United States Institute of Peace

The Iran Primer

Obama Renews State of Emergency with Iran

The following is the full text of the White House press release and President Obama’s letter to Congress on renewing the national emergency with respect to Iran.
On November 14, 1979, by Executive Order 12170, the President declared a national emergency with respect to Iran and, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706), took related steps to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the situation in Iran. Our relations with Iran have not yet returned to normal, and the process of implementing the agreements with Iran, dated January 19, 1981, is still under way. For this reason, the national emergency declared on November 14, 1979, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 2015. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency with respect to Iran declared in Executive Order 12170.
This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress.
November 10, 2015
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, within 90 days prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. In accordance with this provision, I have sent to the Federal Register for publication the enclosed notice stating that the national emergency with respect to Iran that was declared in Executive Order 12170 of November 14, 1979, is to continue in effect beyond November 14, 2015.
Our relations with Iran have not yet returned to normal, and the process of implementing the agreements with Iran, dated January 19, 1981, is still under way. For this reason, I have determined that it is necessary to continue the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12170 with respect to Iran.



Rouhani Challenges Hardline Crackdown

On November 8, President Hassan Rouhani challenged the escalating crackdown on journalists and businessmen, many of whom have links to the United States. He called for transparent media regulations at the opening of a press exhibition in Tehran. “We also need a clear law for press and media, thus, as far as the law is clear and unambiguous, no one can stick to a part of it and play with or misuse people's rights of freedom of press in the society,” he said. Rouhani said that it was a shame that no Iranian publication had lasted as long as The New York Times. He contended that shutting down a newspaper should be the last resort for the judiciary.  
Rouhani alluded to the wave of recent arrests while seeming to criticize newspapers with close ties to security services. “By reading their headlines you know who will be arrested tomorrow.” The president warned that “trying to discredit people is against Islamic values.” Rouhani also said that clearer regulations “will stop certain people picking up on a word or a sentence in a media outlet and putting their freedom at risk.”

Rouhani initially indicated his disapproval of the arrests on November 4. “Let us not go and arrest one person here, another there, based on an excuse and without any reason, and then make up a case and aggrandize it, and finally say this is an infiltration movement,” Rouhani said, in a speech commemorating the 36th anniversary of the U.S. Embassy seizure. 

Rouhani warned against abusing guidance from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to further other personal or political goals. After the nuclear deal, Khamenei advised Iranians to be vigilant against U.S. economic, political and cultural influence. Rouhani admonished, “Some should not want to, God forbid, misuse these words and terminologies and accuse those who are opposed to us and drive them to the margins…  We need to try to develop an accurate understanding of and implement what the Supreme Leader says. We should not let certain individuals use his words to score personal, collective and factional points.” In the past, hardliners have claimed that Rouhani’s government had breached Khamenei’s redlines.

