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Sport II: The Basketball Bridge
May 13, 2013 | 11:19am
Garrett Nada
For more than a decade, Iran has looked to the United States to improve its caliber of basketball. In 2000, the national team even hired American coach Gary LeMoine. Since then, dozens of Americans ― reportedly 37 during one season ― have played on Iranian teams. Jonas Lalehzadeh is among the best-known.
Since 2011, the six-foot-five-inch point guard from California has played for the national team and two professional clubs in the Super League, Iran’s equivalent of the National Basketball Association. He was the league’s top scorer in the 2012-2013 season.
Lalehzadeh has ties to both cultures, which makes him unusual among the Americans who play ball in Iran. His Iranian parents were completing their degrees in the United States during the 1979 revolution and decided to stay. He was born in 1989. He grew up in southern California, but was immersed in Persian culture and spoke Farsi at home. He had hoped to play professional basketball in the United States, but didn’t get drafted. So he turned to his parent’s homeland. In an interview, he discussed his experience playing basketball and living in Iran as an American.
What role can sports play in diplomacy? What do American and Iranians have in common on basketball?
Sports can transcend political differences. American and Iranians both love basketball. Many young Iranians are diehard National Basketball Association (NBA) fans. They do whatever it takes to watch American games online. And they know their favorite players’ statistics by heart. Kobe Bryant and Lebron James have huge followings. The NBA’s only Iranian player, Hamed Haddadi of the Phoenix Suns, also has many fans. Iranians recognize the talent of American players and consider them among the world’s best.
What is the role of foreign players in Iran?
Foreign players, especially Americans, are not only expected to score a lot of points. They are also expected to teach fundamentals to their Iranian teammates and improve their team’s overall ability. Some teams rely heavily on the performance of their foreign players, who are paid up to three times more than their Iranian teammates. As a result, Iran imposes a rule on how many foreigners can play at the same time. During the regular season, each team is allowed to have only one foreign player on the floor at a time. Two are allowed on the court during the playoffs. But most teams have only one foreigner.
How is the level of play in Iran? How do Iranian and U.S. styles differ?
Iran has one of the best national teams in Asia. It’s won the Asia Championship twice. The level of play has improved significantly over the last decade. Iranians train just as hard as their U.S. counterparts. Friday is the only day off, so they train twice a day, six days a week.
In Iranian basketball, big men play with more finesse and move more fluidly. In the United States, the big players focus on power. I have played off guard and point guard in Iran. Iranian guards are more physical than their American counterparts because international rules allow them to be more aggressive.
How did you end up playing professional basketball in Iran? What teams have you played for and what competitions have you participated in?
I played basketball for my high school. I had a walk-on spot on the University of California at Irvine’s team in 2008. I played for three seasons.
In one of the most unusual diplomatic outreach efforts, the State Department and the NBA invited Iran’s national basketball team to play in a summer league hosted by the Utah Jazz. The Iranian team played four games in the U.S. summer league to prepare for the 2008 Olympics. My father contacted the Iranians and told them about me. I went to Utah and trained with the team for a few days. The Iranian coaches were impressed and wanted me to play for Iran in the Olympics. But there was not enough time to get my visa.
The Iranian team later invited me to play for the senior national team in 2011. So I skipped my senior season at Irvine and played in international tournaments for the Iranian team in Portugal and Hungary.
I decided to stay in Iran to get more playing experience at the professional level. I signed with Petrochimi Bandar Imam (a professional team) for the 2011-2012 Super League season. The team is based in Bandar Imam, a small town in Khuzestan province in southwestern Iran. I helped take the team to the Super League national finals for the first time in eight years. But we did not win.
I then played for another team, Petrochimi Mahshar, in the 2012-2013 season. We made it to the playoffs despite the team’s low budget. I was the league’s high scorer during the regular season, averaging about 20.6 points per game.
I was also invited to play for the senior national team, which is drawn from players on many Iranian teams, in the West Asia Basketball Association Championship in February 2013. We beat Lebanon in overtime and won the regional championship. The victory qualified Iran for the Asia Cup, which is scheduled for August 2013 in the Philippines.
How were you received in Iran? How was the transition?
I grew up speaking Farsi with my parents and was already familiar with Persian customs and holidays. Iranians are very warm and hospitable, so they treated me as a guest at first. Learning about my parent’s home country was just as important to me as playing professional basketball.
