On April 8, the United States announced the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), effective April 15. The IRGC is Iran’s most powerful military and security organization as well as a key economic player. “This unprecedented step, led by the Department of State, recognizes the reality that Iran is not only a State Sponsor of Terrorism, but that the IRGC actively participates in, finances, and promotes terrorism as a tool of statecraft,” said President Donald Trump. He noted that it was the “first time that the United States has ever named part of another government as a FTO.” In response, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council designated U.S. Central Command forces as terrorists and the U.S. as a “sponsor of terrorism.” The following are comments from U.S. officials.
President Donald Trump
Today, I am formally announcing my Administration’s plan to designate Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including its Qods Force, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This unprecedented step, led by the Department of State, recognizes the reality that Iran is not only a State Sponsor of Terrorism, but that the IRGC actively participates in, finances, and promotes terrorism as a tool of statecraft. The IRGC is the Iranian government’s primary means of directing and implementing its global terrorist campaign.
This designation will be the first time that the United States has ever named a part of another government as a FTO. It underscores the fact that Iran’s actions are fundamentally different from those of other governments. This action will significantly expand the scope and scale of our maximum pressure on the Iranian regime. It makes crystal clear the risks of conducting business with, or providing support to, the IRGC. If you are doing business with the IRGC, you will be bankrolling terrorism.
This action sends a clear message to Tehran that its support for terrorism has serious consequences. We will continue to increase financial pressure and raise the costs on the Iranian regime for its support of terrorist activity until it abandons its malign and outlaw behavior.
—April 8, 2019, in a statement
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo
The use of terrorism is central to the Iranian regime’s foreign policy. The designation of IRGC, incl. Qods Force, will help starve the regime of the means to execute this destructive policy. Maximum pressure will be unrelenting until Iran’s regime abandons its deadly ambitions.— Secretary Pompeo (@SecPompeo) April 8, 2019
SECRETARY POMPEO: Good morning. I’m here to make an important foreign policy announcement concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran. Today the United States is continuing to build its maximum pressure campaign against the Iranian regime. I am announcing our intent to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including its Qods Force, as a foreign terrorist organization in accordance with Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This designation will take effect one week from today.
This is the first time that the United States has designated a part of another government as an FTO. We’re doing because the Iranian regime’s use of terrorism as a tool of statecraft makes it fundamentally different from any other government. This historic step will deprive the world’s leading state sponsor of terror the financial means to spread misery and death around the world.
Businesses and banks around the world now have a clear duty to ensure that companies with which they conduct financial transactions are not connected to the IRGC in any material way. It also gives the U.S. Government additional tools to counter Iranian-backed terrorism.
This designation is a direct response to an outlaw regime and surprise no one, and it builds on the more than 970 Iranian individuals and entities that the Trump administration has already sanctioned.
For 40 years, the Islamic Republic’s Revolutionary Guard Corps has actively engaged in terrorism and created, supported, and directed other terrorist groups. The IRGC masquerades as a legitimate military organization, but none of us should be fooled. It regularly violates the laws of armed conflict; it plans, organizes, and executes terror campaigns all around the world. From the moment it was founded, the IRGC’s mandate was to defend and export the regime’s revolution by whatever means possible. The IRGC institutionalized terrorism shortly after its inception, directing horrific attacks against the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 and the U.S. embassy annex in 1984 alongside the terror group it midwifed, Lebanese Hizballah. Its operatives have worked to destabilize the Middle East from Iraq to Lebanon to Syria and to Yemen.
With this designation, the Trump administration is simply recognizing a basic reality. The IRGC will take its rightful place on the same list as terror groups its supports: Lebanese Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Kata’ib Hizballah, among others, all of which are already designated as foreign terrorist organizations.
The long list of IRGC backed terrorist incidences is ample justification for today’s decision. I want to just give you a handful of examples.
Last September a federal court in the United States found Iran and the IRGC responsible for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing which killed 19 American service members. In 2011 the United States foiled an IRGC Qods Force plot right here in Washington, D.C. to bomb a restaurant. The attempt was to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States of America.
Outside of the United States, the IRGC’s terror campaign is just as active. In 2012 four Qods Force operatives were apprehended after plotting to attack Israeli targets in Turkey. In that same year, two other Qods Force operatives were arrested in Kenya for planning a bomb attack while the Qods Force also directed a bomb attack that targeted Israeli diplomats. And as recently as January 2018, German authorities uncovered 10 suspected Qods Force operatives active in their country. The IRGC supports Palestinian terror groups that target innocent civilians, and it helped create U.S. designated terror groups both in Lebanon and in Iran. And the IRGC also backs the murderous Assad regime which gasses and slaughters its own people.