Rouhani countered that Iranians are sophisticated enough to recognize U.S. interests. “People properly know the meaning of influence and arrogance and know the history of American mistreatment with their country and the people,” he said. “They can rightly recognize their national interests and their country’s future. We should seriously fight against foreigners’ influence, and no one should play with the word ‘infiltration.’”
The arrests, reportedly by the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), reflect the growing anti-Americanism among hardliners, after the historic nuclear deal and in the run-up to pivotal elections. Hardliners fear new diplomacy with the United States could compromise the revolution, or their own interests, especially amid predictions they could lose their decade-long control of parliament in the February election. “People are well aware of the situation and monitor what is unfolding, and knowingly make their presence felt when it is needed – like in elections – and speak their mind,” Rouhani said.
The two businessmen arrested since mid-September both have strong connections to the United States:
  • Nizar Zakka, a Lebanese national and permanent U.S. resident, is an information and communications technology expert. Invited by the government, he was in Tehran for a conference on business. He was detained on his way to the airport on September 18. He has since been was accused of espionage for the United States.
  • Siamak Namazi, a Dubai-based consultant, was born in Iran but grew up in the United States and became a U.S. citizen. He attended Tufts University and Rutgers. The energy specialist has long held that Iranian-Americans could help foster rapprochement between Tehran and Washington. He was visiting family in Iran when he was arrested mid-October.
Five Iranian journalists were reportedly arrested on November 2. Four have been publicly identified:
  • Issa Saharkhiz,a veteran journalist and political activist, has been accused of “disrespecting the Supreme Leader,” trying “to overthrow the government,” and plotting “to hold mass demonstrations against the government.”
  • Ehsan Mazandarani is the managing editor of the newspaper Farhikhtegan.
  • Saman Safarzaie is a member of the editorial board of the monthly Andisheh Pouya.
  • Afarin Chitsaz is a member of editorial board of Iran newspaper.
The journalists’ detention coincided with a conference organized by the Basij militia and described as “the first anti-American gathering after the nuclear agreement.” At the event, IRGC chief General Mohammad Ali Jafari warned that the United States is scheming to take advantage of negotiations and infiltrate Iran. “The enemy has started its work,” he said. On November 4, the IRGC announced the break-up of an American and British network behind a media campaign against Iran.
Photo credits: President.ir
Translations via President.ir and Iran Front Page

Europe Reaches Out to Iran

Since the final nuclear deal was announced on July 14, at least a dozen European nations have reached out to Iran with high-profile phone calls and visits. After receiving invitations from Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi and French President Francois Hollande, President Hassan Rouhani scheduled visits to Italy, the Vatican, and France from November 14 to 17. It will be his first trip to Europe.

Both France and Italy were major trade partners with Iran before the latest round of sanctions in 2010. Despite taking a tough stance during the nuclear negotiations, France was among the first European countries to seek improved ties with Iran. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius met with officials in Tehran just 15 days after the nuclear deal was signed. Italian officials visited Tehran in early August seeking to boost trade relations. 

The following is a rundown of European outreach since the deal.

On July 23, French President Francois Hollande and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani discussed increasing bilateral cooperation in a phone conversation. A statement released by Hollande’s office “expressed the wish for Iran to contribute positively to the resolution of crises in the Middle East.” Hollande also emphasized increasing tourism between the two countries, since it "can play a major role in advancement of cooperation between Iran and France."
French foreign minister Laurent Fabius visited Tehran on July 29, meeting with Zarif, Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh, and other senior officials. It was the first visit to Iran by a French foreign minister in 12 years. He also extended an invitation for President Hassan Rouhani to visit President Hollande in France in November. "Things will, we hope, be able to change," Fabius said during his visit. In late September, a French delegation with representatives from more than 100 companies visited Tehran and opened a trade office.
Rouhani is scheduled to visit Paris on November 16-17, where he will meet with Hollande and other French officials.
On August 4, Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni and Economic Development Minister Federica Guidi arrived in Iran for a two-day visit, accompanied by Italian businessmen and economic activists. They met with Minister of Industry, Mines, and Trade Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh and other officials.
Italy, which used to be one of Iran’s major trade partners, has been trying to revive economic ties with Iran. During the visit, investment back Mediobanca, Italy’s development ministry, and export credit agency SACE signed a memorandum of understanding “to facilitate future economic and commercial relations between the two countries.”
Gentiloni invited Rouhani to visit Rome, on behalf of Prime Minister Matteo Renzi. Rouhani accepted, and planned to travel to Italy on November 14-15 to meet with Renzi, President Sergio Mattarella, and the Pope.
European Union
On November 7, European Parliament chief Martin Schulz met with officials in Tehran, at the invitation of the Iranian parliament. It was the first time a head of the European Parliament had visited Iran. "The Islamic Republic of Iran is an element of stability in a region full of instability," Schulz said during the visit.
Previously, on July 28, E.U. foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini had traveled Tehran for a one-day visit with senior Iranian officials. She was accompanied by deputy E.U. foreign policy chief Helga Schmid. Mogherini said the nuclear deal “has the capacity to pave the ground for wider cooperation between Iran and the West.”
After meeting with Mogherini, Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said that Iran and the European Union had agreed to hold talks “over different issues, including energy cooperation…human rights, confronting terrorism, and regional issues.”
Mogherini’s visit coincided with her op-ed in The Guardian, in which she argued that cooperation between Iran and the West could help defeat ISIS. The following is an excerpt.
“The Vienna deal tells us that we all have much to earn if we choose cooperation over confrontation. Making the most out of this opportunity is entirely up to us. But nothing good will happen if we do not work hard for it. We Europeans have a long tradition of cultural and economic relationship with Iran. Before sanctions began in 2005, cooperation between our parts of the world spanned many areas, from energy to trade. But our shared interests go well beyond the economy.
“Last week Europe’s foreign ministers tasked me with exploring “ways in which the EU could actively promote a more cooperative regional framework” in the wake of the Vienna deal. Isis (also known as Da’esh) is spreading its vicious and apocalyptic ideology in the Middle East and beyond. There is nothing more worrisome to Isis than cooperation between “the west” and the Muslim world, for it defies the narrative of a clash of civilisations the group is trying to revive. An alliance of civilisations can be our most powerful weapon in the fight against terror.”
—July 28, 2015, in an op-ed published by The Guardian
United Kingdom

