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Latest on the Race: Rafsanjani Redux?

May 19, 2013 | 11:54pm

By Robin Wright and Garrett Nada

            Among the 680-plus candidates who registered to run for president of Iran, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani stands alone as the most experienced and savviest politico — by far. He has almost done it all.

      He was speaker of parliament for nine terms in the 1980s. He was president for two terms from 1989 to 1997. He was chairman of the Assembly of Experts, a panel of more than 80 clerics and scholars who oversee the supreme leader, from 2007 to 2011. And he is currently chief of the Expediency Council, the ultimate arbiter of disputes between parliament and the 12-man Guardian Council.
      But more than titles, Rafsanjani was long the behind-the-scene powerbroker in the world’s only modern theocracy. He orchestrated the rewriting of the constitution in 1989 to create an executive president — and then got himself elected to the more powerful post. The same year, he mobilized the inner circle after the death of revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini to support Ali Khamenei as the new supreme leader. The twin steps are still the biggest political overhaul since the 1979 revolution.
      For his wiliness, Rafsanjani was nicknamed “the shark,” which is also a play on his smooth beardless chin, a physical attribute inherited from Mongolian ancestors. He was also — somewhat cynically — nicknamed “Akbar Shah,” a dig at the king-like power he once wielded. His Cheshire cat grin was a staple of Iranian politics in the 1980s and 1990s — and a barometer of who and what was in favor.
            Yet Rafsanjani has struggled since 2000 to retain his leverage. Subsequent comeback efforts have failed.
            His famous family has also increasingly been targeted by both the regime and his political rivals. Two of his children were charged with acting against the regime after the disputed 2009 presidential election. His daughter Faezeh Hashemi ― a former member of parliament and vice president of Iran’s Olympic committee ― spent six months in prison for “spreading propaganda.” She was released in March 2013. His son, Mehdi Hashemi was jailed for more than two months in late 2012 for inciting unrest and still faces formal prosecution.  

What support does Rafsanjani have among the general population today?
            After two decades of dominating political power, Rafsanjani suffered serious setbacks in his last two campaigns for parliament in 2000 and the presidency in 2005. Although considered a pragmatist in the 1980s and early 1990s, a new generation of reformists began turning elsewhere in the late 1990s. Disillusionment deepened after his statements following the brutal government crackdown on protests in 1999, when university students rallied against the closing of a reformist newspaper and new limits on freedom of expression. In a sermon, Rafsanjani condoned the use of force to stop “enemies of the revolution.”
            In the 2000 election, Rafsanjani failed to win enough votes for any of the 30 parliamentary seats allocated to Tehran — a stunning development. A recount later claimed that he came in 29th, although he opted not to take the seat.
            Rafsanjani attempted another comeback in a run for the presidency in 2005. His inventive campaign had young girls on rollerblades pass out “Hashemi 2005” bumper stickers. The campaign set up tents in Tehran and blared Western-style music ― a controversial move in a country that had banned broadcast music after the 1979 revolution. Rafsanjani faced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the working-class mayor of Tehran, in a runoff election. Ahmadinejad routed Rafsanjani with about 62 percent of the vote.  
           
How is Rafsanjani perceived among Iran’s political elite?
      Key members of the reformist elite supported Rafsanjani’s 2013 presidential bid. Former President Mohammad Khatami (left) called Rafsanjani the “most appropriate figure” for easing economic challenges and international pressures. “Now it is the people's turn to enter the scene with bravery and responsibility and assist him,” Khatami said.
      But hardliners countered by painting Rafsanjani as part of a “deviant camp.” They claimed that he helped incite mass demonstrations—the largest since the revolution—after the disputed 2009 presidential election. Rafsanjani’s critics demanded that he condemn Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, leaders of the opposition Green Movement who both ran for president in 2009.
            In May 2013, some 100 hardline members of parliament reportedly sent a petition to the 12-man Guardian Council urging it to disqualify Rafsanjani for having a major role “in managing the sedition” after the 2009 election. Before the election, hardliners had also considered a new law prohibiting candidates over the age of 75. The idea was widely believed to be an attempt to prevent Rafsanjani, then 78, from running. But the Guardian Council rejected the bill.
 
