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Pew: American Views on Iran Nuke Program
February 15, 2012 | 7:22pm
The latest national survey by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, conducted Feb. 8-12, 2012, among 1,501 adults, finds substantial partisan differences over how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program.
The public supports tough measures – including the possible use of military force – to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Nearly six-in-ten (58%) say it is more important to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, even if it means taking military action. Just 30% say it is more important to avoid a military conflict with Iran, even if it means that country develops nuclear weapons. These opinions are little changed from October 2009.
There have been reports in recent weeks that Israel may soon attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. About half of Americans (51%) say the United States should remain neutral if Israel takes action to stop Iran’s nuclear program, but far more say the U.S. should support (39%) than oppose (5%) an Israeli attack.
Republicans are far more supportive of using military force to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons than are either Democrats or independents. Moreover, a majority of Republicans (62%) say the U.S. should support an Israeli attack to stop Iran’s nuclear program, compared with just a third of independents and Democrats.
For a direct link to the full report, go to http://www.people-press.org/
Election Watch #3: Election Crackdown on Media
February 15, 2012 | 6:25pm
Interview with Yasmin Alem
- This is the first election since the controversial 2009 election and reports of a clampdown on media are increasing. What is the situation for social media and internet usage in the lead-up to the parliamentary elections?
With less than three weeks to parliamentary elections, the Iranian authorities are choking internet access in Iran. Social networking sites and international news sites have either been blocked or the connection is so slow that they are difficult to access. Email providers such as Yahoo, Gmail and MSN have been cut off sporadically, as have many sites with secure coding (https) that protects users from third-parties accessing their information. All of these disruptions have increased since the beginning of February.
The restrictions and extra filtering have even provoked reactions from government officials. On February 12, Ahmad Tavakoli, a conservative member of parliament and the head of the parliament's research center publicly criticized the crackdown on the internet and said "[t]he new filtering measure and cutting of access to the services used by most people without prior notice... will raise the ire of the people."
In the past few months, there has also been talk of establishing Halal internet, a national internet that would disconnect the Iranian population from the World Wide Web and create something like an intranet. With Halal, Iranians would only be able to access internal websites.
- Has the regime imposed similar restrictions in previous elections?
The Iranian regime traditionally permits a politically vibrant atmosphere to emerge before elections by easing restrictions on social liberties. In the months leading up to elections, it usually provides more space for debate in the press to encourage voter turnout. But this year, the regime is taking a different course. The pro-reformist daily newspaper, Roozegar, was shut down by the authorities in the first week of February after it published an interview with Mohammad Reza Khatami, the brother of former President Mohammad Khatami.
The government has also launched a systematic crackdown on civil society actors and journalists since the beginning of 2012. At least ten journalists and bloggers have been arrested. In recent weeks, Minister of Intelligence, Heydar Moslehi, revealed that the government had identified a network of journalists who worked with the BBC and had taken them into custody. In an unprecedented move, family members of journalists living abroad, including BBC Persian employees, have been harassed, questioned and detained.
- Why is the regime increasing media and civil society restrictions at this time?
The regime appears to be worried about two separate challenges. Its first concern is countering the call for an election boycott from reformist groups and political personalities who have used social networking sites and news websites to spread their message. By restricting access to these networks and websites, the authorities may be trying to prevent the message from reaching Iranians.
The second concern is security-related. The government's clampdown can be interpreted as part of the regime's new strategy to prevent unrest following the election, and a repeat of the turmoil after the 2009 presidential election. In the past, the authorities have tried not to arrest journalists and activists or clamp down on the media prior to elections because they want to at least appear to tolerate a vibrant electoral atmosphere. The arrests have usually happened after the elections. This election season, however, the regime started its campaign of intimidation and coercion early apparently because it views the poll as a potential security challenge.
Yasmin Alem, an independent Iran analyst, is the author of Duality by Design: The Iranian Electoral System published by the International Foundation of ElectoralSystems.