On August 23, British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond traveled to Tehran to reopen the British Embassy, which had been closed since 2011. The Iranian embassy in London was reopened the same day. In a joint press conference with Hammond, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said that Iran and Britain had “entered a new phase of relations based on mutual respect.”
Hammond was the first British Foreign Secretary to visit Iran in 12 years. He met with Rouhani, Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani, and other officials during his visit. Hammond was accompanied by a group of British business leaders hoping to reestablish ties in Iran.
British Prime Minister David Cameron had called Rouhani to congratulate him on the nuclear deal on July 16. "You (President Rouhani) had a very constructive role in striking this final deal," he said. During the conversation, Rouhani added that “I think there exists the necessary potential to rebuild relations between Iran and Britain.”
The British government also relaxed its travel warnings for Iran shortly after the deal was announced. “The risk to British nationals has changed, in part due to decreasing hostility under President Rouhani's Government,” British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond said on July 25.
Belgian Foreign Minister Didier Reynders and an economic delegation visited Tehran on November 9, meeting with President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. The officials discussed expanding economic and political ties. During the visit, Rouhani said that Iran "can become a center for organizing and expanding economic relations between Belgium, the European Union, and the whole region."
Austrian President Heinz Fischer visited Tehran from September 7 to 9, accompanied by Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz, and Economy Minister Reinhold Mitterlehner. Fischer said that he expected bilateral trade between Austria and Iran to reach $335 million in 2015.
Fischer met with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani during his visit. Khamenei praised Austria for not complying with "the United States' hostile policies towards Iran."
Fischer had spoken to Rouhani by phone on July 15, following the announcement of the final nuclear deal. Rouhani said the deal “will lay the groundwork for the expansion of ties between Tehran and Vienna.”


Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Garcia-Margallo met with Iranian officials in Tehran from September 7 to 9. He was accompanied by Industry, Energy and Tourism Minister Jose Manuel Soria, Public Works and Transport Minister Ana Maria Pastor Julian, and a delegation of business officials.

Following a meeting with Soria, Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh said the two countries discussed the possibility of exporting crude oil and natural gas to Spain. Additionally, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif met with Garcia-Margallo, and said that Iran and Spain "agreed to negotiate about human rights and refugee issues.”


On July 20, German vice chancellor and economics minister Sigmar Gabriel arrived in Iran for a three-day visit, hoping to resume “economic contacts with Iran, which were traditionally good.” He was the first high-ranking Western official to visit Iran since the final nuclear deal was announced on July 14.
Gabriel also emphasized the need to cooperate with Iran on issues like human rights and its relationship with Israel. "You can't have a good economic relationship with Germany in the long-term if we don't discuss such issues too and try to move them along,” he said.
German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier announced on August 24 that he planned to visit Iran in October.



