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Iran Both Fights and Facilitates Narcotics

Garrett Nada

After struggling for decades to combat narcotics, Iran is today both fighting and facilitating narcotics, according to reports by the United Nations, the United States and Iran. Tehran has escalated its campaign against narcotics use and trafficking with help from the United Nations.
 
At the same time, however, an elite Revolutionary Guards force has reportedly allowed traffickers to smuggle drugs through Iran in exchange for helping Tehran arm Taliban forces fighting NATO troops in Afghanistan. In 2012, the United States sanctioned a senior Revolutionary Guard commander for facilitating drug smuggling that also aided an extremist group.
 
The Islamic Republic now openly admits having a drug problem that it denied for years. “For a long time nobody wanted to admit it, but drug abuse was ravaging our society…Now the scourge is so bad that we are finally reaching the point where the government is getting really involved,” Abbas Deylamizade, managing director of Rebirth, told The Toronto Globe and Mail in May 2012. Rebirth is Iran’s largest non-governmental organization working on drug treatment.
 
Since the 1979 revolution, Iran claims to have lost some 3,720 security forces fighting drug traffickers, many of whom were heavily armed. Tehran estimates that it spends around $1 billion annually on its war on drugs. In 2009, Iran accounted for 89 percent of worldwide opium seizures and 41 percent of heroin seizures, according to the 2011 U.N. World Drug Report.
 
Support for Traffickers
 
But in 2012, the United States revealed inconsistencies in Iran’s public narrative. The U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions in March on General Gholamreza Baghbani, a commander in the Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force (IRGC-QF). The Qods Force is the elite military wing charged with overseeing foreign operations.
 
Baghbani allegedly allowed narcotics traffickers to smuggle opiates from Afghanistan through Iran in exchange for their assistance in delivering weapons across the border to the Taliban in Afghanistan. NATO officials claim the Iranian weapons have been used repeatedly against NATO forces.
 
“Today’s action exposes IRGC-QF involvement in trafficking narcotics, made doubly reprehensible here because it is done as part of a broader scheme to support terrorism. Treasury will continue exposing narcotics traffickers and terrorist supporters wherever they operate,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen on March 7.
 
In March, the House Foreign Affairs Committee also passed the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012. Congress found that, “Iran has used its proxies in Latin America to raise revenues through illicit activities, including drug and arms trafficking.”
 
Widespread Drug Use at Home
 
The Islamic Republic has long struggled to deal with domestic drug use. China has the highest number of opiate abusers in the world, but Iran is second in the percentage of population using opiates, according to the State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2012.
 
The United Nations estimates that the Islamic Republic has some 1.2 million drug addicts. But recreational use is widespread, complicating accurate figures of drug users. Rebirth estimates that Iran may have up to five million addicts, along with millions more occasional users. Young people under the age of 30 have “turned aggressively” to drug abuse, the State Department reported in 2012.
 
Geography has contributed to the problem. Iran is a major trafficking hub for opiates produced in Afghanistan that are smuggled to Europe and beyond. The United Nations estimates that 5,800 tons of opium were grown in Afghanistan in 2011. A 2011 report by the Stimson Center estimated that almost half of Afghanistan’s opium crossed into Iran, where 15 percent—or some 435 tons—was consumed.
 
Drug use has in turn dramatically increased the spread of HIV/AIDS. As of mid-2011, drug use was a factor in 70 percent of more than 23,000 registered cases of HIV/AIDS infections in Iran, according to the State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2012. The debilitating effects of drugs on Iranian society have forced the government to take a more active role in treatment and so-called harm reduction, an umbrella term for government programs to limit the impact of drug use. Harm reduction includes providing clean needles, methadone (a synthetic opium replacement), and condoms to prevent the spread of HIV from people who got it by sharing needles.
 