In Iran, print journalists and television media were interested in how I ended up playing in Iran, given political tensions with United States. I felt like an ambassador at times when answering questions about basketball and life in the United States. Many Iranians told me they think highly of Americans despite tension between Tehran and Washington. I was honored to represent both countries, as the first athlete born outside of Iran to play for its national team.
What are your plans and goals?
I will do whatever it takes to get into the NBA. I might need to keep playing in Iran to gain more experience. I would also consider playing in Europe or the NBA development league. I have really appreciated the opportunity to play basketball and learn more about Iranian culture. My 47,000 Facebook fans and 9,000 Twitter followers have learned a bit about Iran while following my journey. I actually have not spent that much time in Tehran. The professional teams I have played for are based in Khuzestan, a province populated by many Arabs. I have enjoyed experiencing each province’s unique cultural, culinary and linguistic mix.
Sport I: Iran and US Wrestle in a Different Way
Garrett Nada is a Program Assistant at USIP in the Center for Conflict Management.
Online news media are welcome to republish original blog postings from this website in full, with a citation and link back to The Iran Primer website (www.iranprimer.com) as the original source. Any edits must be authorized by the author. Permission to reprint excerpts from The Iran Primer book should be directed to permissions@usip.org
Report: Obstacles to Containing a Nuclear-Armed Iran
May 13, 2013 | 11:18am
The United States may be pressed to adopt a containment strategy if efforts to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran fail, according to a new report by the Center for a New American Security. U.S. intelligence officials have testified that Tehran has not yet decided whether or not to pursue nuclear weapons. But Iran “may be able to achieve an unstoppable breakout capability or develop nuclear weapons in secret before preventative measures have been exhausted,” the report warns. The authors, including Colin Kahl, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East from 2009 to 2010, outline a strategy for the potential “day after” Iran gets a bomb. The following are excerpts, followed by a link to the full text.
Although the United States is not likely to acquiesce to the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran, Tehran may be able to achieve an unstoppable breakout capability or develop nuclear weapons in secret before preventive measures have been exhausted. Alternatively, an ineffective military strike could produce minimal damage to Iran’s nuclear program while strengthening Tehran’s motivation to acquire the bomb. Under any of these scenarios, Washington would likely be forced to shift toward containment regardless of current preferences…
The strategy would seek to advance 11 core objectives:
• Prevent direct Iranian use of nuclear weapons;
• Prevent Iranian transfer of nuclear weapons to terrorists;
• Limit and mitigate the consequences of Iranian sponsorship of conventional terrorism, support for militant groups and conventional aggression;
• Discourage Iranian use of nuclear threats to coerce other states or provoke crises;
• Dissuade Iranian escalation during crises;
• Discourage Iran from adopting a destabilizing nuclear posture that emphasizes early use of nuclear weapons or pre-delegates launch authority;
• Persuade Israel to eschew a destabilizing nuclear posture that emphasizes early use of nuclear weapons or hair-trigger launch procedures;
• Convince other regional states not to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities;
• Limit damage to the credibility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and U.S. nonproliferation leadership;
• Prevent Iran from becoming a supplier of sensitive nuclear materials; and
• Ensure the free flow of energy resources from the Persian Gulf.
To achieve these objectives, containment would integrate five key components: deterrence, defense, disruption, de-escalation and denuclearization. Each of these “five Ds,” in turn, would entail a number of specific policies, activities and resource commitments.
Deterrence would attempt to prevent Iranian nuclear use and aggression through credible threats of retaliation by:
• Strengthening U.S. declaratory policy to explicitly threaten nuclear retaliation in response to Iranian nuclear use and strengthening commitments to defend U.S. allies and partners;
• Engaging in high-level dialogue with regional partners to extend the U.S. nuclear umbrella in exchange for commitments not to pursue independent nuclear capabilities;
• Evaluating options for the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear forces;
• Providing Israel with a U.S. nuclear guarantee and
engaging Israeli leaders on steps to enhance the
credibility of their nuclear deterrent; and
• Improving nuclear forensics and attribution capabilities
to deter nuclear terrorism.
Defense would aim to deny Iran the ability to benefit from its nuclear weapons and to protect U.S. partners and allies from aggression by:
• Bolstering U.S. national missile defense capabilities;
• Improving the ability to detect and neutralize nuclear weapons that might be delivered by terrorists;
• Improving network resilience to reduce the threat posed by Iranian cyber attacks;
• Maintaining a robust U.S. conventional presence in the Persian Gulf and considering additional missile defense and naval deployments;
• Increasing security cooperation and operational integration activities with Gulf countries, especially
in the areas of shared early warning, air and missile defense, maritime security and critical infrastructure protection; and
• Increasing security cooperation with Israel, especially assistance and collaboration to improve Israel’s rocket and missile defenses.