What is Rafsanjani’s record on domestic policy?
      In the 1980s and 1990s, Rafsanjani was considered pragmatic on both domestic and foreign affairs. After the eight-year war with Iraq, he moved to jumpstart the war-ravaged economy. He pushed a free-market agenda after he became president in 1989. He reopened the stock market launched during the monarchy and encouraged foreign investment with new incentives. He cut a few subsidies and started privatizing state-run businesses.
      But conservative opponents in parliament balked at his plans for economic shock therapy. And excessive spending depleted foreign exchange reserves, forcing Iran into debt. When he ran for reelection in 1993, the public also seemed less enthusiastic, as his support at the polls dropped significantly. Inflation soared in 1994, and the economy went into a recession. Iran’s Chamber of Commerce acknowledged that up to 40 percent of Iranians lived below the poverty line in 1996.
            Rafsanjani initially succeeded in easing social restrictions and cultural censorship. Women began wearing brightly colored headscarves instead of the full-body and typically black chador. His minister of culture, Mohammad Khatami, was credited with allowing revival of Iranian music and cinema. But hardliners in parliament forced Khatami from office in 1992. Rafsanjani also found it increasingly difficult to enact reforms as Supreme Leader Khamenei and his conservative allies consolidated power in the mid-1990s.
 
What is Rafsanjani’s record on foreign policy?
            In the mid-1980s, Rafsanjani reportedly played a key role in the arms-for-hostage scandal, which involved acquiring American weapons in exchange for release of American hostages held in Lebanon. He was widely viewed as the leading advocate of repairing relations with the United States to end Iran’s isolation. Even after the scandal was revealed, he reportedly dispatched a nephew to Washington to probe the potential of reviving behind-the-scenes talks.
            In 1988, Rafsanjani also played a key role in convincing Ayatollah Khomeini to end the war with Iraq, in which more than 120,000 Iranians died. Afterwards, he again sought to end Iran’s diplomatic isolation. But he made little progress, partly because of Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1989 fatwa calling for the death of British author Salman Rushdie for his book “The Satanic Verses.” Tehran also continued to support Hezbollah, a radical Lebanese Shiite militia, and opposed the Arab-Israeli peace process. But Rafsanjani did improve relations with China, Saudi Arabia and Russia.
            Toward the end of his presidency in the mid-1990s, Rafsanjani reportedly orchestrated the offer of a $1 billion contract to U.S. oil company Conoco to develop Iran’s offshore fields. The move was widely interpreted as an indirect overture to the United States through commercial channels. Under congressional pressure, however, President Clinton issued an executive order in March 1995 that prohibited U.S. trade in or development of Iranian oil.

What is Rafsanjani’s relationship with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei?
      Rafsanjani and Khamenei both were active against the monarchy. Both spent time in the shah’s jail. And both were close disciples of late revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini. (The three clerics are pictured on the left in the 1980s). Rafsanjani was instrumental in promoting Khamenei to the position of supreme leader in 1989.
      But Rafsanjani’s relationship with Khamenei soured in the 1990s as the two men jockeyed for control of the Islamic Republic. As the new supreme leader, Khamenei reportedly disapproved of Rafsanjani’s efforts to improve relations with the West, move towards a free-market economy, and loosen social restrictions.  Rafsanjani also then had wider popular support.
            Khamenei gradually got the upper hand after Rafsanjani had to step down from the presidency in 1997, as the constitution only allows two sequential terms. Rafsanjani’s attempts at a political comeback in 2000 and 2005 then failed.
            After the controversial 2009 presidential election, the regime also revoked Rafsanjani’s title as Friday prayer leader when he gave a sermon criticizing the government crackdown on protestors. Rafsanjani then lost his post as head of the Assembly of Experts in 2011. Ayatollah Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi Kani, an elderly conservative cleric who reportedly had Khamenei’s backing, took his place. Rafsanjani chose not to contest the election.  
             His third attempt at a comeback in 2013 surprised even astute political analysts in Iran. Rafsanjani had initially said that he would not run for president without the supreme leader’s permission. He reportedly informed the supreme leader of his interest shortly before registering—also in the final minutes of the five-day process. He did not indicate whether or not he won Khamenei’s approval.
 
What positions has Rafsanjani taken on Iran’s most critical domestic and foreign policy issues, such as negotiations over the nuclear program?
            Rafsanjani is generally running on his past record. His official campaign website says Iran needs a “captain,” not an “inexperienced boatman” to lead Iran. He has also compared Iran’s problems in 2013 to the challenges it faced during post-war reconstruction in the 1990s.
            On the economy, Rafsanjani has called for further privatization of Iran’s large state-run sector. He has also criticized the government’s reliance on oil revenues and neglect of the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Rafsanjani has favored subsidy reform but has emphasized the importance of reinvesting government savings.
            On the controversial nuclear program, Rafsanjani has supported negotiations with the West and the international community. He has also been a staunch defender of Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology, including uranium enrichment capabilities. Rafsanjani has said that Tehran does not want nuclear arms.   
            In the past, Rafsanjani advocated rapprochement with the United States and the West. Iran would negotiate with the United States if it showed “goodwill,” Rafsanjani told USA Today in 2005. In comments posted on his 2013 campaign website, he said, “We shouldn’t be afraid of interaction with the world.” At the same time, he has warned against giving into the demands of “bullying and domineering powers.”
            Rafsanjani has also supported opening up Iranian society. He has called for greater media freedom and the release of detained journalists. “We should open the doors to debates,” Rafsanjani said in a July 2009 sermon after the presidential election. He has even reportedly described Facebook and other social media as a “blessing” that helps “movements against tyranny and oppression.”
            Rafsanjani has publicly opposed harsh implementation of Iran’s penal code, which is based on a strict interpretation of Islamic law. “We should live based on Islamic laws and not based on radical individuals' interpretations which sometimes make people's lives difficult,” Rafsanjani told journalists in May 2005.  But he was also in power during periods when the international community criticized Iran for support of extremist movements and ruthless internal repression.
 
