United States Institute of Peace

The Iran Primer

The Final Deal: Obama Statement

On July 14, President Barack Obama welcomed the agreement on Iran’s nuclear program in a televised address. The following is a transcript.

Today, after two years of negotiations, the United States, together with our international partners, has achieved something that decades of animosity has not -- a comprehensive, long-term deal with Iran that will prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

This deal demonstrates that American diplomacy can bring about real and meaningful change -- change that makes our country, and the world, safer and more secure.  This deal is also in line with a tradition of American leadership.  It’s now more than 50 years since President Kennedy stood before the American people and said, “Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate.”  He was speaking then about the need for discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union, which led to efforts to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons.
 
In those days, the risk was a catastrophic nuclear war between two super powers.  In our time, the risk is that nuclear weapons will spread to more and more countries, particularly in the Middle East, the most volatile region in our world. 
 
Today, because America negotiated from a position of strength and principle, we have stopped the spread of nuclear weapons in this region.  Because of this deal, the international community will be able to verify that the Islamic Republic of Iran will not develop a nuclear weapon.
 
This deal meets every single one of the bottom lines that we established when we achieved a framework earlier this spring.  Every pathway to a nuclear weapon is cut off.  And the inspection and transparency regime necessary to verify that objective will be put in place.  Because of this deal, Iran will not produce the highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium that form the raw materials necessary for a nuclear bomb. 
 
Because of this deal, Iran will remove two-thirds of its installed centrifuges -- the machines necessary to produce highly enriched uranium for a bomb -- and store them under constant international supervision.  Iran will not use its advanced centrifuges to produce enriched uranium for the next decade.  Iran will also get rid of 98 percent of its stockpile of enriched uranium. 
 
To put that in perspective, Iran currently has a stockpile that could produce up to 10 nuclear weapons.  Because of this deal, that stockpile will be reduced to a fraction of what would be required for a single weapon.  This stockpile limitation will last for 15 years.
 
Because of this deal, Iran will modify the core of its reactor in Arak so that it will not produce weapons-grade plutonium.  And it has agreed to ship the spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the lifetime of the reactor.  For at least the next 15 years, Iran will not build any new heavy-water reactors. 
 
Because of this deal, we will, for the first time, be in a position to verify all of these commitments.  That means this deal is not built on trust; it is built on verification.  Inspectors will have 24/7 access to Iran’s key nuclear facilities. 
 
*Iran [Inspectors] will have access to Iran’s entire nuclear supply chain -- its uranium mines and mills, its conversion facility, and its centrifuge manufacturing and storage facilities.  This ensures that Iran will not be able to divert materials from known facilities to covert ones.  Some of these transparency measures will be in place for 25 years.
 
Because of this deal, inspectors will also be able to access any suspicious location.  Put simply, the organization responsible for the inspections, the IAEA, will have access where necessary, when necessary.  That arrangement is permanent.  And the IAEA has also reached an agreement with Iran to get access that it needs to complete its investigation into the possible military dimensions of Iran’s past nuclear research. 
 
Finally, Iran is permanently prohibited from pursuing a nuclear weapon under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which provided the basis for the international community’s efforts to apply pressure on Iran. 
 
As Iran takes steps to implement this deal, it will receive relief from the sanctions that we put in place because of Iran’s nuclear program -- both America’s own sanctions and sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council.  This relief will be phased in.  Iran must complete key nuclear steps before it begins to receive new sanctions relief.  And over the course of the next decade, Iran must abide by the deal before additional sanctions are lifted, including five years for restrictions related to arms, and eight years for restrictions related to ballistic missiles.
 
All of this will be memorialized and endorsed in a new United Nations Security Council resolution.  And if Iran violates the deal, all of these sanctions will snap back into place.  So there’s a very clear incentive for Iran to follow through, and there are very real consequences for a violation.
 
That's the deal.  It has the full backing of the international community.  Congress will now have an opportunity to review the details, and my administration stands ready to provide extensive briefings on how this will move forward. 
 
As the American people and Congress review the deal, it will be important to consider the alternative.  Consider what happens in a world without this deal.  Without this deal, there is no scenario where the world joins us in sanctioning Iran until it completely dismantles its nuclear program.  Nothing we know about the Iranian government suggests that it would simply capitulate under that kind of pressure.  And the world would not support an effort to permanently sanction Iran into submission.  We put sanctions in place to get a diplomatic resolution, and that is what we have done. 
 
Without this deal, there would be no agreed-upon limitations for the Iranian nuclear program.  Iran could produce, operate and test more and more centrifuges.  Iran could fuel a reactor capable of producing plutonium for a bomb.  And we would not have any of the inspections that allow us to detect a covert nuclear weapons program.  In other words, no deal means no lasting constraints on Iran’s nuclear program. 
 
Such a scenario would make it more likely that other countries in the region would feel compelled to pursue their own nuclear programs, threatening a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region of the world.  It would also present the United States with fewer and less effective options to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
 
I've been President and Commander-in-Chief for over six years now.  Time and again, I have faced decisions about whether or not to use military force.  It's the gravest decision that any President has to make.  Many times, in multiple countries, I have decided to use force.  And I will never hesitate to do so when it is in our national security interest.  I strongly believe that our national security interest now depends upon preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon -- which means that without a diplomatic resolution, either I or a future U.S. President would face a decision about whether or not to allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon or whether to use our military to stop it. 
 
Put simply, no deal means a greater chance of more war in the Middle East.  Moreover, we give nothing up by testing whether or not this problem can be solved peacefully.  If, in a worst-case scenario, Iran violates the deal, the same options that are available to me today will be available to any U.S. President in the future.  And I have no doubt that 10 or 15 years from now, the person who holds this office will be in a far stronger position with Iran further away from a weapon and with the inspections and transparency that allow us to monitor the Iranian program.
 
For this reason, I believe it would be irresponsible to walk away from this deal.  But on such a tough issue, it is important that the American people and their representatives in Congress get a full opportunity to review the deal.  After all, the details matter.  And we've had some of the finest nuclear scientists in the world working through those details.  And we're dealing with a country -- Iran -- that has been a sworn adversary of the United States for over 35 years.  So I welcome a robust debate in Congress on this issue, and I welcome scrutiny of the details of this agreement.
 
But I will remind Congress that you don't make deals like this with your friends.  We negotiated arms control agreements with the Soviet Union when that nation was committed to our destruction.  And those agreements ultimately made us safer. 
 
I am confident that this deal will meet the national security interest of the United States and our allies.  So I will veto any legislation that prevents the successful implementation of this deal.
 
We do not have to accept an inevitable spiral into conflict. And we certainly shouldn’t seek it.  And precisely because the stakes are so high, this is not the time for politics or posturing.  Tough talk from Washington does not solve problems.  Hard-nosed diplomacy, leadership that has united the world’s major powers offers a more effective way to verify that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon.
 
Now, that doesn’t mean that this deal will resolve all of our differences with Iran.  We share the concerns expressed by many of our friends in the Middle East, including Israel and the Gulf States, about Iran’s support for terrorism and its use of proxies to destabilize the region.  But that is precisely why we are taking this step -- because an Iran armed with a nuclear weapon would be far more destabilizing and far more dangerous to our friends and to the world.
 
Meanwhile, we will maintain our own sanctions related to Iran’s support for terrorism, its ballistic missile program, and its human rights violations.  We will continue our unprecedented efforts to strengthen Israel’s security -- efforts that go beyond what any American administration has done before.  And we will continue the work we began at Camp David to elevate our partnership with the Gulf States to strengthen their capabilities to counter threats from Iran or terrorist groups like ISIL.
 
However, I believe that we must continue to test whether or not this region, which has known so much suffering, so much bloodshed, can move in a different direction. 
 
Time and again, I have made clear to the Iranian people that we will always be open to engagement on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect.  Our differences are real and the difficult history between our nations cannot be ignored.  But it is possible to change.  The path of violence and rigid ideology, a foreign policy based on threats to attack your neighbors or eradicate Israel -- that's a dead end.  A different path, one of tolerance and peaceful resolution of conflict, leads to more integration into the global economy, more engagement with the international community, and the ability of the Iranian people to prosper and thrive.
 
This deal offers an opportunity to move in a new direction.  We should seize it. 
 
We have come a long way to reach this point -- decades of an Iranian nuclear program, many years of sanctions, and many months of intense negotiation.  Today, I want to thank the members of Congress from both parties who helped us put in place the sanctions that have proven so effective, as well as the other countries who joined us in that effort. 
 
I want to thank our negotiating partners -- the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China, as well as the European Union -- for our unity in this effort, which showed that the world can do remarkable things when we share a vision of peacefully addressing conflicts.  We showed what we can do when we do not split apart.
 
And finally, I want to thank the American negotiating team.  We had a team of experts working for several weeks straight on this, including our Secretary of Energy, Ernie Moniz.  And I want to particularly thank John Kerry, our Secretary of State, who began his service to this country more than four decades ago when he put on our uniform and went off to war.  He’s now making this country safer through his commitment to strong, principled American diplomacy.
 
History shows that America must lead not just with our might, but with our principles.  It shows we are stronger not when we are alone, but when we bring the world together.  Today’s announcement marks one more chapter in this pursuit of a safer and more helpful and more hopeful world.
 
Thank you.  God bless you.  And God bless the United States of America.
 
 

The Final Deal: Full Text

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Vienna, 14 July 2015
 
PREFACE
 
The E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the Islamic Republic of Iran welcome this historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which will ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in their approach to this issue. They anticipate that full implementation of this JCPOA will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.
 
Iran envisions that this JCPOA will allow it to move forward with an exclusively peaceful, indigenous nuclear programme, in line with scientific and economic considerations, in accordance with the JCPOA, and with a view to building confidence and encouraging international cooperation. In this context, the initial mutually determined limitations described in this JCPOA will be followed by a gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, of Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, including its enrichment activities, to a commercial programme for exclusively peaceful purposes, consistent with international non-proliferation norms.
 
The E3/EU+3 envision that the implementation of this JCPOA will progressively allow them   to gain confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s programme. The JCPOA reflects mutually determined parameters, consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on the scope of Iran’s nuclear programme, including enrichment activities and R&D. The JCPOA addresses the E3/EU+3’s concerns, including through comprehensive measures providing for transparency and verification.
 
The JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy.
 
PREAMBLE AND GENERAL PROVISIONS
 
i.  The Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) have decided upon this long-term Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).  This JCPOA, reflecting a step-by-step approach, includes the reciprocal commitments as laid down in this document and the annexes hereto and is to be endorsed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council.
 
ii.  The full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.
 
iii.  Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.
 
iv.  Successful implementation of this JCPOA will enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in line with its obligations therein, and the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any other non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT.
 
v.  This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy.
 
vi.  The E3/EU+3 and Iran reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set out in the UN Charter.  
 
vii.  The E3/EU+3 and Iran acknowledge that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
 
viii.  The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation. The E3/EU+3 will refrain from imposing discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by this JCPOA. This JCPOA builds on the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) agreed in Geneva on 24 November 2013.  
 
ix.  A Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of this JCPOA and will carry out the functions provided for in this JCPOA.  This Joint Commission will address issues arising from the implementation of this JCPOA and will operate in accordance with the provisions as detailed in the relevant annex.  
 
x.  The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be requested to monitor and verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA. The IAEA will be requested to provide regular updates to the Board of Governors, and as provided for in this JCPOA, to the UN Security Council.  All relevant rules and regulations of the IAEA with regard to the protection of information will be fully observed by all parties involved.
 
xi.  All provisions and measures contained in this JCPOA are only for the purpose of its implementation between E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as setting precedents for any other state or for fundamental principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the NPT and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognised principles and practices.  
 
xii.  Technical details of the implementation of this JCPOA are dealt with in the annexes to this document.
 
xiii.  The EU and E3+3 countries and Iran, in the framework of the JCPOA, will cooperate, as appropriate, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects as detailed in Annex III, including through  IAEA involvement.
 
xiv.  The E3+3 will submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council endorsing this JCPOA affirming that conclusion of this JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this issue and expressing its desire to build a new relationship with Iran. This UN Security Council resolution will also provide for the termination on Implementation Day of provisions imposed under previous resolutions; establishment of specific restrictions; and conclusion of consideration of the Iran nuclear issue by the UN Security Council 10 years after the Adoption Day.
 
xv.  The provisions stipulated in this JCPOA will be implemented for their respective durations as set forth below and detailed in the annexes.
 
xvi.  The E3/EU+3 and Iran will meet at the ministerial level every 2 years, or earlier if needed, in order to review and assess progress and to adopt appropriate decisions by consensus.
 
I.         
Iran and E3/EU+3 will take the following voluntary measures within the timeframe as detailed in this JCPOA and its Annexes 
 
NUCLEAR
 
A.     ENRICHMENT, ENRICHMENT R&D, STOCKPILES   
 
1.  Iran's long term plan includes certain agreed limitations on all uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment-related activities including certain limitations on specific research and development (R&D) activities for the first 8 years, to be followed by gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to the next stage of its enrichment activities for exclusively peaceful purposes, as described in Annex I.  Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments, as expressed in its own long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of the initial declaration for the Additional Protocol to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement.
 
2.  Iran will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period, Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA continuous monitoring, as specified in Annex I.
 
3.  Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium. Iran's enrichment R&D with uranium for 10 years will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges as laid out in Annex I, and Iran will not engage in other isotope separation technologies for enrichment of uranium as specified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges, and will commence testing of up to 30 IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges after eight and a half years, as detailed in Annex I.
 
4.  As Iran will be phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges, it will not manufacture or assemble other centrifuges, except as provided for in Annex I, and will replace failed centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. Iran will manufacture advanced centrifuge machines only for the purposes specified in this JCPOA. From the end of the eighth year, and as described in Annex I, Iran will start to manufacture agreed numbers of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without rotors and will store all of the manufactured machines at Natanz, under IAEA continuous monitoring until they are needed under Iran's long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan.
 
5.  Based on its long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out its uranium enrichment-related activities, including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%, and, at Fordow, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment R&D and from keeping any nuclear material.
 
6.  Iran will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics and technology centre. International collaboration including in the form of scientific joint partnerships will be established in agreed areas of research. 1044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades will remain in one wing at Fordow. Two of these cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through appropriate infrastructure modification, for stable isotope production.  The other four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle. All other centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure will be removed and stored under IAEA continuous monitoring as specified in Annex I.
 
7.  During the 15 year period, and as Iran gradually moves to meet international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran, it will keep its uranium stockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) or the equivalent in other chemical forms. The excess quantities are to be sold based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran, or are to be down-blended to natural uranium level. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from Russia or other sources for use in Iran's nuclear reactors will not be counted against the above stated 300 kg UF6 stockpile, if the criteria set out in Annex I are met with regard to other sources. The Joint Commission will support assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran. All remaining uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Any additional fuel needed for the TRR will be made available to Iran at international market prices.
 
B.    ARAK, HEAVY WATER, REPROCESSING
 
8.  Iran will redesign and rebuild a modernised heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enriched up to 3.67 %, in a form of an international partnership which will certify the final design. The reactor will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production for medical and industrial purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor will not produce weapons grade plutonium. Except for the first core load, all of the activities for redesigning and manufacturing of the fuel assemblies for the redesigned reactor will be carried out in Iran.  All spent fuel from Arak will be shipped out of Iran for the lifetime of the reactor. This international partnership will include participating E3/EU+3 parties, Iran and such other countries as may be mutually determined.  Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager and the E3/EU+3 and Iran will, before Implementation Day, conclude an official document which would define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants.
 
9.  Iran plans to keep pace with the trend of international technological advancement in relying on light water for its future power and research reactors with enhanced international cooperation, including assurance of supply of necessary fuel.
 
10.  There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy water in Iran for 15 years. All excess heavy water will be made available for export to the international market.
 
11.  Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present power and research nuclear reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevant contracts to be duly concluded with the recipient party.
 
12.  For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any spent fuel reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of spent fuel reprocessing, or reprocessing R&D activities leading to a spent fuel reprocessing capability, with the sole exception of separation activities aimed exclusively at the production of medical and industrial radio-isotopes from irradiated enriched uranium targets.
 
C.    TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES
 
13.  Consistent with the respective roles of the President and Majlis (Parliament), Iran will provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, proceed with its ratification within the timeframe as detailed in Annex V and fully implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.
 
14.  Iran will fully implement the "Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues" agreed with the IAEA, containing arrangements to address past and present issues of concern relating to its nuclear programme as raised in the annex to the IAEA report of 8 November 2011 (GOV/2011/65). Full implementation of activities undertaken under the Roadmap by Iran will be completed by 15 October 2015, and subsequently the Director General will provide by 15 December 2015 the final assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding issues to the Board of Governors, and the E3+3, in their capacity as members of the Board of Governors, will submit a resolution to the Board of Governors for taking necessary action, with a view to closing the issue, without prejudice to the competence of the Board of Governors.
 
15.  Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the voluntary measures for their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency measures, as set out in this JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures include: a long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years; containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years, as defined in Annex I.
 
16.  Iran will not engage in activities, including at the R&D level, that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including uranium or plutonium metallurgy activities, as specified in Annex I.
 
17.  Iran will cooperate and act in accordance with the procurement channel in this JCPOA, as detailed in Annex IV, endorsed by the UN Security Council resolution.
 
SANCTIONS
 
18.  The UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA will terminate all provisions of previous UN Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue - 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) – simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran and will establish specific restrictions, as specified in Annex V.[1]
 
19.  The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation, as subsequently amended, implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions, including related designations, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V, which cover all sanctions and restrictive measures in the following areas, as described in Annex II:
 
i.        Transfers of funds between EU persons and entities, including financial institutions, and Iranian persons and entities, including financial institutions;
ii.        Banking activities, including the establishment of new correspondent banking relationships and the opening of new branches and subsidiaries of Iranian banks in the territories of EU Member States;
iii.        Provision of insurance and reinsurance;
iv.        Supply of specialised financial messaging services, including SWIFT, for persons and entities set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions;
v.        Financial support for trade with Iran (export credit, guarantees or insurance);
vi.       Commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the Government of Iran;
vii.       Transactions in public or public-guaranteed bonds;
viii.       Import and transport of Iranian oil, petroleum products, gas and petrochemical products;
ix.        Export of key equipment or technology for the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
x.         Investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
xi.        Export of key naval equipment and technology;
xii.       Design and construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers;
xiii.       Provision of flagging and classification services;
xiv.       Access to EU airports of Iranian cargo flights;
xv.        Export of gold, precious metals and diamonds;
xvi.       Delivery of Iranian banknotes and coinage;
xvii.       Export of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, and export or software for integrating industrial processes;
xviii.      Designation of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban) set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II; and
xix.        Associated services for each of the categories above.
 
20.  The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation implementing all EU proliferation-related sanctions, including related designations, 8 years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier.
 
21.  The United States will cease the application, and will continue to do so, in accordance with this JCPOA of the sanctions specified in Annex II to take effect simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of the agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V.  Such sanctions cover the following areas as described in Annex II:
 
i.        Financial and banking transactions with  Iranian banks and financial institutions as specified in Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran and specified individuals and entities identified as Government of Iran by the Office of Foreign Assets Control on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), as set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II (including the opening and maintenance of correspondent and payable through-accounts at non-U.S. financial institutions, investments, foreign exchange transactions and letters of credit);
 
ii.        Transactions in Iranian Rial;
 
iii.        Provision of U.S. banknotes to the Government of Iran;
 
iv.        Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues abroad, including limitations on their transfer;
 
v.        Purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt, including governmental bonds;
 
vi.        Financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II;
 
vii.        Underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance;
 
viii.        Efforts to reduce Iran’s crude oil sales;
 
ix.        Investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services, information, technology and technical expertise and support for Iran's oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
 
x.        Purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation or marketing  of petroleum, petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran;
 
xi.        Export, sale or provision of refined petroleum products and petrochemical products to Iran;
 
xii.        Transactions with Iran's energy sector;
 
xiii.        Transactions with Iran’s shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators;
 
xiv.        Trade in gold and other precious metals;
 
xv.        Trade with Iran in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes;
 
xvi.        Sale, supply or transfer of goods and services used in connection with Iran’s automotive sector;
 
xvii.        Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above;
 
xviii.        Remove individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II from the   SDN List, the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List; and
 
xix.        Terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645, and Sections 5 – 7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628.
 
22.  The United States will, as specified in Annex II and in accordance with Annex V, allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran; license non-U.S. persons that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person to engage in activities with Iran consistent with this JCPOA; and license the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs.
 
23.  Eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier, the United States will seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the sanctions specified in Annex II on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in this JCPOA, to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT. 
 
24.  The E3/EU and the United States specify in Annex II a full and complete list of all nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures and will lift them in accordance with Annex V. Annex II also specifies the effects of the lifting of sanctions beginning on "Implementation Day". If at any time following the Implementation Day, Iran believes that any other nuclear-related sanction or restrictive measure of the E3/EU+3 is preventing the full implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the JCPOA participant in question will consult with Iran with a view to resolving the issue and, if they concur that lifting of this sanction or restrictive measure is appropriate, the JCPOA participant in question will take appropriate action.  If they are not able to resolve the issue, Iran or any member of the E3/EU+3 may refer the issue to the Joint Commission.
 