Our designation makes clear to the world that Iranian regime not only supports terrorist groups, but engages in terrorism itself. This designation also brings unprecedented pressure on figures who lead the regime’s terror campaign, individuals like Qasem Soleimani. He is the commander of the Qods Force and oversees Iran’s forces deployed to advance the Islamic Revolution through terrorism and other forms of violence. He doles out the regime’s profits to terrorist groups across the region and around the world.
The blood of the 603 American soldiers the Iranian regime has found to have killed in Iraq is on his hands and on the hands of the IRGC more broadly. Inexplicably the regime has faced no accountability from the international community for those deaths. Far from being an arbitrary attack on Iran, our pressure campaign imposes just and long overdue consequences for the regime’s malign activity.
We should not also forget the IRGC’s central role in the nationwide con artistry and corruption of the regime’s leaders which they perpetrate against the regime’s own people. Other governments and the private sector will now see more clearly how deeply the IRGC has enmeshed itself in the Iranian economy through both licit and illicit means.
In just this past July, the city council of Tehran announced that the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, which manages the IRGC’s investments, has embezzled more than $1 billion from the city of Tehran. The next month, a former councilmember accused the long-time mayor of Tehran of steering contracts to the IRGC. It’s no coincidence that the mayor also formerly served as an IRGC commander and the chief of Iran’s police state. Back in 2017, Tehran arrested several IRGC commanders involved with the Cooperative Fund for corruption, including the IRGC’s financial architect, Masoud Mehrdadi.
Then there’s Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s old college pal, Sadeq Mahsouli. They call him “the billionaire general.” He went from being a low-level IRGC officer to one of Iran’s richest men, all thanks to scoring construction and oil contracts from companies linked to the IRGC.
The leaders of Iran are racketeers, not revolutionaries. The Iranian people deserve better than to be governed by this cadre of hypocritical and corrupt officials. They are opportunists.
And on a final note, the IRGC is also responsible for wrongly detaining U.S. persons, several of whom remain in captivity in Iran. The American people should know that we are working diligently to bring each of those individuals home.
With this designation, we are sending a clear signal, a clear message to Iran’s leaders, including Qasem Soleimani and his band of thugs, that the United States is bringing all pressure to bear to stop the regime’s outlaw behavior. We ask that our allies and partners around the world do the same. Thank you.
QUESTION: Javad Zarif has said today that there will be consequences for U.S. forces in the region after the designation, and he addressed President Trump, saying that he should know better than to be thrown into another U.S. disaster. What’s your answer? And secondly, news reports say that the U.S. is considering sanctions on the Lebanese, the head of the parliament of the Lebanese speaker, Nabih Berri, because of his ties with Hizballah and Iran. Can you confirm that?
SECRETARY POMPEO: So to your second question, on my most recent trip to Beirut, made clear to the Lebanese leadership, including in conversations with Speaker Berri, that America was not going to tolerate the continued rise of Hizballah inside of the country, that it wasn’t in the best interest of the Lebanese people to have a armed terror group underwritten by the very Iran that we’re speaking about today, continue to have significant sway inside of that nation by use of force. This isn’t about political parties; this is about armed forces inside the country of Lebanon. We made very clear that we were going to continue to evaluate sanctions for all those that were connected to the risk that was created to the Lebanese people.
As for the first question, I’ve seen Foreign Minister Zarif make many statements before. We have made clear both publicly and privately that an attack on the United States of America is something that they ought to think more than twice about.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I asked you this question two weeks ago and you didn’t seem to be sure about it. Now that you have list them, I’m wondering what was changed. Now you have list them as a terrorist organization. Will you treat them like ISIS and al-Qaida? In other words, will you target Qasem Soleimani like you target Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi? And on a separate note, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that he wants to annex part of the West Bank today. What’s your reaction to that? Will that undermine the peace plan?
SECRETARY POMPEO: Yeah, I don’t have comments on either one of – a response to either one of those questions. I’ll leave – when you say “target,” you’re usually talking about things that the Department of Defense does. I’ll allow them to respond to that question.
QUESTION: How will this affect EU trade, oil waivers, since the IRGC’s involved in most parts of the Iranian economy – so the question – including banking and everything else? So how does this affect those relations?