What is his background?
      Rafsanjani was born in 1934 in Bahraman village near the south-central city of Rafsanjan, the district from which he gets his name. His father was a well-to-do pistachio farmer. Rafsanjani left home at age 14 to study Islamic jurisprudence in the holy city of Qom, where he developed a close relationship with Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1958, Rafsanjani married Effat Marashi, the daughter of a respected cleric. They have five children: Fatemeh, Mohsen, Faezeh, Mehdi and Yasser.
      Rafsanjani joined the struggle against the Pahlavi dynasty in the late 1950s. He was detained seven times and imprisoned for a total of four years spread out between from 1958 to 1979, according to his bio.
 
            Rafsanjani was a top adviser to Khomeini throughout the revolution. He was elected speaker of Iran’s first post-revolution parliament in 1980 and held the position for nine years.
      Khomeini appointed Rafsanjani to be his personal representative on the Supreme Defense Council during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. He also briefly served as acting commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
      But he also has enemies. In May 1979, he narrowly escaped assassination by members of the leftist Islamic group, Forqan.
      Rafsanjani and his family have reportedly amassed significant wealth since the revolution. In 2003, Forbes named him as one of the “millionaire mullahs.” Critics have accused Rafsanjani and his sons of corruption. His youngest son Yasser, a businessman educated in Belgium, has run a successful export-import firm. Rafsanjani’s middle son, Mehdi, has done well financially through connections to the oil industry. He used to head a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company. Rafsanjani’s oldest son Mohsen headed Tehran’s metro until he resigned in 2011.
 
Links to Rafsanjani’s official website and Twitter account.
 
Robin Wright is a distinguished scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She edited The Iran Primer. See her chapter, “The Challenge of Iran.”
 
Garrett Nada is a Program Assistant at USIP in the Center for Conflict Management.
 
Online news media are welcome to republish original blog postings from this website in full, with a citation and link back to The Iran Primer website (www.iranprimer.com) as the original source. Any edits must be authorized by the author. Permission to reprint excerpts from The Iran Primer book should be directed to permissions@usip.org
 

 

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Latest on the Race: Jalili, Ideologue on Twitter

May 15, 2013 | 11:12am

Garrett Nada

            Saeed Jalili has never held elective office, yet he may have an important edge in the presidential race because of his close ties with Iran’s supreme leader. He is an insider’s insider. At the same time, Jalili is not a charismatic figure. He unsuccessfully ran for parliament in 2000 and 2004 to represent his hometown of Mashhad, according to his website. In a three-week presidential campaign, the challenge for Jalili may be winning sufficient public support in a field of better known candidates.
      Jalili has been secretary of the Supreme National Security Council since 2007. It is a powerful position, yet he has not had same visibility as his predecessors. His main strength has been his loyalty to the regime and commitment to the revolutionary narrative of Iranian independence from both East and West. His politics also fit well with the so-called principlist conservatives—or people who adhere to the revolution’s early ideals.
       Yet Jalili quickly went on a campaign offensive right after registering to run on May 11. He opened a Twitter feed, Google Plus account, blog and website—and in the first few days tweeted up to 50 campaign slogans in English, Arab and Farsi a day. He has had some uncharacteristically tough words for colleagues also running for the presidency. “Some politicians have certain view today, tomorrow they will present totally opposite views based on their own personal interests,” he tweeted on May 14.
 
What support does Jalili have among the general population?
          Jalili’s wartime credentials may be one of his two major assets. Born in 1965, he belongs to a generation defined by the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. His official biography says he served in the Basij paramilitary under the Revolutionary Guards, whose influence in politics and the economy has soared over the past decade. Veterans won at least 16 percent of parliament’s 290 seats in 2004. Jalili posted a picture of himself from the war on his campaign site. On May 13, he tweeted an article about a veteran’s association endorsing his campaign.
            Jalili has also served in highly visible government positions. He ran the supreme leader’s office from 2001 to 2005. In 2005, newly elected President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appointed Jalili, a personal friend, to be deputy foreign minister for European and American affairs. In 2007, Ahmadinejad appointed him to be secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator.
            But Jalili has little experience working on domestic affairs, which may pose a problem since the economy is a key campaign issue.
 
