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Part II – Testimony by U.S. Officials
November 17, 2011 | 6:17pm
The following are excerpts from Congressional testimony at a Nov. 15 hearing on the Obama Administration’s policy toward Iran. The three officials appeared before the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations Subcommittee.
Mr. Adam Szubin, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury
Notwithstanding the sincere offer of engagement extended to the Iranian government by the
United States since the outset of this Administration, Iran has refused to respond meaningfully. In order to compel Iran to change its approach and to make clear to Iran the consequences of its existing approach, the United States is implementing a broad-based pressure strategy.
Among the most important elements of this strategy are targeted financial measures designed both to disrupt Iran's illicit activity and to protect the international financial sector from Iran's abuse. Our actions have focused on key government entities involved in Iran's illicit conduct, including nearly two dozen Iranian state-owned banks; the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its external arm, the IRGC-Qods Force; and, Iran's national maritime carrier, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), and its affiliates. This strategy has yielded significant results. We have imposed costs directly on the entities we sanctioned, and by focusing our efforts on exposing Iranian entities' illicit and deceptive activities, we have built support among foreign governments to take similar actions. The global private sector also has amplified our actions - often taking voluntary steps beyond their legal requirements - because our actions have highlighted the pervasive nature of Iran's illicit and deceptive conduct and the reputational risks associated with any Iran-related business…
Although we are making progress, there is, of course, still much to be done. Iran is feeling the impact of the pressure, but we have yet to achieve the objective of our dual-track strategy: concrete action by Iran to comply with its international obligations and to address the international community's concerns regarding its nuclear program. Last week's release of the IAEA report only makes more clear to the world the severity of the current situation.
Mr. Henry Wooster, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of State
Our domestic measures are dissuading foreign companies from doing business in Iran, and this is inflicting financial, logistical, and economic pain on key sectors that support its proliferation efforts. Companies from other sectors have even voluntarily opted out of the Iranian market, including automotive firms Daimler, Toyota, and Kia, as well as Germany’s ThyssenKrupp. Caterpillar decided to prohibit its non-U.S.subsidiaries from exporting to Iran. The Swiss engineering firm ABB Ltd.; the Italian defense, aerospace, energy and transportation firm Finmeccanica; and the Irish industrial company Ingersoll-Rand Plc have all chosen to end their business with Iran. As the list of designated individuals and entities continues to grow, so does the cost, time, and energy required for Iran to pursue its current policies. Iran has felt the effect of these actions, as Iranian President Ahmadinejad recently admitted in a speech to the parliament when he said, “Which government can work under so much pressure? … Every day, all our banking and trade activities and our agreements are being monitored and blocked. This is the heaviest economic onslaught on a nation in history.”
The result of our strategy is an Iran that is finding dwindling options for doing business internationally. But pressure is not an end unto itself, and this Administration remains committed to engagement with Iran through the P5+1 framework, and with other nations to address the threats posed by Iran…. If, however, Iran simply seeks to buy time to make further progress in its nuclear program, it will face ever-stronger measures and ever-increasing isolation…
At the same time, we use domestic and multilateral measures to call attention to and curb the regime’s behavior on another issue, human rights. With a long track record of human rights abuses, Tehran hit a new low with its systematic campaign of violence and intimidation against the massive demonstrations by Iranians in 2009, when they were protesting against fraud and manipulation in their presidential election. The regime and its forces beat back thousands of protesters, arrested hundreds, and killed dozens more. They detained – and continue to detain – prominent opposition figures; tortured, raped, and killed prisoners; and conducted more than 100 show trials. Despite the government’s best efforts to censor its population, many courageous Iranians found ways to share with the rest of the world their horrific stories of being attacked, silenced, and tortured.
Mr. Colin Kahl, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of Defense
The Department of Defense plays a supporting role in our whole-of government strategy of engagement and pressure toward Iran, which is led by the State and Treasury Departments. However, a supporting role should not be confused with a minor one. In support of interagency efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and counter its destabilizing efforts, the Department of Defense focuses on four major lines of effort. These efforts are: (1) ensuring Israel’s security; (2) building partnership capacity in the region; (3) developing a regional security architecture in the Gulf; and (4) prudent defense planning…
We continue to work with partners in the region to build capacity to defend against Iranian destabilizing influence, particularly in Iraq and Lebanon. By the end of next month, we will complete the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq, in accordance with the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. Some have expressed concerns that we leaving behind a vacuum for Iran to fill. However, we are not disengaging from Iraq, and there is no vacuum for Iran to fill.
