United States Institute of Peace

The Iran Primer

New Articles

Part I: How Would Iran Fight Back?

Alireza Nader

            Iran’s response to Israeli or U.S. air strikes is likely to feature unconventional tactics that would not necessarily lead to battlefield successes, such as defeat of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. But its strategy could theoretically achieve an overall political and psychological victory.
 
            The Islamic Republic’s reaction would incorporate lessons learned from the eight-year Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s and the 34-day war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006—two of the defining conflicts of the late 20th century. The Gulf War was the longest and deadliest modern Middle East conflict. And Hezbollah, with aid and arms from Iran, fought the longest modern war with Israel. Iran would almost certainly also factor in past U.S. military operations in the region.
 
            Despite their boasting, Iranian leaders are well aware that they cannot defeat the U.S. military in a face-to-face conflict. But as Hezbollah’s 2006 war with Israel demonstrated, battlefield losses (or draws) can be turned into psychological victories. The Islamic Republic has devoted substantial information and media resources to fight a psychological war (jang e ravani). Hezbollah was able to withstand the Israeli military and shoot missiles into Israeli cities throughout the conflict – and thus convince many Arabs that it had won.
 
            Iran could again try to claim a victory simply by withstanding an assault and retaining much of its nuclear know-how and technology, even if it sustained significant losses. But Israel and the United States have also learned from the 2006 Hezbollah war. Regardless, any war with Iran could be long, costly and ultimately unsuccessful in eliminating Iran’s nuclear drive.
 
            Again facing a superior enemy, Iran would likely rely on a largely defensive and flexible military doctrine known as a mosaic defense (defa e mozaik). Iran has decentralized its military command and control as part of its doctrine of mosaic defense. Its military officials have noted past U.S. operations that targeted command-and-control centers, including wars against Iraq in 1990-91 and 2003, and have actually divided their command into 32 units, one for each of Iran’s provinces.
 
            The Iranian air force, made up of aging U.S. and Russian platforms, is no match for either the United States or Israel. And Tehran lacks sophisticated air defenses, despite attempts to purchase them from Russia or develop its own.
 
            Given its limitations, Iran has emphasized passive defense (defa e gheir amali). It has buried and hardened key nuclear facilities. Most of Iran’s missiles can be placed on mobile launchers, making them more elusive for Israeli or U.S. fighters. Iran has also built underground silos to make its missiles less vulnerable to airstrikes. The silos could also house nuclear weapons.
 
            After absorbing initial air strikes through passive defense, Iran could then retaliate through conventional missile attacks and asymmetric tactics, from dropping mines in the Persian Gulf to using proxies to attack Israeli or American targets. Iran could use its growing asymmetric naval capabilities to cause economic havoc and increase the pressure on all parties dependent on the Strait of Hormuz.
 
            Iran’s most powerful weapons may be the hundreds of missiles that can reach Israel and U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf or Afghanistan. The goal would be a psychological victory. Volleys of missiles shot at U.S. allies, such as Qatar, could seek to punish Arab regimes that host U.S. warplanes or allow overfly rights.
 
            Tehran’s military doctrine is defined largely by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), rather than by the Artesh, the often neglected regular military. The Guards would seek to avoid a protracted conflict that could damage the Iranian economy and public morale.  The Iran-Iraq War, called the Holy Defense (defa e moghadas), produced hundreds of thousands of casualties and a deep wound in the national psyche. Millions of Iranians were willing to fight for the regime in the revolution’s early days, but many may not view a new conflict as a holy defense of the Islamic Republic.
 
Alireza Nader, coauthor of Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry (RAND, 2011), is a senior policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.
 
 
Online news media are welcome to republish original blog postings from this website in full, with a citation and link back to The Iran Primer website (www.iranprimer.com) as the original source. Any edits must be authorized by the author. Permission to reprint excerpts from The Iran Primer book should be directed to permissions@usip.org
 

US takes MEK off terrorism list

            On Sept. 28, the U.S. State Department revoked the Mujahedin-e Khalq’s (MEK) designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The leftist group killed six Americans in Iran in the 1970s and attempted an attack against the Iranian mission to the United Nations in 1992. The State Department then added it to the terrorism list in 1997. But the MEK renounced violence in 2001 and no terrorist attacks have been positively linked to the organization for more than a decade.

            The following media note details the MEK’s delisting, followed by excerpts from a background briefing.   
 