25.  If a law at the state or local level in the United States is preventing the implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the United States will take appropriate steps, taking into account all available authorities, with a view to achieving such implementation. The United States will actively encourage officials at the state or local level to take into account the changes in the U.S. policy reflected in the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA and to refrain from actions inconsistent with this change in policy.
 
26.  The EU will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions that it has terminated implementing under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. There will be no new nuclear- related UN Security Council sanctions and no new EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures.  The United States will make best efforts in good faith to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realisation of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified in Annex II. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions specified in Annex II that it has ceased applying under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA.  The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.
 
27.  The E3/EU+3 will take adequate administrative and regulatory measures to ensure clarity and effectiveness with respect to the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA.  The EU and its Member States as well as the United States will issue relevant guidelines and make publicly accessible statements on the details of sanctions or restrictive measures which have been lifted under this JCPOA.  The EU and its Member States and the United States commit to consult with Iran regarding the content of such guidelines and statements, on a regular basis and whenever appropriate.
 
28.  The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation. Senior Government officials of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will make every effort to support the successful implementation of this JCPOA including in their public statements[2]. The E3/EU+3 will take all measures required to lift sanctions and will refrain from imposing exceptional or discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by the JCPOA.  
 
29.  The EU and its Member States and the United States, consistent with their respective laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful implementation of this JCPOA.
 
30.  The E3/EU+3 will not apply sanctions or restrictive measures to persons or entities for engaging in activities covered by the lifting of sanctions provided for in this JCPOA, provided that such activities are otherwise consistent with E3/EU+3 laws and regulations in effect. Following the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA as specified in Annex II, ongoing investigations on possible infringements of such sanctions may be reviewed in accordance with applicable national laws.  
 
31.  Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the EU and its Member States will terminate the implementation of the measures applicable to designated entities and individuals, including the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian banks and financial institutions, as detailed in Annex II and the attachments thereto.  Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the United States will remove designation of certain entities and individuals on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, and entities and individuals listed on the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, as detailed in Annex II and the attachments thereto.
 
32.  EU and E3+3 countries and international participants will engage in joint projects with Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation projects, in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including nuclear power plants, research reactors, fuel fabrication, agreed joint advanced R&D such as fusion, establishment of a state-of-the-art regional nuclear medical centre, personnel training, nuclear safety and security, and environmental protection, as detailed in Annex III. They will take necessary measures, as appropriate, for the implementation of these projects.
 
33.  The E3/EU+3 and Iran will agree on steps to ensure Iran’s access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy. The EU will further explore possible areas for cooperation between the EU, its Member States and Iran, and in this context consider the use of available instruments such as export credits to facilitate trade, project financing and investment in Iran.
 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
 
34.  Iran and the E3/EU+3 will implement their JCPOA commitments according to the sequence specified in Annex V. The milestones for implementation are as follows:
 
i.        Finalisation Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concluded among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of the resolution endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for adoption without delay.
 
ii.        Adoption Day is the date 90 days after the endorsement of this JCPOA by the UN Security Council, or such earlier date as may be determined by mutual consent of the JCPOA participants, at which time this JCPOA and the commitments in this JCPOA come into effect.  Beginning on that date, JCPOA participants will make necessary arrangements and preparations for the implementation of their JCPOA commitments.
 
iii.        Implementation Day is the date on which, simultaneously with the IAEA report verifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in Sections 15.1. to 15.11 of Annex V, the EU and the United States take the actions described in Sections 16 and 17 of Annex V respectively and in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution, the actions described in Section 18 of Annex V occur at the UN level.
 
iv.        Transition Day is the date 8 years after Adoption Day or the date on which the Director General of the IAEA submits a report stating that the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier.  On that date, the EU and the United States will take the actions described in Sections 20 and 21 of Annex V respectively and Iran will seek, consistent with the Constitutional roles of the President and Parliament, ratification of the Additional Protocol.
 
v.        UN Security Council resolution Termination Day is the date on which the UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA terminates according to its terms, which is to be 10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions of previous resolutions have not been reinstated. On that date, the EU will take the actions described in Section 25 of Annex V.
 
35.  The sequence and milestones set forth above and in Annex V are without prejudice to the duration of JCPOA commitments stated in this JCPOA.
 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM
 
36.  If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution; similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran was not meeting its commitments under this JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 could do the same. The Joint Commission would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration, any participant could refer the issue to Ministers of Foreign Affairs, if it believed the compliance issue had not been resolved. Ministers would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration – in parallel with (or in lieu of) review at the Ministerial level -  either the complaining participant or the participant whose performance is in question could request that the issue be considered by an Advisory Board, which would consist of three members (one each appointed by the participants in the dispute and a third independent member). The Advisory Board should provide a non-binding opinion on the compliance issue within 15 days. If, after this 30-day process the issue is not resolved, the Joint Commission would consider the opinion of the Advisory Board for no more than 5 days in order to resolve the issue. If the issue still has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant, and if the complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant non-performance, then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance.
 
37.  Upon receipt of the notification from the complaining participant, as described above, including a description of the good-faith efforts the participant made to exhaust the dispute resolution process specified in this JCPOA, the UN Security Council, in accordance with its procedures, shall vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting. If the resolution described above has not been adopted within 30 days of the notification, then the provisions of the old UN Security Council resolutions would be re-imposed, unless the UN Security Council decides otherwise. In such event, these provisions would not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of application, provided that the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent with this JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council resolutions. The UN Security Council, expressing its intention to prevent the reapplication of the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notification is resolved within this period, intends to take into account the views of the States involved in the issue and any opinion on the issue of the Advisory Board. Iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.
 

[1] The provisions of this Resolution do not constitute provisions of this JCPOA.
[2] 'Government officials' for the U.S. means senior officials of the U.S. Administration. 
 
Annex I – Nuclear-related measures
 
A. GENERAL
 
1.  The sequence of implementation of the commitments detailed in this Annex is specified in Annex V to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Unless otherwise specified, the durations of the commitments in this Annex are from Implementation Day.
 
B.  ARAK HEAVY WATER RESEARCH REACTOR
 
2.  Iran will modernise the Arak heavy water research reactor to support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotopes production for medical and industrial purposes.  Iran will redesign and rebuild the reactor, based on the agreed conceptual design (as attached to this Annex) to support its peaceful nuclear research and production needs and purposes, including testing of fuel pins and assembly prototypes and structural materials. The design will be such as to minimise the production of plutonium and not to produce weapon-grade plutonium in normal operation. The power of the redesigned reactor will not exceed 20 MWth. The E3/EU+3 and Iran share the understanding that the parameters in the conceptual design are subject to possible and necessary adjustments in developing the final design while fully preserving the above-mentioned purposes and principles of modernisation.
 
3.  Iran will not pursue construction at the existing unfinished reactor based on its original design and will remove the existing calandria and retain it in Iran. The calandria will be made inoperable by filling any openings in the calandria with concrete such that the IAEA can verify that it will not be usable for a future nuclear application.  In redesigning and reconstructing of the modernized Arak heavy water research reactor, Iran will maximise the use of existing infrastructure already installed at the current Arak research reactor.
 
4.  Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager, and have responsibility for overall implementation of the Arak modernisation project, with E3/EU+3 participants assuming responsibilities regarding the modernisation of the Arak reactor as described in this Annex.  A Working Group composed of E3/EU+3 participants will be established to facilitate the redesigning and rebuilding of the reactor.  An international partnership composed of Iran and the Working Group would implement the Arak modernisation project.  The Working Group could be enlarged to include other countries by consensus of the participants of the Working Group and Iran.  E3/EU+3 participants and Iran will conclude an official document expressing their strong commitments to the Arak modernisation project in advance of Implementation Day which would provide an assured path forward to modernise the reactor and would define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants, and subsequently contracts would be concluded.  The participants of the Working Group will provide assistance needed by Iran for redesigning and rebuilding the reactor, consistent with their respective national laws, in such a manner as to enable the safe and timely construction and commissioning of the modernised reactor.
 
5.  Iran and the Working Group will cooperate to develop the final design of the modernised reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories to be carried out by Iran, and review conformity with international safety standards, such that the reactor can be licensed by the relevant Iranian regulatory authority for commissioning and operation.  The final design of the modernised reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories will be submitted to the Joint Commission.  The Joint Commission will aim to complete its review and endorsement within three months after the submission of the final design.  If the Joint Commission does not complete its review and endorsement within three months, Iran could raise the issue through the dispute resolution mechanism envisaged by this JCPOA.
 
6.  The IAEA will monitor the construction and report to the Working Group for confirmation that the construction of the modernised reactor is consistent with the approved final design.
 
7.  As the project manager, Iran will take responsibility for the construction efforts. E3/EU+3 parties will, consistent with their national laws, take appropriate administrative, legal, technical, and regulatory measures to support co-operation.
 
E3/EU+3 parties will support the purchase by Iran, the transfer and supply of necessary materials, equipment, instrumentation and control systems and technologies required for the construction of the redesigned reactor, through the mechanism established by this JCPOA, as well as through exploration of relevant funding contributions.
 
8.  E3/EU+3 parties will also support and facilitate the timely and safe construction of the modernized Arak reactor and its subsidiary laboratories, upon request by Iran, through IAEA technical cooperation if appropriate, including but not limited to technical and financial assistance, supply of required materials and equipment, state-of-the-art instrumentation and control systems and equipment and support for licensing and authorization.
 
9.  The redesigned reactor will use up to 3.67 percent enriched uranium in the form of UO2 with a mass of approximately 350 kg of UO2 in a full core load, with a fuel design to be reviewed and approved by the Joint Commission. The international partnership with the participation of Iran will fabricate the initial fuel core load for the reactor outside Iran.  The international partnership will cooperate with Iran, including through technical assistance, to fabricate, test and license fuel fabrication capabilities in Iran for subsequent fuel core reloads for future use with this reactor.  Destructive and non-destructive testing of this fuel including Post-Irradiation-Examination (PIE) will take place in one of the participating countries outside of Iran and that country will work with Iran to license the subsequent fuel fabricated in Iran for the use in the redesigned reactor under IAEA monitoring.
 
10.  Iran will not produce or test natural uranium pellets, fuel pins or fuel assemblies, which are specifically designed for the support of the originally designed Arak reactor, designated by the IAEA as IR-40. Iran will store under IAEA continuous monitoring all existing natural uranium pellets and IR-40 fuel assemblies until the modernised Arak reactor becomes operational, at which point these natural uranium pellets and IR-40 fuel assemblies will be converted to UNH, or exchanged with an equivalent quantity of natural uranium. Iran will make the necessary technical modifications to the natural uranium fuel production process line that was intended to supply fuel for the IR-40 reactor design, such that it can be used for the fabrication of the fuel reloads for the modernised Arak reactor.
 
11.  All spent fuel from the redesigned Arak reactor, regardless of its origin, for the lifetime of the reactor, will be shipped out of Iran to a mutually determined location in E3/EU+3 countries or third countries, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevant contracts to be concluded, consistent with national laws, with the recipient party, within one year from the unloading from the reactor or whenever deemed to be safe for transfer by the recipient country.
 
12.  Iran will submit the DIQ of the redesigned reactor to the IAEA which will include information on the planned radio-isotope production and reactor operation programme. The reactor will be operated under IAEA monitoring.
 
13.  Iran will operate the Fuel Manufacturing Plant only to produce fuel assemblies for light water reactors and reloads for the modernized Arak reactor.
 
C. HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION PLANT
 
14.  All excess heavy water which is beyond Iran's needs for the modernised Arak research reactor, the Zero power heavy water reactor, quantities needed for medical research and production of deuterate solutions and chemical compounds including, where appropriate, contingency stocks, will be made available for export to the international market based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer for 15 years.  Iran's needs, consistent with the parameters above, are estimated to be 130 metric tonnes of nuclear grade heavy water or its equivalent in different enrichments prior to commissioning of the modernised Arak research reactor, and 90 metric tonnes after the commissioning, including the amount contained in the reactor.
 
15.  Iran will inform the IAEA about the inventory and the production of the HWPP and will allow the IAEA to monitor the quantities of the heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced, including through IAEA visits, as requested, to the HWPP.
 
D. OTHER REACTORS
 
16.  Consistent with its plan, Iran will keep pace with the trend of international technological advancement in relying only on light water for its future nuclear power and research reactors with enhanced international cooperation including assurances of supply of necessary fuel.
  
17.  Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present nuclear power and research reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevant contracts to be concluded consistent with national laws with the recipient party.
 
E. SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES
 
18.  For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any spent fuel reprocessing or spent fuel reprocessing R&D activities. For the purpose of this annex, spent fuel includes all types of irradiated fuel.
 
19.  For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, reprocess spent fuel except for irradiated enriched uranium targets for production of radio-isotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes.
 
20.  For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, develop, acquire or build facilities capable of separation of plutonium, uranium or neptunium from spent fuel or from fertile targets, other than for production of radio-isotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes.
 
21.  For 15 years, Iran will only develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions less than 6 cubic meters in volume compatible with the specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol.  These will be co-located with the modernised Arak research reactor, the Tehran Research Reactor, and radio-medicine production complexes, and only capable of the separation and processing of industrial or medical isotopes and non-destructive PIE. The needed equipment will be acquired through the procurement mechanism established by this JCPOA. For 15 years, Iran will develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions beyond 6 cubic meters in volume and specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol, only after approval by the Joint Commission.
 
22.  The E3/EU+3 are ready to facilitate all of the destructive and non-destructive examinations on fuel elements and/or fuel assembly prototypes including PIE for all fuel fabricated in or outside Iran and irradiated in Iran, using their existing facilities outside Iran. Except for the Arak research reactor complex, Iran will not develop, build, acquire or operate hot cells capable of performing PIE or seek to acquire equipment to build/develop such a capability, for 15 years.
 
23.  For 15 years, in addition to continuing current fuel testing activities at the TRR, Iran will undertake non-destructive post irradiation examination (PIE) of fuel pins, fuel assembly prototypes and structural materials. These examinations will be exclusively at the Arak research reactor complex. However, the E3/EU+3 will make available their facilities to conduct destructive testing with Iranian specialists, as agreed. The hot cells at the Arak research reactor in which non-destructive PIE are performed will not be physically interconnected to cells that process or handle materials for the production of medical or industrial radioisotopes.
 
24.  For 15 years, Iran will not engage in producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their alloys, or conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.
 
25.  Iran will not produce, seek, or acquire separated plutonium, highly enriched uranium (defined as 20% or greater uranium-235), or uranium-233, or neptunium-237 (except for use as laboratory standards or in instruments using neptunium-237) for 15 years.
 
26.  If Iran seeks to initiate R&D on uranium metal based TRR fuel in small agreed quantities after 10 years and before 15 years, Iran will present its plan to, and seek approval by, the Joint Commission.
 
F. ENRICHMENT CAPACITY
 
27.  Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at no more than 5060 IR-1 centrifuge machines in no more than 30 cascades in their current configurations in currently operating units at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) for 10 years.
 
28.  Iran will keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67 percent for 15 years.
 
29.  Iran will remove the following excess centrifuges and infrastructure not associated with 5060 IR-1 centrifuges in FEP, which will be stored at Natanz  in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous  monitoring:
 
29.  All excess centrifuge machines, including IR-2m centrifuges. Excess IR-1 centrifuges will be used for the replacement of failed or damaged centrifuges of the same type on a one-for-one basis.
 
29.  UF6 pipework including sub headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters, and UF6 withdrawal equipment from one of the withdrawal stations, which is currently not in service, including its vacuum pumps and chemical traps.
 
30.  For the purpose of this Annex, the IAEA will confirm through the established practice the failed or damaged status of centrifuge machines before removal.
 
31.  For 15 years, Iran will install gas centrifuge machines, or enrichment-related infrastructure, whether suitable for uranium enrichment, research and development, or stable isotope enrichment, exclusively at the locations and for the activities specified under this JCPOA.
 
G. CENTRIFUGES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
 
32.  Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium. For 10 years and consistent with its enrichment R&D plan, Iran's enrichment R&D with uranium will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges. Mechanical testing on up to two single centrifuges for each type will be carried out only on the IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7 and IR-8.  Iran will build or test, with or without uranium, only those gas centrifuges specified in this JCPOA.
 
33.  Consistent with its plan, Iran will continue working with the 164-machine IR-2m cascade at PFEP in order to complete the necessary tests until 30 November 2015 or the day of implementation of this JCPOA, whichever comes later, and after that it will take these machines out of the PFEP and store them under IAEA continuous monitoring at Natanz in Hall B of FEP.
 
34.  Consistent with its plan, Iran will continue working with the 164-machine IR-4 cascade at PFEP in order to complete the necessary tests until 30 November 2015 or the day of implementation of this JCPOA, whichever comes later, and after that it will take these machines out of the PFEP and store them under IAEA continuous monitoring at Natanz in Hall B of FEP.
 
35.  Iran will continue the testing of a single IR-4 centrifuge machine and IR-4 centrifuge cascade of up to 10 centrifuge machines for 10 years.
 
36.  Iran will test a single IR-5 centrifuge machine for 10 years.  
 
37.  Iran will continue testing of the IR-6 on single centrifuge machines and its intermediate cascades and will commence testing of up to 30 centrifuge machines from one and a half years before the end of year 10.  Iran will proceed from single centrifuge machines and small cascades to intermediate cascades in a logical sequence.
 
38.  Iran will commence, upon start of implementation of the JCPOA, testing of the IR-8 on single centrifuge machines and its intermediate cascades and will commence the testing of up to 30 centrifuges machines from one and a half years before the end of year 10. Iran will proceed from single centrifuges to small cascades to intermediate cascades in a logical sequence.
 
39.  For 10 years, Iran, consistent with the established practice, will recombine the enriched and depleted streams from the IR-6 and IR-8 cascades through the use of welded pipework on withdrawal main headers in a manner that precludes the withdrawal of enriched and depleted uranium materials and verified by the IAEA.
 
40.  For 15 years, Iran will conduct all testing of centrifuges with uranium only at the PFEP. Iran will conduct all mechanical testing of centrifuges only at the PFEP and the Tehran Research Centre.
 
41.  For the purpose of adapting PFEP to the R&D activities in the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, Iran will remove all centrifuges except those needed for testing as described in the relevant paragraphs above, except for the IR-1 cascade (No. 1) as described below. For the full IR-1 cascade (No. 6), Iran will modify associated infrastructure by removing UF6 pipework, including sub-headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters. The IR-1 cascade (No. 1) centrifuges will be kept but made inoperable, as verified by the IAEA, through the removal of centrifuge rotors and the injection of epoxy resin into the sub headers, feeding, product, and tails pipework, and the removal of controls and electrical systems for vacuum, power and cooling. Excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring. The R&D space in line No. 6 will be left empty until Iran needs to use it for its R&D programme.
 
42.  Consistent with the activities in the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, Iran will maintain the cascade infrastructure for testing of single centrifuges and small and intermediate cascades in two R&D lines (No. 2 and No. 3) and will adapt two other lines (No. 4 and No. 5) with infrastructure similar to that for lines No. 2 and No. 3 in order to enable future R&D activities as specified in this JCPoA. Adaptation will include modification of all UF6 pipework (including removal of all sub headers except as agreed as needed for the R&D programme) and associated instrumentation to be compatible with single centrifuges and small and intermediate cascade testing instead of full scale testing.
 
43.  Consistent with its plan and internationally established practices, Iran intends to continue R&D on new types of centrifuges through computer modelling and simulations, including at universities. For any such project to proceed to a prototype stage for mechanical testing within 10 years, a full presentation to, and approval by, the Joint Commission is needed.   
 
H. FORDOW FUEL ENRICHMENT PLANT
 
44.  The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) will be converted into a nuclear, physics, and technology centre and international collaboration will be encouraged in agreed areas of research. The Joint Commission will be informed in advance of the specific projects that will be undertaken at Fordow.
 
45.  Iran will not conduct any uranium enrichment or any uranium enrichment related R&D and will have no nuclear material at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) for 15 years.
 
46.  For 15 years, Iran will maintain no more than 1044 IR-1 centrifuge machines at one wing of the FFEP of which:
 
46.  Two cascades that have not experienced UF6 before will be modified for the production of stable isotopes.  The transition to stable isotope production of these cascades at FFEP will be conducted in joint partnership between the Russian Federation and Iran on the basis of arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. To prepare these two cascades for installation of a new cascade architecture appropriate for stable isotope production by the joint partnership, Iran will remove the connection to the UF6 feed main header, and move cascade UF6 pipework (except for the dump line in order to maintain vacuum) to storage in Fordow under IAEA continuous monitoring. The Joint Commission will be informed about the conceptual framework of stable isotope production at FFEP.
 
46.  For four cascades with all associated infrastructure remaining except for pipework that enables crossover tandem connections, two will be placed in an idle state, not spinning. The other two cascades will continue to spin until the transition to stable isotope production described in the previous subparagraph has been completed. Upon completion of the transition to stable  isotope production described in the previous subparagraph, these two spinning cascades will be placed in an idle state, not spinning.  
 
47.  Iran will remove the other 2 cascades of IR-1 centrifuges from this wing, by removing all centrifuges and cascade UF6 pipework, including sub headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters.  
 
47. also subsequently remove cascade electrical cabling, individual cascade control cabinets and vacuum pumps. All these excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring. 
 
