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Biden on Iran

The following are excerpts from a speech by Vice President Joe Biden to the Rabbinical Assembly convention in Atlanta on May 8, 2012:

"We will prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon by whatever means we need..."

“There remains space for diplomacy. The window has not closed in terms of the ability of the Israelis, if they choose on their own, to act militarily.  But diplomacy backed by serious, serious sanctions and pressure to succeed, though, as the president's clearly stated -- on that score, the window is closing in the near term. This cannot go on forever…"

On Europe's embargo on oil imports from Iran, due to begin July 1 "[it] will have a devastating impact on the Iranian economy and force them to think even harder."

"We're not doing anything but tightening the screws…Unless Iran changes course, the pressure will keep increasing…"

"As the president has made clear, we take no option off the table as part of our determination to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.."

"By going the extra diplomatic mile, presenting Iran with a clear choice, we demonstrated to the region and to the world that Iran is the problem, not the United States.  That's why China, that's why Europe, that's why the rest of the world has joined us in these sanctions…"

"When we took office, there was virtually no international pressure on Iran…We were the problem. We were diplomatically isolated in the world, in Europe ... By presenting Iran with a clear choice, we demonstrated that Iran is the problem, not the United States. That's why China, Europe, Russia, the rest of the world has joined us in these sanctions..."

"The purpose of this pressure is not punishment, it's to convince Iran that the price, and it's an overwhelming price to be paid for pursuing nuclear weapons capability, that the price is too high..."
 

Ties Grow Between Iran and China

The following is an excerpt from a new report by Alireza Nader and Scott Harold entitled “China and Iran: Economic, Political, and Military Relations” issued May 3, 2012 by the Rand Corporation. The full link is at the bottom.

 
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s possible pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability presents a serious challenge to U.S. interests in the Middle East. The U.S. strategy to dissuade Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability has relied heavily on international sanctions, in addition to diplomatic engagement with the Islamic Republic.
 
No other country is as critical in this effort as the People’s Republic of China. Winning China’s cooperation on sanctions has been difficult, in large part due to the broad and deep partnership between China and Iran. In the past decade, China has become Iran’s number one trading partner. Collaboration between Beijing and Tehran centers on China’s energy needs and Iran’s abundant resources but also includes significant non-energy economic ties, arms sales and defense cooperation, and geostrategic balancing against the United States.
 
Understanding the nature and range of Chinese-Iranian cooperation is important to crafting a successful U.S. strategy toward Iran. China’s policies have hampered U.S. and international efforts to shape Iran’s decisions on its nuclear program, and continued ChineseIranian cooperation will hinder U.S. attempts to pressure Iran.
 
The United States has limited options to influence China’s relationship with Iran. Some observers have proposed that the United States use positive inducements to reduce Chinese cooperation with Iran, such as significantly enhancing bilateral relations with China or trading key U.S. interests. However, these policy moves would involve costly trade-offs and are probably politically unfeasible. The United States could also use negative inducements, such as sanctions against Chinese firms, though such measures are also of limited use given China’s economic power. A third approach has been to build a broad international sanctions coalition against Iran, which has raised the diplomatic pressure on China to stop doing business with Iran but increased Iran’s incentive to reach out to Beijing. While China may decrease business ties with Iran, it will nevertheless continue to see Iran as a central actor shaping Chinese interests in the Middle East. The increasing U.S.-Chinese competition in the Pacific region will also have a direct impact on China’s willingness to cooperate with the United States on Iran.
 
Nevertheless, China and Iran face divergent interests across a number of issues, which could provide opportunities to contain their growing relationship. While some in China see value in leveraging Iran to tie the U.S. down strategically, China is generally reluctant to embrace Iran too tightly for fear of precipitating an open break in ties between China and the United States. Many Iranians perceive China to be exploiting Iran economically while backing an increasingly brutal and repressive regime.
 
Finally, neither country is destined to remain an authoritarian state forever. Democratic forces in either country could precipitate the emergence of regimes less hostile to the United States—a more democratic Iran that may not pursue nuclear weapons or a China less interested in balancing against the United States. Given that such changes may be far in the future, the United States should continue to forestall an Iranian nuclear weapons capability and pressure China to reduce ties to Iran.
 

 

Alireza Nader, coauthor of Coping with a Nuclearizing Iran (RAND, 2011), is a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit institution that improves policy and decision-making through research and analysis.

Tags: China, Reports

Gulf Considers Political Union to Handle Iran and Arab Spring

Caroline Crouch

The six oil-rich sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf are now considering political federation to unify their foreign and defense policies. The move, originally proposed last December by Saudi King Abdullah, is a response to growing regional challenges over the past 18 months, including from Iran, Sunni-Shiite tensions in little Bahrain, and the Arab uprisings.
 
On April 28, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal said the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman—will discuss details of a “federation” at a May 14 summit in Riyadh.  The first step reportedly may be a federation between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
 
"Cooperation and coordination between the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council in its current format may not be enough to confront the existing and coming challenges, which require developing Gulf action into an acceptable federal format," the Saudi foreign minister said in a speech delivered on his behalf at a GCC youth event.
 