How is Jalili perceived among Iran’s political elite?
      Jalili and Ahmadinejad’s friendship has reportedly suffered since the president began challenging the supreme leader’s authority after his 2009 reelection. Jalili is now widely considered to be closer to the supreme leader, which could be a key to his political future. Many candidates are running on anti-Ahmadinejad platforms.
      Among Iran watchers, Jalili is also considered an old-time ideologue at a time when more practical issues, such as the economic crisis and international isolation, dominate the political space. Jalili has promoted his religiosity in his campaign materials. His campaign posted a picture of Jalili praying in a mosque in Kazakhstan during the April 2013 nuclear negotiations with the United States and five other world powers.
            Conservative media have portrayed Jalili as a man with a common touch. One news agency posted a picture of the Jalili’s Kia Pride next to the high-end Mercedes of Hashemi Rafsanjani, another presidential candidate. His own website described him as “a diplomat who speaks little, but who is decisive and revolutionary.” His official biography has emphasized his “humility” and preference for “simple living.”
 
What positions has Jalili taken on the top campaign issues?
             On the economy, Jalili has claimed that international sanctions against Iran have actually spurred economic growth. His campaign website has highlighted his drive to combat public corruption, which several candidates have blamed for causing the economic crisis. He reportedly dismissed 17 envoys while working at the foreign ministry for corruption. Jalili has also called for further privatization. Iran’s large public sector is widely regarded as inefficient.
             On foreign policy, Jalili has echoed the supreme leader. He has described the Arab uprisings as part of “Islamic Awakening” modeled on Iran’s 1979 revolution—noting that the Iran model of an Islamic state can be reproduced everywhere. Jalili has also encouraged developing countries to pool their economic power to rival the superpowers. He tweeted the following slogan on May 14, 2013:
            Jalili has taken a hardline position on the United States and the West. The United States “violates its claims about democracy and free trade by meddling in the internal affairs of other countries,” he said on a January 2013 visit to India. But in a May 14 tweet, his campaign supported U.S.-Iran cooperation to keep the Olympic committee from cutting wrestling. The Iranian team was scheduled to visit the Los Angeles and New York for two friendly matches to raise the sport’s profile that week.
            Jalili has been a staunch defender of Iran’s nuclear energy program and right to enrich uranium. He has claimed that Tehran has no intention of building nuclear weapons. Jalili has also warned the international community against imposing further sanctions on Iran. He tweeted the following message on May 15, 2013.
 
What role has he played in negotiations between Iran and the outside world?
      Since 2007, Jalili has been Iran’s chief negotiator in talks on Iran’s controversial nuclear program with the international community. He led Iran’s delegations in talks with both the world’s six major powers – the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany—as well as with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is the U.N. nuclear watchdog.
      Foreign diplomats describe Jalili as adamant in defending Iran’s right to enrich uranium and long-winded, often taking hours to outline Iran’s positions. In negotiations, he is generally viewed as a purveyor of Iran’s position and a functionary rather than a pivotal decision-maker with the latitude to negotiate compromise on the spot. But they may be assets that generate trust within the regime’s inner circle.
 
What is his background?
            Jalili was born in 1965 in the northeastern city of Mashhad. He attended Imam Sadiq University after serving on the front during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. The elite Tehran institution has prepared many students for bureaucratic positions. Jalili did his graduate work on political thought in the Koran. He reportedly published a book on the Prophet Mohamed’s foreign policy while working for the foreign ministry. Jalili has also taught courses on political science at Sharif University and Imam Sadiq University, according to the biography on his campaign website. 

 

Click here for Jalili's positions on key issues

 

 
Garrett Nada is a Program Assistant at USIP in the Center for Conflict Management.
 
Online news media are welcome to republish original blog postings from this website in full, with a citation and link back to The Iran Primer website (www.iranprimer.com) as the original source. Any edits must be authorized by the author. Permission to reprint excerpts from The Iran Primer book should be directed to permissions@usip.org
 

 

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Latest on the Race: Heir Apparent Esfandiar Mashaei

May 13, 2013 | 2:10pm

Kourosh Rahimkhani

      Although never elected to office, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei has become a major political figure as chief of staff to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He is also one of Iran’s most controversial politicians. Ahmadinejad appointed him vice-president in 2009, but the political backlash and opposition from Iran’s supreme leader forced him to resign within days.
      In May 2013, Mashaei was one of more than 500 candidates who registered to run for the presidency. He is widely viewed as Ahmadinejad’s political heir—and an attempt to keep the faction in power. The two men are also related by marriage. In 2008, Mashaei’s daughter married Ahmadinejad’s oldest son. Kourosh Rahamkhani profiles Mashaei.
 