Swiss Deputy Foreign Minister Yves Rossier arrived in Tehran on July 21 for a four-day trip to meet with Iranian officials, including Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, and Rouhani’s chief of staff Mohammad Nahavandian. “Iran welcomes the expansion of economic and banking relations with Switzerland,” Nahavandian said.
On August 12, Switzerland became the first nation to lift sanctions on Iran after the nuclear deal was announced.
Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic arrived in Tehran on August 3 for a three-day visit. Dacic held a series of meetings with senior Iranian officials and explored opportunities for greater economic cooperation with Iran. Zarif welcomed a proposal by Dacic to hold the 14th Iran-Serbia Joint Economic Committee, adding that an Iranian delegation would visit Belgrade in the future.
On October 10-11, Polish Senate Speaker Bogdan Borusewicz visited Tehran, where he met with President Hassan Rouhani, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, Chairman of the Expediency Council Akbar Hashemni Rafsanjani, and other officials. Iran and Poland "can further contribute to regional and international security through mutual cooperation," Borusewicz said during the visit. And Rouhani said that "Iran sees no obstacles in the way of expanding relations and cooperation with Poland."

The Netherlands

Dutch Foreign Minister Bert Koenders met with Rouhani, Zarif, and other officials in Tehran on September 21 and 22. It was the first time in 14 years that a Dutch foreign minister had visited Iran. The officials discussed expanding political and economic ties, and Koenders announced that at least three other Dutch ministers planned to visit Iran in the near future.