Changing Strategies: From Punishment to Treatment
 
After the 1979 revolution, the new Islamic government dealt with its drug problem through strict law enforcement and tough penalties. Iran ended treatment programs launched by the monarchy and instead imprisoned users and executed traffickers. But Iran shifted strategies again under reformist President Mohammad Khatami, who instituted a treatment-based approach after his election in 1997.
 
Users now have access to facilities and aid to cope with addiction. The government subsidizes some NGOs and community-based programs, but non-government groups have are now taking the lead. By 2012, only 150 out of the 850 clinics in Iran were government-run. Rebirth, Iran’s largest drug-focused NGO, runs more than 140 drug treatment centers that help 600,000 users, The Globe and Mail reported.
 
But Iran also still executes drug traffickers. On June 9, 2012, Iran publicly hanged five men for drug trafficking in Shiraz.
 
Stemming the Flow from Afghanistan
 
Tehran has reportedly intensified efforts to catch traffickers recently. It has deployed 50,000 border guards along its 1150-mile eastern border with Afghanistan and Pakistan. It has also spent $1 billion to erect land barriers—such as trenches and barbed wire fences—as well as observation towers and electronic detection equipment since 2005.
 
Iran claims it seized more than 500 tons of drugs in 2011. Iranian Police Chief Esmail Ahmadi Moqaddam said that security forces had seized 30 percent more narcotics between March and May 2012 than during the same period in 2011.
 
Narcotics is one issue on which Iran has worked closely with the international community. The United States has even approved licenses to permit American non-government organizations to help on drug issues in Iran. “The Iranian government has taken strong measures against illicit narcotics smuggling, including cooperation with the international community and interdiction of drugs moving into and through its territory,” the State Department said in its 2012 report.
 
The United Nations also commended Iran for its efforts to cut down on trafficking, attributing the global increase in opium seizures since 2002 primarily to Iran’s efforts. Since 1996, Iran has accounted for more than three quarters of opium seizures worldwide. In 2011, the Iranian Anti-Narcotics Police introduced a new squad of 40 drug-sniffing dogs with U.N. support.
 
Global Overspill
 
The crisis extends well beyond Iran’s borders, however. Most opiates processed in Iran, including heroin, have long been sold in Europe, Russia and the Middle East. But they have also recently been seized in Australia and the United States.
 
In March 2012, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration announced charges against six Iranians who imported opium from the Afghan border hidden in Persian rugs to the United States for distribution in New York, Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. The United Nations estimated that there are between 12 and 21 million opiate users worldwide; more than 100,000 people die annually as a result of Afghan opium, making it the deadliest drug in the world.
 
In 2007, the United Nations brokered the Triangular Initiative among Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan to enhance cooperation among the countries in fighting drug trafficking. But the joint planning cell in Tehran launched only 12 joint operations between 2009 and 2011. On November 28, 2011, Yuri Fedotov, Executive Director of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime warned that, “Much more needs to be done.” Joint patrols, he advised, should become “routine, not exceptional events.”
 
Garrett Nada recently graduated from the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs with an MA in Middle East Studies.
 
 

 

Tags: Drugs, Iran

What Happened when Putin and Netanyahu talked Iran?

Mark  N. Katz

On Iran, what came out of the meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel? What specifically did each leader want from the other?

The Putin-Netanyahu summit made little progress in bridging vast differences between Russian and Israeli positions over the Iranian nuclear program—or what do about it.

Israeli Prime Minister wanted Russian President Putin to support four specific demands on Iran: 

  • Expansion of sanctions against Tehran,
  • A halt to all enrichment of uranium by Iran,
  • Removal of all enriched uranium from Iran,
  • Dismantling of Iran’s new underground nuclear facility near Qom. 

In contrast, Putin did not advance any particular demands with regard to Iran.

On what did the men agree on Iran? And on what about Iran did they disagree?

In a joint press conference after meeting Putin, Netanyhau claimed that the two leaders agreed that a nuclear-armed Iran “presents a grave danger first of all to Israel, and to the region and the world as a whole.”  Putin said “the talks were detailed and very useful.”  But he was much more non-committal about their discussions of Iran’s nuclear program. He did not publicly support Netanyahu’s warning that Iran represents a grave danger or his four specific demands.