Does Mashaei have a base of support among the general population?
            Mashaei shares several characteristics with a new generation of political elites. Most were born in villages and small towns. They were young during the 1979 revolution. They have not emerged from the traditional conservative establishment. Many have backgrounds in the Revolutionary Guards or security forces, fostering a “military-security” political class. Finally, few have so far held elected office. But it is difficult to assess how much appeal Mashaei has among the general population. Some of the president’s allies are concerned that Mashaei’s rhetoric has the potential to become popular.

How is Mashaei perceived among Iran’s political elite?
            Mashaei’s statements have provoked the clerical establishment in the holy city of Qom as well as traditional conservatives in the regime. In 2007, Mashaei—then the vice president and head of the Cultural Heritage Organization—angered top clerics and politicians by attending an event in Turkey where women performed a traditional dance. In 2008, he hosted a ceremony in which some women played tambourines and others carried Korans. “It is people who do not understand music who say it is haram [forbidden by Islamic law],” he said.
            He has also sparked controversies over statements about everything from Biblical history to foreign affairs. If the Prophet Noah “had had good managerial skills, other prophets would not have appeared after him,” he reportedly said. He also pronounced, “Without Iran, Islam would be lost.” On current events, he once said, “Iranians are friends of Israelis.”
            His daring comments and actions have pushed the envelope of the Islamic Republic’s officially sanctioned values. Many clerics consider his remarks on religious affairs to be encroaching on their territory and dismissing them as uninformed or even heretical.
            Even fervent supporters of Ahmadinejad have criticized Mashaei. Hardline cleric Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi branded Mashaei’s statements “erroneous and inappropriate.” In 2009, the supreme leader’s representative on the hardline newspaper Keyhan accused Mashaei of being an agent of the “velvet revolution.” General Hassan Firouzabadi, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, denounced Mashaei’s remarks as a “deviation” that undermined national security and against the principles of the Islamic Republic.
 
What is his background?
            Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei was born in 1960 in a northern Iranian village. He participated in his town’s revolutionary rallies as an 18-year-old and studied electrical engineering at Isfahan University after the revolution. In 1981, Mashaei joined the Revolutionary Guards intelligence unit after the Mujahedeen-e Khalq instigated an armed campaign against the Iranian government during the Iran-Iraq War. He was later dispatched to Kurdistan, where Kurdish militants were battling forces loyal to the newly formed Islamic Republic. Mashaei championed a cultural-propaganda campaign, rather than a purely coercive counterinsurgency, to deal with the Kurds.
            In 1984, Mashaei joined the Intelligence Ministry in Kurdistan, where he met Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, then governor of the northwestern city of Khoy. The two men developed a close friendship that has endured almost three decades.
            In 1986, Mashaei was appointed director of an Intelligence Ministry department that dealt with ethnic issues in sensitive regions. He left Kurdistan to help formulate a national strategy. In 1993, he became head of the Interior Ministry’s Social Affairs Department under President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.  After the 1997 victory of reformist President Mohammad Khatami, Mashaei left the Interior Ministry and worked for state radio, which is under the direct control of the supreme leader.
            In 2003, Mashaei joined the staff of Tehran’s new mayor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, after he was selected by the conservative municipal council. He headed the city’s cultural-artistic affairs organization. Among his controversial initiatives, Mashaei proposed building a major thoroughfare to prepare for the arrival of the twelfth Shiite Imam—the Mahdi or “Hidden Imam”—who disappeared in the ninth century. The Mahdi will return as a messiah as the world comes to an end, according to Shiite eschatology.
            After Ahmadinejad was elected president in 2005, Mashaei became a major player in his cabinet, serving as the president’s chief of staff. They also now have family ties. In 2008, Mashaei’s daughter married Ahmadinejad’s oldest son.
 
What role has Mashaei played in Iranian politics?
            Under Ahmadinejad’s patronage, Mashaei has gained more influence in the cabinet, and many see him as the president’s second-in-command. But since 2005, he has also emerged as one of the most controversial figures in the Iranian government. He has been at the center of internal battles between Ahmadinejad’s circle and conservatives known as principlists, who feel the president is veering from the revolution’s early principles.
            Mashaei has held other key positions on both domestic and foreign affairs. Besides chief of staff, he has been the president’s adviser for Middle Eastern affairs; vice president of the High Council of Iranian Affairs Abroad; and the secretary of the administration’s cultural committee.
            Mashaei is often blamed for formulating apocalyptic and religious-nationalistic themes prominent in Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric. Ahmadinejad has urged Iranians to actively pave the way for the coming of the Mahdi. The two themes have been widely viewed as an attempt to build a new constituency among the young and the poor. Ahmadinejad’s messianic interpretation differs from popular Shiite mythology and diminishes the role of Shiite clerics.
            As clerics are falling out of favor in Iranian politics, Ahmadinejad’s opponents are concerned that his rhetoric of “principlists minus the clergy” will become more popular and enhance hardliners around the president.
 