Click here to read Yasmin Alem's latest article on the upcoming Elections.
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Gallup: Iranians Split on Nuclear Military Power
February 15, 2012 | 10:29am
According to a 2012 Gallup poll, Iranians are split, 40% to 35%, on nuclear military power. Half support cutting ties with countries that impose sanctions.
WASHINGTON, D. C. -- Iranians are more likely to approve of Iran developing its nuclear power capabilities for non-military use (57%) than for military use (40%). They are more mixed about military use, which Iran insists it is not pursuing, with 40% approving and 35% disapproving. Nearly one in four did not express an opinion either way.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors are preparing to return to Iran next week for more talks about the "'possible military dimensions' to Iran's disputed nuclear program." The IAEA's visit may ease tensions following waves of economic sanctions by the United Nations, the U.S., and Western Europe against Iran's program. Following the EU's ban on oil from Iran, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast said international pressure would not deter his country from pursuing a peaceful nuclear program and warned that sanctioning countries would not find Iran's response "pleasant."
Although most Iranians expect the economic sanctions to hurt their livelihoods, nearly half (46%) approve of cutting diplomatic relations with countries that impose economic sanctions on it. A sizable minority of Iranians, 31%, disapprove of cutting ties.
Highly Educated Iranians More Critical of Military Use of Nuclear Power
Regardless of education level, more Iranians approve than disapprove of Iran developing nuclear capability for non-military use. However, Iranians who completed four years of college are most likely to approve of nuclear power capabilities for non-military use (76%), compared with those with secondary school education (59%) or less (46%). Iranian adults with higher education are also more likely to oppose developing Iran's nuclear power for military purposes, and are more likely to oppose cutting ties with countries that impose economic sanctions on Iran.
Implications
As governments in the West and Israel step up sanctions and weigh potential military options as a solution for stopping Iran's nuclear program, many experts fear that hostile actions taken against Iran will only strengthen the regime internally. Iranians' opinion about their country's own nuclear program remains far from uniform with support for peaceful non-military nuclear use higher than support for military purposes. While the IAEA continues its work in Iran to determine the nature of its nuclear program, Western governments looking for long-term change in Iran should consider how the people of Iran will perceive their actions, particularly when a sizable minority of Iranians do not want to cut ties with these nations.
To view this poll on Gallup's website, click here.
ISIS on Iran Nuke: Low Risk in 2012
February 14, 2012 | 6:02pm
The Institute for Science and International Security published “Preventing Iran from getting Nuclear Weapons: Constraining its future options” by David Albright, Paul Brannan, Andrea Stricker, and Christina Walrond. The report concludes, “In 2012, the probability of all of the scenarios occurring is judged to be low. This can be interpreted to mean that Iran is currently in a poor position to build nuclear weapons covertly and is thus unlikely to attempt to do so this year.” The following is the summary from the report.
Without past negotiated outcomes, international pressure, sanctions, and intelligence operations, Iran would likely have nuclear weapons by now. Iran has proven vulnerable to international pressure. It now faces several inhibitions against building nuclear weapons, not least of which is fear of a military strike by Israel and perhaps others if it “breaks out” by egregiously violating its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and moves to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons.
However, threats of pre-emptive military strikes alone have been unproductive in extending this inhibition against building nuclear weapons. Instead, these threats have led Iran to better protect its nuclear facilities and activities and allowed it to make false comparisons to the case of Iraq, undermining support in much of the world for increasing pressure internationally out of fear that pressure would lead to a preventive attack.
Iran is already capable of making weapon-grade uranium and a crude nuclear explosive device. Nonetheless, Iran is unlikely to break out in 2012, in large part because it will remain deterred from doing so and limited in its options for quickly making enough weapon-grade uranium. Iran continues to be subject to a complex set of international actions that constrain its nuclear options.