Is the meeting likely to change the dynamics of diplomacy by the world’s six major powers, especially given the stalemate during their talks with Iran on June 18-19?

The Moscow talks  on Iran’s controversial nuclear issue were a disappointment.  But for Putin to travel to Israel within a week—and to receive such a warm reception—must have been a disappointment to Tehran as well. 

The Israelis will undoubtedly focus on how little support Putin offered for their position. But the Iranians are also sure to recognize that he did not support Tehran’s position either.  This suggests that Tehran may have limited ability to play differences between the Russians on the one hand against the United States and Europe on the other in the new diplomatic effort.

How critical will this Russian-Israeli relationship be to what happens with Iran?

Putin’s visit to Israel underscores something that Tehran would prefer to ignore--and usually does.  Under Putin, Russian-Israeli relations have grown quite close.  And this is not likely to change as long as Putin is in power—which could be for six years, 12 years, or even longer.  As a result, Tehran should not assume that Moscow will back Iran in any confrontation it may have with Israel. 

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University, and is the author of "Leaving without Losing: The War on Terror after Iraq and Afghanistan" (2012).

 

Clinton and Baker on Diplomacy v. War

On June 20, the State Department hosted a conversation on U.S. foreign policy between Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and former Secretary of State James Baker. The following are excerpts from the discussion, which was hosted by Charlie Rose.
 
CLINTON: One of the real successes of our diplomatic strategy toward Iran, which was to be willing to engage with them but to keep a very clear pressure track going, is that the Chinese and the Russians are part of a unified negotiating stance that we have presented to the Iranians, most recently in Moscow.
 
I think the Iranians have been surprised. They have expended a certain amount of effort to try to break apart this so-called P-5+1, and they haven’t been successful. The Russians and the Chinese have been absolutely clear they don’t want to see Iran with a nuclear weapon. They have to see concrete steps taken by Iran that are in line with Iran’s international obligations. And we have said we’ll do action for action, but we have to see some willingness on the part of the Iranians to act first...
 
It took three-plus years, because one of the efforts that we’ve been engaged in is to make the case that as difficult as it is to put these sanctions on Iran, and particularly to ask countries like China to decrease their crude oil purchases from Iran, the alternatives are much worse. And we’ve seen China slowly but surely take actions, along with some other countries for whom it was quite difficult – Japan, South Korea, India, et cetera. So on Iran, they are very much with us in the international arena.
 
ROSE: Will they support an oil embargo?
 
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, absent some action by Iran between now and July 1st, the oil embargo is going into effect. And that’s been very clear from the beginning, that we were on this track. I have to certify under American laws whether or not countries are reducing their purchases of crude oil from Iran, and I was able to certify that India was, Japan was, South Korea was. And we think, based on the latest data, that China is also moving in that direction. And thankfully, there’s been enough supply in the market that countries have been able to change suppliers.
 
BAKER: If  we’re going to have differences with Russia – and we do have some differences with Russia – it seems to me the most important difference we might have is with respect to Iran. And we don’t have that now, and that’s really important. And I don’t think we ought to create a problem with Russia vis-a-vis what we want to do in Iran about their nuclear ambitions as a result of something we might do in Syria. I just think the Iranian issue there is far more important really than how we resolve the Syrian issue.
 
ROSE: [On the Syrian crisis] Is there a role for Iran?
 
CLINTON: At this point, it would be very difficult for Iran to be initially involved. I mean, I’m a big believer in talking to people when you can and trying to solve problems when you can. But right now, we’re focused on dealing with Iran and the nuclear portfolio. That has to be our focus. Iran’s always trying to get us to talk about anything else except their nuclear program.
And then we also have the added problem that Iran is not just supporting Assad, they are helping him to devise and execute the very plans that he is following to suppress, oppress the opposition.
 