President Ahmadinejad appointed Mashaei vice president in 2009, but he lasted only one week. What happened, and why the controversy?
            President Ahmadinejad appointed Mashaei as his first vice president on July 17, 2009 after the disputed June presidential election. The appointment angered many top clerics and other allies of Ahmadinejad. The appointment reportedly increased tensions within the administration. At one cabinet meeting, four ministers clashed with the president over Mashaei’s appointment. On July 24, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei overruled Ahamdinejad’s appointment and Mashaei was forced to resign.
            The Iranian constitution states that the first vice president has the duty to lead cabinet meetings in the absence of the president. He also succeeds the president—with approval of the supreme leader—if the president dies or becomes incapable of performing his duties. Ahmadinejad’s critics suggested that the president was manipulating the post-election turmoil to insert his right-hand man into the center of power. In the end, however, Mashaei’s opponents had enough leverage to block his appointment. Ahmadinejad instead appointed Mashaei his chief of staff.
 
What is Mashaei’s relationship with Ahmadinejad, and why is the president so supportive of him?
            Mashaei has been viewed as a man surrounded by controversy, and his relationship with President Ahmadinejad has been an enigma to the president’s conservative allies. Ahmadinejad once said he had “a thousand reasons” to support Mashaei and that there was “no convincing” reason for the attacks on him. “One of the virtues and glories God has bestowed on me in life was to become acquainted with this great, honest, and pious man,” Adhmadinejad said.

What positions has Mashaei taken on Iran’s most critical domestic and foreign policy issues, such as negotiations over the nuclear program?
            Mashaei generally echoes the president’s views on Iran’s nuclear program. There is no sign of disagreement between them. But both men have distanced themselves from core fundamentalist policies in Iran, including the hejab (Islamic dress) and police crackdowns on styles of dress considered un-Islamic.
 

Kourosh Rahimkhani is an independent scholar specializing in Iranian affairs. He worked as a journalist for a number of reformist newspapers in Iran before moving to the United States.
 
 
Online news media are welcome to republish original blog postings from this website in full, with a citation and link back to The Iran Primer website (www.iranprimer.com) as the original source. Any edits must be authorized by the author. Permission to reprint excerpts from The Iran Primer book should be directed to permissions@usip.org
 
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Sport I:Iran and US Wrestle--in a different way

May 13, 2013 | 12:00pm

Garrett Nada

           Iran and the United States have at least one urgent interest in common: Their wrestling federations have teamed up to salvage wrestling for the 2020 Olympics after the Olympic Committee recommended dropping the sport in February 2013. The Iranian and American teams were scheduled to hold two friendly matches ― in New York on May 15 and in Los Angeles on May 19 ― to raise the sport’s profile before the committee makes a final decision in September. The Iranians beat the Americans 6 to 1 in New York.

      But the Iranian team’s first trip to the United States in a decade was cut short. The team abruptly flew back to Tehran on May 16. Iran’s wrestling federation told its U.S. counterpart that the team’s schedule had changed but did not provide further explanation. The Iranians said that they remain committed to keeping wrestling in the Olympics.
      Despite tensions between their governments, the American and Iranian wrestling organizations have developed a unique relationship over the past two decades. Iran’s national team has competed in the United States ten times since 1995.
      U.S. participation in Iran’s 1998 Takhti Cup marked the first visit by an American sports team since the 1979 Islamic revolution. The team has competed in Iran ten other times since then. Rich Bender, executive director of USA Wrestling, discusses the U.S.-Iran wrestling relationship.

What is the nature of the U.S.-Iran wrestling relationship?
      We have a positive and strong relationship built on years of competition. The U.S. team has been to Iran 11 times. I have been on four of those tours, and the atmosphere has always been really positive. We have been greeted with open arms. Iranians have shown our athletes a great deal of respect on and off the field of play. Iranians have a high degree of wrestling knowledge, and they appreciate high-level competition. They have been really supportive of our athletes and have cheered them on. Most U.S.-Iran interaction revolves around competitions and exchanges, with the exception of our current joint effort to keep wrestling in the 2020 Olympics.
 
How are Iran and the United States coordinating their efforts to keep wrestling in the 2020 Olympics?
            I visited Iran for the freestyle World Cup in mid-February, less than a week after the Olympic committee recommended dropping wrestling. After I landed in Tehran, I immediately started talking to my Iranian counterparts about ways to collaborate.
            The international wrestling federation and 177 nations, including Iran and the United States, have launched a coordinated effort to retain wrestling as an Olympic sport. Our two federations are hosting the Los Angeles and New York matches in conjunction with “World Wrestling Month.”
 