Faced with the difficulties and risks of military options and the marginal benefits of negotiations during the last several years, an alternative third option, born out of frustration and slow, patient work, has developed. It builds on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions that delegitimize certain aspects of Iran’s nuclear programs. However, it goes beyond these efforts by increasing the chance of detecting secret nuclear activities and heightening barriers against Iran achieving its nuclear objectives. Its goal is to create and implement measures to delay, thwart, and deter Iran’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities. This strategy is having some significant successes, including delaying Iran’s ability to make nuclear weapons and creating significant deterrence against it building nuclear weapons today. Absent a meaningful negotiated settlement, which remains the best way to resolve the nuclear crisis with Iran, its longer-term prognosis is difficult to predict without broader application.
These methods help explain Iran’s delayed progress in developing its nuclear weapons capabilities. However, they have not completely stopped Iran from making progress toward that goal. Iran continues to make both 3.5 and 19.75 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) and it has said it will soon triple its rate of 19.75 percent LEU production with the installation of IR-1 centrifuges at the subterranean Fordow enrichment site. Enrichment at this site started in late 2011 or early 2012.
This project has examined a wide range of future options that Iran may use during the next several years to build nuclear weapons (see table 2). The four that emerged as showing the highest probability of occurring in the period from now through 2015 are:
- Dash at a Declared Enrichment Site
- Dash at a Covert Enrichment Site
- Cheating in Plain Sight
- A Parallel Program
In all cases ISIS evaluated, each potential nuclear future is not inevitable. International actions may delay or prevent them. Iran may decide that the potential costs are too high and may choose not to pursue any of them. Despite the existing constraints, however, Iran may decide that at some point obtaining nuclear weapons is worth the risks.
In 2012, the probability of all of the scenarios occurring is judged to be low. This can be interpreted to mean that Iran is currently in a poor position to build nuclear weapons covertly and is thus unlikely to attempt to do so this year. In 2013 and onward, the probabilities of the four futures mentioned above occurring begin to increase toward a medium likelihood.
None of the probabilities of the nuclear futures evaluated by ISIS is judged as being high; many remain low. These judgments reflect technical challenges Iran will face, international actions that will continue to constrain particular nuclear futures, and the extent of pressure on Iran today and that is expected to be applied in the future to deter Iran from building nuclear weapons.
However, low-probability events should not be interpreted in the context of this study as not meriting concern. The assigned probabilities during the next several years provide no reason for complacency. Given the consequences of a nuclear armed Iran, even options with low probabilities of occurring require action designed to keep them low. Similarly, since an Iran with nuclear weapons would be a high impact event, futures with a low probability, or those that are unlikely to occur, are still highly important and could have a severe impact. Thus, working to lower their probability of occurrence is important, as is developing contingency plans in case they do occur. In this report, the medium probability futures are the top priorities, and they require extra effort to reduce their likelihood of occurring.
According to this analysis, the options that Iran would tend to favor involve developing and deploying advanced centrifuges, continuing to find ways to produce higher enriched uranium in greater quantities under a civilian cover, building confidence in an ability to build covert sites, evading answering the IAEA’s questions about past nuclear weaponization activities, and better protecting nuclear sites against military strikes. The task is to prevent Iran from succeeding by lowering the probabilities that Iran could achieve any of these nuclear futures while keeping it within the constraints of the NPT.
This report shows that Iran’s capability to build nuclear weapons is constrained. However, this capability nevertheless increases with time, and Iran could develop more options to acquire nuclear weapons in the coming years unless it is further constrained or the probabilities of these futures occurring are lowered further. Additional constraints can emerge through negotiations, but these are more likely if a range of methods are utilized along the way to slow Iran’s progress.