48. Iran will remove all excess centrifuges and uranium enrichment related infrastructure from the other wing of the FFEP. This will include removal of all centrifuges and UF6 pipework, including sub headers, valves and pressure gauges and transducers, and frequency inverters and converters, and UF6 feed and withdrawal stations.
 
48.  also subsequently remove cascade electrical cabling, individual cascade control cabinets, vacuum pumps and centrifuge mounting blocks. All these excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring. 
 
49.  Centrifuges from the four idle cascades may be used for the replacement of failed or damaged centrifuges in stable isotope production at Fordow.
 
50.  Iran will limit its stable isotope production activities with gas centrifuges to the FFEP for 15 years and will use no more than 348 IR-1 centrifuges for these activities at the FFEP. The associated R&D activities in Iran will occur at the FFEP and at Iran's declared and monitored centrifuge manufacturing facilities for testing, modification and balancing these IR-1 centrifuges.
 
51.  The IAEA will establish a baseline for the amount of uranium legacy from past enrichment operations that will remain in Fordow. Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily as requested by the IAEA, access to the FFEP in order to monitor Iran's production of stable isotopes and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at the FFEP for 15 years.
 
I. OTHER ASPECTS OF ENRICHMENT
 
52.  Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments as expressed in its own long term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of the initial declaration described in Article 2 of the Additional Protocol.[1] The IAEA will confirm on an annual basis, for the duration of the plan that the nature and scope and scale of Iran's enrichment and enrichment R&D activities are in line with this plan. 
 
53.  Iran will start to install necessary infrastructure for the IR-8 at Natanz in Hall B of FEP after year 10.
 
54.  An agreed template for describing different centrifuge types (IR-1, IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7, IR-8) and the associated definitions need to be accomplished by implementation day.
 
55.  An agreed procedure for measuring IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuge performance data needs to be accomplished by implementation day.
 
J. URANIUM STOCKS AND FUELS
 
56.  Iran will maintain a total enriched uranium stockpile of no more than 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) for 15 years.
 
57.  All enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched UF6 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) will be down blended to natural uranium level or be sold on the international market and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran. Iran will enter into a commercial contract with an entity outside Iran for the purchase and transfer of its enriched uranium stockpile in excess of 300 kg UF6 in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran. The E3/EU+3 will facilitate, where applicable, the conclusion and implementation of this contract. Iran may choose to seek to sell excess enriched uranium to the IAEA fuel bank in Kazakhstan when the fuel bank becomes operational.
 
58.  All uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or less. Scrap oxide and other forms not in plates that cannot be fabricated into TRR fuel plates will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or less. In case of future supply of 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) for TRR fuel plates fabrication, all scrap oxide and other forms not in plates that cannot be fabricated into TRR fuel plates, containing uranium enriched to between 5% and 20%, will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or less within 6 months of its production. Scrap plates will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside Iran. The commercial transactions should be structured to return an equivalent amount of natural uranium to Iran. For 15 years, Iran will not build or operate facilities for converting fuel plates or scrap back to UF6.
 
59.  Russian designed, fabricated and licensed fuel assemblies for use in Russian-supplied reactors in Iran do not count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from other sources outside of Iran for use in Iran's nuclear research and power reactors, including those which will be fabricated outside of Iran for the initial fuel load of the modernised Arak research reactor, which are certified by the fuel supplier and the appropriate Iranian authority to meet international standards, will not count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit.  The Joint Commission will establish a Technical Working Group with the goal of enabling fuel to be fabricated in Iran while adhering to the agreed stockpile parameters (300 kg of up to 3.67 % enriched UF6 or the equivalent in different chemical forms). This Technical Working Group will also, within one year, work to develop objective technical criteria for assessing whether fabricated fuel and its intermediate products can be readily converted to UF6. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies and its intermediate products manufactured in Iran and certified to meet international standards, including those for the modernised Arak research reactor, will not count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit provided the Technical Working Group of the Joint Commission approves that such fuel assemblies and their intermediate products cannot be readily reconverted into UF6. This could for instance be achieved through impurities (e.g. burnable poisons or otherwise) contained in fuels or through the fuel being in a chemical form such that direct conversion back to UF6 would be technically difficult without dissolution and purification. The objective technical criteria will guide the approval process of the Technical Working Group. The IAEA will monitor the fuel fabrication process for any fuel produced in Iran to verify that the fuel and intermediate products comport with the fuel fabrication process that was approved by the Technical Working Group. The Joint Commission will also support assistance to Iran including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced by Iran.
 
60.  Iran will seek to enter into a commercial contract with entities outside Iran for the purchase of fuel for the TRR and enriched uranium targets. The E3/EU+3 will facilitate, as needed, the conclusion and implementation of this contract. In the case of lack of conclusion of a contract with a fuel supplier, E3/EU+3 will supply a quantity of 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) and deliver to Iran, exclusively for the purpose of fabrication in Iran of fuel for the TRR and enriched uranium targets for the lifetime of the reactor. This 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) will be supplied in increments no greater than approximately 5 kg and each new increment will be provided only when the previous increment of this material has been verified by the IAEA to have been mixed with aluminum to make fuel for the TRR or fabricated into enriched uranium targets. Iran will notify the E3/EU+3 within 2 year before the contingency of TRR fuel will be exhausted in order to have the uranium oxide available 6 months before the end of the 2 year period.
 
K. CENTRIFUGE MANUFACTURING
 
61.  Consistent with its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, Iran will only engage in production of centrifuges, including centrifuge rotors suitable for isotope separation or any other centrifuge components, to meet the enrichment and enrichment R&D requirements of this Annex.
 
62. Consistent with its plan, Iran will use the stock of IR-1 centrifuge machines in storage, which are in excess of the remaining 5060 IR-1 centrifuges in Natanz and the IR-1 centrifuges installed at Fordow, for the replacement of failed or damaged machines. Whenever during the 10 year period from the start of the implementation of the JCPOA, the level of stock of IR-1 machines falls to 500 or below, Iran may maintain this level of stock by resuming production of IR-1 machines at a rate up to the average monthly crash rate without exceeding the stock of 500.
 
63.  Consistent with its plan, at the end of year 8, Iran will commence manufacturing of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges without rotors through year 10 at a rate of up to 200 centrifuges per year for each type. After year 10, Iran will produce complete centrifuges with the same rate to meet its enrichment and enrichment R&D needs. Iran will store them at Natanz in an above ground location, under IAEA continuous monitoring, until they are needed for final assembly according to the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan.
 

L. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AND MODIFIED CODE 3.1
 
64.  Iran will notify the IAEA of provisional application of the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol pending its entry into force, and subsequently seek ratification and entry into force, consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Parliament).
 
65.  Iran will notify the IAEA that it will fully implement the Modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement as long as the Safeguards Agreement remains in force.
 
M. PAST AND PRESENT ISSUES OF CONCERN
 
66.  Iran will complete all activities as set out in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues”, as verified by the IAEA in its regular updates by the Director General of the IAEA on the implementation of this Roadmap.
 
N. MODERN TECHNOLOGIES AND LONG TERM PRESENCE OF IAEA
 
67.  For the purpose of increasing the efficiency of monitoring for this JCPOA, for 15 years or longer, for the specified verification measures: 
 
67.  Iran will permit the IAEA the use of on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors, as well as other IAEA approved and certified modern technologies in line with internationally accepted IAEA practice. Iran will facilitate automated collection of IAEA measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices and sending to IAEA working space in individual nuclear sites.
 
67. Iran will make the necessary arrangements to allow for a long-term IAEA presence, including issuing long-term visas, as well as providing proper working  space at nuclear sites and, with best efforts, at locations near nuclear sites in Iran for the  designated IAEA inspectors for working and keeping necessary equipment.
 
67. Iran will increase the number of designated IAEA inspectors to the range of 130-150 within 9 months from the date of the implementation of the JCPOA, and will generally allow the designation of inspectors from nations that have diplomatic relations with Iran, consistent with its laws and regulations.

O. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO URANIUM ORE CONCENTRATE (UOC)
 
68.  Iran will permit the IAEA to monitor, through agreed measures that will include containment and surveillance measures, for 25 years, that all uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source, is transferred to the uranium conversion facility (UCF) in Esfahan or to any other future uranium conversion facility which Iran might decide to build in Iran within this period.
 
69.  Iran will provide the IAEA with all necessary information such that the IAEA will be able to verify the production of the uranium ore concentrate and the inventory of uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source for 25 years.
 
P. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO ENRICHMENT
70.  For 15 years, Iran will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, including through containment and surveillance measures, as necessary, to verify that stored centrifuges and infrastructure remain in storage, and are only used to replace failed or damaged centrifuges, as specified in this Annex.
 
71.  Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily access as requested by the IAEA, to relevant buildings at Natanz, including all parts of the FEP and PFEP, for 15 years.
 
72.  For 15 years, the Natanz enrichment site will be the sole location for all of Iran's uranium enrichment related activities including safeguarded R&D.
 
73.  Iran intends to apply nuclear export policies and practices in line with the internationally established standards for the export of nuclear material, equipment and technology. For 15 years, Iran will only engage, including through export of any enrichment or enrichment related equipment and technology, with any other country, or with any foreign entity in enrichment or enrichment related activities, including related research and development activities, following approval by the Joint Commission.

Q. ACCESS
 
74.  Requests for access pursuant to provisions of this JCPOA will be made in good faith, with due observance of the sovereign rights of Iran, and kept to the minimum necessary to effectively implement the verification responsibilities under this JCPOA. In line with normal international safeguards practice, such requests will not be aimed at interfering with Iranian military or other national security activities, but will be exclusively for resolving concerns regarding fulfilment of the JCPOA commitments and Iran's other non-proliferation and safeguards obligations. The following procedures are for the purpose of JCPOA implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran and are without prejudice to the safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol thereto. In implementing this procedure as well as other transparency measures, the IAEA will be requested to take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge.  
 
75.  In furtherance of implementation of the JCPOA, if the IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA, at locations that have not been declared under the comprehensive safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol, the IAEA will provide Iran the basis for such concerns and request clarification.
 
76.  If Iran’s explanations do not resolve the IAEA’s concerns, the Agency may request access to such locations for the sole reason to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at such locations.  The IAEA will provide Iran the reasons for access in writing and will make available relevant information.
 
77.  Iran may propose to the IAEA alternative means of resolving the IAEA’s concerns that enable the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the location in question, which should be given due and prompt consideration.
 
78.  If the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA cannot be verified after the implementation of the alternative arrangements agreed by Iran and the IAEA, or if the two sides are unable to reach satisfactory arrangements to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the specified locations within 14 days of the IAEA’s original request for access, Iran, in consultation with the members of the Joint Commission, would resolve the IAEA’s concerns through necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA.  In the absence of an agreement, the members of the Joint Commission, by consensus or by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members, would advise on the necessary means to resolve the IAEA's concerns. The process of consultation with, and any action by, the members of the Joint Commission would not exceed 7 days, and Iran would implement the necessary means within 3 additional days.

R. CENTRIFUGE COMPONENT MANUFACTURING TRANSPARENCY
 
79.  Iran and the IAEA will take the necessary steps for containment and surveillance on centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows for 20 years.
 
80.  In this context:
 
80.  Iran will provide the IAEA with an initial inventory of all existing centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows and subsequent reports on changes in such inventory and will permit the IAEA to verify the inventory by item counting and numbering, and through containment and surveillance, of all rotor tubes and bellows, including in all existing and newly produced centrifuges.
 
80.  Iran will declare all locations and equipment, namely flow-forming machines, filament-winding machines and mandrels that are used for production of centrifuge rotor tubes or bellows, and will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, including through containment and surveillance on this equipment, to verify that this equipment is being used to manufacture centrifuges only for the activities specified in this JCPOA.

S. OTHER URANIUM ISOTOPE SEPARATION ACTIVITIES
 
81.  For 10 years, Iran's uranium isotope separation-related research and development or production activities will be exclusively based on gaseous centrifuge technology.[2] Iran will permit IAEA access to verify that uranium isotope separation production and R&D activities are consistent with this Annex.
 
T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
 
82.  Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device:
 
82.  Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices.
 
82.  Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.
 
82.  Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.
 
82.  Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.

Attachment: Arak conceptual design
 
Fundamental Principles:
·         Maximize use of the current infrastructure of original design of Arak research reactor, designated by the IAEA as IR-40, according to their respective ratings.
·         Modernizing of the original design in order to be a multi-purpose research reactor comprising radio-isotope production, structural materials and fuel (pins and assembly prototypes) testing and able to conduct other neutronic experiments which demand high neutron fluxes (more than 1014).
·         Using heavy water as coolant, moderator and reflector. Light water would be utilized as an annular ring around the compact new core for safety reasons if necessary.
·         Around 78 fuel assemblies in a tight hexagonal grid spacing with the following preliminary characteristics will be loaded.
·         Up to 3.67 percent enriched UO2, in the improved assembly design, will be used as fuel.
·         Power will not exceed to 20 MWth.
·         Adding different types of beam tubes to the existing beam tubes which being extended to the edge of the new compact core.
·         Having one central channel in the center of the new core with passive cooling system for the purpose of structural materials and fuel pins and assembly prototypes testing with neutron flux beyond 2•1014, twelve in-core irradiation channels (IIC) inside the core and twelve lateral irradiation chennals (LIC) just next to the outer ring of fuel assemblies.
·         The location of the in-core and lateral irradiation channels should be designed and fixed to meet the best anticipated performances.
·         Consistent with relevant section of Annex 1, sibsidiary laboratories are part of the modernization project of the Arak Research Reactor. In Addition, Annex III reinforce design and construction of subsidiary laboratoties.
·         The highest tolerable pressure for the first and second loop is 0.33 Mpa (at the interance of the reactor pit).
·         The highest possible flow rate for coolant is 610 kg/s at the pressure of 0.33 MPa in the main piping system and 42 Kg/sec for Moderator with the same conditions.
 
 
Preliminary Characteristics:
Core Parameters
Values
Power (MW)
20
Number of fuel assemblies
~ 78
Active length (cm)
~ 110
Lattice configuration
Hexagonal
Fuel pellets Material
UO2
Fuel enrichment level
Up to 3.67 %
Clad material
Zr Alloys
Burnable poison
Yes, if necessary
Lattice pitch (cm)
~ 11
Coolant medium
D2O
Moderator medium
D2O
Reflector medium
D2O
Reflector thickness (cm)
~ 50
Purity of D2O
~ 99.8%
Mass of D2O (mtons)
~ 60-70
Yearly makeup
Yes
Keff
< 1.25
Core Excess reactivity (pcm)
< 20000
Cycle length (days) approximatly
~ 250
239Pu at EoC (g)
~ 850
239Pu purity at EoC
~ 78%
235U consumption
~ 60%
Maximum Thermal Flux , E<0.625ev
~ 3•1014
Maximum Fast Flux, E>0.625ev
~ 1•1014
Minimum Thermal Flux , E<0.625ev
~ 1•1014
Minimum Fast Flux, E>0.625ev
~ 1•1014
Fluid velocity in channels (m/s)
~ 3.8
Channel mass flow rate (kg/s)
~ 2.4
Working pressure (MPa)
0.33
Fluid inlet temperature (oC)
~ 47
Fluid outlet temperature (oC)
~ 78
Core material
Mainly S.S. 304
Core wall Thichness (mm)
~ 30
Fuel Pellet Diameter (cm)
~ 0.65
Inner Clad Diameter (cm)
~ 0.67
Outer Clad Diameter (cm)
~ 0.8
Number of pins per assembly
12
Mass of UO2 in full core load (Kg)
~ 350
Core diameter (cm)
~ 240
 
 
 
 
 

[1] Iran will permit the IAEA to share the content of the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, as submitted as part of the initial declaration, with the Joint Commission participants. 
[2] For the purpose of this Annex, non-gaseous centrifuge uranium isotope separation-related research and development or production will include laser isotope separation systems, electromagnetic isotope separation systems, chemical exchange systems, gaseous diffusion systems, vortex and aerodynamic systems, and other such processes that separate uranium isotopes.
 

Annex II – Sanctions-related commitments                                                          
 
The sequence of implementation of the commitments detailed in this Annex is specified in Annex V (Implementation Plan) to this Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
 
A.    European Union[1]
 
1.    The EU and EU Member States commit to terminate all provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 (as subsequently amended) implementing all nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures as specified in Sections 1.1-1.10 below, to terminate all provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP (as subsequently amended), as specified in Sections 1.1-1.10 below, and to terminate or amend national implementing legislation as required, in accordance with Annex V:
 
1.    Financial, banking and insurance measures[2]
 
1.    Prohibition and authorisation regimes on financial transfers to and from Iran (Article 10 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 30, 30a, 30b and 31 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
 
1.    Sanctions on banking activities (Article 11 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 33 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
 
1.    Sanctions on insurance (Article 12 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 35 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
 
1.    Sanctions on financial messaging services (Article 20(12) of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 23(4) of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
 
1.    Sanctions on financial support for trade with Iran (Article 8 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP);
 
1.    Sanctions on grants, financial assistance and concessional loans (Article 9 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP);
 
1.    Sanctions on Government of Iran public-guaranteed bonds (Article 13 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 34 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
 
1.    Sanctions on associated services[3] for each of the categories above (see the references above).
 
1.    Oil, gas and petrochemical sectors
 
1.    Sanctions on the import of oil and gas from Iran (Articles 3a, 3c and 3e of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 11, 12 and 14a, and Annexes IV and IVA of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
 
1.    Sanctions on the import of Iranian petrochemical products (Articles 3b and 3d of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 13 and 14, and Annex V of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
 
1.    Sanctions on the export of key equipment for the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors (Articles 4, 4a and 4b of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 8, 9 and 10, and Annexes VI and VIA of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
 
1.    Sanctions on investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors  (Articles 6, 6a and 7 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 17(1), 17(2)(b) and (c), 17(3), 17(4), 17(5), 20 and 21 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
 
1.    Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see the references above).
 
1.    Shipping, shipbuilding and transport sectors
 
1.    Sanctions related to shipping and shipbuilding (Articles 4g, 4h, 8a, 18a and 18b of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 10a, 10b, 10c, 37a, and 37b, and Annex VIB of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
 
1.    Sanctions related to the transport sector (Articles 15, 16, 17 and 18 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 36 and 37 of Council Regulation  (EU) No 267/2012); and
 
1.    Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see the references above).
 
1.    Gold, other precious metals, banknotes and coinage
 
1.    Sanctions on gold, precious metals and diamonds, banknotes and coinage (Articles 4c and 4d of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 15 and 16, and Annex VII of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
 
1.    Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see the references above).
 
1.    Nuclear proliferation-related measures
 
1.    Sanctions related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities (goods and technology, investment and specialised training) (Articles 1(1) (a), (b), (d), (e), (2), (3) and (4), 2, 3, 5, 14 and 21 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,7, 17(1) and (2)(a), 18, 19 and 22, and Annexes I, II and III of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
 
1.    Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).
 
1.    Metals
 
1.    Sanctions on metals (Articles 4e and 4f of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 15a, 15b and 15c, and Annex VIIB of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
 
1.    Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).
 
1.    Software
 
1.    Sanctions on software (Articles 4i and 4j of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 10d, 10e and 10f, and Annex VIIA of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
 
1.    Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).
 
1.    Arms
 
1.    Sanctions on arms (Articles 1(1)(c), (3) and (4), and 3 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 5(1)(a) and (c), 17(1) and (2)(a), and 19 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
 
1.    Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).
 
1.    Listing of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban)
 
1.    Asset freeze and visa ban measures applicable to:
 
1.    listed Iranian banks and financial institutions,  including the Central Bank of Iran;
2.    listed persons, entities and bodies related  to the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
3.    listed persons, entities and bodies related  to shipping, shipbuilding and transport;
4.    other listed persons, entities and bodies not related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear-, arms- and ballistic missile- related activities;
5.    listed persons, entities and bodies related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear-, arms- and ballistic missile-related activities; and
6.    entities and individuals listed by the UN Security Council,
 
as set out in Attachment 1, part I to this Annex for categories 1.9.1.1-1.9.1.4, Attachment 2, part I to this Annex for category 1.9.1.5, and Parts II of Attachments 1 and 2 to this Annex for category 1.9.1.6 (Articles 19 and 20, and Annexes I and II to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 28a, 28b and 29, and Annexes VIII and IX to Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012).
 
1.    Other provisions
 
1.    The commitment in Section 1 covers all remaining provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 not specified above.
 
1.    Definitions (Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
 
1.    General and final provisions (Articles 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 26a, 27 and 28 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP;  Articles 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 43a, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 and 51, and Annex X of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012).
 
2.    The EU represents that the provisions listed in Section 1 above constitute the full and complete list of all EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures. These sanctions or restrictive measures will be lifted in accordance with Annex V.
 