BAKER: With respect to Iran, I agree with the Secretary. This is not the place to involve them. However, I would think there might be a place for them in a group with respect to Afghanistan. They helped us when we first went in there. We talked to them. They were helpful. I’ve never understood myself why we are doing all the laboring, pulling all the – doing all the labor in Iran, treasure, blood --
 
ROSE: In Afghanistan.
 
SECRETARY BAKER: I’m sorry – in Afghanistan – treasure, blood. And yet, every country who’s surrounding Afghanistan has a huge interest in a stable Afghanistan. Why don’t we see if we – everyone needs to – we’re leaving now, and we’ve said that, and I agree with that. So why don’t we say, “Hey, look it here. You all want a stable Afghanistan? Come on in here and help us. Everybody contribute.” In that instance, I think we ought to have Iran at the table.
 
SECRETARY CLINTON: And we agree with that. We are part of a large group of nations, as well as a smaller segment of that. Just last week, my deputy, Bill Burns, was in Kabul. Iran was there. Other countries in the region and further afield were there. Because Jim is absolutely right. I mean, part of what the problem, as we look forward in Central and South Asia, is that, once again, Afghanistan is so strategically located. And in the neighborhood in which it finds itself, there’s a lot of interest at work that have to be in some way brought to the table in order to try to have as much stability going forward.
 
And Iran is at the table. Now, Iran oftentimes is not a constructive player, but we’re going to keep them at the table and try to do what we can on behalf of Afghanistan for them to be a more positive force.
 
ROSE: My understanding of the Administration’s position on containment is that dog will not hunt. Right?
 
CLINTON: Yes.
 
BAKER: I agree with that. My personal position on that is this: We ought to try every possible avenue we can to see if we can get them to correct their desire and goal of acquiring a nuclear weapon, but we cannot let them acquire that weapon. We are the only country in the world that can stop that. The Israelis, in my opinion, do not have the capability of stopping it. They can delay it. There will also be many, many side effects, all of them adverse, from an Israeli strike. But at the end of the day, if we don’t get it done the way the Administration’s working on it now – which I totally agree with – then we ought to take them out.
 
CLINTON: Well, we’re working hard. We’re working hard… I think the President has been very clear on this. He has always said all options are on the table. And he means it. He addressed this when he spoke to it earlier in the year… And also in public speeches that he’s given.
 
I think Jim and I both would agree that everybody needs to know – most particularly the Iranians – that we are serious that they cannot be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. It’s not only about Iran and about Iran’s intentions, however once tries to discern them. It’s about the arms race that would take place in the region with such unforeseen consequences. Because you name any country with the means, anywhere near Iran that is an Arab country, if Iran has a nuclear weapon – I can absolutely bet on it and know I will win – they will be in the market within hours. And that is going to create a cascade of difficult challenges for us and for Israel and for all of our friends and partners.
 
So this has such broad consequences. And that’s why we’ve invested an enormous amount in trying to persuade Iran that if – as the Supreme Leader says and issued a fatwa about – it is un-Islamic to have a nuclear weapon, then act upon that edict and demonstrate clearly that Iran will not pursue a nuclear weapon. And we are pushing them in these negotiations to do just that.
 
ROSE: But as you know, the question is not whether they will have a nuclear weapon, but whether they will have the capacity to quickly have a nuclear weapon.
 
CLINTON: Well, that is obviously the question, and that is why Jim said at the end of the day, maybe a year. I mean, these kinds of calculations are –
 
BAKER: It may be more than that.
 
CLINTON: It may be more than that. They are difficult to make. A lot of countries around the world have what’s called breakout capacity. They have stopped short of it. They have not pursued it. They have found it not to be in their interests or in the interests of regional stability.
 
ROSE: But do you think that’s what they mean and that’s what they intend?
 