Any pragmatic future strategy must inhibit Iran’s nuclear progress and pressure it into changing course while offering it an alternative, more prosperous pathway forward. But as we seek and engage in negotiations for a long-term solution, the key goal must be, at the same time, to implement additional measures to delay, thwart, and deter Iran’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities and inhibit its ability to break out. In particular, such a strategy should focus on several key priorities:
- More effective legal mechanisms to stop Iran from acquiring key goods for its nuclear programs. A priority is China’s domestic enforcement of sanctions and trade controls;
- Better detection of Iran’s illicit procurement efforts and broader enforcement of legal mechanisms worldwide;
- Increased efforts in countries of transit concern to prevent Iran from transshipping banned goods;
- Stepped up operations to detect clandestine Iranian nuclear activities, including heightened intelligence operations inside Iran aimed at detecting secret nuclear sites and activities and encouraging defections of nuclear program “insiders”;
- Covert action to slow Iran’s nuclear program, particularly if the conflict transforms into a protracted Cold War style stand-off between Iran and several members of the international community; and,
- Increased economic and financial sanctions aimed at augmenting pressure, combined with an effort to displace Iranian oil exports.
A parallel strategy alongside pressure is to seek interim negotiated constraints on Iran’s nuclear program that serve to reduce concerns about an Iranian breakout or dash to the bomb. Iran can receive tangible benefits in return for reducing its options to build nuclear weapons quickly and in secret. All sides could build valuable trust, something currently in short supply.
Table 4 evaluates a set of interim measures. The measures are ranked on their ability on an interim basis to inhibit breakout to weapons, improve detection of secret nuclear activities and sites, and prevent further development, diffusion, and protection of centrifuge assets. The table shows that none of the measures are effective at accomplishing all three goals. As these are interim measures, the P5+1 should focus on the strategies that impact Iran’s ability to break out in the short term, deploy advanced centrifuges, and to diffuse and better protect its centrifuge assets. The priority measures based on the ranking in are:
- Cap all enrichment at the level of five percent;
- Freeze centrifuge installation at Qom (limit of two IR-1 centrifuge cascades);
- Limit the number of advanced centrifuges enriching uranium to fewer than 500 and limit deployment exclusively to the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP); and
- Deposit all 19.75 percent LEU overseas.
Based on the public discussion, the following summarizes the most commonly discussed incentives in the context of an interim agreement:
- Provision of 19.75 percent LEU fuel for TRR, starting within one year of date of agreement;
- Provision of LEU targets for medical isotope production;
- Provision of medical isotopes of the type that the TRR would produce; and
- Commitment by P5+1 not to seek new U.N. Security Council sanctions for a defined period of time, contingent on implementation of agreement.
At the same time, the United States and its allies should reject any Iranian effort to trade interim measures for a reduction in sanctions or commitments not to add national or regional sanctions. In addition, Iran sought in an agreeemnt negotiated by Turkey, Brazil, and Iran to establish an essentially unbridled right to uranium enrichment. But the P5+1 is unlikely to acknowledge Iran’s right to uranium enrichment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty without a verified assurance that it is in compliance with this treaty, something lacking today. Iran needs to first satisfy the many concerns raised on an on-going basis by the IAEA about Iran’s nuclear efforts.
Significant sanctions relief and how to ensure Iran is in compliance with the NPT are the proper subject of long-term negotiations.
The best remedy is a negotiated long-term resolution of the nuclear issues. Although Iran remains difficult to engage in a comprehensive negotiated solution, the shape of a future solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis is important to consider now. Several earlier attempts to engage Iran in a long-term solution have laid the basis for an acceptable outcome including illuminating creative diplomatic methods of achieving a compromise. The first was the “freeze for freeze” proposal, whereby Iran would have agreed to a suspension of its enrichment program in return for a freeze in additional U.N. sanctions. More recently, Russia proposed a step-wise resolution to the issue, although it did not release its proposal publicly.
These earlier efforts have created a sound foundation to build on. One lesson is that because the situation is so complicated, the negotiating goal should be a framework agreement that can incorporate a series of stages where each step includes concessions by Iran matched with incentives or concessions by the P5+1. (The P5+1 is the main negotiating partner of Iran composed of the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany.)