3.    Effects of the lifting of EU economic and financial sanctions
 
3.    As a result of the lifting of sanctions specified in Section 1 above, the following activities, including associated services, will be allowed, beginning on implementation day, in accordance with this JCPOA and provided that such activities are otherwise consistent with EU and EU Member States’ laws and regulations in effect:[4]
 
3.    Financial, banking and insurance measures (See Sections 1.1.1 to 1.1.8)
 
1.    Transfers of funds between EU persons, entities or bodies, including EU financial and credit institutions, and Iranian persons, entities or bodies, including Iranian financial and credit institutions, without the requirement for authorisation or notification;
 
1.    Opening of new branches, subsidiaries or representative offices of Iranian banks in the territories of EU Member States; and the establishment of new joint ventures, or the taking of an ownership interest or the establishment of new correspondent banking relationships by Iranian banks with EU banks; and opening by EU persons, including EU financial and credit institutions, of representative offices, subsidiaries, joint ventures or bank accounts in Iran;
 
1.    Provision of insurance or reinsurance to Iran or the Government of Iran, an Iranian legal person, entity or body, or a natural person or a legal person, entity or body acting on their behalf or at their direction;
 
1.    Supply of specialised financial messaging services to any Iranian natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, including those listed in Attachment 1 to this Annex;
 
1.    Entering into commitments by EU Member States to provide financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance; and into commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the Government of Iran; and
 
1.    Sale or purchase of public or public-guaranteed bonds to and from Iran, the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, or Iranian banks and financial institutions or persons acting on their behalf.
 
3.    Oil, gas and petrochemical sectors (See Sections 1.2.1 to 1.2.5)
 
1.    Import, purchase, swap or transport of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products, natural gas or petrochemical products and related financing;
 
1.    Sale, supply, transfer or export of equipment or technology, technical assistance, including training, used in the sectors of the oil, gas and petrochemical industries in Iran covering exploration, production and refining of oil and natural gas, including liquefaction of natural gas, to any Iranian person, in or outside Iran, or for use in Iran; and
 
1.    Granting of any financial loan or credit to, the acquisition or extension of a participation in, and the creation of any joint venture with, any Iranian person that is engaged in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors in Iran or outside Iran.
 
3.    Shipping, shipbuilding and transport sectors (See Sections 1.3.1 to 1.3.3)
 
1.    Sale, supply, transfer or export of naval equipment and technology for ship building, maintenance or refit, to Iran or to any Iranian persons engaged in this sector; the design, construction or the participation in the design or construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers for Iran or for Iranian persons; the provision of vessels designed or used for the transport or storage of oil and petrochemical products to Iranian persons, entities or bodies; and the provision of flagging and classification services, including those pertaining to technical specification, registration and identification numbers of any kind, to Iranian oil tankers and cargo vessels;
 
1.    Access to the airports under the jurisdiction of EU Member States of all cargo flights operated by Iranian carriers or originating from Iran;
 
1.    Cessation of inspection, seizure and disposal by EU Member States of cargoes to and from Iran in their territories with regard to items which are no longer prohibited; and
 
1.    Provision of bunkering or ship supply services, or any other servicing of vessels, to Iranian-owned or Iranian-contracted vessels not carrying prohibited items; and the provision of fuel, engineering and maintenance services to Iranian cargo aircraft not carrying prohibited items.
 
3.    Gold, other precious metals, banknotes and coinage (See Sections 1.4.1 to 1.4.2)
 
1.    Sale, supply, purchase, export, transfer or transport of gold and precious metals as well as diamonds, and provision of related brokering, financing and security services, to, from or for the Government of Iran, its public bodies, corporations and agencies, or the Central Bank of Iran; and
 
1.    Delivery of newly printed or minted or unissued Iranian denominated banknotes and coinage to, or for the benefit of the Central Bank of Iran.
 
3.    Metals (See Sections 1.6.1 to 1.6.2)
 
1.    Sale, supply, transfer or export of graphite and raw or semi-finished metals, such as aluminum and steel to any Iranian person, entity or body or for use in Iran, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA.
 
3.    Software (See Sections 1.7.1 to 1.7.2)
 
1.    Sale, supply, transfer or export of software for integrating industrial processes, including updates, to any Iranian person, entity or body, or for use in Iran, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA,
 
3.    Listing of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban) (See Section 1.9.1)
 
1.    As a result of delisting as specified in this Annex, releasing of all funds and economic resources which belong to, and making available funds or economic resources to, the persons, entities and bodies, including Iranian banks and financial institutions, the Central Bank of Iran, listed in Attachment 1 to this Annex; and
 
3.8.2.     As a result of delisting as specified in this Annex, entry into, or transit through the territories of EU Member States of individuals listed in Attachment 1 to this Annex.
 
B.    United States[5]
 
4.                      The United States commits to cease the application of, and to seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, all nuclear-related sanctions[6] as specified in Sections 4.1-4.9 below, and to terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622 and 13645, and Sections 5-7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628, in accordance with Annex V.[7]
 
4.1.               Financial and banking measures
 
4.1.1.           Sanctions on transactions with individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex, including: the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and other specified Iranian financial institutions; the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC),[8] Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) and other specified individuals and entities identified as Government of Iran by the Office of Foreign Assets Control; and certain designated individuals and entities on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) Section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii)(I); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA) Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA) Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1245(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(C)(i)(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i) and 5(a) of Executive Order (E.O.) 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
 
4.1.2.           Sanctions on the Iranian Rial (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 1(a), 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
 
4.1.3.           Sanctions on the provision of U.S. banknotes to the Government of Iran (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
 
4.1.4.           Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues held abroad, including limitations on their transfer (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i)-(ii), 2(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
 
4.1.5.           Sanctions on the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt, including governmental bonds (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA) Section 213(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
 
4.1.6.           Sanctions on financial messaging services to the CBI and Iranian financial institutions set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 220; IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and
 
4.1.7.           Sanctions on associated services[9] for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).
 
4.2.               Insurance measures
 
4.2.1.           Sanctions on the provision of underwriting services, insurance, or re-insurance in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including activities with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to this Annex (Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA) Section 5(a)(7); NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Sections 211(a) and 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645).
 
4.3.               Energy and petrochemical sectors
 
4.3.1.           Efforts to reduce Iran's crude oil sales, including limitations on the quantities of Iranian crude oil sold and the nations that can purchase Iranian crude oil (ISA Section 5(a)(7); NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 1 of E.O. 13574, Sections 1(a)(i)-(ii), 2(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, Section 5 of E.O. 13628, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
 
4.3.2.           Sanctions on investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services, information, technology and technical expertise and support for Iran's oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors  (ISA Sections 5(a)(1)-(2) and (4)-(8); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2), 1245(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C)(i)(I)-(II), (a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)-(II) and (c),  1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 1 of E.O. 13574, Section 1 of E.O. 13590, Sections 1(a)(i)-(ii), 2(a)(i)-(iii) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
 
4.3.3.           Sanctions on the purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation, or marketing of petroleum, petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and  (h)(2), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i)-(iii), 2(a)(i)-(ii) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
 
4.3.4.           Sanctions on the export, sale or provision of refined petroleum products and petrochemical  products to Iran (ISA Section 5(a)(3); NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 1 of E.O. 13574, Sections 1(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, Section 5 of E.O. 13628, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
 
4.3.5.           Sanctions on transactions with Iran's energy sector including with NIOC, NICO and NITC  (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2), 1246(a) and 1247(a); TRA Section 212(a); Sections 1(a)(i)-(iii), 2(a)(i)-(ii) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and
 
4.3.6.           Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).
 
4.4.               Shipping, shipbuilding and port sectors
             
4.4.1.           Sanctions on transactions with Iran's shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators including IRISL, South Shipping Line, and NITC, and the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas[10] (TRA Sections 211(a) and 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d); 1245(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C)(i)(I)-(II), (a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)-(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and
 
4.4.2.           Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).
 
4.5.               Gold and other precious metals
 
4.5.1.           Sanctions on Iran's trade in gold and other precious metals (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1245(a)(1)(A) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and
 
4.5.2.           Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).
 
4.6.               Software and metals
 
4.6.1.           Sanctions on trade with Iran in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes, in connection with  activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachments 3 and 4 to this Annex (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1245(a)(1)(B)-(C) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and
 
4.6.2.           Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).
 
4.7.               Automotive sector
 
4.7.1.           Sanctions on the sale, supply or transfer of goods and services used in connection with Iran's automotive sector (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1245(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C)(i)(II), (a)(1)(C)(ii)(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i), 3(a)(i)-(ii), 5 and 6 of E.O. 13645); and
 
4.7.2.           Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).
 
4.8.               Designations and other sanctions listings
 
4.8.1.           Removal of individuals and entities set out in Attachments 3 and 4 to this Annex from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List (Removal of designations and/or sanctions imposed under ISA Section 5(a), IFCA Section 1244(d)(1) and TRA Section 212; and removals pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of certain persons listed pursuant to E.O. 13382, E.O. 13608, E.O. 13622, and E.O. 13645).
 
4.9.               Nuclear proliferation-related measures
 
4.9.1.           Sanctions under the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in the JCPOA, to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT;
 
1.    Sanctions on joint ventures relating to the mining, production, or transportation of uranium (ISA Section 5(b)(2)); and
 
1.    Exclusion of Iranian citizens from higher education coursework related to careers in nuclear science, nuclear engineering or the energy sector (TRA Section 501).
 
5.                      Other trade measures
 
5.1.               The United States commits to: [11]
 
5.1.1.           Allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran by licensing the (i) export, re-export, sale, lease or transfer to Iran of commercial passenger aircraft for exclusively civil aviation end-use, (ii) export, re-export, sale, lease or transfer to Iran of spare parts and components for commercial passenger aircraft, and (iii) provision of associated serviced, including warranty, maintenance, and repair services and safety-related inspections, for all the foregoing, provided that licensed items and services are used exclusively for commercial passenger aviation;[12]
 
5.1.2.           License non-U.S. entities that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person[13]  to engage in activities with Iran that are consistent with this JCPOA; and
 
5.1.3.           License the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs, including pistachios and caviar.
 
6.                      The United States represents that the provisions listed in Section 4 above constitute the full and complete list of all U.S. nuclear-related sanctions. These sanctions will be lifted in accordance with Annex V.
 
7.    Effects of the lifting of U.S. economic and financial sanctions:
 
7.    As a result of the lifting of sanctions specified in Section 4 above, beginning on implementation day such sanctions, including associated services, would not apply to non-U.S. persons who carry out the following or that:[14]
 
7.    Financial and banking measures[15] (See Sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.7)
 
Engage in activities, including financial and banking transactions, with the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, Iranian financial institutions and other Iranian persons specified in Attachment 3 to this Annex, including the provision of loans, transfers, accounts (including the opening and maintenance of correspondent and payable through accounts at non-U.S. financial institutions), investments, securities, guarantees, foreign exchange (including Rial related transactions), letters of credit and commodity futures or options, the provision of specialised financial messaging services and facilitation of direct or indirect access thereto, the purchase or acquisition by the Government of Iran of U.S. bank notes, and the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt.[16] 
 
7.    Insurance measures (See Section 4.2.1)
 
Provide underwriting services, insurance, or re-insurance in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including activities with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to this Annex, including underwriting services, insurance, or re-insurance in connection with activities in the energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors of Iran, for the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) or the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), or for vessels that transport crude oil, natural gas, liquefied natural gas, petroleum and petrochemical products to or from Iran.
 
7.    Energy and petrochemical sectors (See Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.6)
 
Are part of the energy sector of Iran; purchase, acquire, sell, transport or market petroleum, petroleum products (including refined petroleum products), petrochemical products or natural gas (including liquefied natural gas) to or from Iran; provide to Iran support, investment (including through joint ventures), goods, services (including financial services) and technology that can  be used in connection with Iran’s energy sector, the development of its petroleum resources, its domestic production of refined petroleum products and petrochemical products; or engage in activities with Iran’s energy sector, including NIOC, NITC, and NICO). 
 
7.    Shipping, shipbuilding and port sectors (See Sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.2)
 
Are part of the shipping or shipbuilding sectors of Iran; own, operate, control or insure a vessel used to transport crude oil, petroleum products (including refined petroleum products), petrochemical products or natural gas (including liquefied natural gas) to or from Iran; operate a port in Iran, engage in activities with, or provide financial services and other goods and services used in connection with, the shipping and shipbuilding sectors of Iran or a port operator in Iran (including the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas[17]), including port services, such as bunkering and inspection, classification, and financing, and the sale, leasing, and provision of vessels to Iran, including to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), NITC, and South Shipping Line Iran or their affiliates.
 
7.    Gold and other precious metals (See Sections 4.5.1 to 4.5.2)
 
Sell, supply, export or transfer, directly or indirectly, to or from Iran, gold and other precious metals, or conduct or facilitate a financial transaction or provide services for the foregoing including security, insurance and transportation.
 
7.    Software and metals (See Sections 4.6.1 to 4.6.2)
 
Sell, supply, or transfer,  directly or indirectly, graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes, to or from Iran in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to this Annex, and the sale, supply, or transfer of such materials to the energy, petrochemical, shipping and shipbuilding sectors of Iran, and Iranian ports, or conduct or facilitate a financial transaction or provide services for the foregoing, including insurance and transportation.
 
 
7.    Automotive sector (See Sections 4.7.1 to 4.7.2)
 
Conduct or facilitate financial or other transactions for the sale, supply or transfer to Iran of goods and services used in connection with the automotive sector of Iran.
 
7.    Designations and other sanctions listings (See Section 4.8.1)
 
The removal of designations and/or sanctions as described in Section 4.8.1, ceasing the application of secondary sanctions for transactions with individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex; and unblocking of property and interests in property within U.S. jurisdiction for individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex.
 
 
 

[1] For the purposes of EU legislation, “Iranian person, entity or body” means:
i.        the State of Iran or any public authority thereof;
ii.        any natural person in, or resident in, Iran;
iii.        any legal person, entity or body having its registered office in Iran;
iv.        any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside Iran, owned or controlled directly or indirectly by one or more of the above mentioned persons or bodies.
 
[2] The headings and subheadings in this Annex are for descriptive purposes only
 
[3] For the purposes of this Annex, the term "associated services" means any service –
including technical assistance, training, insurance, re-insurance, brokering, transportation or financial service – necessary and ordinarily incident to the underlying activity for which sanctions have been lifted pursuant to this JCPOA.
 
[4] Unless specifically provided otherwise, the sanctions lifting described in this Section does not apply to transactions that involve persons still subject to restrictive measures and is without prejudice to sanctions that may apply under legal provisions other than those referred to in Section 1. Nothing in this JCPOA reflects a change in Iran's position on EU sanctions.
 
[5] For the purposes of U.S. legislation, “Iranian person” means (A) an individual who is a citizen or national of Iran; and (B) an entity organised under the laws of Iran or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran.
 
[6] The sanctions that the United States will cease to apply, and subsequently terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, pursuant to its commitment under Section 4 are those directed towards non-U.S. persons. For the purposes of Sections 4 and 6-7 of this JCPOA, the term “non-U.S. person” means any individual or entity, excluding (i) any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organised under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States, and (ii) any entity owned or controlled by a U.S. person.  For the purposes of (ii) of the preceding sentence, an entity is “owned or controlled” by a U.S. person if the U.S. person: (i) holds a 50 percent or greater equity interest by vote or value in the entity; (ii) holds a majority of seats on the board of directors of the entity; or (iii) otherwise controls the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity. U.S. persons and U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities will continue to be generally prohibited from conducting transactions of the type permitted pursuant to this JCPOA, unless authorised to do so by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
 
[7] All citations to statutes and Executive orders included in this JCPOA refer to the statute or Executive order as amended as of the conclusion date of this JCPOA, including:  the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA), as amended by Section 102 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) and Sections 201-207 and 311 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA); CISADA, as amended by Sections 214-216, 222, 224, 311-312, 402-403 and 605 of TRA and Section 1249 of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA); the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA), as amended by Sections 503-504 of TRA and Section 1250 of IFCA; Executive Order (E.O.) 13622, as amended by Section 15 of E.O. 13628 and Section 16 of E.O. 13645. The citations listed in Section 4 include authorities under which secondary sanctions will no longer apply as a result of actions described in Section 4.8.1.
 
[8] Removal of NIOC from the SDN List, as provided for in Section 4.8.1, will include resolution of related designations and determinations.
 
[9] See footnote 3 for the meaning of "associated services".
 
[10] This commitment in Section 4.4.1 is based on the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas no longer being controlled by a person on the SDN List.
 
[11] To give effect to the measures described in this Section 5.1, the United States will license activities that do not involve any person on the SDN List and are otherwise consistent with applicable U.S. laws and regulations, including but not limited to the Export Administration Act, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act.
 
[12] Licenses issued in furtherance of Section 5.1.1 will include appropriate conditions to ensure that licensed activities do not involve, and no licensed aircraft, goods, or services are re-sold or re-transferred to, any person on the SDN list. Should the United States determine that licensed aircraft, goods, or services have been used for purposes other than exclusively civil aviation end-use, or have been re-sold or re-transferred to persons on the SDN List, the United States would view this as grounds to cease performing its commitments under Section 5.1.1 in whole or in part.
 
[13] For the purposes of Section 5.1.2 of this JCPOA, a non-U.S. entity is owned or controlled by a U.S. person if the U.S. person: (i) holds a 50 per cent or greater equity interest by vote or value in the entity; (ii) holds a majority of seats on the board of directors of the entity; or (iii) otherwise controls the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity.
 
[14] Unless specifically provided otherwise, the sanctions lifting described in this Section does not apply to transactions that involve persons on the SDN List and is without prejudice to sanctions that may apply under legal provisions other than those cited in Section 4. Nothing in this JCPOA reflects a change in Iran's position on U.S. sanctions.
 
[15] For the purposes of the cessation of application of the provisions set out in Sections 4.1.1-4.1.7, the effects described for non-U.S. financial institutions extend to the activities outside of U.S. jurisdiction of international financial institutions.
 
[16] Non-U.S., non-Iranian financial institutions engaging in transactions with Iranian financial institutions (including the Central Bank of Iran) not appearing on the SDN List will not be exposed to sanctions as a result of those Iranian financial institutions engaging in transactions or banking relationships involving Iranian individuals and entities, including financial institutions, on the SDN List, provided that the non-U.S., non-Iranian financial institution does not conduct or facilitate, and is not otherwise involved in, those specific transactions or banking relationships with the Iranian individuals and entities, including financial institutions, on the SDN List.
 
[17] The effects described in Section 7.5 with respect to the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas are based on the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas no longer being controlled by a person on the SDN List.
 