Delisting of the Mujahedin-e Khalq

The Secretary of State has decided, consistent with the law, to revoke the designation of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and its aliases as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under the Immigration and Nationality Act and to delist the MEK as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224.  These actions are effective today.  Property and interests in property in the United States or within the possession or control of U.S. persons will no longer be blocked, and U.S. entities may engage in transactions with the MEK without obtaining a license.  These actions will be published in the Federal Register.
 
With today’s actions, the Department does not overlook or forget the MEK’s past acts of terrorism, including its involvement in the killing of U.S. citizens in Iran in the 1970s and an attack on U.S. soil in 1992.  The Department also has serious concerns about the MEK as an organization, particularly with regard to allegations of abuse committed against its own members.
 
The Secretary’s decision today took into account the MEK’s public renunciation of violence, the absence of confirmed acts of terrorism by the MEK for more than a decade, and their cooperation in the peaceful closure of Camp Ashraf, their historic paramilitary base. 
 
The United States has consistently maintained a humanitarian interest in seeking the safe, secure, and humane resolution of the situation at Camp Ashraf, as well as in supporting the United Nations-led efforts to relocate eligible former Ashraf residents outside of Iraq.
 
###
 
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: I can’t speak with authority as to how foreign governments will react, but it is certainly plausible to assume that this action will assist in our efforts to support the UNHCR in its efforts to find homes for these people outside of Iraq.

Certainly, now with Camp Ashraf effectively closed, only a residual group remaining, and with over 3,000 of its – Camp Ashraf’s former residents peacefully relocated to Camp Hurriya, the major task in our humanitarian efforts with respect to this organization’s members is their peaceful, orderly resettlement outside of Iraq. If this decision assists in those efforts, so much the better. I will be working intensely in the days and weeks to come with European Governments and other governments bilaterally and with the UNHCR to advance this process...
 
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Well, let’s be clear. The timing of the de-listing has to do with the deadline given by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. That court had set this deadline of October 1 as a date when there had to be a decision on the MEK’s petition to have its FTO status revoked. That was the condition that led to this timing and this decision was taken on the merits for the reasons that I explained before and not for any other reasons...

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: We do not see the MEK as a viable opposition or democratic opposition movement. We have no evidence and we have no confidence that the MEK is an organization that could promote the democratic values that we would like to see in Iran.

There is nothing in the way they govern themselves that would suggest they’re interested in adopting democratic principles, and there is a long and fairly rich set of documentation on how they treat their own personnel that really does suggest to the contrary. So we continue to have serious concerns about the group with regard to allegations of abuse that’s committed against its own members. They are not part of our picture in terms of the future of Iran.

Click here for the full briefing.

Iran and the Arab Spring: Ascendancy Frustrated

Shahram Chubin

On Sept. 27, the Gulf Research Center published “Iran and the Arab Spring: Ascendancy Frustrated” by Shahram Chubin.
 
A PDF of the full report can be found at the bottom of the page. The following excerpts are a summary of the report:
 
Introduction: The Geopolitics of the Region
 
The Arab Spring has yet to give way to the hoped-for glorious summer, but for Iran it has already turned into a ‘winter of discontent.’ Iran finds its revolutionary message diluted and overtaken by events. Characteristically, Tehran has raised the stakes by increasing its involvement in Syria and Yemen.
 
Widespread regional instability has not been conducive to the extension of either its power or influence, and Iran finds itself reacting – often defensively – to events rather than dictating them.
 
The Background: Iran in the Region 2005-2010
 
Increasingly in this decade, the Gulf States have begun to view Iran, not Israel, as their principal security concern…By now, Iran’s tactics were clear enough. Like the Soviet Union, Iran wanted to be in a position in which no regional issue could be decided without reference to it.
 
To ensure this, it would get involved in all issues, whether to hedge against an unwanted outcome, or to acquire bargaining chips to exchange for things of more direct interest to it. This implied a region-wide presence politically and investment across-the-board in Shi’a and Sunni groups (Hizbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad) or as in Iraq the Mahdi army, Al Dawa and SCIRI, and in Afghanistan anti- and pro- Taliban forces, including Al Qaeda. The instrument for this regional involvement has been the Qods Force of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC).
 
The Islamic Republic and Domestic Politics
 
In theory, Iran under international pressure economically and politically, and with domestic preoccupations foremost, has three choices:
 
• Seek a (strategic) compromise on the nuclear issue to reduce the pressure;
• Lash out regionally to improve its bargaining position (e.g., up the ante in Syria or Yemen);
• Settle for riding out the pressure with tactical adjustments and ‘concessions,’ without yielding much of substance or foregoing its revolutionary role.
 