Due the extraordinary sacrifices of our armed forces, civilians, and the Iraqis, Iraq has emerged as an increasingly stable, sovereign, and self-reliant nation. Iraq has no desire to be dominated by Iran or anyone else. Iraqi nationalism is strong, and the Iraqis have consistently shown their willingness to resist the Iranians and their surrogates when Tehran has over-reached. This will continue as Iraq’s economy grows, particularly through its oil industry.
The Iraqis have also made clear that they desire a strong and enduring relationship with the United States, including robust security cooperation, and we will purse that partnership under the Strategic Framework Agreement.
Part I – Testimony by Iran Experts
November 17, 2011 | 5:58pm
The following are excerpts from Congressional testimony at a Nov. 15 hearing on the Obama Administration’s policy toward Iran. The three analysts appeared before the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations Subcommittee.
Dr. Kenneth M. Pollack, Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution
Because of Iraq's intrinsic importance coupled with its significance to the vital Persian Gulf region, preventing Iran from achieving its maximal goals in Iraq will be crucial to America's interests in the region. Moreover, given the remarkable transformations sweeping the Arab world, it would be a terrible tragedy if Iran were able to exploit the volatility of the Arab Awakening to strengthen its position and undermine the stability of the Middle East. Here as well, Iran's ability to shape the outcome in Iraq will play a major role in determining how well Tehran is able to influence the wider political changes in the region. For all of these reasons, what happens in Iraq, and what happens regarding Iranian influence in Iraq, is one of the crucial questions facing the region today.
Unfortunately, the situation at present is not favorable to the interests of the United States and its allies in the region. Although it is both premature and beside the point to ask whether the United States "lost" Iraq or if Iran has "won" it, there is no question that Iran today has considerable sway in Iraq—far more than we or the Iraqis would like. Moreover, while it is certainly possible to imagine a course of action that the United States could pursue to reverse this state of affairs,under current circumstances it seems unlikely either that Washington would be willing to make the necessary effort or that if we were, that it would do more than marginally diminish Iran's influence in the short term. This is part of the reason that a realistic assessment of Iraq's likely near-term future can only be a relatively pessimistic one. Most plausible scenarios for Iraq's future at this point are unhappy, at least in the near term, and the best (or perhaps, the least bad) scenarios do not seem to be the most likely. Iraq is liable to get worse before it gets better—if it gets better—although there are certainly things that the United States can do to minimize both the duration and the depth of these difficult times, if we are willing.
Mr. Mark Dubowitz, Executive Director, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
The recent report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran‘s nuclear program has
raised legitimate questions about the effectiveness of sanctions to frustrate Tehran‘s nuclear
plans. Sanctions targeting Iran‘s energy, banking, and shipping sectors have cost the Islamic
Republic billions of dollars. These sanctions have led to the slow-motion demise of the Iranian
energy industry as Iranian oil production continues to materially decline. However, their
medium-to-long term impact is insufficient because Iran will likely cross the nuclear threshold
before these sanctions have time to work. There is also no evidence yet to suggest that economic pressure could make the Iranian regime rethink its decision to develop nuclear weapons.
For the West, however, sanctions have to be ―targeted. They cannot impose massive economic costs on a country‘s citizens. They can‘t inflict too much economic pain on international companies, or rattle voters with higher gasoline prices. Even against this Iranian regime, whose possession of nuclear weapons could lead to a cascade of proliferation resulting in a nuclear armed Middle East, the diminishment of American power, and a clerical regime even more willing to use terrorism, many in the West resist sanctions that are too ―”punishing” or ―”crippling.”
So are sanctions against the Iranian regime destined to fail?
I believe sanctions can still work. But they must hit harder at the heart of Iran‘s oil industry,
specifically oil sales, which account for between 50 and 75 percent of the national budget, and 80 percent of hard-currency export earnings, without causing a significant increase in global petroleum prices. Otherwise, Tehran can sell less oil and make more money while roiling global markets. This is a scenario we want to avoid.
Dr. Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution
Even as Iran‘s opposition remained largely dormant throughout the course of the early
months of the Arab spring, the political frictions within the regime have ramped up sharply. The longstanding resentment toward President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad harbored by the traditional stalwarts of the Iranian revolutionary regime exploded into public view. The outcome of this infighting has only reinforced the role of Iran‘s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as the country‘s paramount authority. The fierce contention has opened new fissures among the political elite, but this has not yet substantially eroded the regime‘s capabilities for maintaining authority in the short term.