SECRETARY POMPEO: Yeah.
QUESTION: And number two: How – if you’re – you said often that you want bring Iran back to the – this is aimed at forcing Iran back to the negotiating table. Do you believe that this would help bring them back, or is that no longer your aim here?
SECRETARY POMPEO: So I think what we’ve said before is we want Iran to behave like a normal nation. We hit on 12 things that they needed to do back in what would have been almost a year ago, May of last year. That’s the mission; that’s the mission of this designation as well. So that’s our purpose. If you said “what’s the intent,” it’s to achieve the outcomes that we laid out back in May of last year to get the Islamic Republic of Iran to do the simple thing like not launch missiles into Saudi Arabia, risking American lives each and every day.
What was your – remind me of your first question.
QUESTION: And then the first one is: How does this affect things on EU trade --
SECRETARY POMPEO: So, yeah. So here’s the simple answer to that. If you’re the general counsel for a European financial institution today, there is more risk. It is absolutely the case that the IRGC amounts to a significant piece of the Iranian economy through pure kleptocracy. And it is also the case that it is sometimes difficult to know whether the IRGC is involved. That is, the diligence effort is an enormous undertaking. I think this – I think this will require more diligence be done by every business that is considering doing things that are even now second and third orders removed from what you might think of as a traditional connection to the Iranian economy. This extends – to your point about trade – oh, you asked about oil waivers. We’ll make that decision in due course as we move towards May 2nd, but it – this absolutely extends the – and creates clarity around those transactions that create risk for companies not just in Europe, but frankly all over the world.
—April 8, 2019, to the press
Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook And Ambassador Nathan A. Sales, Coordinator for Counterterrorism
QUESTION: This has been obviously under consideration for a while. Previous administrations have considered it as well but opted not to do it, and one of the reasons has been for not doing it to date that it creates complications – particularly in Iraq but also in Lebanon and elsewhere for American soldiers but also American diplomats and how they – so are there any exclusions, waivers, carve-outs, however you want to call this, that would allow the kind of contacts, particularly in Iraq, that American commanders or regular troops might have with people – Iraqi officials who, by virtue of their station, have to interact with IRGC personnel.
MR HOOK: I’ll do the first part and then ask (inaudible) to take on the second part. The IRGC has been threatening American troops almost since its inception. And whenever we impose sanctions on Iran, it’s usually followed by a range of threats. What endangers American troops in the Middle East is an IRGC that operates with impunity and never has its ambitions checked in the Middle East. We’re taking an entirely new approach to this of significant sort of sustained maximum economic pressure to deny the IRGC and the Iranian regime of the revenue that it needs to conduct its foreign policy.
And we know that the IRGC has been a principle architect, an enforcer of Iran’s foreign policy since around 1979, the way the ayatollah designed the regime. And they are trying to reshape the Middle East in their favor, working as a power broker and as a military force. And they assassinate rivals, not only in the Middle East but in Europe. They organize, train, and equip these militias all over the Middle East. As we saw in Syria, they direct a network of militant groups, and in the case of Iraq, they’ve killed over 600 American servicemen. And so we think it’s important to – in this case today, we’re adding a layer of additional sanctions on the IRGC to make radioactive those sectors of Iran’s economy that are influenced or controlled by the IRGC.
QUESTION: Well, I just want to make sure you understood. I’m not talking about threats to U.S. forces and diplomats from Iran. I’m talking about threats to them from potential U.S. prosecution for violating sanctions by doing something that may be construed as providing material support to an IRGC affiliate or associate. That’s --
AMBASSADOR SALES: We’re not going to answer hypotheticals about various cases that could be conjured up in the future. We simply don’t have anything to say on that. What I can tell you is the United States has a strong interest in an Iraqi Government that is strong and stable and sovereign and free from malign external influence. The record of Iranian involvement in the region is not a promising one. Look at Syria, look at Yemen, look at Lebanon. We have an interest in making sure that Iraq does not take that road and is able to stand on its own two feet as a strong and prosperous country in its own right.
MR HOOK: I would just maybe add one thing to that. The Middle East cannot be more stable and peaceful without weakening the IRGC. It’s just simply not possible. When you study their 40-year history, it’s impossible to allow the IRGC to continue to operate under this fiction that it’s a benign part of the Iranian Government. It is the blunt instrument of Iran’s foreign policy, and it has been that way for decades. And what we’re doing today is, in addition to the new tools that this gives us, we’re also stigmatizing this organization. We’re highlighting to the world, as the Secretary just did, the perils of working with the IRGC, which by some estimates controls up to or more than half of Iran’s economy.