One complication for Iran is the degree to which its revolutionary foreign policy is hostage to domestic politics: can Iran afford in terms of its revolutionary identity – an intrinsic part of its legitimacy – to become a ‘normal’ state? Can it afford politically to abandon the ‘sense of embattlement’ which it utilizes domestically?
 
Iran’s Reading of the Arab Spring
 
The Islamic Republic’s initial response to change in the region was positive. After all, upsetting the status quo, especially the reversal of a US client in Egypt, would – it was thought – rebound to Iran’s benefit. It could lead to a significant strengthening of Islamist forces in the region and reanimate hostility toward Israel. Furthermore, any weakening of important Arab states such as Egypt would magnify Iran’s regional influence…
 
Iran and the Arab Spring
 
For our purposes, the question is where does this leave Iranian influence and place in the region? It may appear paradoxical but while political Islam may be the big winner in these changes, Iran is one of the principal losers. That political Islam is likely to emerge as a central factor in the future politics of many countries should not surprise us…
 
Geo-strategically, the situation has also changed for the worse for Iran. The decline of Egypt’s power has left only Saudi Arabia to contain Iran. In this effort, it has two allies, Turkey and Israel.
 
Arab perceptions of Iran have evolved to seeing it taking the place of Israel as a major threat to the Arabs. They now see their Persian neighbor as “a hegemonic state that is attempting to implement aggressively interventionist and potentially expansionist policies…”
 
As poker players, the Iranians might seek to raise the stakes through bluff, to cover their vulnerability. As chess players, however, they would be advised to look to their primary long-range strategic goal – regime survival.
 
This will depend largely on domestic factors; Iran may be vulnerable but it is not about to collapse. The regime benefits from societal fractures that still give it a large- enough constituency to stay in power by force if necessary. What could change things is a combination of a significant, precipitate and sustained decline in oil prices, reduced production capacity, and the cumulative bite of sanctions.
 
To view the full PDF, click here.
 
 
Shahram Chubin is a Geneva-based specialist on Iranian politics and a non-resident senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His latest book is, “Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions” (2006). He is a former Woodrow Wilson Center scholar and received a USIP grant for a study of conflict and cooperation in the Persian Gulf.
 

World Leaders React to Ahmadinejad

            Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad arrived in New York on Sept. 22 and addressed the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 26. President Barack Obama and other U.S. and world leaders condemned Iran’s positions on Syria, Israel and its nuclear program both before and after Ahmadinejad’s address.

            The following are excerpts from statements by U.S. and world leaders from the past week:
 
President Barack Obama’s remarks to the U.N. General Assembly, Sept. 25
 
“In Iran, we see where the path of a violent and unaccountable ideology leads. The Iranian people have a remarkable and ancient history, and many Iranians wish to enjoy peace and prosperity alongside their neighbors. But just as it restricts the rights of its own people, the Iranian government continues to prop up a dictator in Damascus and supports terrorist groups abroad. Time and again, it has failed to take the opportunity to demonstrate that its nuclear program is peaceful, and to meet its obligations to the United Nations.
 
So let me be clear. America wants to resolve this issue through diplomacy, and we believe that there is still time and space to do so. But that time is not unlimited. We respect the right of nations to access peaceful nuclear power, but one of the purposes of the United Nations is to see that we harness that power for peace. And make no mistake, a nuclear-armed Iran is not a challenge that can be contained. It would threaten the elimination of Israel, the security of Gulf nations, and the stability of the global economy. It risks triggering a nuclear-arms race in the region, and the unraveling of the non-proliferation treaty. That’s why a coalition of countries is holding the Iranian government accountable. And that’s why the United States will do what we must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.”
 
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to the U.N. Security Council, Sept. 26
 
“No discussion of the Middle East would be complete without a mention of Iran and the profound threat its activities pose to the region and beyond. Despite numerous demands by this Council, Iran still has not taken the necessary steps to cooperate fully with the IAEA and to resolve doubts about its nuclear program. In addition, Iran continues to sponsor terrorist groups and smuggle weapons for the Assad regime’s use against the Syrian people. Meanwhile, the Iranian people themselves suffer gross violation of their rights at the hand of their own government.”
 