 
ACENA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
ADVANCE NOVEL
AGHAJARI OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
AGHAZADEH, Reza
AHMADIAN, Mohammad
AKHAVAN-FARD, Massoud
ALPHA EFFORT LTD
ALPHA KARA NAVIGATION LIMITED
ALPHA NARI NAVIGATION LIMITED
ARIAN BANK
ARVANDAN OIL & GAS COMPANY
ASHTEAD SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
ASPASIS MARINE CORPORATION
ASSA CORPORATION 
ASSA CORPORATION LTD
ATLANTIC INTERMODAL
AVRASYA CONTAINER SHIPPING LINES
AZARAB INDUSTRIES
AZORES SHIPPING COMPANY ALIAS AZORES SHIPPING FZE LLC
BANCO INTERNACIONAL DE DESARROLLO CA
BANK KARGOSHAE
BANK MELLAT
BANK MELLI IRAN INVESTMENT COMPANY
BANK MELLI IRAN ZAO
BANK MELLI PRINTING AND PUBLISHING COMPANY
BANK MELLI,
BANK OF INDUSTRY AND MINE
BANK REFAH KARGARAN
BANK TEJARAT
BATENI, Naser
BEST PRECISE LTD
BETA KARA NAVIGATION LTD
BIIS MARITIME LIMITED
BIS MARITIME LIMITED
BONAB RESEARCH CENTER
BRAIT HOLDING SA
BRIGHT JYOTI SHIPPING
BRIGHT SHIP FZC
BUSHEHR SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
BYFLEET SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
CEMENT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN
CHAPLET SHIPPING LIMITED
COBHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD                                        
CONCEPT GIANT LTD
COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT BANK
CRYSTAL SHIPPING FZE
DAJMAR, Mohammad Hossein
DAMALIS MARINE CORPORATION
DARYA CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH
DARYA DELALAN SEFID KHAZAR SHIPPING COMPANY
DELTA KARA NAVIGATION LTD
DELTA NARI NAVIGATION LTD
DIAMOND SHIPPING SERVICES
DORKING SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
EAST OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
EDBI EXCHANGE COMPANY
EDBI STOCK BROKERAGE COMPANY
EFFINGHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
EIGHTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH 
EIGHTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
ELBRUS LTD
ELCHO HOLDING LTD
ELEGANT TARGET DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
ELEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
ELEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
EMKA COMPANY
EPSILON NARI NAVIGATION LTD
E-SAIL A.K.A.E-SAIL SHIPPING COMPANY 
ETA NARI NAVIGATION LTD
ETERNAL EXPERT LTD.
EUROPÄISCH-IRANISCHE HANDELSBANK
EXPORT DEVELOPMENT BANK OF IRAN
FAIRWAY SHIPPING
FAQIHIAN, Dr Hoseyn
FARNHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
FASIRUS MARINE CORPORATION
FATSA
FIFTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FIFTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FIFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FIFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FIRST ISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK
FIRST OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FIRST OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FIRST PERSIAN EQUITY FUND
FOURTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FOURTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FOURTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FOURTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FUTURE BANK BSC
GACHSARAN OIL & GAS COMPANY
GALLIOT MARITIME INCORPORATION
GAMMA KARA NAVIGATION LTD
GIANT KING LIMITED
GOLDEN CHARTER DEVELOPMENT LTD.
GOLDEN SUMMIT INVESTMENTS LTD.
GOLDEN WAGON DEVELOPMENT LTD.
GOLPARVAR, Gholam Hossein
GOMSHALL SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
GOOD LUCK SHIPPING COMPANY LLC
GRAND TRINITY LTD.
GREAT EQUITY INVESTMENTS LTD.
GREAT METHOD LTD
GREAT PROSPECT INTERNATIONAL LTD.
HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING LINES
HANSEATIC TRADE TRUST & SHIPPING GMBH
HARVEST SUPREME LTD.
HARZARU SHIPPING
HELIOTROPE SHIPPING LIMITED
HELIX SHIPPING LIMITED
HK INTERTRADE COMPANY LTD
HONG TU LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED
HORSHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
IFOLD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
INDUS MARITIME INCORPORATION
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT & RENOVATION ORGANIZATION
INSIGHT WORLD LTD
INTERNATIONAL SAFE OIL
IOTA NARI NAVIGATION LIMITED
IRAN ALUMINIUM COMPANY
IRAN FUEL CONSERVATION ORGANIZATION
IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY
IRAN LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS CO.
IRANIAN OFFSHORE ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CO
IRANIAN OIL COMPANY LIMITED
IRANIAN OIL PIPELINES AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANY (IOPTC)
IRANIAN OIL TERMINALS COMPANY
IRANO MISR SHIPPING COMPANY
IRINVESTSHIP LTD
IRISL (MALTA) LTD
IRISL EUROPE GMBH 
IRISL MARINE SERVICES AND ENGINEERING COMPANY
IRISL MARITIME TRAINING INSTITUTE
IRITAL SHIPPING SRL
ISI MARITIME LIMITED
ISIM AMIN LIMITED
ISIM ATR LIMITED
ISIM OLIVE LIMITED
ISIM SAT LIMITED
ISIM SEA CHARIOT LTD
ISIM SEA CRESCENT LTD
ISIM SININ LIMITED
ISIM TAJ MAHAL LTD
ISIM TOUR COMPANY LIMITED
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
JACKMAN SHIPPING COMPANY
KALA NAFT
KALAN KISH SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
KAPPA NARI NAVIGATION LTD
KARA SHIPPING AND CHARTERING GMBH 
KAROON OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
KAVERI MARITIME INCORPORATION
KAVERI SHIPPING LLC
KEY CHARTER DEVELOPMENT LTD.
KHALILIPOUR, Said Esmail
KHANCHI, Ali Reza
KHAZAR EXPL & PROD CO
KHAZAR SHIPPING LINES
KHEIBAR COMPANY
KING PROSPER INVESTMENTS LTD.
KINGDOM NEW LTD
KINGSWOOD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
KISH SHIPPING LINE MANNING COMPANY
LAMBDA NARI NAVIGATION LIMITED
LANCING SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
LOGISTIC SMART LTD
LOWESWATER LTD
MACHINE SAZI ARAK
MAGNA CARTA LIMITED
MALSHIP SHIPPING AGENCY
MARBLE SHIPPING LIMITED
MAROUN OIL & GAS COMPANY
MASJED-SOLEYMAN OIL & GAS COMPANY              
MASTER SUPREME INTERNATIONAL LTD.
MAZANDARAN CEMENT COMPANY
MEHR CAYMAN LTD.
MELLAT BANK SB CJSC
MELLI AGROCHEMICAL COMPANY PJS
MELLI BANK PLC
MELLI INVESTMENT HOLDING INTERNATIONAL
MELODIOUS MARITIME INCORPORATION
METRO SUPREME INTERNATIONAL LTD.
MIDHURST SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED (MALTA)
MILL DENE LTD
MINISTRY OF ENERGY
MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM
MODALITY LTD
MODERN ELEGANT DEVELOPMENT LTD.
MOUNT EVEREST MARITIME INCORPORATION
NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE COMPANY
NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE COMPANY SRL
NAMJOO, Majid
NARI SHIPPING AND CHARTERING GMBH & CO. KG
NARMADA SHIPPING
NATIONAL IRANIAN DRILLING COMPANY
NATIONAL IRANIAN GAS COMPANY
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY NEDERLAND (A.K.A.: NIOC NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATION OFFICE)
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY PTE LTD
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LIMITED
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (NIOEC)
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL PRODUCTS DISTRIBUTION COMPANY (NIOPDC)
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL REFINING AND DISTRIBUTION COMPANY
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
NEUMAN LTD
NEW DESIRE LTD
NEW SYNERGY
NEWHAVEN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
NINTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
NINTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
NOOR AFZA GOSTAR
NORTH DRILLING COMPANY
NUCLEAR FUEL PRODUCTION AND PROCUREMENT COMPANY
OCEAN CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH
OCEAN EXPRESS AGENCIES PRIVATE LIMITED
ONERBANK ZAO
OXTED SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
PACIFIC SHIPPING
PARS SPECIAL ECONOMIC ENERGY ZONE
PARTNER CENTURY LTD
PEARL ENERGY COMPANY LTD
PEARL ENERGY SERVICES, SA
PERSIA INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC
PETRO SUISSE
PETROIRAN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LTD
PETROLEUM ENGINEERING & DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
PETROPARS INTERNATIONAL FZE
PETROPARS IRAN COMPANY
PETROPARS LTD.
PETROPARS OILFIELD SERVICES COMPANY
PETROPARS OPERATION & MANAGEMENT COMPANY
PETROPARS RESOURCES ENGINEERING LTD
PETROPARS UK LIMITED
PETWORTH SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
POST BANK OF IRAN
POWER PLANTS' EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURING COMPANY (SAAKHTE TAJHIZATE NIROOGAHI)
PROSPER METRO INVESTMENTS LTD.
RASTKHAH, Engineer Naser
REIGATE SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
REZVANIANZADEH, Mohammad Reza
RISHI MARITIME INCORPORATION
SACKVILLE HOLDINGS LTD
SAFIRAN PAYAM DARYA SHIPPING COMPANY
SALEHI, Ali Akbar
SANFORD GROUP
SANTEXLINES
SECOND OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
SECOND OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
SEIBOW LOGISTICS LIMITED
SEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
SEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
SHALLON LTD
SHEMAL CEMENT COMPANY
SHINE STAR LIMITED
SHIPPING COMPUTER SERVICES COMPANY
SILVER UNIVERSE INTERNATIONAL LTD.
SINA BANK
SINO ACCESS HOLDINGS
SINOSE MARITIME
SISCO SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
SIXTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
SIXTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
SIXTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
SIXTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
SMART DAY HOLDINGS LTD
SOLTANI, Behzad
SORINET COMMERCIAL TRUST (SCT)
SOROUSH SARAMIN ASATIR
SOUTH WAY SHIPPING AGENCY CO. LTD
SOUTH ZAGROS OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
SPARKLE BRILLIANT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
SPRINGTHORPE LIMITED
STATIRA MARITIME INCORPORATION
SUREH (NUCLEAR REACTORS FUEL COMPANY) 
SYSTEM WISE LTD
TAMALARIS CONSOLIDATED LTD
TENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
TENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
TEU FEEDER LIMITED
THETA NARI NAVIGATION
THIRD OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
THIRD OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
THIRTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
THIRTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
TOP GLACIER COMPANY LIMITED
TOP PRESTIGE TRADING LIMITED
TRADE CAPITAL BANK
TRADE TREASURE
TRUE HONOUR HOLDINGS LTD
TULIP SHIPPING INC
TWELFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
TWELFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
UNIVERSAL TRANSPORTATION LIMITATION UTL
VALFAJR 8TH SHIPPING LINE
WEST OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
WESTERN SURGE SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
WISE LING SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
ZANJANI, Babak
ZETA NERI NAVIGATION
 
AGHA-JANI, Dawood
ALAI, Amir Moayyed
ASGARPOUR, Behman
ASHIANI, Mohammad Fedai
ASHTIANI, Abbas Rezaee
ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANISATION OF IRAN (AEOI)
BAKHTIAR, Haleh
BEHZAD, Morteza
ESFAHAN NUCLEAR FUEL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CENTRE (NFRPC) AND ESFAHAN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY CENTRE (ENTC)
FIRST EAST EXPORT BANK, P.L.C.:
HOSSEINI, Seyyed Hussein
IRANO HIND SHIPPING COMPANY
IRISL BENELUX NV
JABBER IBN HAYAN
KARAJ NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTRE
KAVOSHYAR COMPANY
LEILABADI, Ali Hajinia
MESBAH ENERGY COMPANY
MODERN INDUSTRIES TECHNIQUE COMPANY
MOHAJERANI, Hamid-Reza
MOHAMMADI, Jafar
MONAJEMI, Ehsan
NOBARI, Houshang
NOVIN ENERGY COMPANY
NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER FOR AGRICULTURE AND MEDICINE
PARS TRASH COMPANY
PISHGAM (PIONEER) ENERGY INDUSTRIES
QANNADI, Mohammad
RAHIMI, Amir
RAHIQI, Javad
RASHIDI, Abbas
SABET, M. Javad Karimi
SAFDARI, Seyed Jaber
SOLEYMANI, Ghasem
SOUTH SHIPPING LINE IRAN (SSL)           
TAMAS COMPANY
 
 
 
 
AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ORGANISATION, AIO
AL YASIN, Javad
ALUMINAT
ANSAR BANK
ARAN MODERN DEVICES
ARAS FARAYANDE
ARFA PAINT COMPANY
ARFEH COMPANY
ARIA NIKAN,
ARMED FORCES GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANISATION
ASHTIAN TABLO
BABAEI, Davoud
BALS ALMAN
BANK SADERAT IRAN
BANK SADERAT PLC
BARGH AZARAKSH
BEHNAM SAHRIYARI TRADING COMPANY
BONYAD TAAVON SEPAH
BORBORUDI, Sayed Shamsuddin
DANESHJOO, Kamran
DARVISH-VAND, IRGC Brigadier-General Javad
ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS INDUSTRIES
ESNICO (EQUIPMENT SUPPLIER FOR NUCLEAR INDUSTRIES CORPORATION)
ETEMAD AMIN INVEST CO MOBIN
EYVAZ TECHNIC 
FADAVI, Rear Admiral Ali
FAJR AVIATION COMPOSITE INDUSTRIES
FARAHI, IRGC Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi
FARASEPEHR ENGINEERING COMPANY
FATAH, Parviz
GHANI SAZI URANIUM COMPANY
HAERI, Engineer Mojtaba
HIRBOD CO
HOSEYNITASH, IRGC Brigadier-General Ali
HOSSEINI NEJAD TRADING CO.
INSTITUTE OF APPLIED PHYSICS
IRAN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES
IRAN AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING COMPANY
IRAN CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY COMPANY
IRAN COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRIES
IRAN COMPOSITES INSTITUTE
IRAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES
IRAN MARINE INDUSTRIAL COMPANY
IRAN POOYA
IRAN SAFFRON COMPANY OR IRANSAFFRON CO.
IRANIAN AVIATION INDUSTRIES ORGANIZATION
IRGC AIR FORCE
IRGC QODS FORCE 
IRGC-AIR FORCE AL-GHADIR MISSILE COMMAND
ISFAHAN OPTICS
ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS
JAFARI, Milad
JAVEDAN MEHR TOOS
JELVESAZAN COMPANY
KARANIR
KARIMIAN, Ali
KHALA AFARIN PARS
KHANSARI, Majid
MAAA SYNERGY
MACPAR MAKINA SAN VE TIC
MAHMUDZADEH, Ebrahim
MARINE INDUSTRIES
MAROU SANAT
MATSA (MOHANDESI TOSEH SOKHT ATOMI COMPANY)
MECHANIC INDUSTRIES GROUP
MEHR BANK
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND SUPPORT FOR ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS
MOBIN SANJESH
MODERN TECHNOLOGIES FZC
MOHAMMADI, Mohammad
MOHAMMADLU, Brigadier-General Beik
MOVASAGHNIA, Mohammad Reza
MULTIMAT LC VE DIS TICARET PAZARLAMA LIMITED SIRKETI
NACCACHE, Anis
NADERI, Brigadier-General Mohammad
NAJJAR, IRGC Brigadier-General Mostafa Mohammad
NAQDI, BrigGen Mohammad Reza
NASERI, Mohammad Sadegh
NASERIN VAHID
NEDA INDUSTRIAL GROUP
NEKA NOVIN
NOAVARAN POOYAMOJ
NOURI, Ali Ashraf
OIL INDUSTRY PENSION FUND INVESTMENT COMPANY
ORGANISATION OF DEFENSIVE INNOVATION AND RESEARCH
PAKPUR, BrigGen Mohammad
PARCHIN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES
PARTO SANAT CO
PASSIVE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
PAYA PARTO
QASEMI, Rostam (a.k.a. Rostam GHASEMI)
RAAD IRAN
RAKA
RESEARCH CENTRE FOR EXPLOSION AND IMPACT
ROSMACHIN
SAIDI, Hojatoleslam Ali
SALAMI, BrigGen Hossein
SAMAN NASB ZAYENDEH ROOD; SAMAN NASBZAINDE ROOD
SAMAN TOSE'E ASIA
SAMEN INDUSTRIES
SCHILLER NOVIN
SEPANIR OIL AND GAS ENERGY ENGINEERING COMPANY 
SHAFI'I RUDSARI, Rear Admiral Mohammad
SHAHID AHMAD KAZEMI INDUSTRIAL GROUP
SHAHID BEHESHTI UNIVERSITY
SHAKHESE BEHBUD SANAT
SHAMS, Abolghassem Mozaffari
SHAMSHIRI, IRGC Brigadier-General Ali
SHARIF UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
SHETAB G.
SHETAB GAMAN
SHETAB TRADING
SHIRAZ ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES
SIMATEC DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
SOLAT SANA, Abdollah
SOLTANI, Hamid
STATE PURCHASING ORGANISATION
STEP STANDART TEKNIK PARCA SAN VE TIC A.S.
SUN MIDDLE EAST FZ COMPANY
SURENA (A.K.A. SAKHD VA RAH-AN- DA-ZI)
TABA (IRAN CUTTING TOOLS MANUFACTURING COMPANY - TABA TOWLID ABZAR BORESHI IRAN)
TAGHTIRAN
TAJHIZ SANAT SHAYAN
TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION OFFICE OF THE IRANIAN PRESIDENT'S OFFICE
TEST TAFSIR
TIDEWATER
TOSSE SILOOHA
TURBINE ENGINEERING MANUFACTURING
VAHIDI, IRGC Brigadier-General Ahmad
WEST SUN TRADE GMBH
Y.A.S. CO. LTD
YARSANAT
YASA PART
ZADEH, Amir Ali Haji
 
 
7TH OF TIR.
ABBASI-DAVANI, Fereidoun
ABZAR BORESH KAVEH CO.
AGHAJANI, Azim
AHMADIAN, Ali Akbar
AMIN INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
AMMUNITION AND METALLURGY INDUSTRIES GROUP
ARMAMENT INDUSTRIES GROUP
BAHMANYAR, Bahmanyar Morteza
BANK SEPAH
BANK SEPAH INTERNATIONAL
BARZAGANI TEJARAT TAVANMAD SACCAL COMPANIES
BEHINEH TRADING CO.
CRUISE MISSILE INDUSTRY GROUP
DASTJERDI, Ahmad Vahid
DEFENCE INDUSTRIES ORGANISATION (DIO)
DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE RESEARCH CENTER
DERAKHSHANDEH, Ahmad
DOOSTAN INTERNATIONAL COMPANY
ELECTRO SANAM COMPANY
ESLAMI, Mohammad
ESMAELI, Reza-Gholi
ETTEHAD TECHNICAL GROUP
FAJR INDUSTRIAL GROUP
FAKHRIZADEH-MAHABADI, Mohsen
FARASAKHT INDUSTRIES
FARAYAND TECHNIQUE
FATER (OR FAATER) INSTITUTE
GHARAGAHE SAZANDEGI GHAEM
GHORB KARBALA
GHORB NOOH
HARA COMPANY
HEJAZI, Mohammad
HOJATI, Mohsen
IMENSAZAN CONSULTANT ENGINEERS INSTITUTE
INDUSTRIAL FACTORIES OF PRECISION (IFP) MACHINERY
JOZA INDUSTRIAL CO.
KALA-ELECTRIC
KAVEH CUTTING TOOLS COMPANY
KETABACHI, Mehrdada Akhlaghi
KHATAM AL-ANBIYA CONSTRUCTION HEADQUARTERS
KHORASAN METALLURGY INDUSTRIES
M. BABAIE INDUSTRIES
MAKIN
MALEK ASHTAR UNIVERSITY
MALEKI, Naser
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LOGISTICS EXPORT
MIZAN MACHINERY MANUFACTURING A.K.A.: 3MG
NAQDI, Mohammad Reza
NEJAD NOURI, Mohammad Mehdi
NIRU BATTERY MANUFACTURING COMPANY
OMRAN SAHEL
ORIENTAL OIL KISH
PARCHIN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES
PARS AVIATION SERVICES COMPANY
PEJMAN INDUSTRIAL SERVICES CORPORATION
QODS AERONAUTICS INDUSTRIES
RAH SAHEL
RAHAB ENGINEERING INSTITUTE
REZAIE, Morteza
SABALAN COMPANY
SAD IMPORT EXPORT COMPANY
SAFARI, Morteza
SAFAVI, Yahya Rahim
SAFETY EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT (SEP)
SAHAND ALUMINUM PARTS INDUSTRIAL COMPANY
SAHEL CONSULTANT ENGINEERS
SALIMI, Hosein
SANAM INDUSTRIAL GROUP
SEPANIR
SEPASAD ENGINEERING COMPANY
SHAHID BAGHERI INDUSTRIAL GROUP (SBIG)
SHAHID HEMMAT INDUSTRIAL GROUP (SHIG)
SHAHID KARRAZI INDUSTRIES
SHAHID SATARRI INDUSTRIES
SHAHID SAYYADE SHIRAZI INDUSTRIES
SHO’A’ AVIATION.
SOLEIMANI, Qasem
SPECIAL INDUSTRIES GROUP
TABATABAEI, Ali Akbar
TIZ PARS
YA MAHDI INDUSTRIES GROUP
YAS AIR
YAZD METALLURGY INDUSTRIES
ZAHEDI, Mohammad Reza
ZOLQADR, General
 
 
 