This report discusses the essential elements of such an agreement. Table 5 in the Appendices lists ISIS rough proposal for a five stage framework agreement with Iran. The five stages in brief are:
1. Updated, verified “freeze for freeze” agreement
2. Iran coming clean in a verifiable manner about its past and possible on-going nuclear weaponization activities and accomplishments and receiving significant sanctions relief
3. Intensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification, temporary suspension of sensitive Iranian nuclear programs, and provisional suspension of U.N. Security Council sanctions
4. IAEA certification of absence of undeclared nuclear activities, resumption of Iran’s nuclear program, provision of major incentives package, and end of U.S. sanctions
5. Growth of Iran’s civil nuclear program and end of all remaining sanctions
Absent a negotiated outcome, the international community must be prepared to signal for years if necessary that an Iran that seeks nuclear weapons will never be integrated. It must not acquiesce to Iran’s current trajectory or give up on sanctions and other measures while accepting the current level of ambiguity over Iran’s nuclear weapons aspirations. Ultimately, a negotiated solution remains the best way to resolve the nuclear crisis with Iran, and increased pressure offers the best hope of convincing Iran to undertake successful negotiations.
This report builds on a series of ISIS reports, research, and workshops during the last year. Background information and reports are available on the ISIS web site at www.isis-online.org.
Gallup: Iranians Feel Sanctions Bite
February 7, 2012 | 7:28pm
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- As the U.S. orders more economic sanctions against Iran, a new Gallup poll finds nearly two-thirds of Iranians think recent sanctions that the United Nations, the U.S., and Western Europe have already imposed will hurt the livelihoods of the country's residents "a great deal" (27%) or "somewhat" (38%).
The European Union on Jan. 23 banned Iranian oil exports and froze the assets of Iran's central bank in the EU to pressure the government over its suspected nuclear weapons program. That move followed the Dec. 31 signing of a U.S. law imposing new sanctions targeting Iran's central bank. President Barack Obama went a step further Sunday, signing an executive order that freezes Iranian state assets in the U.S.
In the face of mounting financial pressure, the value of the Iranian rial has dropped sharply in recent weeks, and prices of food, consumer goods, and utilities have spiraled. Almost half of Iranians (48%) now say there were times in the past year when they did not have enough money to buy food their families needed, more than tripling the 15% who said so in 2005. Forty-eight percent also currently report there were times in the past year when they didn't have enough money to provide adequate housing for themselves or their families, up from 29% in 2005.
These economic ramifications may also be affecting Iranians' daily mood. A majority (55%) say they experienced worry for much of the previous day, up from 38% when Gallup last surveyed in Iran in February-March 2011. Similarly, almost half of Iranians (47%) say they felt angry during a lot of the previous day, compared with slightly more than one-third (35%) a year ago.
Implications
In pursuing tighter economic sanctions against Iran, U.S. officials point to evidence that they have slowed the progress of Tehran's suspected nuclear program. However, the effect of sanctions on day-to-day life in Iran is also a major concern for U.S. leaders, who seek to engage with ordinary Iranians even as they attempt to make things more difficult for the country's leaders. In addition to the possible humanitarian consequences of economic sanctions, experts cite the possibility that any hardship they create may intensify anti-Western sentiment in Iran and strengthen support for the current regime.
Iranians' favorability toward Western leaders remains low. Eight percent say they approve of U.S. leadership, 7% approve of U.K. leadership, and 13% approve of German leadership, results similar to those found in early 2011. Such figures demonstrate that Iranians' protests against their own leadership should not be construed as support for the West -- and that Western leaders need to monitor the unintended effects sanctions may have on Iranians' lives.
Click here to view the poll on the Gallup website.
The Islamists Are Coming
The Islamists Are Coming, edited by Robin Wright, surveys the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region more than any other political bloc. Yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.
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