U.S. Mission to the United Nations statement, Sept. 26
 
“Over the past couple of days, we’ve seen Mr. Ahmadinejad once again use his trip to the U.N. not to address the legitimate aspirations of the Iranian people but to instead spout paranoid theories and repulsive slurs against Israel. It’s particularly unfortunate that Mr. Ahmadinejad will have the platform of the U.N. General Assembly on Yom Kippur, which is why the United States has decided not to attend.”
 
U.N Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s remarks to the U.N. General Assembly, Sept. 25
 
“Iran must prove the solely peaceful intent of its program.” 
 
Office of U.N.Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, Sept. 24
 
“The secretary-general drew [President Ahmadinejad’s] attention to the potentially harmful consequences of inflammatory rhetoric, counter-rhetoric and threats from various countries in the Middle East.”
 
French President Francois Hollande’s remarks to the U.N. General Assembly, Sept. 25
 
“For years now, Iran has been ignoring the international community’s demands, has avoided IAEA inspections, and has not kept her word or complied with the Security Council resolutions. I myself hoped that negotiation could really take place and that targets would be set. Once again this negotiation did not succeed. France does not accept this violation, which is a threat to regional security and, as we know, a threat to global peace. So I want to say here again that we’re ready to impose new sanctions – not to punish the great people of Iran but to say to their leaders that they must resume the negotiations before it’s too late.”
 
German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle to the press at the U.N. General Assembly, Sept. 25
 
“Iran has not taken advantage of the talks in the past months to negotiate substantially…A nuclear armed Iran is unacceptable.”
 
White House Press Secretary Jay Carney to the media on Sept. 24
 

“President Ahmadinejad says foolish, offensive and sometimes unintelligible things with great regularity. What he should focus on is the failure of his government of Iran to abide by its international obligations, to abide by United Nations Security Council resolutions.”

 

Ahmadinejad’s Speech at the United Nations

            On Sept. 26, President Ahmadinejad addressed the 76th annual U.N. General Assembly. He spoke about the need "to remove the structural barriers" between people and criticized the current state of global decision-making.

           The following are excerpts from his speech:

“Despite all efforts made by righteous people and justice seekers, and the sufferings and pains endured by masses of people in the quest to achieve happiness and victory, the history of mankind, except in rare cases, is marked with unfulfilled dreams and failures...”
 

“Arms race and intimidation by nuclear weapons and weapons of mass-destruction by the hegemonic powers have become prevalent: Testing new generations of ultra-modern weaponry and the pledge to disclose these armaments on due time is now being used as a new language of threat against nations to coerce them into accepting a new era of hegemony. Continued threat by the uncivilized Zionists to resort to military action against our great nation is a clear example of this bitter reality...”

“[Imagine] if the tragic incident of September 11, and the military actions against Afghanistan and Iraq that left millions killed and homeless had not happened, and if, instead of killing and throwing the culprit into the sea without trial or without informing the world and people of America, an independent fact-finding team had been formed to make the general public aware of the truth behind the incident, and prepare for bringing to justice the perpetrators...”
 
“The UN lacks the efficiency to bring about the required changes. If this inefficiency persists, nations will lose hope in the global structures to defend their rights. If the UN is not restructured, international interactions and the spirit of collective global cooperation will be tarnished and the standing of the UN will be damaged...”
 
“On behalf of the members of Non-Aligned Movement, I would like to invite all countries of the world to play a more active role in making it possible for everybody to contribute to the global decision-making processes. The need to remove the structural barriers and encourage the process of universal participation in global management has never been greater before...”
 
“I do not believe that Muslims, Christians, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, and others have any problems, or are hostile against each other. They get along together comfortably and live together in an atmosphere of peace and amity...”
 
“From the standpoint of the politicians who control the world power centers, concepts such as moral principles, purity, honesty, integrity, compassion and self-sacrifice are rejected as defunct and outdated notions, and an impediment to the accomplishment of their goals. They openly talk about their disbelief in the relevance of ethics to the political and social affairs. Pure and indigenous cultures as the product of centuries - old efforts of nations, the common denominator reflecting human profound feeling and love towards beauties, and the force which breeds diversity, cultural vividness, and social dynamism, are under constant attacks, and susceptible to extinction...”
 
 

The Islamists Are Coming

The Islamists Are Coming, edited by Robin Wright, surveys the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region more than any other political bloc. Yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.

Connect With Us

Our Partners

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Logo