AA ENERGY FZCO[*]
ABAN AIR
ADVANCE NOVEL LIMITED
AFZALI, Ali
AGHA-JANI, Dawood
AL AQILI GROUP LLC
AL AQILI, Mohamed Saeed
AL FIDA INTERNATIONAL GENERAL TRADING
AL HILAL EXCHANGE
ALPHA EFFORT LIMITED
AMERI, Teymour
AMIN INVESTMENT BANK*
ANTARES SHIPPING COMPANY NV
ARASH SHIPPING ENTERPRISES LIMITED*
ARIAN BANK
ARTA SHIPPING ENTERPRISES LIMITED*
ASAN SHIPPING ENTERPRISE LIMITED*
ASCOTEC HOLDING GMBH*
ASCOTEC JAPAN K.K.*
ASCOTEC MINERAL & MACHINERY GMBH*
ASCOTEC SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY GMBH*
ASCOTEC STEEL TRADING GMBH*
ASHTEAD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
ASIA BANK
ASIA ENERGY GENERAL TRADING (LLC)*
ASIA MARINE NETWORK PTE. LTD.
ASSA CO. LTD.
ASSA CORP.
ATLANTIC INTERMODAL
                   ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION OF IRAN
AZORES SHIPPING COMPANY LL FZE
BAHADORI, Masoud*
BANCO INTERNACIONAL DE DESARROLLO, C.A.
BANDAR IMAM PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
BANK KARGOSHAEE
BANK KESHAVARZI IRAN*
BANK MARKAZI JOMHOURI ISLAMI IRAN*
BANK MASKAN*
BANK MELLAT*
BANK MELLI IRAN INVESTMENT COMPANY
BANK MELLI IRAN*
BANK MELLI PRINTING AND PUBLISHING CO.
BANK OF INDUSTRY AND MINE (OF IRAN)*
BANK REFAH KARGARAN*
BANK SEPAH INTERNATIONAL PLC
BANK SEPAH*
BANK TEJARAT*
BANK TORGOVOY KAPITAL ZAO*
BANK-E SHAHR*
BATENI, Naser
BAZARGAN, Farzad*
BEHSAZ KASHANE TEHRAN CONSTRUCTION CO.*
BEHZAD, Morteza Ahmadali
BELFAST GENERAL TRADING LLC
BEST PRECISE LIMITED
BIIS MARITIME LIMITED
BIMEH IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED*
BLUE TANKER SHIPPING SA*
BMIIC INTERNATIONAL GENERAL TRADING LTD
BOU ALI SINA PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
BREYELLER STAHL TECHNOLOGY GMBH & CO. KG*
BUSHEHR SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
BYFLEET SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
CAMBIS, Dimitris*
CASPIAN MARITIME LIMITED*
CAUCASUS ENERGY
CEMENT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
CENTRAL INSURANCE OF IRAN
CISCO SHIPPING COMPANY CO. LTD.
COBHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
COMMERCIAL PARS OIL CO.*
CONCEPT GIANT LIMITED
CREDIT INSTITUTION FOR DEVELOPMENT*
CRYSTAL SHIPPING FZE
CYLINDER SYSTEM L.T.D.*
DAJMAR, Mohhammad Hossein
DANESH SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
DARYA CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH
DAVAR SHIPPING CO LTD*
DENA TANKERS FZE*
DERAKHSHANDEH, AHMAD
DETTIN SPA
DEY BANK*
DFS WORLDWIDE
DIVANDARI, Ali
DORKING SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
EDBI EXCHANGE COMPANY
EDBI STOCK BROKERAGE COMPANY
EFFINGHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
EGHTESAD NOVIN BANK*
EIGHTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
EIGHTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
ELEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
ELEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
                   ESFAHAN NUCLEAR FUEL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CENTER
ESLAMI, Mansour
EUROPAISCH-IRANISCHE HANDELSBANK AG*
EUROPEAN OIL TRADERS
EVEREX
EXECUTION OF IMAM KHOMEINI'S ORDER*
EXPORT DEVELOPMENT BANK OF IRAN*
EZATI, Ali
FAIRWAY SHIPPING LTD
FAL OIL COMPANY LIMITED
FARNHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
FARSOUDEH, Houshang
FAYLACA PETROLEUM
FERLAND COMPANY LIMITED
FIFTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FIFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FIFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FIRST EAST EXPORT BANK, P.L.C.
FIRST ISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK LTD.
FIRST OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FIRST OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FIRST PERSIA EQUITY FUND
FOURTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FOURTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FOURTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FUTURE BANK B.S.C.*
GALLIOT MARITIME INC
GARBIN NAVIGATION LTD*
GEORGIAN BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
GHADIR INVESTMENT COMPANY*
GHAED BASSIR PETROCHEMICAL PRODUCTS COMPANY*
GHALEBANI, Ahmad*
GHARZOLHASANEH RESALAT BANK*
GHAVAMIN BANK*
GHEZEL AYAGH, Alireza
GOLDEN RESOURCES TRADING COMPANY L.L.C.*
GOLDENTEX FZE
GOLPARVAR, Gholamhossein
GOMSHALL SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
GOOD LUCK SHIPPING L.L.C.
GRACE BAY SHIPPING INC*
GREAT BUSINESS DEALS
GREAT METHOD LIMITED
HADI SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING CO
HARAZ SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
HATEF SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
HEKMAT IRANIAN BANK*
HERCULES INTERNATIONAL SHIP*
HERMIS SHIPPING SA*
HIRMAND SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
HODA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
HOMA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
HONAR SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
HONG KONG INTERTRADE COMPANY*
HORMOZ OIL REFINING COMPANY*
HORSHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
HOSSEINPOUR, Houshang
HTTS HANSEATIC TRADE TRUST AND SHIPPING, GMBH
IDEAL SUCCESS INVESTMENTS LIMITED
IFIC HOLDING AG*
IHAG TRADING GMBH*
IMPIRE SHIPPING COMPANY*
INDUS MARITIME INC
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND RENOVATION ORGANIZATION OF IRAN*
INTERNATIONAL SAFE OIL
INTRA CHEM TRADING GMBH*
IRAN & SHARGH COMPANY*
IRAN & SHARGH LEASING COMPANY*
IRAN AIR
IRAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT COMPANY*
IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY*
IRAN O HIND SHIPPING COMPANY
IRAN O MISR SHIPPING COMPANY
IRAN PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY*
IRAN ZAMIN BANK*
IRANAIR TOURS
IRANIAN MINES AND MINING INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT AND RENOVATION ORGANIZATION*
IRANIAN OIL COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED*
IRANIAN-VENEZUELAN BI-NATIONAL BANK / JOINT IRAN-VENEZUELA BANK*
IRASCO S.R.L.*
IRINVESTSHIP LTD.
IRISL (MALTA) LIMITED
IRISL (UK) LTD.
IRISL CHINA SHIPPING CO., LTD.
IRISL EUROPE GMBH
IRISL MARINE SERVICES & ENGINEERING COMPANY
IRISL MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT CO.
IRITAL SHIPPING SRL COMPANY
ISI MARITIME LIMITED
ISIM AMIN LIMITED
ISIM ATR LIMITED
ISIM OLIVE LIMITED
ISIM SAT LIMITED
ISIM SEA CHARIOT LIMITED
ISIM SEA CRESCENT LIMITED
ISIM SININ LIMITED
ISIM TAJ MAHAL LIMITED
ISIM TOUR LIMITED
ISLAMIC REGIONAL COOPERATION BANK*
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
                   JABBER IBN HAYAN
JAM PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY
JASHNSAZ, Seifollah*
JUPITER SEAWAYS SHIPPING*
KADDOURI, Abdelhak
KAFOLATBANK*
KALA LIMITED*
KALA PENSION TRUST LIMITED*
KARAFARIN BANK*
KASB INTERNATIONAL LLC*
KAVERI MARITIME INC
                   KAVOSHYAR COMPANY
KERMAN SHIPPING CO LTD
KHALILI, Jamshid
KHAVARMIANEH BANK*
KHAZAR SEA SHIPPING LINES
KISH INTERNATIONAL BANK*
KISH PROTECTION & INDEMNITY
KONING MARINE CORP*
KONT INVESTMENT BANK
KONT KOSMETIK
KSN FOUNDATION
KUO OIL PTE. LTD
LANCELIN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
LEADING MARITIME PTE. LTD.
LEILABADI, Ali Hajinia
LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC
LOGISTIC SMART LIMITED
LOWESWATER LIMITED
MACHINE SAZI ARAK CO. LTD.*
MAHAB GHODSS CONSULTING ENGINEERING COMPANY*
MAHDAVI, Ali
MALSHIP SHIPPING AGENCY LTD.
MARANER HOLDINGS LIMITED
MARBLE SHIPPING LIMITED
MARJAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
MAZANDARAN CEMENT COMPANY
MAZANDARAN TEXTILE COMPANY
MCS ENGINEERING*
MCS INTERNATIONAL GMBH*
MEHR CAYMAN LTD.
MEHR IRAN CREDIT UNION BANK*
MEHRAN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
MELLAT BANK SB CJSC
MELLAT INSURANCE COMPANY*
MELLI AGROCHEMICAL COMPANY, P.J.S.
MELLI BANK PLC
MELLI INVESTMENT HOLDING INTERNATIONAL
MELODIOUS MARITIME INC
MERSAD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
MESBAH ENERGY COMPANY
METAL & MINERAL TRADE S.A.R.L.*
MID OIL ASIA PTE LTD
MILL DENE LIMITED
MINAB SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
MINES AND METALS ENGINEERING GMBH*
MIR BUSINESS BANK ZAO
MOALLEM INSURANCE COMPANY
MOBIN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
MODABER*
MODALITY LIMITED
MOGHADDAMI FARD, Mohammad
MOHADDES, Seyed Mahmoud*
MOINIE, Mohammad*
MONSOON SHIPPING LTD*
MOUNT EVEREST MARITIME INC
MSP KALA NAFT CO. TEHRAN*
N.I.T.C. REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE*
NABIPOUR, Ghasem
NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE CO. (NICO) LIMITED*
NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE CO. (NICO) SARL*
NAFTIRAN TRADING SERVICES CO. (NTS) LIMITED*
NARI SHIPPING AND CHARTERING GMBH & CO. KG
NASIRBEIK, Anahita
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY PTE LTD*
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY*
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY LLC*
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY*
NATIONAL PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
NAYEBI, Pourya
NEFERTITI SHIPPING COMPANY
NEUMAN LIMITED
NEW DESIRE LIMITED
NEW YORK GENERAL TRADING
NEW YORK MONEY EXCHANGE
NICO ENGINEERING LIMITED*
NIKOUSOKHAN, Mahmoud*
NIKSIMA FOOD AND BEVERAGE JLT
NINTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
NINTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
NIOC INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (LONDON) LIMITED*
NIZAMI, Anwar Kamal
                   NOOR AFZAR GOSTAR COMPANY
NOOR ENERGY (MALAYSIA) LTD.*
NOURI PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
                   NOVIN ENERGY COMPANY
NPC INTERNATIONAL LIMITED*
                   NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER FOR AGRICULTURE AND MEDICINE
                   NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
OCEAN CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH
OIL INDUSTRY INVESTMENT COMPANY*
OMID REY CIVIL & CONSTRUCTION COMPANY*
ONE CLASS PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD.*
ONE VISION INVESTMENTS 5 (PTY) LTD.*
ONERBANK ZAO*
ORCHIDEA GULF TRADING
P.C.C. (SINGAPORE) PRIVATE LIMITED*
PACIFIC SHIPPING DMCEST
PAJAND, Mohammad Hadi
PARDIS INVESTMENT COMPANY*
PARS MCS*
PARS OIL AND GAS COMPANY*
PARS OIL CO.*
PARS PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
PARS PETROCHEMICAL SHIPPING COMPANY*
PARS TRASH COMPANY
PARSAEI, Reza*
PARSIAN BANK*
PARTNER CENTURY LIMITED
PARVARESH, Farhad Ali
PASARGAD BANK*
PEARL ENERGY COMPANY LTD.
PEARL ENERGY SERVICES, SA
PERSIA INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC
PERSIA OIL & GAS INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT CO.*
PETRO ENERGY INTERTRADE COMPANY*
PETRO ROYAL FZE*
PETRO SUISSE INTERTRADE COMPANY SA*
PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED*
PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY FZE*
PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY INTERNATIONAL*
PETROIRAN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY (PEDCO) LIMITED*
PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA S.A. (PDVSA)
PETROPARS INTERNATIONAL FZE*
PETROPARS LTD.*
PETROPARS UK LIMITED*
PIONEER ENERGY INDUSTRIES COMPANY
POLAT, Muzaffer
POLINEX GENERAL TRADING LLC*
POLYNAR COMPANY*
POST BANK OF IRAN*
POURANSARI, Hashem*
PROTON PETROCHEMICALS SHIPPING LIMITED*
PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA
QANNADI, Mohammad
QULANDARY, Azizullah Asadullah
                   RAHIQI, Javad
RASOOL, Seyed Alaeddin Sadat
REY INVESTMENT COMPANY*
REY NIRU ENGINEERING COMPANY*
REYCO GMBH.*
                   REZVANIANZADEH, Mohammed Reza
RISHI MARITIME INC
RISHMAK PRODUCTIVE & EXPORTS COMPANY*
ROYAL ARYA CO.*
ROYAL OYSTER GROUP
ROYAL-MED SHIPPING AGENCY LTD
                   SABET, Javad Karimi
SACKVILLE HOLDINGS LIMITED
SADAF PETROCHEMICAL ASSALUYEH COMPANY*
SAFDARI, Seyed Jaber
SAFIRAN PAYAM DARYA SHIPPING COMPANY
SAMAN BANK*
SAMAN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
SAMBOUK SHIPPING FZC*
SANDFORD GROUP LIMITED
SANTEX LINES LIMITED
SARKANDI, Ahmad
SARMAYEH BANK*
SARV SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
SECOND OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
SECOND OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
SEIBOW LIMITED
SEIBOW LOGISTICS LIMITED
SEIFI, Asadollah
SEPID SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
SEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
SEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
SEYYEDI, Seyed Nasser Mohammad*
SEYYEDI, Seyedeh Hanieh Seyed Nasser Mohammad
SHAHID TONDGOOYAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
SHALLON LIMITED
SHAZAND PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
SHERE SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
SHIPPING COMPUTER SERVICES COMPANY
SHOMAL CEMENT COMPANY
SIMA GENERAL TRADING CO FZE*
SIMA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
SINA BANK*
SINA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
SINGA TANKERS PTE. LTD.
SINO ACCESS HOLDINGS LIMITED
SINOSE MARITIME PTE. LTD.
SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP.
SIXTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
SIXTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
SMART DAY HOLDINGS GROUP LIMITED
SOKOLENKO, Vitaly
SORINET COMMERCIAL TRUST (SCT) BANKERS
SOROUSH SARZAMIN ASATIR SHIP MANAGEMENT COMPANY
SOUTH SHIPPING LINE IRAN
SPEEDY SHIP FZC
SPRINGTHORPE LIMITED
STARRY SHINE INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
SWISS MANAGEMENT SERVICES SARL*
SYNERGY GENERAL TRADING FZE*
SYSTEM WISE LIMITED
TABATABAEI, Seyyed Mohammad Ali Khatibi*
TABRIZ PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
TADBIR BROKERAGE COMPANY*
TADBIR CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT COMPANY*
TADBIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GROUP*
TADBIR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT GROUP CO.*
TADBIR INVESTMENT COMPANY*
TAFAZOLI, Ahmad
TALAI, Mohamad
TAMAS COMPANY
TAT BANK*
TC SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
TENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
THE EXPLORATION AND NUCLEAR RAW MATERIALS PRODUCTION COMPANY
                   THE NUCLEAR REACTORS FUEL COMPANY
THIRD OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
THIRD OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
THIRTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
TONGHAM SHIPPING CO LTD
TOP GLACIER COMPANY LIMITED
TOP PRESTIGE TRADING LIMITED
TOSEE EQTESAD AYANDEHSAZAN COMPANY*
TOSEE TAAVON BANK*
TOURISM BANK*
TRADE TREASURE LIMITED
TRUE HONOUR HOLDINGS LIMITED
TWELFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
TWELFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
UPPERCOURT SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
VALFAJR 8TH SHIPPING LINE CO SSK
VOBSTER SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
WEST SUN TRADE GMBH*
WIPPERMANN, Ulrich
WOKING SHIPPING INVESTMENTS LIMITED
YASINI, Seyed Kamal
YAZDI, Bahareh Mirza Hossein
ZADEH, Hassan Jalil
ZANJANI, Babak Morteza
ZARIN RAFSANJAN CEMENT COMPANY*
ZEIDI, Hossein
ZHUHAI ZHENRONG COMPANY
ZIRACCHIAN ZADEH, Mahmoud*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EP-CFD
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-CFE
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-CFH
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-CFI
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-CFJ
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-CFK
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-CFL
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-CFM
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-CFO
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-CFP
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-CFQ
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-CFR
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IAA
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IAB
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IAC
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IAD
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IAG
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IAH
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IAI
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IAM
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IBA
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IBB
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IBC
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IBD
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IBG
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IBH
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IBI
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IBJ
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IBK
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IBL
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IBM
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IBN
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IBP
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IBQ
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IBS
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IBT
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IBV
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IBZ
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-ICD
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-ICE
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-ICF
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IDA
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IDD
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IDF
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IDG
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IEB
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IEC
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IED
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IEE
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IEF
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IEG
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IRK
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IRL
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IRM
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IRN
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IRR
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IRS
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-IRT
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-MDD
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
EP-MDE
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
UR-BXI
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
UR-BXL
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
UR-BXM
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
UR-CGS
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
UR-CGT
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
UR-CHW
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
UR-CHX
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
UR-CHY
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
UR-CHZ
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
UR-CJQ
IRAN AIR
Aircraft
 
UR-BHJ
PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA
Aircraft
 
UR-BXN
PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA
Aircraft
 
UR-CIX
PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA
Aircraft
 
UR-CIY
PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA
Aircraft
 
UR-CJA
PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA
Aircraft
 
UR-CJK
PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA
Aircraft
 
RIONA
HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING CO
Vessel
9349588
MIRZA KOCHEK KHAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
7027899
ASSA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
7632814
AMITEES
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
7632826
HORMUZ 2
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
7904580
PARMIDA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8105284
BARSAM
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8107581
PANTEA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8108559
IRAN AKHAVAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8113009
SARINA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8203608
SABRINA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8215742
ATTRIBUTE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8309593
ALIAS
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8309608
AQUARIAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8309610
ADVENTIST
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8309622
AGEAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8309634
ANGEL
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8309646
AGILE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8309658
AJAX
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8309672
ACROBAT
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8309684
SHADFAR  
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8309696
AMPLIFY           
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
 8309701
IRAN HORMUZ 21
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8314263
IRAN HORMUZ 22
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8314275
IRAN HORMUZ 23
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8319782
IRAN SHALAK
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8319940
IRAN YOUSHAT
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8319952
AEROLITE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8320121
ADRIAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8320133
NAGHMEH
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8320145
RONAK
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8320157
ACCURATE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8320169
TABANDEH
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8320171
GULAFSHAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8320183
ALAMEDA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8320195
IRAN PARAK
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8322064
IRAN CHARAK
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8322076
IRAN HORMUZ 25
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8422072
IRAN HORMUZ 26
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8422084
DORITA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8605234
IRAN SHALAMCHEH
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8820925
AAJ
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
8984484
IRAN HORMUZ 12
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9005596
IRAN KONG
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9007582
VISTA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9010711
VIANA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9010723
IRAN HORMUZ 14
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9020778
HAMD
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9036052
SOBHAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9036935
SATTAR
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9040479
ABBA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9051624
BEHDAD
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9051636
PARSHAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9051648
VALERIAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9051650
NEGEEN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9071519
ATTAR
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9074092
PARIN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9076478
TEEN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9101649
GOWHAR
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9103087
IRAN DALEER
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9118551
PATRIS
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9137210
NARDIS
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9137246
KADOS
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9137258
ZOMOROUD
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9138044
BRELYAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9138056
NILDA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9165786
JOVITA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9165798
MANOLA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9165803
GLADIOLUS
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9165815
ELYANA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9165827
NEGAR
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9165839
SAVIZ
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9167253
GLOXINIA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9167265
NESHAT
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9167277
BEHSHAD
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9167289
JAIRAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9167291
IRAN SHAHED
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9184691
GOLSAR
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9193185
ZARSAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9193197
ARVIN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9193202
ARTAVAND
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9193214
TERESA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9209324
GABRIELA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9209336
SARITA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9209348
SILVER CRAFT
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9209350
MAHNAM
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9213387
TERMEH
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9213399
MAHSAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9226944
HAMADAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9226956
TARADIS
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9245304
PARMIS
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9245316
ZAR
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9260160
ZIVAR
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9260172
VALILI
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9270646
SHAMIM
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9270658
IRAN SHAHR-E-KORD
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9270684
IRAN KASHAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9270696
SININ
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9274941
PARMIS
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9283007
AZARGOUN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9283019
SALIS
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9283021
GOLBON
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9283033
PARDIS
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9284142
TANDIS
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9284154
SHERE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9305192
UPPERCOURT
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9305207
TONGHAM
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9305219
VOBSTER
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9305221
GOLAFRUZ
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9323833
ADALIA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9328900
SHABGOUN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9346524
AGATA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9346536
BENITA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9346548
MARISOL
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9349576
ORIANA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9349590
MERCEDES
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9349667
RAMONA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9349679
GILDA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9367982
SANIA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9367994
SARIR
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9368003
SOMIA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9368015
GLORY
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9369710
ARIES
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9369722
ABTIN 1
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9379636
ARSHAM
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9386500
PARSHAD
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9387786
HAADI
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9387798
RAAZI
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9387803
SAEI
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9387815
ARTMAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9405930
BASKAR
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9405942
BAHJAT
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9405954
HAAMI
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9405966
SHAADI
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9405978
SHAYAN 1
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9420356
TABAN 1
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9420368
YARAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9420370
AMIN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9422366
AVANG
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9465746
KIAZAND
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9465758
BATIS
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9465760
WARTA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9465849
SALIM
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9465851
ARDAVAN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Vessel
9465863
NAMI
LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC
Vessel
8419178
GAS CAMELLIA
LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC
Vessel
8803381
TESS
LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC
Vessel
8913564
KATERINA 1
LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC
Vessel
9031959
MARIA
LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC
Vessel
9110626
SUN OCEAN
LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC
Vessel
9408358
YOUNES ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
8212465
YOUSEF ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
8316106
YAGHOUB ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
8316168
TOLOU ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
8318178
VALFAJR2 ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
8400103
BADR ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
8407345
BANEH ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
8508462
SARDASHT ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
8517231
MARIVAN ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
8517243
BRIGHT ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9005235
CARIBO ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9011246
AURA ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9013749
BICAS ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9077850
MAHARLIKA ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9079066
NAPOLI ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9079078
NYOS ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9079080
NAINITAL ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9079092
NATIVE LAND ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9079107
ATLANTIC ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9107655
SPARROW ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9171450
SWALLOW ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9171462
SUPERIOR ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9172038
SPOTLESS ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9172040
SABRINA ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9172052
DESTINY ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9177155
HUMANITY ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9180281
ORIENTAL ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9183934
SHONA ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9187629
ABELIA ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9187631
ALERT ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9187643
SUNDIAL ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9187655
SILVER CLOUD ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9187667
HUWAYZEH ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9212888
HORIZON ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9212890
HAPPINESS ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9212905
MARINA ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9212917
HALISTIC ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9212929
DELVAR ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9218454
DAYLAM ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9218466
DAMAVAND ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9218478
DENA ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9218480
DARAB ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9218492
IRAN FAZEL ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9283746
FIANGA ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9283760
IRAN FAHIM ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9286140
IRAN FALAGH ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9286152
DECESIVE ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9356593
SANCHI ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9356608
MAJESTIC ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9357183
SUCCESS ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9357353
SUNEAST ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9357365
SPLENDOUR ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9357377
COURAGE ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9357389
HONESTY ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9357391
AMBER ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9357406
DAL LAKE ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9357717
JUSTICE ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9357729
HYDRA ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9362059
DOVE ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9362061
ZEUS ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9362073
IMICO NEKA 455 ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9404546
IMICO NEKA 456 ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9404558
IMICO NEKA 457 ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9404560
SUNSHINE ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9569205
DOJRAN ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9569619
ATLANTIS ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9569621
FORTUN ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9569633
SALALEH ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9569645
SMOOTH ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9569657
SKYLINE ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9569669
INFINITY ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9569671
DEMOS ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9569683
YANGZHOU DAYANG DY905 ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9575424
SUNRISE ×
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
Vessel
9615092
ANTHEM
SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP
Vessel
8310669
JAFFNA
SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP
Vessel
8609515
OLYSA
SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP
Vessel
9001605

 

 
 
 
ABBASI-DAVANI, Fereidoun                                                                                                                                  
ADVANCE ELECTRICAL AND INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES SL
ALUMINAT
ANDISHEH ZOLAL
ARIA NIKAN MARINE INDUSTRY
BUJAR, Farhad
DAYENI, Mahmoud Mohammadi
EYVAZ TECHNIC MANUFACTURING COMPANY
FAKHRIZADEH-MAHABADI, Mohsen
FARATECH
FARAYAND TECHNIQUE
FULMEN GROUP
IMANIRAD, Arman
IMANIRAD, Mohammad Javad
IRAN CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY COMPANY
IRAN POOYA
JAHAN TECH ROOYAN PARS
JAVEDAN MEHR TOOS
KAHVARIN, Iradj Mohammadi
KALAYE ELECTRIC COMPANY
KHAKI, Parviz
MANDEGAR BASPAR KIMIYA COMPANY
MARO SANAT COMPANY
MODERN INDUSTRIES TECHNIQUE COMPANY
NEDA INDUSTRIAL GROUP
NEKA NOVIN
PARTO SANAT CO.
PAYA PARTOV CO.
PENTANE CHEMISTRY INDUSTRIES
PETRO GREEN
PISHRO SYSTEMS RESEARCH COMPANY
POUYA CONTROL
PUNTI, Pere
RAHIMYAR, Amir Hossein
SIMATIC DEVELOPMENT CO.
TAGHTIRAN KASHAN COMPANY
TANIDEH, Hossein
TARH O PALAYESH
THE ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSIVE INNOVATION AND RESEARCH
TOWLID ABZAR BORESHI IRAN
WISSER, Gerhard
YASA PART
ZOLAL IRAN COMPANY
 

[*]Denotes Iranian financial institutions and individuals and entities identified as GOI by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). U.S. persons and foreign entities owned or controlled by a U.S. person will continue to be prohibited from transactions with these individuals and entities, pursuant to the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations.
 