Faced with profound popular dissatisfaction and intra-elite tensions at home, the turbulence
across the region has only reinforced the Iranian regime‘s determination to eradicate dissent and assert their influence across a changing Middle East. Despite their obvious vulnerabilities, Iran‘s dogmatic theocrats perceive the Arab uprisings in triumphal terms. From Tehran‘s vantage point, regional change has been a net positive so far. Several of the Islamic Republic‘s most determined regional adversaries were dispatched into exile, prison, or at minimum in a defensive crouch. This offers Tehran at least the possibility of new access in the Sunni Arab world, and the regime has sought to exploit the abiding uncertainty and undercurrents of mistrust for U.S. intentions that lie just beneath the surface of regional enthusiasm for change. The Arab spring has also ratcheted oil prices back up from a two-year downturn brought on by the global economic slowdown, and the instability premium will ensure Iranian revenues sufficient to ride out almost any pressures.
To be sure, the regional environment has also created new liabilities for Tehran. Whatever
soft power Iran could claim in its own neighborhood has surely faded by the Arab embrace of
democratic activism and government accountability. Iran‘s leaders have been exposed as tin-pot dictators, and their unflinching defiance of Washington rings far more hollow in a region where the mantle of heroism has been seized by the millions of ordinary citizens willing to risk their lives in pursuit of a better future. An even more immediate problem for Tehran is the violence in Syria, its only reliable Arab ally. Unrest in Syria jeopardizes the Islamic Republic‘s most trusted regional partner and its most reliable mechanism for resupplying its proxy Hezbollah and maintaining direct access into the political dramas of the Levant. Moreover, the scope and pace of Syria‘s devolution must be unnerving for Iranian leaders‘ confidence in their own capabilities for preserving control.
Iran Letter to U.N. about Bomb Plot
November 17, 2011 | 9:26am
In response to a draft resolution against Iran, its mission at the United Nations issued the following letter refuting U.S. allegations about an Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Washington as "circumstantial and unsubstantiated."
In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
No. 1312 15 November 2011
Excellency,
We are surprised to learn that a draft resolution contained in document A/66/L.8 entitled "Terrorist attacks on Internationally Protected Persons" is proposed by the United States under Agenda item 118 of the General Assembly, which refers to the alleged plot against the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Washington. This is an unprecedented attempt with all its ramifications for the credibility of the United Nations. In this regard, I would like to state the following:
By submitting this draft the sponsor is inviting the General Assembly to consider an unsubstantiated allegation, and as such it would amount to an unprecedented, thus unacceptable move. While under Article 10 of the UN Charter any matter could be considered by the General Assembly, however, it is evident that placing hypothetical, circumstantial and unsubstantiated matters on the agenda of this august body would be a gross disservice thereto. The case at hand is a clear example in this respect. If the General Assembly allows the submission and consideration of such draft resolution, this principal organ of the United Nations would run the risk of turning into a venue for settling political scores through introducing countless draft resolutions on contentious issues, which should be seriously avoided. Consequently, such an action, if pressed on, would significantly undermine the role, authority, integrity, and credibility of the General Assembly as the highest and universal political body of the United Nations.
Furthermore, by proposing this draft resolution under agenda item "the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Strategy", the United States tends to exploit such an important document which is the symbol of global consensus against terrorism. Such a politically motivated move would indeed undermine the relevance and credibility of this major consensus document.
The United States attitude with regard to the alleged plot, which began with an explosive media campaign against Iran, and its long-standing hostile policies, is unconstructive and reveals once again the latter's ill-intentions. It is worth mentioning that this Government has supported acts of terrorism against the Islamic Republic of Iran in which many Iranians, including its diplomats were victims of such acts according to existing hard evidences, some of which were presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
As I explained in my letters dated 11 October 2011 (document A/66/513–S/2011/633) and 4 November 2011 (document A/66/546–S/2011/696), my Government categorically rejects the involvement of any of its officials or organs in the alleged plot against the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Washington as it has been claimed.
The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms its full commitment to its obligations under the relevant international legal instruments, including the 1973 "Convention on the Prevention of Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents".
Member States should be cautious about the adverse consequences of such a move, which is in contradiction to the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations and 1970 "Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."
It would be appreciated if this letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under the agenda item 83.
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Mohammad Khazaee
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
H.E. Mr. Nasser
President of the General Assembly,
United Nations, New York
cc: H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-moon
Secretary General
United Nations, New York
Russian Scientist Helped Nuclear Program?