Disruption activities would seek to shape a regional environment resistant to Iranian influence and to thwart and diminish Iran’s destabilizing activities by:
• Building Egyptian and Iraqi counterweights to Iranian influence through strategic ties with Cairo and Baghdad, leveraging assistance to consolidate democratic institutions and encourage related reform;
• Promoting evolutionary political reform in the Gulf;
• Increasing assistance to non-jihadist elements of the Syrian opposition and aiding future political transition efforts;
• Increasing aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces as a long-term check on Hezbollah;
• Continuing to assist Palestinian security forces and institution building while promoting an
Israeli-Palestinian accord;
• Enhancing counterterrorism cooperation and activities against the Iranian threat network, including expanded U.S. authorities for direct action;
• Expanding collaboration with partners to interdict Iranian materials destined for proxies such as Hezbollah; and
• Aggressively employing financial and law enforcement instruments to target key individuals within the Iranian threat network.
De-escalation would attempt to prevent Iran-related crises from spiraling to nuclear war by:
• Shaping Iran’s nuclear posture through a U.S. “nofirst-use” pledge;
• Persuading Israel to eschew a preemptive nuclear doctrine and other destabilizing nuclear postures;
• Establishing crisis communication mechanisms with Iran and exploring confidence-building measures;
• Limiting U.S. military objectives in crises and conflicts with Iran to signal that regime change is not the goal of U.S. actions; and
• Providing the Iranian regime with “face-saving” exit ramps during crisis situations.
Denuclearization activities would seek to constrain Iran’s nuclear weapons program and limit broader damage to the nonproliferation regime by:
• Maintaining and tightening sanctions against Iran; and
• Strengthening interdiction efforts, including the Proliferation Security Initiative, to limit Iran’s access to nuclear and missile technology and stop Iran from horizontally proliferating sensitive technologies to other states and non-state actors.
If these steps are carried out, effective containment is possible. But it would be highly complex and far from foolproof. The residual dangers of a nuclear-armed Iran would be meaningful, and the consequences of a failure of containment would be profound. The success of the strategy would also depend on numerous factors that Washington can influence but not control, including the preferences of the Iranian regime, the decisions of key allies and partners and the degree of international cooperation in support of containment…
More resources by Colin Kahl:
Nukes Unlikely to Change Iran’s Strategy
May 12, 2013 | 7:30pm
Nuclear arms would be unlikely to change Iran’s fundamental interests and strategy in the Middle East, according to a new report by the Rand Corporation’s Alireza Nader. Tehran is primarily concerned with survival. So it probably would not attack Israel or U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf if it were to attain nuclear weapons, according to the report. The Islamic Republic would not likely use them against its Muslim neighbors either. Iran “does not seek to invade, conquer, or occupy other nations,” argues Nader. The following are excerpts, with a link to the full text at the end.
•The Islamic Republic is a revisionist state that seeks to undermine what it perceives to
be the American-dominated order in the Middle East. However, it does not have
territorial ambitions and does not seek to invade, conquer, or occupy other nations.
be the American-dominated order in the Middle East. However, it does not have
territorial ambitions and does not seek to invade, conquer, or occupy other nations.
•Nuclear arms would probably reinforce Iran's traditional national security objectives,
including deterring a U.S. or Israeli attack.
including deterring a U.S. or Israeli attack.
• Iran is unlikely to use nuclear weapons against other Muslim countries, particularly in
view of its diminishing influence and deteriorating economy; it is unlikely to use them
against Israel given Israel's overwhelming military superiority.
view of its diminishing influence and deteriorating economy; it is unlikely to use them
against Israel given Israel's overwhelming military superiority.
•The Iranian government does not use terrorism for ideological reasons. Instead, Iran's
support for terrorism is motivated by cost and benefit calculations, with the aims of
maintaining deterrence and preserving or expanding its influence in the Middle East.
support for terrorism is motivated by cost and benefit calculations, with the aims of
maintaining deterrence and preserving or expanding its influence in the Middle East.
•Iran's possession of nuclear weapons will create greater instability in the Middle East.
An inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran is a dangerous
possibility. However, there is not much evidence to suggest that rogue elements could
have easy access to Iranian nuclear weapons, even if the Islamic Republic were to
collapse.
An inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran is a dangerous
possibility. However, there is not much evidence to suggest that rogue elements could
have easy access to Iranian nuclear weapons, even if the Islamic Republic were to
collapse.
•Elements of the political elite, including Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, may be fervent
Mahdists or millenarians, but their beliefs are not directly related to nuclear weapons
and will not shape Iran's nuclear decision making.
Mahdists or millenarians, but their beliefs are not directly related to nuclear weapons
and will not shape Iran's nuclear decision making.
There is substantial evidence to suggest that Iran would not be greatly emboldened by a nuclear weapons capability. Nevertheless, Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons will create greater instability in the Middle East. An accidental or inadvertent nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel would be a dangerous possibility. Moreover, quite aside from how Iran might behave, its possession of nuclear weapons could arguably set off a cascade effect, encouraging other regional rivals to move in the same direction.
Latest on the Race: Candidates on U.S. Ties
May 8, 2013 | 11:28am
Garrett Nada
After the economy, the most controversial issue in the presidential election is normalizing Tehran’s ties with the United States. For the first time, both major conservative and reformist candidates actually embrace the idea that direct talks could bring Iran out of isolation by lifting sanctions. They all stipulate that Washington must first change its behavior and tone, but their initial positions may indicate a new openness to diplomatic compromise. The foreign policy debate has also provided candidates with yet another opportunity to blast outgoing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Many blame the president’s inflammatory rhetoric for damaging Iran’s standing worldwide. Ahmadinejad’s claim that the Holocaust never happened has even become a campaign issue.
• “Where did the case of the Holocaust [denial] take us?” said Tehran mayor
Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, a conservative presidential candidate.
• Ahmadinejad’s words “provided the Zionists with something to make a row about,”
said Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel, another candidate and a parliamentarian.
• The president should “think before talking and avoid disparate words,” said Akbar
Velayati, chief foreign policy adviser to the supreme leader.
Iran’s supreme leader has the final word on foreign policy. A senior cleric explicitly warned candidates against discussing issues beyond the president’s authority. “You are neither competent nor authorized to decide on the resumption of ties with the United States,” Ayatollah Mohammad Emami Kashani, a member of the Assembly of Experts, said on May 3. The following are foreign policy positions of eight major candidates, according to Iranian news media.
Mostafa Kavakebian, secretary general of the Democracy Party
• “Direct talks between Iran and the United States could be constructive and useful for both sides…”
• “Relations with United States are not a piece of merchandise you could buy right away. Rather we must be able to ward off sanctions and establish relations with the United States through a proper agenda and according to the 176th article of the constitution.”
• “Not all of our problems will be solved [by U.S. ties], rather the effects of the sanctions will at least be reduced…”
• “While I was in parliament, I presented a six-month plan which would improve Iran’s relations with the United States, and I still insist on this plan.”
Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, mayor of Tehran
• “It is wrong to tell society that the country’s problems will be resolved if we establish relations with the United States.”
• I “neither sanctify nor reject the possibility of holding direct talks with the United States.”
• Iran “should not be involved in disputes with other countries for no reason.”
• Iran needs “intelligent and rational” diplomacy.
• The nuclear energy program is “our most important foreign-policy topic.”
• Controversial and useless remarks “struck a blow against us…Where did the case of the Holocaust take us? We were never against Judaism; it’s a religion. What we opposed was Zionism.”
• Strengthening resistance under pressure is part of Iran’s strategy.
Hassan Rouhani, former head of the Supreme National Security Council
• “We should gradually harness this hostility [with the U.S.] and… move towards putting tension aside.”
• “We must enter talks [with the West] only if we can guarantee our national interests…We must resolve the nuclear dispute. We must also stick to our nuclear [energy program]…”
• “No country can afford being cut off from the rest of the world.”
• Foreign policy should take a “rational direction.”
Mohammad Reza Bahonar, deputy speaker of parliament
• Tehran is ready for direct U.S. talks if the United States “does not have the upper-hand and a domineering position.”
• “We recognize U.S. interests… But when they [Americans] want to shake hands, they show an iron first to us. They should change that arrogant attitude first.”
• Build relations with all countries, except Israel, by 2025
• “Having or not having relations with a country is not a virtue.”
• Don’t change Iran’s nuclear policy and maintain the right to a civilian nuclear energy program.