What difference do matches like these have on diplomacy with Iran? What is the role of sports between nations?
            Sports are a force for good. They bring people together. And interaction increases understanding and lowers barriers. Love of sports is a commonality even among nations that see things differently in terms of politics and religion.
            “Ping-pong diplomacy” had a positive impact on the U.S.-China relationship in the early 1970s. The exchange of players helped pave the way for President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing.
            Wrestling in particular is one of the best sports to provide the opportunity for collaboration. The upcoming exchanges in Los Angeles and New York will feature some intense matchups. But the events are solely about raising wrestling’s profile. The U.S. and Iranian teams want to make a strong case for keeping wrestling in the Olympics.
 
How do the two teams compare?
      Iran, Russia and the United States have the top three teams in freestyle wrestling. Iran’s team won six medals at the 2012 Olympics, including three golds. Iran has won 38 medals in wrestling since 1948.
      In the 2012 games, the U.S. team took four medals, including two golds. The United States has won 129 medals in wrestling since 1904.
      Iran won the freestyle World Cup in February 2013. Russia took second place, followed by the United States.
 
How do U.S. and Iranian wrestling styles differ?
            Neither team has a particular style. The great thing about wrestling is that no technique necessarily works better than another. The athletes use a diverse range of styles and skill sets. There are similarities on both sides of the mat. Some wrestlers tend to be very technical, while others focus on their power.
 
How often do the teams compete? How do the athletes and coaches get along?  
            We meet just about every year at the World Championships, sometimes at World Cups and some other competitions. The United States regularly attends Iran’s annual Takhti Cup. The teams have a mutual respect for each other’s skills.
            The head coaches of the two teams, Zeke Jones and Gholamreza Mohammadi, actually wrestled against each other in the early 1990s. So the rivalry between the two teams has some history.
            The current rivalry dates from the finals of the 2012 Olympics. Jordan Burroughs beat Iran’s Sadegh Goudarzi for the gold medal in the 74 kilo weight class.
            One of the most interesting matchups in the upcoming tour will be between 120 kilogram heavyweights Tervel Dlagnev and Komeil Ghasemi. Iran’s Ghasemi beat Dlagnev for the bronze medal in the 2012 Olympics. 
            Friendly meets and exchanges provide opportunities for interactions off the mat, including occasional team meals together. But for the most part, athletes from both teams tend to stay in competition mode and focus on the matches.
 
Iran’s wrestling team has competed in the United States ten times:
1995 World Championships in Atlanta, Georgia
1995 World Cup in Chattanooga, Tennessee
1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, Georgia
1998 Junior World Championships in Primm, Nevada
1998 World Cup in Stillwater, Oklahoma
1998 Goodwill Games in New York City, New York 
1999 World Cup in Spokane, Washington
2000 World Cup in Fairfax, Virginia
2001 World Cup in Baltimore, Maryland
2003 World Championships in New York City, New York
 
Rich Bender is the executive director of USA Wrestling.
 
Photo Credits: Jordan Burroughs and Sadegh Goudarzi at the 2012 Olympics, courtesy of USA Wrestling.
 
 
Garrett Nada is a Program Assistant at USIP in the Center for Conflict Management.
 
Online news media are welcome to republish original blog postings from this website in full, with a citation and link back to The Iran Primer website (www.iranprimer.com) as the original source. Any edits must be authorized by the author. Permission to reprint excerpts from The Iran Primer book should be directed to permissions@usip.org
 

 

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Sport II: The Basketball Bridge

May 13, 2013 | 11:19am

Garrett Nada

      For more than a decade, Iran has looked to the United States to improve its caliber of basketball. In 2000, the national team even hired American coach Gary LeMoine. Since then, dozens of Americans ― reportedly 37 during one season ― have played on Iranian teams. Jonas Lalehzadeh is among the best-known.
      Since 2011, the six-foot-five-inch point guard from California has played for the national team and two professional clubs in the Super League, Iran’s equivalent of the National Basketball Association. He was the league’s top scorer in the 2012-2013 season.
      Lalehzadeh has ties to both cultures, which makes him unusual among the Americans who play ball in Iran. His Iranian parents were completing their degrees in the United States during the 1979 revolution and decided to stay. He was born in 1989. He grew up in southern California, but was immersed in Persian culture and spoke Farsi at home. He had hoped to play professional basketball in the United States, but didn’t get drafted. So he turned to his parent’s homeland. In an interview, he discussed his experience playing basketball and living in Iran as an American.