QUESTION: So does this rule out any sort of contacts with anyone connected to the IRGC? And I’m asking because in the past – the past – last administration had to negotiate with the IRGC to get American hostages out, for instance, or at least have some contacts with members of the IRGC. So do you not have any kind of contact with people who are holding Americans or people who are threatening Americans in places like Iraq?
AMBASSADOR SALES: Let me tell you what the law provides. The law provides that it is a federal criminal offense punishable by up to 20 years in prison for any person who provides material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization. That is what the IRGC will be seven days from today. Now, the application of that law to particular cases, it’s impossible to predict in advance what that’s going to look like. We simply don’t want to get into hypothetical situations.
But the point of this designation that the Secretary just announced is to render the IRGC radioactive, and so all businesses, all foreign officials who are thinking about engaging with the IRGC, should think long and hard about whether that makes sense.
QUESTION: But that includes U.S. Government, American diplomats?
MR HOOK: Well, we have – this is a tool. The FTO tool is something that we have used since 1993, I want to say, over 60 times. And we’re still able to execute our diplomacy and our foreign policy without any impediments, and we have --
QUESTION: But this is the first time you’ve done it to a U.S. --
MR HOOK: Right, but we --
QUESTION: -- to a government entity. That’s why I’m asking the question.
MR HOOK: Doing this will not impede our diplomacy.
QUESTION: Sir, just to clarify, on Iraq, will you be requiring the Iraqi Government as of now to turn over any suspected or known members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard since you’ve declared them as terrorists?
AMBASSADOR SALES: We’re not making any demands of the Iraqi Government. As I said a moment ago, we share the Iraqi Government’s interest in ensuring that the Government of Iraq is able to represent a proud and free and prosperous people without any undue influence from malign actors.
QUESTION: So they will continue to operate freely in Iraq?
AMBASSADOR SALES: It is a criminal offense for any person to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization. How that applies in particular cases we’re simply not going to speculate about right now.
QUESTION: So over the weekend, an IRGC commander warned that if the U.S. take – took this action, U.S. forces in Western Asia will lose peace and quiet. And it’s obviously something we’ve been talking about, U.S. forces operating very close to the IRGC members in Iraq. So is there more being done to provide safety measures to members of the U.S. military that are in close proximity, or are you confident that they are defended enough against the IRGC at this point?
MR HOOK: The decision leading up to this process was a full interagency process that included every member of the National Security Council. We have taken all measures that are appropriate and prudent in the context of this designation.
With respect to Iranian threats, when you play under house rules, the house always wins. And Iran has a very long history of trying to get the world to play by its rules, and every time the world calls out this regime for being a mafia racket – the IRGC, as the Secretary said, resembles more a racket than a revolutionary cause. And so whenever we and other nations call out and expose the regime for what it is, it behaves like a mafia organization, increasing its threats, and we will not be deterred by their threats.
AMBASSADOR SALES: And let me just say we’re not going to get into the details of what we’re doing to make sure that our people downrange are safe. I can assure you that we take force protection very, very seriously, and that is why we have run a robust interagency process to make sure that all interested parties are prepared for whatever the Iranian regime might throw at us.
QUESTION: I know there has been some criticism about, especially now, because U.S. forces are in close proximity, this might put them at risk, which you answered a little bit. But we’ve been hearing about this for a year. Why now? What was the tipping point that made this designation important this week?
AMBASSADOR SALES: Well, it’s the next step in our maximum pressure campaign. This administration previously designated the IRGC for providing support to terrorism. Today, we have stripped away the plausible deniability. It’s not just that the IRGC supports terrorism that its proxies undertake. Today the IRGC stands accused and convicted of directly engaging in terrorism itself.
This new tool doesn’t just add rhetorical heft to our campaign. It has practical, real-world consequences, some of which we’ve discussed. It’s now a federal criminal offense to provide material support to a designated FTO such as IRGC when this take effect on Monday. The material support statute is an incredibly powerful tool. Since 2001, since 9/11, we’ve used it to obtain hundreds of convictions. And the sentence, “For which you are eligible if convicted,” 20-year maximum penalty. So this creates very powerful deterrents for anyone who would provide material support to the IRGC or to any other designated organization.