CLINTON: Well, that’s what we’re testing. That’s what every meeting with them is about, to try to really probe and see what kinds of commitments we can get out of them. Now, at this point we don’t have them, so I can’t speak to what they might be if they are ever to be presented. But that’s why we have to take this meeting by meeting and pursue it as hard as we can.
 
BAKER: And the problem is not so much the threat they would represent to us or to Israel or to our allies somewhere in the region. It’s the proliferation problem, because it would really then be out of control. And that’s the real thing you have to guard, and that’s why I would say at the end of the day you just cannot let them have the weapon.
 
Now, what is – is that breakout time or is that after they make one or after they make three or four, or after you’re convinced they have the delivery vehicles? That’s all for the military to decide. But at some point you have to say that’s simply not going to happen.
 
ROSE: I think I heard that loud and clear. But you’ve also suggested that the United States should do it rather than Israel.
 
BAKER: Absolutely. And the reason I say that is if you look at what [Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman General] Martin Dempsey said not long ago, he said if Israel hits the Iranian nuclear facilities, we’re going to lose a lot of American lives in the region. Many people in the Israeli national security establishment have come out publicly now and questioned their leadership’s view that maybe Israel ought to do it. And they say no, Israel shouldn’t do it.
 
There are a lot of unanticipated consequences that could follow from that, not least of which is strengthening the hand of the hardliners in Iran. I mean, you don’t want to do that. They’re having troubles now. The sanctions are not complete yet. We want to squeeze them down more. But they’re having an effect. And the government is having some problems, and you don’t want to lose all that.
 
CLINTON: In fact, I mean, what Jim is saying is a really important point, because we know that there is a vigorous debate going on within the leadership decision-making group in Iran. There are those who say look, these sanctions are really biting, we’re not making the kind of economic progress we should be making, we don’t give up that much by saying we’re not going to do a nuclear weapon and having a verifiable regime to demonstrate that.
 
And then frankly, there are those who are saying the best thing that could happen to us is be attacked by somebody, just bring it on, because that would unify us, it would legitimize the regime. You feel sometimes when you hear analysts and knowledgeable people talking about Iran that they fear so much about the survival of the regime, because deep down it’s not a legitimate regime, it doesn’t represent the will of the people, it’s kind of morphed into kind of a military theocracy. And therefore an argument is made constantly on the hardline side of the Iranian Government that we’re not going to give anything up, and in fact we’re going to provoke an attack because then we will be in power for as long as anyone can imagine.
 
BAKER: I don’t think the Israelis can do it but we can. The reason I say that is the Israeli Government came to the prior administration, the Bush 43 Administration, and then they asked for overflight rights, they asked for bunker-busting bombs, they asked for in-flight refueling capabilities. And the administration said no, that’s not in the national interest of the United States today for you to strike Iran’s nuclear facility.
 
My understanding is they made the same request of this Administration. I don’t know the answer to that for sure. The Secretary would. But whether they did or not, that’s the reason I say if anybody’s going to do it, we ought to do it because we have the capability of doing it.
 
CLINTON: And hopefully we won’t get to that…I’m not going to talk about a change of regime. I see no evidence of that. I think the Iranian people deserve better, but that’s for them to try to determine.
 
ROSE: But there is this question too about Iran, and I want to move to some other issues. Looking back at the time of the protest over the election, do you wish you’d done more? Do you wish you’d been more public, more supportive?
 
CLINTON: At the time there was a very strong, consistent message coming from within Iran that anything we said would undermine the legitimacy of their opposition. This is from the opposition coming out to us. And one can argue, were they right, were they not right, but at the time it seemed like they had some momentum, they did not want to look like they were acting on behalf of the United States or anybody else.
 
This was indigenous to Iran and to Iranians’ discontents. And that made a lot of sense at the time, because the last thing anybody wanted was to give the regime the excuse that they didn’t have to respond to the legitimate concerns arising out of that election.
 