The GCC was created in 1981 in response to the 1979 Iranian Revolution and outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980. Its original goals were greater cooperation in defense, finance, trade and scientific research.  But deep divisions among the GCC sheikdoms have often undercut unity projects. In 2009, a proposal to create a common currency failed when the United Arab Emirates withdrew its support.  
 
F. Gregory Gause is chair of the University of Vermont’s political science department and author of The International Relations of the Persian Gulf.  The following is an interview in which he analyzed the motives, impact and obstacles to a GCC federation:
 
Why are the six sheikhdoms in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) talking about a political union or federation?  And why now?
 
 This is clearly a reaction to the events of the Arab Spring more generally and the upheaval in Bahrain specifically.  It can be seen in a general context of GCC fears about the growth of Iranian power in the wake of the Iraq War, but the real driver here is Bahrain specifically and the upheavals of 2011 generally.  We should note that all six are not talking with equal enthusiasm about the idea of union or federation.  This is very much a Saudi-driven idea and the Bahraini government is its most enthusiastic supporter.  The other states do not seem as committed.
 
How feasible is a political union, given the history of differences among the Gulf countries?  What are the obstacles? And what is the proposed timeframe—given that the GCC was formed in 1981 and still is not completely coordinated on defense capabilities?
 
It is very unlikely that the governments of Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE or Oman would give up any real sovereign power, even if they agreed to a federation.  The most likely "constitutional" change would be a coordinating foreign and defense policy committee, with an eye (by the Saudis) to replicating the European Union experiment of a "common foreign and defense policy" and a single representative (like Lady Ashton, but it would be a man) of that policy. 
 
But the EU has had its own problems here, and the GCC would too.  Each state has a bilateral relationship with its most important security partner, the United States, and that would not change.  Qatar's leaders are unlikely to give up their regional ambitions and submerge them in a Saudi-led effort for long.  Right now, all the GCC states are basically on the same page -- worried about Iran, supportive of regime change in Syria, looking for a soft landing in Yemen.  But that might not last forever. 
 
It is entirely possible that there will be some announcement about a federation or union plan at the next GCC meeting, but actual implementation would be far down the road.  The organization is having lots of trouble coordinating on a common currency.  It would have equal troubles implementing a real common foreign and defense policy.
 
What would a political union or federation look like? Is there a model elsewhere in the world? Is this potentially an equivalent of the European Union?  How might a Gulf union differ from other regional alliances, such as the Arab League and OPEC?
 
It would differ from the Arab League in that there would be fewer members and thus it would be easier to reach unanimity and take actions.  It would be different from OPEC in that it would tackle a range of issues, and not be concentrated on just one.  I think that the supporters of the notion really do have the EU in mind as a model of economic and political integration, but I doubt that the political circumstances are such that any of the smaller state governments except Bahrain would be willing to submerge their sovereign powers to Saudi Arabia, which is what, in effect, such a union would be.  Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE do not need Saudi money and do not need Saudi security forces.
 
What difference would a Gulf political federation make in either individual countries or the Gulf region? What would it change as far as regional dynamics with Iran?
 
I'm not sure there would be much change at all, except in Bahrain, where any hope for political reconciliation would go out the window.  There is already a common GCC policy on a number of issues with Iran, including the UAE islands, and a common perception that Iran is their biggest security issue.  There is already GCC cooperation on internal security issues, most notably manifested in the sending of troops to Bahrain to support the government by not just Saudi Arabia, but also (more symbolically) by Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. 
 
 There might be some better coordination on defense issues -- early warning systems, inter-operability on radars and the like, more joint military planning, more intelligence sharing.  But since the confrontation with Iran is more political and less military, these would not be centrally important in the current context.
 
How much of the Saudi proposal was spurred by fears of Iran? And how much was spurred by Sunni-Shiite sectarian differences, particularly the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran?
 
 For the Saudis, there is little difference right now between fear of Iran and Sunni-Shiite tensions.  The Saudis see the Iranians behind the Iraqi government and Bahrain protests.  The Saudi leadership sees Iran primarily in balance-of-power terms, not in sectarian terms.  As recently as 2005-06, Riyadh was willing to engage Iran much more directly. 
 
But the struggle for influence with Iran is played out in the domestic politics of weak states and divided societies -- Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Yemen (to a lesser extent), now Syria -- where the Saudis usually find Sunni allies and the Iranians find Shiite allies (some exceptions, to be sure). So the sectarian struggle and balance-of-power politics are now conflated.  The Saudis believe they have the upper hand here, given the majority status of Sunnis in the Muslim world.  But such an emphasis on sectarian identity pushes Arab Shiite in Iraq, Bahrain and elsewhere toward Iran, if they are not allied with Iran already.
 
 

U.S. to Punish Sanctions Evaders

     On May 1, the White House issued a new Executive Order targeting foreign sanctions evaders. The following is a fact sheet on the Executive Order. Full links to the Executive Order and the letter to Congress are provided below. 