Impact of Sanctions Relief on Iran

Sanctions relief is “unlikely to greatly empower the Iranian regime at home or abroad,” according to RAND Corporation analyst Alireza Nader. The following are excerpts from his November 5 testimony presented before the House Oversight and Governmental Reform Committee, Subcommittee on National Security.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany) will no doubt provide Iran with significant sanctions relief and alleviate some of the stresses faced by the Iranian economy, but several factors will constrain the Iranian regime’s ability to substantially grow the economy and use newly found resources to achieve its foreign policy objectives. My testimony today will review these constraining factors and provide several recommendations for U.S. policymakers to consider.
First, sanctions relief will not be granted unless Iran implements the JCPOA by sharply reducing its nuclear capabilities. This means that Iran will be unable to use its nuclear program to expand its influence in the region. Iran will only be rewarded economically once it has met its obligations under JCPOA, which include reconfiguring the Arak nuclear facility, sharply cutting the number of operating centrifuges, reducing Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium, and accepting intrusive inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities. Second, while the United States will lift secondary sanctions against Iran, primary American sanctions targeting the Iranian regime’s support for terrorism and its human rights abuses will remain, preventing Iran from gaining access to American capital, and—most importantly—American technology and know-how. The European Union is expected to lift most of its nuclear-related sanctions against Iran once Tehran complies with JCPOA. However, European sanctions on other issues such as human rights will remain.
Although the JCPOA is expected to provide Iran with significant economic relief, the amounts involved are unlikely to greatly empower the Iranian regime at home or abroad. The Iranian regime is massively indebted due to its costly nuclear policies; it owes as much as $100 billion to Iranian banks and private firms. The Rouhani government was elected on a campaign to improve the economy, which will require Iran to spend at least $200 billion on its dilapidated energy sector, in addition to tens of billions of dollars on domestic infrastructure, health care, and the educational system. The Iranian people have high expectations from their government and they are waiting anxiously to see the benefits of sanctions relief. So while the lifting of U.S. secondary and European nuclear sanctions may enable Iran to increase its oil exports by around 1 million barrels per day and give it access to $50–100 billion held in escrow accounts, much of this money will be used to pay debts and invest in the country’s infrastructure and social services.
In addition, because global oil prices are likely to remain low for the foreseeable future, oil exports will not enable Iran to get rich quickly. Iran faces stiff global competition, and its reentry into the global market is unlikely to pose serious competition to major oil producers, such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Iran is eager to exploit its massive natural gas resources, but it is years—if not decades—behind such major producers as Qatar, which enjoys a close relationship with the United States and has been able to become an energy powerhouse through technologies such as liquefied natural gas.
Even after the JCPOA, many foreign companies will be hesitant to trade with Iran due to remaining U.S. sanctions and, perhaps more importantly, due to the overall reputation of the Iranian regime. Many firms will avoid making capital investments in Iran out of fear that disputes over the JCPOA’s implementation will lead to the reimposition of sanctions. The resulting uncertainty will slow the rate at which Iran sees economic returns from the nuclear deal.
Iran is one of the most corrupt and least business friendly countries in the world. The Iranian government’s chronic mismanagement of the economy, endemic inflation, unemployment, and societal repression will continue to plague the economy well into the future. The role of the Revolutionary Guards in the Iranian economy, in addition to other government actors, will ensure a long-term degree of caution on the part of foreign investors. Many of the Guards are opposed to the opening of Iran’s economy, fearing that the government of President Hassan Rouhani intends to use a more open and globalized economy to curtail their economic and political authority. The Guards’ detention and harassment of Iranian-American businesspeople is an indication of their reluctance to embrace a new economic era. The Rouhani government’s inability or unwillingness to protect those who want change in Iran will surely restrain the benefits of sanctions relief for the Iranian regime, and unfortunately for the Iranian people.
The JCPOA is a strong non-proliferation agreement. However, it does not address all of the United States’ problems with the Iranian regime. Nor should it do so. The JCPOA is a pragmatic solution to stopping the Iranian regime’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. By ensuring that Iran does not pose a nuclear danger to the United States and its regional allies, it can be a first step in allowing the United States to contain and roll back Iran’s regional influence through military, diplomatic, and economic means. The Iranian regime will remain a challenge on many fronts once the JCPOA has been implemented, but the United States has the means to mitigate these challenges.
U.S. and allied military superiority will deter Iran’s conventional military capabilities even as Iran regains some of the resources necessary to improve its military. Iran’s deteriorating economy has meant a decline in Iran’s military capabilities as well. The GCC states spend more than ten times as much on their defense capabilities as Iran does. According to General David Petraeus, the United Arab Emirates air force “could take out the entire Iranian Air Force, I believe, given that it’s got . . . somewhere around 70 Block 60 F-16 fighters, which are better than the U.S. F-16 fighters.” And Iran will face an arms embargo for eight years after the JCPOA has been implemented.