MR HOOK: Matt – we have said from the time the administration came into office that we’re going to be taking a new approach to Iran, and you have seen over now two years we’ve had 25 rounds of sanctions. We’ve designated almost a thousand individuals and entities. We left the Iran deal, which has given us enormous diplomatic and economic leverage to go after the full range of threats that Iran presents to peace and security. This is just another chapter, and there will be more chapters to come. This is a sustained and focused effort at the direction of the President that enjoys the full support of the national security cabinet.
QUESTION: Last time you were here, we talked about that 600 number that’s been mentioned several times today. You said the Pentagon would give more guidance. They didn’t really. Do you have any more context as to how that number was arrived at as the 600 --
MR HOOK: Well, it’s – there have been estimates over many years. I think in the Obama administration, one DOD official said that somewhere north of 500. It took a while to I think pull together all of the information and to be accurate about it, and the number that has come out of the Defense Department is over 600. Secretary gave the number – I think it’s 603 – and those are just the ones who’ve been killed. It’s an enormous number of Americans who’ve been maimed and hurt because of Iran’s improvised explosive devices.
That’s only Iraq, which accounts for 17 percent of all American service – servicemens’ deaths in Iraq. That doesn’t include Lebanon and the bombings there and other terrorist attacks around the world conducted by this regime. This is the right thing to do; it’s long overdue. It does give us a lot of new tools, and there will be more tools to come.
QUESTION: Well, I just wanted to know about Ambassador Sales’ – the IRGC stands convicted today. I mean, are you referring to a court decision, the one that the Secretary mentioned? I mean, it’s a legal term, and I’m not aware that they have been convicted of being a foreign terrorist organization. They may well should – that may well happen, but are you referring to previous cases where that’s happened?
AMBASSADOR SALES: That was a rhetorical turn of phrase.
QUESTION: Earlier on a conference call this morning, a U.S. administration official said that the IRGC’s dual mission is to suppress people at home and the other terrorize abroad. Now, is this designation today in any way geared towards the first part of the mission here, suppress people at home? Do you expect this designation to in any way affect how the IRGC treats the people within the country?
MR HOOK: Yes, we do. Yes, we do. The IRGC is responsible for much of the repression at home. When you saw the protests in 2009, the detentions, the arrests, the harassment, and then the murders, that is very much an IRGC operation. And so they have been a principle driver of repressing the Iranian people who want a better way of life at home. So when we deny this organization revenue and we put a black cloud above it, it makes it harder for the IRGC to conduct its mission. And they also do this overseas, principally through the Quds Force. And so today’s designation is IRGC and Quds Force, and they are the – of course, IRGC and QF rotate personnel domestically and internationally as Soleimani sees fit. As Qasem Soleimani said in March 2009, “The battlefield is mankind’s lost paradise.”
And this is the true nature of Iran’s foreign policy. It is not the very nice-seeming tweets of Iran’s foreign minister. If you want to know Iran’s foreign policy, pay more attention to what Qasem Soleimani has said and continues to say. He was recently given a medal by the supreme leader, who wished for his martyrdom, and the supreme leader has said things – he’s been lionizing people who drink “the sweet syrup of martrydom.” This regime is in many ways a death cult, and their foreign policy resembles that with all of this talk about martyrdom. And it’s a very dangerous, dark, and brutal regime, both for the Iranian people and for those nations who are on the front line of trying to respond to Iranian aggression.
And we know that Saudi Arabia, with the missile launches from Yemen into Saudi; Bahrain, which has – since ’81 the Iranian regime has tried to destabilize and overthrow the government there in Bahrain; Lebanon, Syria, the Hizballah tunnels – the list goes on and on. It is very hard to imagine a peaceful Middle East with a strong Iranian regime.
—April 8, 2018, at a press briefing
Counter Terrorism Designations; IRGC Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
Specially Designated Nationals List Update
The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
ALI, Halima Adan, Mombasa, Kenya; Nairobi, Kenya; DOB 10 Oct 1986; nationality Kenya; Gender Female; Passport A1659348 (Kenya); Kenyan ID No. 25142129; alt. Kenyan ID No. 22536936; alt. Kenyan ID No. 30760317; alt. Kenyan ID No. 22645786 (individual) [SDGT].
