treasury to increase sanctions on Iran following the September 14 drone and cruise missile strike on Saudi oil facilities, which Washington blamed on Tehran. Iran denied involvement.

The United States also sanctioned the National Development Fund of Iran and Etemad Tejarate Pars Co., which allegedly conceals financial transfers for military purchases. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said the measures would cut off Tehran’s last remaining source of funds. “Iran’s Central Bank and the National Development Fund were ostensibly intended to safeguard the welfare of the Iranian people, but have been used instead by this corrupt regime to move Iran’s foreign currency reserves for terrorist proxies,” he said. 

 

This chapter was originally published in 2010, and is updated as of September 2019. Garrett Nada, managing editor of The Iran Primer, and Alex Yacoubian, a program assistant at the U.S. Institute of Peace, contributed to this chapter as well.