And what we did do, which I think was very value-added, was to work overtime to keep lines of communication open. We found out that social media tools, one in particular, was going to shut down for a long-scheduled rebooting of some sort, and we intervened and said no, because the opposition uses you to communicate, to say where they’re going to have demonstrations, to warn people. So we were deeply involved in a lot of public messaging that we thought did not cross the line that the opposition didn’t want us to cross. That was our assessment.
 
 

Quotes from Iran nuclear talks June 18-19

The world’s six major powers held talks with Iran in Moscow on June 18 and 19. The following are comments from key parties to the talks.
Six Major Powers
 
European Union foreign policy chief Lady Catherine Ashton
We set out our respective positions in what were detailed, tough and frank exchanges. After give plenary sessions and several bilateral meetings we have begun to tackle critical issues. However, it remains clear that there are significant gaps between the substance of the two positions. We have therefore agreed as follow:
  • An early follow-on technical-level meeting in Istanbul on 3 July to provide further clarification about the E3+3 proposal; increase the E3+3 understanding of the Iranian response; and study the issues raised by Iran during the sessions;
  • This will be followed by contact at the deputy-level between Ms. Schmid and Dr. Bagheri;
  • I will then be directly in touch with Dr. Jalili about prospects for a future meeting at the political level.

The choice is Iran’s. We expect Iran to decide whether it is willing to make diplomacy work, to focus on reaching agreement on concrete confidence-building steps, and to address the concerns of the international community.

EU Foreign Policy spokesman Michael Mann
“Sanctions policy by definition is always under review, but can only be eased in response to real changes on the ground, so there is no question that our sanctions will come into force on the first of July.”
United States
 
U.S. briefer to press in Moscow
“We are not going to get trapped in a process that we do not think is a productive one...All of our sanctions will go into effect on July 1, and there will be further sanctions to come, so our dual-track policy is not changing. Because we are in negotiations, the second track, the pressure track, is not stopping because in fact they haven't taken any concrete action."
 
Statement by President Obama and Russian President Putin at the G-20 summit
"We agree that Iran must undertake serious efforts aimed at restoring international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program."
 
United States Senator, Mark Kirk (R., Ill.)
"After three rounds of meetings, Iran remains in violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions ordering it to halt all its uranium enrichment activities."
 
Iran
 
 Iranian chief negotiator Saeed Jalili
"In this round of negotiations, the discussions were more direct, more serious and more realistic…We are hopeful that the [next] technical meeting ... can reach acceptable conclusions and give proposals so that Ms Ashton and I can reach a decision regarding the time and place for the next negotiations."
 
Ali Bagheri, deputy Iran negotiator
"We elaborated in detail ... the illegality of referring Iran's nuclear issue to the U.N. Security Council and issuance of U.N. Security Council resolutions.”
 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
"Our enemies should know that arrogance and un-substantiated demands from Iran will lead to nowhere."
Europeans
 
French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius
"We regret that Iran has still not made the concrete gestures that we were waiting for and that could constitute a first step towards respecting UN Security Council and IAEA resolutions…Sanctions will continue to be strengthened as long as Iran refuses serious negotiations."
 
British Foreign Secretary William Hague
“We regret that Iran was not prepared to negotiate seriously on specific concerns of the international community - in particular regarding 20 percent enrichment. This is a missed opportunity to address the serious concerns of the international community…This is a missed opportunity to address the serious concerns of the international community."
 
 

ICG Warns on Brinksmanship with Iran

On June 15, the International Crisis Group issued a report warning that the new negotiations between the world’s six major powers and Iran is becoming a “diplomatic roller coaster.” The assessment warns that the talks are likely to “hit a wall” unless the parties on both sides alter their approach to the issues. The non-partisan foreign policy group urges the parties to turn the sporadic talks into “intensive, continuous, technical-level negotiations” to forge agreement about Iran’s controversial nuclear program.

The full report can be found at:

 

The Islamists Are Coming

The Islamists Are Coming, edited by Robin Wright, surveys the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region more than any other political bloc. Yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.

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