AL-RAWI, Abd-al-Rahman 'Ali Husayn al-Ahmad (a.k.a. AL RAWI, Abdulrahman; a.k.a. AL-RAWI, Abd-al-Rahman; a.k.a. AL-RAWI, Abdul Rahman; a.k.a. AL-RAWI, Abu Abd Al Rahman), Turkey; DOB 1983; POB Albu Kamal, Dayr az Zawr Province, Syria; nationality Syria; Gender Male; Phone Number 905515983567; alt. Phone Number 9647718635788; alt. Phone Number 96351667406; alt. Phone Number 9647715959705 (individual) [SDGT].
AL-RAWI, Muhammad Abd-al-Qadir Mutni Assaf (a.k.a. MATNEE, Mohammed Abdulqader; a.k.a. MATNI, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qadir; a.k.a. MUTNI, Mohammad Abdul Kadir; a.k.a. MUTNI, Muhammad Abdul Qadar; a.k.a. "ABD-AL-QARIM, Abu"), Erbil, Iraq; DOB 15 Apr 1983; Gender Male; Passport G2590897 (individual) [SDGT].
AL-RAWI, Muhannad Mushtaq Talib Zghayir Karhout (a.k.a. TALIB, Mohanad M.; a.k.a. TALIB, Muhannad Mushtaq; a.k.a. ZUGHAYAR, Muhanad Mushtaq; a.k.a. ZUGHAYAR, Muhanad Mushtaq Talib), Baghdad, Iraq; Samsun, Turkey; DOB 26 Dec 1996; POB Al-Qa'im, Iraq; nationality Iraq; Email Address email@example.com; Gender Male; Phone Number 9647821757598; National Foreign ID Number 00167950 (Iraq) (individual) [SDGT].
AL-RAWI, Mushtaq Talib Zughayr (a.k.a. AL-HASHIMI, Mushtaq Talib Zughayar Karhut; a.k.a. AL-RAWI, Abu Mus'ab; a.k.a. AL-RAWI, Mushtaq; a.k.a. AL-RAWI, Mushtaq Talib; a.k.a. AL-RAWI, Mushtaq Talib Zaghayir), Turkey; Belgium; DOB 1964; alt. DOB 1969; Gender Male; Phone Number 905537471039 (individual) [SDGT].
AL-RAWI, Umar Talib Zughayr (a.k.a. AL-HASHIMI, Umar Talib Zughayr; a.k.a. AL-RAWI, 'Umar Talib; a.k.a. AL-RAWI, Umar Talib Zughayr Karhoot; a.k.a. ZGHYR, 'Umr Talib; a.k.a. "AL-RAWI, Abu Umar"), Samsun, Turkey; al-Qa'im, Anbar Province, Iraq; Mersin Province, Turkey; DOB 1970; alt. DOB 1971; POB Iraq; nationality Iraq; Gender Male; Phone Number 907816941101; alt. Phone Number 9647734097694 (individual) [SDGT].
AL-RAWI, Walid Talib Zughayr (a.k.a. AL-HASHIMI, Walid Talib Zughayr; a.k.a. AL-RAWI, Waleed Talib Zghayir Karhout; a.k.a. ZGHAIR, Waleed Talib Zghair; a.k.a. ZGHYR, Walid Talib; a.k.a. "AL-RAWI, Abu Khalid"), Baghdad, Iraq; DOB 11 Nov 1988; nationality Iraq; Email Address firstname.lastname@example.org; Gender Male; Phone Number 9647807890955; alt. Phone Number 96407707840824; alt. Phone Number 9647720364973; Passport A11071541 (individual) [SDGT].
The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
AL-ARD AL-JADIDAH MONEY EXCHANGE COMPANY (a.k.a. AL ARDH AL JADIDA; a.k.a. AL-ARDH AL-JADEEDA EXCHANGE COMPANY; a.k.a. NEW LAND MONEY EXCHANGE COMPANY), Iraq; Hajin, Dayr az Zawr Province, Syria; Sanliurfa, Turkey; Phone Number 9647807798905; alt. Phone Number 964805611259; alt. Phone Number 9647905886647 [SDGT].
IRGC GROUND FORCES (a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTION GUARDS CORPS GROUND FORCE), Tehran, Iran; Syria; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [FTO] [IRGC].
IRGC NAVY (a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTION GUARDS CORPS NAVAL FORCE), Tehran, Iran; Syria; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [FTO] [IRGC].