• The nuclear issue needs to be solved through the United Nations, “not through political channels.”
• Fight terrorism and defend Muslims worldwide.
Mohammad Reza Aref, vice president under former President Mohammad Khatami
• Tehran would agree to bilateral talks with Washington if it stops setting conditions.
• Iran should depoliticize the controversy over its nuclear energy program and seek a win-win deal in negotiations.
• Direct talks with the United States would need to be regulated by the Supreme National Security Council.
• Iran should interact with all countries except Israel.
Ali Akbar Velayati, chief foreign policy adviser to the supreme leader
• Talks with Washington depend on U.S. behavior.
• Any direct negotiations with the United States would be based on the supreme leader’s guidelines.
• Expand relations with other countries and do not allow Iran to be driven into isolation.
• “Think before talking and avoid disparate words” in foreign relations.
• Continue “resisting against the expansionist policies of Western states.”
• Resolve economic issues through effective foreign policy and calculated steps
Mohsen Rezaei, Expediency Council secretary and ex-Revolutionary Guards chief
• “If negotiations take place between Iran and United States and end in failure, undoubtedly Iran will come under military attack…”
• Revamp foreign policy to confront sanctions more effectively.
Alireza Zakani, ex-health minister and current member of parliament
• “As for normalization of ties with the United States, Washington holds the key. It has to change its hostile attitude first.”
More "Latest on the Race"
Sampling of Iranian news sources for this article on the presidential race:
Photo Credit: Babolshop.persianblog.ir
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Iran Calls for Syrian Dialogue With Opposition
May 7, 2013 | 7:03pm
In talks in Damascus and Amman in early May, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi called on the Syrian government to engage in dialogue with its “peaceful opposition.” But he made clear that Tehran still fully backs the government of President Bashar Assad. “Iran stands at the side of Syria in the face of Israeli aggression,” Salehi said in Damascus.
Salehi met with Assad on May 7 after a two-day visit to Jordan. At a press conference in Amman, the Iranian foreign minister called for the formation of a “transitional government” that included both the current government and the opposition movements that had not taken up arms. He pointedly rejected any role for the al Nusra Front, a Sunni Islamist militia affiliated with al Qaeda.
Salehi’s trip followed reported Israeli airstrikes on Iranian-made missiles bound for Lebanon’s Hezbollah on May 3 and a military complex near Damascus on May 5. The following are excerpted remarks by top Iranian and Syrian officials.
Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran’s foreign minister
“The time has come to dissuade the Israeli occupier from carrying out such aggression against the peoples of the region… Iran stands at the side of Syria in the face of Israeli aggression, whose aim is to damage the security of the region and weaken the axis of resistance… We are fully confident that Syria will emerge victorious from the crisis…“ May 7 to Syrian news media
“We reject any foreign intervention in Syria and we don’t want Syria to plunge into crisis… The Syria crisis and its consequences for the region are very heavy, and must be peacefully settled within the framework of a Syrian-Syrian solution… The repercussions of the Syrian crisis will reflect on neighboring states and other countries… If a vacuum is created, God forbid, the outcome will be unknown. We believe the Syrian crisis must be resolved peacefully…
We have called for talks between the Syrian government and the peaceful opposition to form a transitional government… We have advised the Syrian government to sit with the opposition but not with the Nusra Front [an al Qaeda affiliate]…
We do not want history to repeat itself. We have seen what such interference did in other countries…[Tehran is] helping Syria economically…” May 7 in a joint press conference with Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh
"We have engaged all the political currents in Syria and have worked to remove any obstacles that stand in the way of a national dialogue to be held in Damascus. We put forward an initiative for resolving the conflict and presented it to all the parties involved. We even announced our acceptance in advance of any plan that seeks a political resolution regardless of who proposes it. The regime has shown some flexibility and reacted positively to our efforts, and so have some factions in the opposition..." May 8 in an op-ed for Al Akhbar
Bashar Assad, Syria’s president
“The Syrian people and their valiant army are capable of confronting the Israeli adventures, which are one of the faces of terrorism targeting Syria everyday… [The Israeli strikes were proof of] the implication of Israel and regional and Western countries..." May 7 to Syrian news media
Walid Moualem, Syria’s foreign minister
“We have now been at war for two years. We are not afraid and we will not remain silent in the face of aggression..." May 7 to Syrian news media
The Islamists Are Coming
The Islamists Are Coming, edited by Robin Wright, surveys the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region more than any other political bloc. Yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.
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