 
Annex III - Civil Nuclear Cooperation
 
A. General       
                                             
1.    Iran and E3/EU+3 decided to co-operate, among others, including through IAEA technical cooperation, where appropriate, and without prejudice to the existing bilateral agreements, in different areas of civil nuclear co-operation to be developed within the framework of this JCPOA, as detailed in this Annex. In this context, the Joint Commission will also support assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation projects, as appropriate.
 
2.    All civil nuclear cooperation projects under this JCPOA will be mutually determined by the participating states and will be consistent with the JCPOA and the national laws and regulations of the participating parties. 
 
3.    The civil nuclear and scientific cooperation projects envisioned between Iran and the E3/EU+3 as part of this JCPOA may be undertaken in a variety of formats, with a variety of potential participants. A given project undertaken by the E3/EU+3 will not necessarily include participation by all E3/EU+3 parties:
 
3.    bilateral or multilateral cooperation arrangements with Iran.  Such arrangements would be mutually determined by the participating states.
 
3.    projects under the auspices of the IAEA, either through IAEA technical co-operation projects including through Project and Supply Agreements.
 
3.    through International Science and Technology Centres. 
 

 

Specifically, E3/EU+3 parties will undertake, to develop nuclear co-operation with Iran, in particular within the following areas:
 
B. Reactors, Fuels and Associated Technologies, Facilities and Processes
 
4.    Modern light water power and research reactors and associated equipment, technologies and facilities
 
E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, will facilitate Iran’s acquisition of light-water research and power reactors, for research, development and testing, and for the supply of electricity and desalination, with arrangements for the assured supply of nuclear fuel and the removal of spent fuel as provided for in relevant contracts, for each reactor provided. This may include the following areas for co-operation:
 
4.    Construction as well as effective and safe operation of new light water power reactors and associated equipment, according to Generation III+ requirements, including small and medium sized nuclear reactors, including joint design and manufacturing, as appropriate.
 
4.    Construction of state of the art light water moderated multipurpose research reactors capable of testing fuel pins, assembly prototypes and structural materials with associated related facilities, including joint design and manufacturing, as appropriate.
 
4.    Supply of state-of-the-art instrumentation and control systems for the above research and power reactors, including joint design and manufacturing, as appropriate;
 
4.    Supply of nuclear simulation and calculation codes and software solutions with regard to the above areas, including joint development, as appropriate;
 
4.    Supply of first and second loop main equipment as well as core of the above research and power reactors, including joint design and manufacturing, as appropriate;
 
4.    On-the-job training on fuel management scenarios and reshuffling for the above research and power nuclear reactors;
 
4.    Joint technical review of Iran’s current nuclear reactors, upon the request by Iran, in order to upgrade current equipment and systems, including concerning nuclear safety;
 
5.    Arak Modernisation Project
 
5.    As described in Section B of Annex I, an international partnership composed of   E3/EU+3 parties and Iran, which may subsequently be enlarged to include mutually determined third countries will be established, to support and facilitate the redesign and rebuilding of the IR-40 reactor at Arak into a modernised, not exceeding 20MWth, heavy-water moderated and cooled research reactor, based on the agreed conceptual design (as attached to Annex I).
 
5.    Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager, and have responsibility for overall implementation of the Arak modernisation project.  A Working Group composed of E3/EU+3 participants will be established to support and facilitate the redesigning and rebuilding of the reactor.  An international partnership composed of Iran and the Working Group would implement the Arak modernisation project, with E3/EU+3 participants assuming responsibilities as described in Annex I. The Working Group could be enlarged to include other countries by consensus of the participants of the Working Group and Iran.  E3/EU+3 participants and Iran will conclude an official document expressing their strong commitments to the Arak modernisation project in advance of Implementation Day which would provide an assured path forward to modernise the reactor and would define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants, especially in the key areas such as redesign, design review and certification, reactor core manufacturing, fuel design, fabrication and supply, safety and security, spent fuel treatment or disposition, as well as concerning the supply of materials, equipment, instrumentation and control systems, and subsequently contracts would be concluded.  The participants of the Working Group will provide assistance needed by Iran for redesigning and rebuilding the reactor, consistent with their respective national laws, in such a manner as to enable the safe and timely construction and commissioning of the modernised reactor.
 
5.    Iran and the Working Group will cooperate to develop the final design of the modernised reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories to be carried out by Iran, and review conformity with international safety standards, such that the reactor can be licensed by the relevant Iranian regulatory authority for commissioning and operation.
 
5.    Iran will continue to assume the primary responsibility for financing the modernisation project. Additional funding arrangements for the project, including for IAEA projects supporting the Arak modernisation project, will be determined based on the official document and contracts to be subsequently concluded.
 
6.    Nuclear Fuel
 
6.    E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, will support assistance to Iran, including through the IAEA, as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel fabricated by Iran.
 
6.    E3/EU+3 parties will seek to cooperate regarding the supply of modern fuels, including, as appropriate, joint design and fabrication, the relevant licenses and fabrication technologies and equipment and related infrastructure, for current and future nuclear research and power reactors, including technical assistance on purification processes, forming and metallurgical activities for different types of nuclear fuel clads and cladding for the modernised Arak heavy water research reactor.
 
C. Research and Development (R&D) Practices
 
7.    To implement other aspects of this JCPOA and in support of a broader opening of scientific engagements between the E3/EU+3 and Iran, the E3/EU+3 and Iran will seek cooperation and scientific exchange in the field of nuclear science and technology:
 
7.    Accelerator-based nuclear physics and nuclear astrophysics research, and stable isotope production in international collaboration at the nuclear, physics, and technology centre at the Fordow facility. Iran will request from the E3/EU+3 and other interested parties specific proposals for cooperative international nuclear, physics, and technology projects and will host an international workshop to review these proposals. The goal is to realise international collaborative projects within a few years. The transitioning to stable isotope production of two cascades will be conducted in a joint partnership between the Russian Federation and Iran on the basis of arrangements to be mutually agreed upon.
 
7.    Plasma physics and nuclear fusion;
 
7.    Research reactor applications at the TRR, modernized Arak reactor, or at other future research reactors in Iran, such as:
 
1.    Training
2.    Radio-isotope production and utilization
3.    Nuclear desalination
4.    Neutron transmutation doping
5.    Neutron activation analysis
6.    Neutron capture therapy
7.    Neutron imaging and materials characterization studies using neutron beams
 
7.    E3/EU+3 parties and Iran could also explore co-operation in the following additional areas:
 
1.    Design, manufacture and/or assembly of in-core measuring instrumentation and technologies;
 
2.    Nuclear instrumentation and control, systems and electronics design, manufacture and/or assembly;
 
3.    Fusion technology and plasma physics and related infrastructure and facilitating contribution of Iran to the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) Project and/or similar projects, including relevant IAEA technical cooperation projects;
 
4.    Neutrino astronomy;
 
5.    Design and manufacturing, and supply, of different types of accelerators and supply of related equipment including through relevant IAEA technical cooperation projects;
 
6.    Data acquisition and processing software and interface equipment;
 
D. Nuclear Safety, Safeguards and Security
 
8.    Nuclear safety
 
E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran to establish a Nuclear Safety Centre in Iran, engage in workshops and training events in Iran to support interactions between Iranian nuclear regulatory authorities and those from the E3/EU+3 and elsewhere to, among other things, share lessons learned on establishing and maintaining regulatory independence and effectiveness, and training on implementing nuclear safety culture and best practices; facilitate exchanges and visits to nuclear regulatory authorities and nuclear power plants outside of Iran focusing on best practices for safe operation; and enhance and strengthen domestic emergency preparedness and severe accident management capability.
 
Provide support and assistance to enable Iran to join relevant conventions on nuclear safety and security, e.g. through workshops or seminars furthering accession to such commitments. Such workshops or seminars could also take place under the auspices of the IAEA.
 
E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, will co-operate with Iran in the following areas of nuclear safety, as well as in other areas to be mutually agreed:
 
8.    Conclusion of bilateral/multilateral agreements with related organisations and research centres;
 
8.    Supply of valid codes, instruments and equipment related to nuclear safety;
 
8.    Facilitate exchange of knowledge and experience in the area of nuclear safety;
 
8.    Enhance and strengthen domestic emergency preparedness and severe accident management capability;
 
8.    Arrange on-the-job training and apprenticeship courses for reactor and facility operators, regulatory authority personnel and related supportive organizations in the area of nuclear safety inside and outside of Iran;
 
8.    Establish a Nuclear Safety Centre in Iran, which shall be equipped with necessary tools, techniques and equipment, in order to support and facilitate technical and professional training and exchange of lessons-learned for reactor and facility operators, regulatory authority personnel and related supportive organizations;
 
9.    Nuclear Safeguards
 
E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran on the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards and transparency measures in Iran.  Co-operation in the following areas can be envisaged:
 
9.    Cooperation in the form of on-the-job trainings and workshops to strengthen nuclear material accounting and control process, human resource development, and quality assurance/quality control processes;
 
9.    E3/EU+3 parties, and other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran for the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards and transparency measures in Iran.
 
9.    This cooperation could take the form of training and workshops to strengthen Iran’s safeguards regulatory authority, nuclear material accounting and control processes, human resource development, and quality assurance/quality control processes.
 
10. Nuclear Security
 
E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran on the implementation of nuclear security guidelines and best practices.  Co-operation in the following areas can be envisaged:
 
10. Co-operation in the form of training courses and workshops to strengthen Iran's ability to prevent, protect and respond to nuclear security threats to nuclear facilities and systems as well as to enable effective and sustainable nuclear security and physical protection systems;
 
10. Co-operation through training and workshops to strengthen Iran’s ability to protect against, and respond to nuclear security threats, including sabotage, as well as to enable effective and sustainable nuclear security and physical protection systems.
 
E. Nuclear Medicine and Radioisotopes, Associated Technologies, Facilities and Processes
 
11. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran to improve the utilization of nuclear medicine in Iran in order to enhance Iran's expertise in diagnostic imaging and radiotherapy, increase the availability of medical radioisotopes for diagnosis and treatment of Iranian citizens, and facilitate Iran’s participation in the broader international scientific and nuclear medicine community. Such cooperation may include:
 
11. Upgrades to the infrastructure associated with existing cyclotron facilities, including    for medical radioisotopes production.
 
11. Facilitating Iranian acquisition of a new cyclotron, and associated radio-pharmacy equipment, for medical radioisotopes production.
 
11. Acquisition of state-of-the-art diagnostic imaging and radiotherapy equipment for existing or new nuclear medicine centers, including co-operation between hospitals for the treatment of individual patients.
 
11. Cooperation on occupational and patient dosimetry procedures.
 
11. Improved target utilization to increase radioisotope production.
 
11. Acquisition of radioisotope sources for bracho therapy, and radiotherapy instrument calibration, and other medical and industrial applications.
 
11. Supply of state-of-the art radio-medicine center and necessary laboratories.
 
F. Waste Management and Facility Decommissioning
 
12. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran in the safe, effective, and efficient management and disposition of nuclear and radiological wastes derived from Iran's nuclear fuel cycle activities and nuclear medicine, radioisotope production and/or consumption activities.
 
13. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran in areas of safe, effective, and environmentally friendly best practices for facility decontamination and decommissioning, including co-operation on long term storage facilities for the repository of low and medium level waste.
 
14. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to facilitate exchanges and visits to relevant sites and locations outside of Iran related to effective waste management and best practices.
 
15. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, will facilitate the supply of appropriate equipment and systems for waste management and depository facilities in Iran.
 
G. Other projects
 
16. Other projects may be implemented between the relevant E3/EU+3 parties and Iran, as mutually determined by the participants in the JCPOA, including in the following areas:
 
16. Construction of nuclear desalination and associated infrastructure in Iran;
 
16. Development of laser technology for medical applications (e.g. for eye surgery);
                                                                       
Annex IV – Joint Commission
 
1.    Establishment, Composition, and Coordinator
 
1.    The Joint Commission is established to carry out the functions assigned to it in the JCPOA, including its Annexes.
 
1.    The Joint Commission is comprised of representatives of Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), together, the JCPOA participants. 
 
1.    The Joint Commission may establish Working Groups in particular areas, as appropriate.
 
1.    The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ('High Representative'), or his/her designated representative will serve as the Coordinator of the Joint Commission.
 
2.    Functions
 
2.    The Joint Commission will perform the following functions:
 
1.    Review and approve the final design for the modernized heavy water research reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories prior to the commencement of construction, and review and approve the fuel design for the modernized heavy water research reactor as provided for in Section B of Annex I;
 
2.    Review and approve, upon request by Iran, development, acquisition, construction or operation of hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions beyond 6 cubic meters in volume and specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol, as provided for in paragraph 21 of Annex I;
 
3.    Review and approve plans submitted by Iran to initiate R&D on uranium metal based TRR fuel, as provided for in paragraph 26 of Annex I;
 
4.    Review and approve, upon request by Iran, projects on new types of centrifuges to proceed to a prototype stage for mechanical testing, as provided for in paragraph 43 of Annex I;
 
5.    Receive information in advance about the specific projects that will be undertaken at Fordow, as provided for in paragraph 44 of Annex I;
 
6.    Receive information about the conceptual framework of stable isotope production at Fordow, as provided for in paragraph 46.1 of Annex I;
 
1.    Assess and then approve, upon request by Iran, that fuel assemblies manufactured in Iran and their intermediate products cannot be readily reconverted into UF6, based on the objective technical criteria, with the goal of enabling fuel to be fabricated in Iran, as provided in paragraph 59 of Annex I;
 
2.    Support assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced by Iran, as provided for in paragraph 59 of Annex I;
 
3.    Review and approve in advance, upon request by Iran, engagement by Iran, including through export of any enrichment or enrichment related equipment and technology, with any other country, or with any foreign entity in enrichment and enrichment related activities, including related research and development, as provided for in paragraph 73 in Annex I;
 
4.    Provide consultation, and advise on the necessary means in the context of access as specified in paragraph 78 of Annex I;
 
5.    Review and approve in advance, upon request by Iran, the design, development, fabrication, acquisition, or use for non-nuclear purposes of multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device and explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, as provided for in paragraphs 82.2 and 82.3 of Annex I;    
 
6.    Review and consult to address issues arising from the implementation of sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA and its Annex II;
 
7.    Review and decide on proposals for nuclear-related transfers to or activities with, Iran, in accordance with Section 6 of this Annex and the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA;
 
8.    Review, with a view to resolving, any issue that a JCPOA participant believes constitutes nonperformance by another JCPOA participant of its commitments under the JCPOA, according to the process outlined in the JCPOA;
 
9.    Adopt or modify, as necessary, procedures to govern its activities;
 
10. Consult and provide guidance on other implementation matters that may arise under the JCPOA.
 
3.    Procedures
 
3.    The Joint Commission will meet on a quarterly basis and at any time upon request of a JCPOA participant to the Coordinator. The Coordinator will convene a meeting of the Joint Commission to be held no later than one week following receipt of such a request, except for consultations in accordance with Section Q of Annex I and any other matter that the Coordinator and/or a JCPOA participant deem urgent, in which case the meeting will be convened as soon as possible and not later than three calendar days from receipt of the request.
 
3.    Meetings of the Joint Commission will be held in New York, Vienna, or Geneva as appropriate.  The host country should facilitate entry formalities for those attending such meetings.
 
3.    The Joint Commission may decide by consensus to invite observers to attend its meetings.
 
3.    Except as provided in Section 6 of this Annex which will be subject to the confidentiality procedure of the UN, the work of the Joint Commission is confidential and may be shared only among JCPOA participants and observers as appropriate, unless the Joint Commission decides otherwise.
 
4.    Decisions
 
4.    Except as stated otherwise in this Annex, decisions by the Joint Commission are to be made by consensus.
 
4.    Each JCPOA participant will have one vote. Decisions of the Joint Commission are to be taken by the Representative or the Deputy Representative or other such alternate as the JCPOA participant may designate.
 
4.    The vote of each JCPOA participant will be made known to all other JCPOA participants if any JCPOA participant requests a recorded vote.
 
4.    Matters before the Joint Commission pursuant to Section Q of Annex I are to be decided by consensus or by affirmative vote of five JCPOA participants. There is no quorum requirement.
 
4.    The Coordinator will not take part in decision-making on nuclear-related transfers and activities as set out in Section 6 of this Annex.
 
5.    Other
 
5.    Each JCPOA participant will be responsible for its own costs of participating in the Joint Commission, unless the Joint Commission decides otherwise.
 
5.    JCPOA participants may request that the Coordinator circulates a notification to the other JCPOA participants at any time.  Upon such a request, the Coordinator will circulate such notification without delay to all JCPOA participants.
 
6.    Procurement Working Group
 
6.    With the purpose of establishing a procurement channel, the Joint Commission will, except as otherwise provided by the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA, review and decide on proposals by states seeking to engage in:
 
7.    the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, and, if the end-use will be for Iran's nuclear programme set out in this JCPOA or other non-nuclear civilian end-use, all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council), as well as any further items if the relevant State determines that they could contribute to activities inconsistent with the JCPOA; and,
 
8.    the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph (a) above;
 
9.    acquisition by Iran of an interest in a commercial activity in another State involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and technologies as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, and such investments in territories under their jurisdiction by Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in Iran or subject to its jurisdiction, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them.
 
6.    The Joint Commission will discharge its responsibility for reviewing and making recommendations on proposals for nuclear-related transfers to or activities with Iran through a Procurement Working Group.
 
6.    Each E3+3 State and Iran will participate in the Procurement Working Group. The High Representative will serve as the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group.
 
6.    Except as otherwise provided by the Joint Commission or the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA, the Procurement Working Group will consider proposals according to the following process:
 
1.    Upon receipt of a proposal, including all necessary supporting information, by a State seeking to engage in transfers and activities referenced in Section 6.1, the Coordinator will forward the proposal, through appropriate means, without delay to the Procurement Working Group and, when the proposal relates to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, to the IAEA. The Procurement Working Group will have up to 30 working days to consider and decide on the proposal.
 
2.    “Necessary supporting information” for purposes of Section 6.4.1 means: (a) a description of the item; (b) the name, address, telephone number, and email address of the exporting entity; (c) the name, address, telephone number, and email address of the importing entity; (d) a statement of the proposed end-use and end use location, along with an end-use certification signed by the AEOI or the appropriate authority of Iran attesting the stated end-use; (e) export license number if available; (f) contract date, if available; and (g) details on transportation, if available; provided that if any of the export license number, contract date, or details on transportation are not available as of the time of submittal of the proposal, such information will be provided as soon as possible and in any event as condition of approval prior to shipment of the item.
 
3.    Each participant in the Procurement Working Group will have to communicate to the Coordinator, within 20 working days, whether it approves or rejects the proposal. The timeline for consideration may be extended for an additional period of 10 working days at the request of a participant of the Procurement Working Group.
 
4.    The proposal will be recommended for approval as soon as the Coordinator receives formal approvals from all the Procurement Working Group Participants or if, at the end of the 30 working day period, the Coordinator has received no disapprovals from any of the Procurement Working Group Participants. If at the end of the 30 working day period, the proposal has not been recommended for approval, the proposal may, at the request of at least two Working Group Participants within 5 working days, be referred to the Joint Commission, which would decide on approval of the proposal by consensus within 10 working days. Otherwise the proposal will be recommended for disapproval. The disapproving JCPOA participant(s) should provide relevant information regarding the disapproval to the Joint Commission as appropriate, taking into account the need to protect confidential information.
 