The following changes have been made to OFAC's SDN List:
BASIJ RESISTANCE FORCE (a.k.a. BASEEJ; a.k.a. BASIJ; a.k.a. BASIJ-E MELLI; a.k.a. MOBILIZATION OF THE OPPRESSED ORGANIZATION; f.k.a. SAZMAN BASIJ MELLI; a.k.a. SAZMAN-E MOGHAVEMAT-E BASIJ; f.k.a. VAHED-E BASIJ-E MOSTAZAFEEN; f.k.a. "NATIONAL MOBILIZATION ORGANIZATION"; a.k.a. "NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOBILIZATION"; a.k.a. "RESISTANCE MOBILIZATION FORCE"), Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [SDGT] [IRGC] [IFSR] [IRAN-HR] (Linked To: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (IRGC)-QODS FORCE; Linked To: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS). -to- BASIJ RESISTANCE FORCE (a.k.a. BASEEJ; a.k.a. BASIJ; a.k.a. BASIJ RESISTANCE FORCES; a.k.a. BASIJ-E MELLI; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTION GUARDS CORPS RESISTANCE FORCE; a.k.a. MOBILIZATION OF THE OPPRESSED ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. NIROOYE MOGHAVEMATE BASIJ; a.k.a. NIRUYEH MOGHAVEMAT BASIJ; a.k.a. SAZEMAN-E BASIJ-E MOSTAZAFAN; f.k.a. SAZMAN BASIJ MELLI; a.k.a. SAZMAN-E MOGHAVEMAT-E BASIJ; a.k.a. VAHED-E BASIJ MOSTAZA'FEEN; f.k.a. VAHED-E BASIJ-E MOSTAZAFEEN; a.k.a. "MOBILIZATION OF THE OPPRESSED"; a.k.a. "MOBILIZATION OF THE OPPRESSED UNIT"; f.k.a. "NATIONAL MOBILIZATION ORGANIZATION"; a.k.a. "NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOBILIZATION"; a.k.a. "ORGANIZATION OF THE MOBILISATION OF THE OPPRESSED"; a.k.a. "RESISTANCE MOBILIZATION FORCE"), Tehran, Iran; Syria; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [FTO] [SDGT] [IRGC] [IFSR] [IRAN-HR] (Linked To: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (IRGC)-QODS FORCE; Linked To: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS).
ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [SDGT] [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IFSR] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT-IR]. -to- ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTION GUARDS CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. PASDARN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN ENGHELAB ISLAMI; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran; Syria; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Additional Program Tags - [FTO][SDGT] [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IFSR] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT-IR].
ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (IRGC)-QODS FORCE (a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI (PASDARAN); a.k.a. SEPAH-E QODS (JERUSALEM FORCE)); Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [SDGT] [SYRIA] [IRGC] [IFSR] [IRAN-HR]. -to- ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (IRGC)-QODS FORCE (a.k.a. AL QODS; a.k.a. IRGC-QF; a.k.a. IRGC-QUDS FORCE; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS-QODS FORCE; a.k.a. JERUSALEM FORCE; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI (PASDARAN); a.k.a. QODS (JERUSALEM) FORCE OF THE IRGC; a.k.a. QODS FORCE; a.k.a. QUDS FORCE; a.k.a. SEPAH-E QODS; a.k.a. SEPAH-E QODS (JERUSALEM FORCE)), Tehran, Iran; Syria; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [FTO] [SDGT] [SYRIA] [IRGC] [IFSR] [IRAN-HR].
ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AIR FORCE (a.k.a. IRGC AIR FORCE; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN AIR FORCE), Tehran, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [SDGT] [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IFSR]. -to- ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AIR FORCE (a.k.a. AEROSPACE DIVISION OF IRGC; a.k.a. AEROSPACE FORCE OF THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. AFAGIR; a.k.a. AIR FORCE, IRGC (PASDARAN); a.k.a. IRGC AEROSPACE FORCE; a.k.a. IRGC AIR FORCE; a.k.a. IRGCAF; a.k.a. IRGCASF; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTION GUARDS CORPS AIR FORCE; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS AEROSPACE FORCE; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS AIR FORCE; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN AIR FORCE), Tehran, Iran; Syria; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [FTO] [SDGT] [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IFSR].
Part 2: Fact Sheets on IRGC, Qods Force
Part 3: What Will IRGC Designation Actually Do?
Part 4: Experts on IRGC Designation
Part 5: How Might Tehran Respond to IRGC Designation?
Part 6: Iranian Officials React to IRGC Designation