On June 12, U.N. Secretary General António Guterres released the fifth report on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. “Notwithstanding the continued adherence by the Islamic Republic of Iran to its nuclear-related commitments, the agreement is unfortunately at a crossroads” following the U.S. withdrawal from the accord. “I deeply regret this setback to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation that has contributed to regional and international peace and security.” The following are excerpts from the report.
Introduction
Since 16 January 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported 11 times to the Security Council that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In its most recent quarterly reports (see S/2018/205 and S/2018/540), the Agency again reported that it continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and that its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the Islamic Republic of Iran remained ongoing. The Agency also reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, pending its entry into force, and to apply the transparency measures set out in the Plan. In its latest report, the Agency further indicated that it had conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran that it needed to visit.
Notwithstanding the continued adherence by the Islamic Republic of Iran to its nuclear-related commitments, the agreement is unfortunately at a crossroads. On 8 May 2018, the United States of America announced its withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the re-imposition of all national sanctions that had been lifted or waived pursuant to the Plan. I deeply regret this setback to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation that has contributed to regional and international peace and security. I believe that issues not directly related to the Plan should be addressed without prejudice to preserving the agreement and its accomplishments.
It is important to recall that the Security Council, in its resolution 2231 (2015), urged the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the timetable established in the Plan. The Council further called upon all Members States, regional organizations and international organizations to support its implementation and to refrain from actions that undermine the implementation of commitments under the Plan. In this regard, it is important that the withdrawal of one country not impede the ability of others to fully implement their commitments under the Plan or to engage in activities consistent with resolution 2231 (2015) and the provisions and objectives of the Plan.
Key Findings and Recommendations
In its resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council endorsed the establishment of a dedicated procurement channel, under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, to review proposals by States seeking to engage in certain transfers of nuclear or dual-use goods, technology and/or related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Through that channel, the Council reviews and decides on recommendations from the Joint Commission established under the Plan, regarding proposals by States to participate in or permit activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
Since 8 December 2017, 13 new proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been submitted to the Security Council, bringing to 37 the total number of proposals submitted since Implementation Day (16 January 2016) for approval through the procurement channel. At the time of reporting, 24 proposals had been approved by the Council, 3 had been disapproved, 7 had been withdrawn by the proposing States and 3 were currently under review.
In addition, the Security Council received 13 new notifications pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) for certain nuclear-related activities that do not require approval, but do require a notification to the Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission.
Since my previous report, the Secretariat received information on the supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that may have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). In a letter dated 19 April 2018, the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates brought to the attention of the Secretariat information and documents related to four shipments of dual-use items. Those shipments were seized by the authorities of the United Arab Emirates while in transit to the Islamic Republic of Iran in May 2016 and in April, July and December 2017. The authorities of the United Arab Emirates assessed, on the basis of the declared technical specifications or specialized tests, that the items involved (40 cylindrical segments of tungsten, 1 inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometer, 10 capacitors, and 1 titanium rod) met the criteria set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 and that their transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran would have required prior approval from the Security Council.
In addition, on 27 April 2018, the authorities of the United States informed the Secretariat that, in their assessment, two commodities (carbon fibre and aluminium alloys) that had been transferred to the Islamic Republic of Iran over the past year without prior approval from the Security Council met the criteria set out in the above-mentioned information circular.
In response to requests for clarification on the above-mentioned information, several Member States informed the Secretariat that they had initiated internal reviews and would provide additional information as soon as those reviews were concluded. In a letter dated 1 June 2018, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated, inter alia, that it was “the responsibility of the exporting State to seek approval through the procurement channel” and encouraged the Secretariat to undertake more outreach activities to address the lack of awareness among some Member States. I intend to report thereon to the Council in due course as more information becomes available.
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