5.    The Coordinator will communicate the recommendation of the Joint Commission to the United Nations Security Council no later than 35 working days, or in case of referral to the Joint Commission no later than 45 working days from the date the Coordinator transmitted the proposal and all necessary supporting information to the Procurement Working Group.
 
6.    Except as decided otherwise by consensus, the Procurement Working Group will meet every three weeks for reviewing the proposals. When some of the proposals to be reviewed relate to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, the IAEA may be invited to attend the meeting as an observer.
 
6.    All JCPOA participants will act in accordance with the procurement channel and will only engage in transfers and activities referenced in Section 6.1 following approval by the Joint Commission and the United Nations Security Council. Iran will not use, acquire, or seek to procure the items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology referred to in Section 6.1 of this Annex for nuclear activities which are inconsistent with this JCPOA.
 
6.    Any JCPOA participant may refer a procurement-related activity to the Joint Commission under the dispute settlement mechanism if it is concerned that such activity is inconsistent with this JCPOA.   
 
6.    Iran will provide to the IAEA access to the locations of intended use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex.
 
6.    Iran will permit the exporting state to verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex. Upon request of the exporting state, or if the Joint Commission deems necessary when approving a proposal for transfer, the Joint Commission will provide expertise to the exporting state, including experts, as needed, to participate in the end-use verification.
 
6.    The Procurement Working Group will respond to requests for guidance on procurement activities from third parties, as communicated by the Coordinator. The Procurement Working Group will endeavor to respond to such requests for guidance within 9 working days from the date the Coordinator submits it to the Procurement Working Group.
 
6.    The Joint Commission will report to the United Nations Security Council at least every 6 months on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues.
 
7.    Working Group on Implementation of Sanctions Lifting
 
7.    The Joint Commission will discharge its responsibilities for reviewing and consulting on issues related to the implementation of sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA assisted by a working group on the implementation of sanctions lifting.
 
7.    The Joint Commission participants will participate in this working group. The High Representative will serve as coordinator of this working group.
 
7.    If at any time following the implementation day Iran believes that any other nuclear-related sanction or restrictive measure including related designations of the E3/EU+3 is preventing the full implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the JCPOA participant in question will consult with Iran with a view to resolving the issue. If they are not able to resolve the issue, Iran or any member of the E3/EU+3 may refer the issue to the working group.
 
7.    The participants of the working group will review and consult, with a view to resolving the issue within 30 working days.
 
7.    If after involvement of the working group, the issue remains unresolved, any participant of the JCPOA may refer it to the Joint Commission.
            
Annex V - Implementation Plan[1]
 
1.    This Annex describes the sequence of the actions specified in Annexes I and II to this JCPOA.
 
A. Finalisation Day
 
2.    Upon conclusion of the negotiations of this JCPOA, the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and Iran will endorse this JCPOA.
 
3.    Promptly after the conclusion of the negotiations of this JCPOA, the proposed UN Security Council resolution referred to in Section 18 of this Annex will be submitted to the UN Security Council for adoption without delay.
 
4.    The EU will promptly endorse the UN Security Council resolution referred to above through Council Conclusions.
 
5.    Iran and the IAEA will start developing necessary arrangements to implement all transparency measures provided for in this JCPOA so that such arrangements are completed, in place, and ready for implementation on Implementation Day.
 
B. Adoption Day
 
6.    Adoption Day will occur 90 days after the endorsement of this JCPOA by the UN Security Council through the resolution referred to above, or at an earlier date by mutual consent of all JCPOA participants, at which point this JCPOA comes into effect.
 
7.    Beginning on Adoption Day, JCPOA participants will make necessary arrangements and preparations, including legal and administrative preparations, for the implementation of their JCPOA commitments.
 
8.    Iran will officially inform the IAEA that, effective on Implementation Day, Iran will provisionally apply the Additional Protocol, pending its ratification by the Majlis (Parliament), and will fully implement the modified code 3.1.
 
9.    Iran will implement paragraph 66 from Section M on “Past and Present Issues of Concern" of Annex I.
 
10. The EU and its Member States will adopt an EU Regulation, taking effect as of Implementation Day, terminating all provisions of the EU Regulation implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial EU sanctions as specified in Section 16.1 of this Annex, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation by Iran of agreed nuclear-related measures.
 
11. The United States, acting pursuant to Presidential authorities, will issue waivers, to take effect upon Implementation Day, ceasing the application of the statutory nuclear-related sanctions as specified in Sections 17.1 to 17.2 of this Annex. The President will also take action to direct that all appropriate additional measures be taken to implement the cessation of application of sanctions as specified in Sections 17.1 to 17.4 of this Annex, including the termination of Executive orders as specified in Section 17.4, and the licensing of activities as specified in Section 17.5.
 
12. E3/EU+3 participants and Iran will begin discussions on an official document to be concluded in advance of Implementation Day which will express strong commitments of the E3/EU+3 participants to the Arak Heavy Water Reactor modernisation project and define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants.
 
13. The EU, its Member States and the United States will begin consultation as appropriate with Iran regarding relevant guidelines and publicly accessible statements on the details of sanctions or restrictive measures to be lifted under this JCPOA.
    
C. Implementation Day
 
14. Implementation Day will occur upon the IAEA-verified implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in paragraph 15 below, and, simultaneously, the E3/EU+3 taking the actions described in paragraphs 16 and 17 below, and with the actions described in paragraph 18 below taking place at the UN level in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution.
 
15. Iran will implement the nuclear-related measures as specified in Annex I:
 
15. Paragraphs 3 and 10 from Section B on "Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor";
 
15. Paragraphs 14 and 15 from Section C on "Heavy Water Production Plant";
 
15. Paragraphs 27, 28, 29, 29.1 and 29.2 from Section F on "Enrichment Capacity";
 
15. Paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 from Section G on "Centrifuges Research and Development";
 
15. Paragraphs 45, 46, 46.1, 46.2, 47.1, 48.1 from Section H on "Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant";
 
15. Paragraphs 52, 54 and 55 from Section I on "Other Aspects of Enrichment";
 
15. Paragraphs 57 and 58 from Section J on "Uranium Stocks and Fuels";
 
15. Paragraph 62 from Section K on "Centrifuge Manufacturing";
 
15. Complete the modalities and facilities-specific arrangements to allow the IAEA to implement all transparency measures provided for in Annex I;
 
15. Paragraphs 64 and 65 from Section L on "Additional Protocol and Modified Code 3.1";
 
15. Paragraphs 80.1 and 80.2 from Section R on "Centrifuge Component Manufacturing Transparency"; and
 
15. Within one year from Implementation Day, Iran will have completed the measures specified in paragraphs 47.2 and 48.2 of Section H on "Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant".
 
16. The European Union will:
 
16. Terminate the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and suspend the corresponding provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Sections 1.1.1- 1.1.3; 1.1.5 - 1.1.8; 1.2.1 - 1.2.5; 1.3.1, 1.3.2 (in so far as it concerns Articles 16 and 17 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP) and 1.3.3; 1.4.1 and 1.4.2; 1.10.1.2 (in so far as it concerns Articles 39, 43, 43a of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012) of Annex II. EU Member States will terminate or amend national implementing legislation as required.
 
16. Amend the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and the corresponding provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Sections 1.6.1 - 1.7.2 of Annex II, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA.
 
16. Remove individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 1 to Annex II of this JCPOA from Annexes VIII and IX to Council Regulation (EU) 267/2012. Suspend the provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Section 1.9.1 of Annex II in relation to individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 1 to Annex II.  
 
16. Amend the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Sections 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 of Annex II to implement the relevant provisions of the UN Security Council resolution referred to above.
 
17. The United States will:[2]
 
17. Cease the application of the sanctions set forth in Sections 4.1 - 4.5 and 4.7 of Annex II, with the exception of Section 211(a) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA);
 
17. Cease the application of the sanctions set forth in Section 4.6 of Annex II, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II;
 
17. Remove individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List (FSE List), and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List as set forth in Section 4.8.1 of Annex II;
 
17. Terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, 13645 and Sections 5-7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628 as set forth in Section 4 of Annex II; and
 
17. License activities as set forth in Section 5 of Annex II.
 
18. UN Security Council
 
18. In accordance with the UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA, the provisions imposed in UN Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) will be terminated subject to re-imposition in the event of significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments, and specific restrictions, including restrictions regarding the transfer of proliferation sensitive goods will apply.[3]
 
18. The E3/EU+3 will take appropriate measures to implement the new UNSC resolution.
 
D. Transition Day
 
19. Transition Day will occur 8 years from Adoption Day or upon a report from the Director General of the IAEA to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the UN Security Council stating that the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier.
 
20. The European Union will:
 
20. Terminate the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and suspend the corresponding provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Sections 1.1.4, 1.3.2 (in so far as it concerns Articles 15 and 18 of Council Decision and Articles 36 and 37 of Council Regulation); 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 (in so far as it concerns Ballistic Missiles restrictions); 1.6.1 - 1.9.1 of Annex II.
 
20. Remove individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 2 to Annex II from Annexes VIII and IX to Council Regulation (EU) 267/2012.
 
20. Remove individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 1 to Annex II from Annexes I and II to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP.
 
20. Terminate all provisions in Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP suspended on Implementation Day.
 
21. The United States will:
 
21. Seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the statutory sanctions set forth in Sections 4.1-4.5, 4.7 and 4.9  of Annex II;
 
21. Seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the statutory sanctions described in Section 4.6 of Annex II, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachments 3 and 4 to Annex II; and
 
21. Remove individuals and entities set out in Attachment 4 to Annex II from the SDN List and/or the FSE List as set forth in Section 4.8.1 of Annex II.
 
22. Iran will:
 
22. Seek, consistent with the Constitutional roles of the President and Parliament, ratification of the Additional Protocol.
 
E. UNSCR Termination Day
 
23. UNSCR (UN Security Council resolution) Termination Day will occur in accordance with the terms of the UN Security Council resolution endorsing the JCPOA, which is 10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions of previous resolutions have not been reinstated.
24. On UNSCR Termination Day, the provisions and measures imposed in that resolution would terminate and the UN Security Council would no longer be seized of the Iran nuclear issue.
 
25. The European Union will:
 
25. Terminate all remaining provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP.
 
F.    Other
 
26. The terminations described in this Annex V are without prejudice to other JCPOA commitments that would continue beyond such termination dates. 
 
----------
 

[1] This Annex is only for the purpose of determining the sequence of implementation of the commitments described in this JCPOA and annexes thereto and does not restrict or expand the scope of these commitments.
[2] The sanctions that the United States will cease to apply are those directed towards non-U.S. persons, as described in Section 4 of Annex II.
[3] The provisions of this Resolution do not constitute provisions of this JCPOA.
 
Click here to see the text as published on the Russian Foreign Ministry website.  

 

The Final Deal: Zarif, Mogherini Statement

On July 14, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and E.U. foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini announced that Iran and the world's six major powers - Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States - had reached a final nuclear agreement. The following is a transcript of the joint statement presented in Vienna, with statements from other leaders of the world's six major powers.

Today is an historic day.

It is a great honour for us to announce that we have reached an agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue.
 
With courage, political will, mutual respect and leadership, we delivered on what the world was hoping for: a shared commitment to peace and to join hands in order to make our world safer. This is an historic day also because we are creating the conditions for building trust and opening a new chapter in our relationship.
 
 
This achievement is the result of a collective effort.
 
No one ever thought it would be easy. Historic decisions never are. But despite all twists and turns of the talks, and the number of extensions, hope and determination enabled us to overcome all the difficult moments. We have always been aware we had a responsibility to our generation and the future ones.
 
Thanks to the constructive engagement of all parties, and the dedication and ability of our teams, we have successfully concluded negotiations and resolved a dispute that lasted more than 10 years.
 
Many people brought these difficult negotiations forward during the last decade and we would like to thank all of them - as we would like to thank the International Atomic Energy Agency for its critical contribution and close cooperation as well as the Austrian government for the support and hospitality.
 
We, the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security policy and the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, together with the Foreign Ministers of the People´s Republic of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America met here in Vienna, following several months of intensive work, at various levels and in different formats, to negotiate the text of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), based on the key parameters agreed in Lausanne on 2 April.
 
We have today agreed on the final text of this Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
The E3/EU+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran welcome this historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which will ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in their approach to this issue. They anticipate that full implementation of this Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.
 
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action includes Iran’s own long-term plan with agreed limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, and will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy.
 
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action comprises of a main text, and five technical annexes - on nuclear, sanctions, civil nuclear energy cooperation, a joint commission, and implementation. These documents are detailed and specific: that is important because all sides wanted clarity so as to ensure the full and effective implementation of the agreement.
 
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is a balanced deal that respects the interests of all sides. It is also complex, detailed and technical: we cannot fully summarise the agreement now. But the full main text and all its annexes will be made public still today and will be presented within the next few days by the E3+3 to the Security Council for endorsement.
We know that this agreement will be subject to intense scrutiny. But what we are announcing today is not only a deal but a good deal. And a good deal for all sides – and the wider international community.
 
This agreement opens new possibilities and a way forward to end a crisis that has lasted for more than 10 years. We are committed to make sure this Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is fully implemented, counting also on the contribution of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
 
We call on the world community to support the implementation of this historic effort.
This is the conclusion of our negotiations, but this is not the end of our common work. We will keep doing this important task together.
 
United Kingdom
 
Prime Minister David Cameron
 
"I think [the deal] is so much better than the alternative.  I think that if there wasn't a deal, I think we would face Iran with a nuclear weapon.  And that would've given a terrible choice to the West of either enabling that, allowing that to happen, or a very difficult decision to take military action.  So, this the better outcome.  It keeps Iran away from a nuclear weapon.  It's a successful negotiation for the allies.  And I think we should be proud of a good deal done."
 
"Now, of course, there'll be those that complain about details of the deal.  But fundamentally, this is the toughest set of proposals put in place and verification put in place and inspection put in place that I think we've seen in any of these sorts of negotiations.  So, I think it is a good deal.  It was right to get on with it.  And the sanctions pressure worked.  And I think that's all to the credit of the U.S. administration, to Barack Obama, but also the action taken in Europe, too."
—July 19, 2015, on NBC's Meet the Press
 
Foreign Minister Phillip Hammond
 
 
In return, once Iran has taken key steps to introduce these restrictions, the international community will lift some of its sanctions on Iran, delivering significant economic and financial benefits.
 
Having reached this important agreement, our focus will now be on its swift and full implementation to make sure that a nuclear weapon remains beyond Iran’s reach.
 
We recognise the concern in the region about Iran’s historic pattern of regional activity. We will maintain our clear position in support of the Gulf states and against Iranian interference in their internal affairs. We hope, and expect, that this agreement will herald a step-change in Iran’s relations with its neighbours and with the international community.
 
The removal, over time, of economic and financial sanctions represents a huge opportunity for Iranians to make positive decisions about their country’s future and its role in the region.
 
We will continue to work closely with our international partners to encourage Iran to play a transparent and constructive role in regional affairs, particularly in the struggle against violent Islamist extremism.
—July 14, 2015 in a statement
 
France

Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius
 
 
Russia

President Vladimir Putin
 

“Despite the attempts to justify forceful scenarios, the negotiators made a firm choice in favor of stability and cooperation, which will be reflected in a UN Security Council resolution."
“Russia welcomes the decision reached in Vienna today, aimed at resolving the situation around the Iranian nuclear program, and the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan approved by the six mediators and Iran. We are certain that today the world sighed with great relief."

“The comprehensive agreement is based on the solid foundation of international law, primarily, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement, including the Additional Protocol."
 
“We have come a long way in the framework of the UN Security Council-backed negotiations involving Russia, China, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Iran and the European Union. We are satisfied that the decision they reached is based on the principle of gradualness and reciprocity our country has consistently defended at every stage of these complicated negotiations."
—July 14, 2015, in a statement(via Iran Front Page)
 

Photo credit: U.S. State Department via Flickr

 

Iranian Front Pages on Nuclear Deal

On July 13 and 14, the front pages of Iranian newspapers reflected widespread anticipation of a nuclear deal between Iran and the world’s six major powers. Reports from the Vienna talks suggested a deal could be announced within a day. Conservative papers framed the agreement as a potential capitulation to Western or U.S. demands. Reformist papers, on the other hand, described the deal as a fulfillment of President Hassan Rouhani’s promise to solve the nuclear dispute. Some papers compared Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to heroes from Iran’s past. The following is a sampling of the diverse headlines on the negotiations.

July 14

Aftab-e Yazd (Reformist)
 

Amir Kabir* of our times

*Amir Kabir was chief minister to Naser al Din Shah in the mid-19th century and is regarded as one of Iran’s early reformers.

Aftab continues: “Regardless of the results of negotiations, Zarif’s special status will be reserved among Iranians. We say this because, regardless of results, some will attack this true servant of our country. Of course, this has historical background. Upon reading history, we notice that some people cannot stand these great men. For example, in case of Amir Kabir, we see that hostilities began when he started his reforms when he became prime minister. Today we see that our Mohammad Javad Zarif has changed the rules of the game for some. Those who profited from the cruel sanctions hoped that they would be prolonged. But it seems that it is a new day. Due to Zarif and his colleagues, the world looks at Iran differently. We do not intend to say that Zarif is Amir Kabir, but to better understand his greatness, it is good to make a small comparison-- a small comparison, to make a big point.”

 

Ghanoon (Centrist)

From Arash [the Archer]* to Zarif: We have suffered a lot for Iran to become a jewel.

*Arash the Archer is a hero from Iranian folklore who helped determine Iran’s borders by shooting an arrow that flew a great distance.

 

Kayhan (Conservative)

The 12 year struggle; is Vienna the last stop?

“Is resolving the nuclear issue the West’s only problem? If it is true, why do the Americans and some of the other members of P5+1 [countries] insist on inspecting Iran’s military sites? Why does the Western media say that P5+1 countries emphasized that Iran should change its behavior with regards to the resistance front [referring to Hezbollah and Hamas]? To answer this question, we should look at the background of 12 years of negotiations between Iran and P5+1. Many domestic analysts and fair foreigners [analysts] emphasize that the nuclear struggle and the U.S. and its allies concerns is an excuse to counter the Islamic revolution’s progress…”
 

 

Arman-e Emrooz (Reformist)
 
No extension, no halts. A Deal and nothing else. The nuclear eid is on its way [referring to the upcoming Eid al Fitr holiday]
 
 

Etemad (Reformist)

Agreement Day

“The end of nuclear struggle will be announced today.”

 

July 13

Kayhan (Conservative)

An agreement under the Lausanne framework is a defeat [for Iran]

“Evidence suggests that the Americans are pursuing their goals under the Lausanne framework. If those goals, which reflect the American fact sheet, are met, the United States would be the winner of this struggle.”

 

Arman-e Emrooz (Reformist)
 
Spokesman for the police force: Police are ready for the nuclear [deal] celebration
 
“We do not have official orders, but if there are, the police will be side-by-side with the people, celebrating “
 
Iran (Centrist)
 
The smile of diplomats in the last stage of negotiations
 
“Rouhani: We are very close to the top of the mountain; our diplomats stand firm.”
 
 
Shargh (Reformist)
 
Day of Reckoning
 
“Rouhani: I kept my promise.”
“Zarif: There will be no extensions.”
 
 
 
Vatan Emrooz (Conservative)
 
American factsheet being imposed?
 
“Is the White House’s interpretation from Lausanne going to be the basis of the comprehensive deal in Vienna?”
 
Tejarat (Centrist)
 
Everyone is prepared for the big agreement.
 
The last sequence of 22 months of negotiations.”  
 
 
Aftab-e Yazd (Reformist)
 
Rouhani : I kept my [campaign] promise [on the nuclear issue]
 
“Unofficial sources hint toward the nuclear agreement between Iran and the west.”
“People should be ready for the nuclear celebration.”
 
 
Ebtekar (Reformist)
 
Preparation for the nuclear [deal] celebration
 
“Iran’s nuclear case has finally reached its end after 13 years.”
"NAJA [law enforcement forces or police]: Within the framework of laws, we are side-by-side with the people."
 
 
 
Sina Azodi, a research assistant at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, contributed to this roundup.

 

Photo credit: Iran Front Page 

 

Tags: Offbeat

Twitter Craze: #NeverThreatenAnIranian

Talks became heated as foreign ministers from Iran and the world's six major powers met in Vienna to push towards a final nuclear deal. After E.U. foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini said that talks should end if Iran does not want a deal, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif reportedly said, "Never try to threaten the Iranians." Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov added, "nor the Russians." At the time, negotiators were allegedly discussing whether to lift a U.N. arms embargo on Iran. Both Russia and Iran support removing the ban.

Zarif reportedly responded to press surrounding the story by stating that Mogherini "has always had a very positive and constructive role in the negotiations and our relationship has been governed by mutual respect." But the incident prompted Iranians to start a new hashtag on Twitter, #NeverThreatenAnIranian. The following is a sample of tweets that used the hashtag.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Translation: "Never threaten an Iranian, especially Zarif."

The picture of Zarif was taken during a verbal dispute with an Iranian lawmaker in May. Click here for more information.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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