The Iranian regime’s asymmetric capabilities will remain the key challenge for U.S. interests; but increasing U.S. military leverage in Syria and Iraq, a political solution to the Syrian conflict, and the defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant on the battlefield will decrease the regional instability which the Iranian regime exploits consistently.
This means that the United States should be willing to engage Iran diplomatically when it suits its own interests. Diplomacy with Iran is not a sign of weakness, but of strength. The JCPOA was achieved due to Washington’s ability to create and sustain an international coalition to enforce sanctions against the Iranian regime. The United States could only persuade the world that it was willing to resolve the nuclear issue by engaging Iran directly. Multilateral diplomacy that includes Iran can similarly help the United States in resolving the Syrian conflict.
The Iranian regime appears ascendant in Syria today, as evidenced by the presence of a reported 2,000 Revolutionary Guards fighting on behalf of the Syrian regime. Iran also appears to have coordinated its expanding military campaign with Russia, giving the Assad regime a potential military boost before the resumption of diplomatic negotiations. However, the mounting economic cost of supporting the Assad regime and the increasing deaths of Iranian generals and soldiers is sparking a debate within Iran and leading more Iranians to question their government’s actions. The Iranian regime is more eager to end its involvement in the Syrian conflict than it may appear.
Of course, Tehran is eager to protect its own interests in Syria, and is unlikely to curtail its military support for Assad until it has met some of its objectives, including the preservation of Iranian influence in Syria and Lebanon. However, there is no military solution to the Syrian conflict for Iran, Russia, the United States, and its Arab partners. A political solution means flexibility from all sides, as was the case with the negotiations leading to the JCPOA. Greater U.S. military leverage in Syria through increased support for moderate anti-Assad insurgent groups can mean greater U.S. diplomatic leverage on the negotiation table.
The JCPOA will not end the rivalry between the United States and the Islamic Republic. Iran’s regime is still largely revolutionary in character. The election of Rouhani has meant a more pragmatic Iranian foreign policy on certain issues, including the nuclear program and possibly the Syrian conflict. However, Iran’s senior leadership, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, remain committed to enmity with the United States. Khamenei may have approved of the nuclear agreement and may support multilateral negotiations with Syria involving the United States, but his fundamental view of America has not changed.
Nevertheless, there is a future for Iran beyond Khamenei and the Islamic Republic. Iran’s population is relatively young, worldly, and eager to engage the international community. The Iranian regime’s decision to sign the JCPOA is in part due to pressures it faced from Iranians who revolted against the regime’s corruption and repression in 2009. There are no indications that Iran will face a mass insurgency or revolution in the near future, but the voice of the Iranian people matters; many have supported the JCPOA not just for the economic relief, but in the hope of a brighter future.
The United States should be open to engaging the Rouhani government on various issues, but the real hope for better U.S.-Iran relations lies in a more democratic and open Iran. Rouhani’s government has demonstrated its desire for a more open economy, but it has taken little to no action to challenge Iran’s repressive political system. The Iranian regime’s human rights abuses remain as horrible as before Rouhani’s election, if not even worse; a recent report by the United Nations noted a record number of executions in Iran, among other human rights abuses against women and religious and sexual minorities.
The regime has imprisoned hundreds, if not thousands, of Iranians who have expressed a desire for a more democratic and pluralistic political system. In addition, five Americans remain in Iranian jails or unaccounted for: Jason Rezaian, Amir Hekmati, Saeed Abedini, Robert Levinson, and the recently arrested Siamak Namazi. As Iran implements the JCPOA, it remains essential that the United States seek the release of U.S. citizens unjustly jailed by the Iranian regime.
The jailing of Iranian-Americans is an indicator that the JCPOA and sanctions relief will not lead to a dramatic transformation of Iran or its relations with the United States. However, the JCPOA is a first step in the right direction. Not only does it stop Iran’s nuclear weapons capability, but it also gives Iranians a chance to change their future. The taboo of U.S.-Iran engagement has been broken. The Iranian regime can no longer convincingly blame the United States for all of Iran’s problems, which makes it accountable, alone, for the country’s success or failure.
U.S. efforts to strengthen Iranian civil society by promoting democracy could help lead to a more open and humane Iran but, ultimately, only the people of Iran can change their country. Engaging the Iranian regime through the JCPOA and other diplomatic initiatives does not confer legitimacy upon the Islamic Republic, nor does it mean that the United States will ignore Iran’s aggressive regional policies or its abuses at home. The JCPOA is a pragmatic necessity, but much work remains to be done in containing, deterring, and rolling back the Iranian regime.

Click here for the full text. 


Click here to read Nader's chapter on the Revolutionary Guards.    


In Pictures: Iran Marks Anniversary of US Embassy Seizure

On November 4, Iran marked the 36th anniversary of the U.S. Embassy takeover in massive street rallies across the country. As in previous years, effigies of President Obama were burned along with American flags. The slogan “Death to America,” or “Down with the USA,” was chanted loudly and featured prominently on posters and billboards. This year, some of the signs carried by demonstrators displayed the logos of U.S. fast food chains, including KFC and McDonalds, and warned against American cultural and economic infiltration.  


Click here for analysis on the recent rise in anti-Americanism in Iran. 



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