FACT SHEET: New executive order targeting foreign sanctions evaders

Today the President signed an Executive Order (E.O.), “Prohibiting Certain Transactions with and Suspending Entry into the United States of Foreign Sanctions Evaders with Respect to Iran and Syria,” providing the U.S. Treasury Department with a new authority to tighten further the U.S. sanctions on Iran and Syria.
 
This E.O. targets foreign individuals and entities that have violated, attempted to violate, conspired to violate, or caused a violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran or Syria, or that have facilitated deceptive transactions for persons subject to U.S. sanctions concerning Syria or Iran. With this new authority, Treasury now has the capability to publicly identify foreign individuals and entities that have engaged in these evasive and deceptive activities, and generally bar access to the U.S. financial and commercial systems.
 
“The foreign sanctions evaders E.O. provides Treasury additional means to impose serious consequences on foreign persons who seek to evade our sanctions and undermine international efforts to bring pressure to bear on the Iranian and Syrian regimes. Whoever tries to evade our sanctions does so at the expense of the people of Syria and Iran, and they will be held accountable,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen.
 
Upon Treasury’s identification and listing of a foreign sanctions evader, U.S. persons will generally be prohibited from providing to, or procuring from, the sanctioned party goods, services, or technology, effectively cutting the evader off from the U.S. marketplace. This provides Treasury with a powerful new tool to prevent, deter, and respond to the risks posed by sanctions evaders to the U.S. and global financial system. It also will help prevent U.S. persons from unwittingly engaging in transactions with foreign individuals and entities that pose a particular risk of running afoul of U.S. sanctions concerning Iran or Syria.
 
The foreign sanctions evaders E.O. is the latest in a broad-based and escalating series of steps taken by the United States and its international partners targeting the governments of Iran and Syria with respect to their abuse of human rights, support for terrorism, and proliferation and development of weapons of mass destruction. The foreign sanctions evaders E.O. follows by one week the Executive Order Blocking The Property And Suspending Entry into the United States of Certain Persons with Respect to Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria via Information Technology (the “GHRAVITY E.O.”), which targeted the provision and use of information and communications technology to facilitate computer or network disruption, monitoring, or tracking that could assist in or enable serious human rights abuses by or on behalf of the Government of Iran or the Government of Syria.
 
The United States has already blocked (i.e., frozen) property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its agencies and instrumentalities, and all Iranian financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Iran. In all, the Treasury Department has announced over 400 Iran-related designations and identifications of individuals and entities supporting various illicit actions of the Government of Iran, including human rights abuses, support for terrorism, and WMD proliferation. For more information, please see http://www.treasury.gov/ofac.
 
Similarly, the Administration has blocked the property and interests in property of the Government of Syria and its agencies and instrumentalities, including the Central Bank of Syria. The Treasury Department also has designated major Syrian financial institutions, including the Commercial Bank of Syria. In all, the Treasury Department has designated more than 60 individuals and entities supporting Syria’s human rights abuses and other repressive policies. For more information, please see http://www.treasury.gov/ofac.
 ###
 

Click here to view the Executive Order and the letter to Congress.

Israeli Leaders Diverge on Iran

Ted Wynne

Over the past month, different branches of the Israeli government have taken widely diverse positions on Iran, its leadership and the state of its threat to Israel. Differences between senior political and military officials—present and past—are particularly striking. The following are recent quotes.
 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, April 19 speech
“Today, the regime in Iran openly calls and determinedly works for our destruction.  And it is feverishly working to develop atomic weapons to achieve that goal…Those who dismiss Iran’s threats as exaggerated or as mere idle posturing have learned nothing from the Holocaust.”
 
Former Mossad intelligence chief Meir Dagan, March 11 on CBS 60 Minutes
“The regime in Iran is a very rational regime… No doubt that the Iranian regime is maybe not exactly rational based on what I call Western thinking, but no doubt they are considering all the implications of their actions.”
 
Defense Minister Ehud Barak, April 27 speech
"The truth must be told. The chance that, at this level of pressure, Iran will meet the international demand to stop the program irrevocably - that chance appears to be low."
 
Military Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz, April 25 to Haaretz
“The program is too vulnerable, in Iran's view. If the supreme religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei wants, he will advance it to the acquisition of a nuclear bomb, but the decision must first be taken. It will happen if Khamenei judges that he is invulnerable to a response. I believe he would be making an enormous mistake, and I don't think he will want to go the extra mile. I think the Iranian leadership is composed of very rational people. But I agree that such a capability, in the hands of Islamic fundamentalists who at particular moments could make different calculations, is dangerous."
 
Former Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin, April 27 speech
The Israeli leadership "presents a false view to the public on the Iranian bomb, as though acting against Iran would prevent a nuclear bomb. But attacking Iran will encourage them to develop a bomb all the faster."
 
Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, March 18 to Yedioth Ahronoth
“If, God forbid, a war with Iran breaks out, it will be a nightmare. And we will all be in it, including the Persian Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia. No one will remain unscathed. We have to do everything we can to urge the international community to assume responsibility and take action to stop the Iranians.”
 

Ted Wynne works for the Center for Conflict Management at the U. S. Institute of Peace.

Tags: Israel

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