What role can sports play in diplomacy? What do American and Iranians have in common on basketball?
          Sports can transcend political differences. American and Iranians both love basketball. Many young Iranians are diehard National Basketball Association (NBA) fans. They do whatever it takes to watch American games online. And they know their favorite players’ statistics by heart. Kobe Bryant and Lebron James have huge followings. The NBA’s only Iranian player, Hamed Haddadi of the Phoenix Suns, also has many fans. Iranians recognize the talent of American players and consider them among the world’s best.
 
What is the role of foreign players in Iran?
      Foreign players, especially Americans, are not only expected to score a lot of points. They are also expected to teach fundamentals to their Iranian teammates and improve their team’s overall ability. Some teams rely heavily on the performance of their foreign players, who are paid up to three times more than their Iranian teammates.
      As a result, Iran imposes a rule on how many foreigners can play at the same time. During the regular season, each team is allowed to have only one foreign player on the floor at a time. Two are allowed on the court during the playoffs. But most teams have only one foreigner.
 
How is the level of play in Iran? How do Iranian and U.S. styles differ?
            Iran has one of the best national teams in Asia. It’s won the Asia Championship twice. The level of play has improved significantly over the last decade. Iranians train just as hard as their U.S. counterparts. Friday is the only day off, so they train twice a day, six days a week.
            In Iranian basketball, big men play with more finesse and move more fluidly. In the United States, the big players focus on power. I have played off guard and point guard in Iran. Iranian guards are more physical than their American counterparts because international rules allow them to be more aggressive.
 
How did you end up playing professional basketball in Iran? What teams have you played for and what competitions have you participated in?
            I played basketball for my high school. I had a walk-on spot on the University of California at Irvine’s team in 2008. I played for three seasons.
            In one of the most unusual diplomatic outreach efforts, the State Department and the NBA invited Iran’s national basketball team to play in a summer league hosted by the Utah Jazz. The Iranian team played four games in the U.S. summer league to prepare for the 2008 Olympics. My father contacted the Iranians and told them about me. I went to Utah and trained with the team for a few days. The Iranian coaches were impressed and wanted me to play for Iran in the Olympics. But there was not enough time to get my visa.
            The Iranian team later invited me to play for the senior national team in 2011. So I skipped my senior season at Irvine and played in international tournaments for the Iranian team in Portugal and Hungary. 
            I decided to stay in Iran to get more playing experience at the professional level. I signed with Petrochimi Bandar Imam (a professional team) for the 2011-2012 Super League season. The team is based in Bandar Imam, a small town in Khuzestan province in southwestern Iran. I helped take the team to the Super League national finals for the first time in eight years. But we did not win.
            I then played for another team, Petrochimi Mahshar, in the 2012-2013 season. We made it to the playoffs despite the team’s low budget. I was the league’s high scorer during the regular season, averaging about 20.6 points per game.
            I was also invited to play for the senior national team, which is drawn from players on many Iranian teams, in the West Asia Basketball Association Championship in February 2013. We beat Lebanon in overtime and won the regional championship. The victory qualified Iran for the Asia Cup, which is scheduled for August 2013 in the Philippines.
 
How were you received in Iran? How was the transition?
            I grew up speaking Farsi with my parents and was already familiar with Persian customs and holidays. Iranians are very warm and hospitable, so they treated me as a guest at first. Learning about my parent’s home country was just as important to me as playing professional basketball.
            In Iran, print journalists and television media were interested in how I ended up playing in Iran, given political tensions with United States. I felt like an ambassador at times when answering questions about basketball and life in the United States. Many Iranians told me they think highly of Americans despite tension between Tehran and Washington. I was honored to represent both countries, as the first athlete born outside of Iran to play for its national team.
 
What are your plans and goals?
      I will do whatever it takes to get into the NBA. I might need to keep playing in Iran to gain more experience. I would also consider playing in Europe or the NBA development league.
      I have really appreciated the opportunity to play basketball and learn more about Iranian culture. My 47,000 Facebook fans and 9,000 Twitter followers have learned a bit about Iran while following my journey. I actually have not spent that much time in Tehran. The professional teams I have played for are based in Khuzestan, a province populated by many Arabs. I have enjoyed experiencing each province’s unique cultural, culinary and linguistic mix.

 

Sport I: Iran and US Wrestle in a Different Way 

Garrett Nada is a Program Assistant at USIP in the Center for Conflict Management.
 
Online news media are welcome to republish original blog postings from this website in full, with a citation and link back to The Iran Primer website (www.iranprimer.com) as the original source. Any edits must be authorized by the author. Permission to reprint excerpts from The Iran Primer book should be directed to permissions@usip.org
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The Islamists Are Coming

The Islamists Are Coming, edited by Robin Wright, surveys the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region more than any other political bloc. Yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.

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