November 17, 2011 | 9:17am
The following is an excerpt from a new assessment by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) about Russian scientist Vycheslav Danilenko, who worked in Iran from 1996 until 2002 and reportedly may have provided assistance to Iran on explosive technology that could be used in its nuclear device. A link to the full report is at the bottom.
by David Albright, Paul Brannan, Mark Gorwitz and Andrea Stricker
The November 8, 2011 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards report on Iran identifies a foreign expert that may have been important to Iran’s development of implosion detonation systems used in nuclear weapons. The Agency writes in the report that it has “strong indications that the development by Iran of the high explosives initiation system, and its development of the high speed diagnostic configuration used to monitor related experiments, were assisted by the work of a foreign expert who was not only knowledgeable in these technologies, but who, a Member State has informed the Agency, worked for much of his career with this technology in the nuclear weapon programme of the country of his origin.”
Information in other IAEA documents reviewed by ISIS identifies this person as Vycheslav V. Danilenko1. Born in 1934, Danilenko worked in the nuclear weapon complex at VNIITF, Chelyabinsk-70 for three decades. At VNIITF in the early 1960s, he was a member of the gas dynamics group and became involved in the study of the manufacture of synthetic diamonds. He worked with leading explosives experts in the Soviet nuclear weapons program and developed understanding of the fundamentals of detonation, including shock compression. In 1960, the head of VNIIF, B. I. Zababakhin, launched the institute’s research into the possibility of diamond synthesis by using the shock compression of graphite. Leading Soviet nuclear weapons experts were leaders in this effort in the early 1960s. In a recent book chapter Danilenko says that “experiments aimed at developing methods for synthesis were highly classified; for security reason, the results were initially contained only in secret reports from VNIITF.” According to IAEA officials, he likely had knowledge of the application of high explosives in the Soviet nuclear weapons program. Given his background and experience, this ex-Soviet nuclear weapons expert was well versed in key aspects of developing nuclear weapons.
Danilenko also has experience in the important area of the diagnostics of high explosions. His publications include work on high-speed photography and describe optical techniques by which fiber optic cables are used to capture the time of arrival of explosive shock waves.
After leaving VNIITF in either 1989 or 1991, Danilenko moved to Ukraine and established the company ALIT in Kiev, producing ultra-dispersed diamonds (UDD or nanodiamonds). He experienced economic difficulties by the mid-1990s. According to the IAEA, he contacted the Iranian embassy in mid-1995, offering his expertise on UDD. At the end of the year, he was contacted by Dr. Seyed Abbas Shahmoradi, who headed the Physics Research Center and also worked at the Sharif University of Technology. Danilenko signed a contract with Shahmoradi, according to IAEA documents.
As head of Iran’s secret nuclear sector involved in the development of nuclear weapons, Shahmoradi would have undoubtedly recognized Danilenko’s value to an incipient nuclear weapons effort. Synthetic diamond production is unlikely to have been a priority, although it has obvious value as a cover story. In assessing the important contributions make by scientists and engineers to secret proliferant state nuclear programs, ISIS has not found any that did not initially offer other, more benign assistance that provided a plausible cover for their secret nuclear assistance. In some cases, their intention was originally benign but they were lured by money to assist in sensitive nuclear areas.
According to the recent IAEA safeguards report, Danilenko worked in Iran from about 1996 until about 2002, “ostensibly to assist Iran in the development of a facility and techniques for making UDD, where he also lectured on explosion physics and its applications.” He told the IAEA that he lectured and constructed an explosive firing cylinder which was not designed for experiments on spherical systems. In 2002, he returned to Russia.
The IAEA has reviewed publications by Danilenko and has met with him. It has been able to verify through three separate sources, including the expert himself, that he was in Iran during that time. Danilenko told the IAEA that he does not exclude that his information was used for other purposes.
At the very least, Danilenko had reason to know or should have known exactly why the Iranians were interested in his research and expertise. The IAEA information suggests he provided more than he has admitted.
Nature of Assistance
The IAEA obtained additional information that adds credibility to the conclusion that Danilenko used his technical and practical knowledge and expertise to provide assistance to Iran’s program to develop a suitable initiation system for a nuclear explosive device. The IAEA assessed that a monitoring, or diagnostic, technique described in one of his papers had a remarkable similarity to one that the IAEA saw in material from a member state about a hemispherical initiation and explosives system developed in Iran (see below). This system is also described in the IAEA safeguards report as a multipoint initiation system used to start the detonation of a nuclear explosive.
The system that the IAEA says Iran was developing prior to 2004 was relatively sophisticated and small in diameter. Iran is unlikely to have been able to design it on its own. According to the November 2011 IAEA safeguards report, Iran is also believed to have obtained information from the A.Q. Khan network on nuclear weapons design. But the initiation and explosive system is sufficiently sophisticated that it points to a contribution from Danilenko.
The multipoint initiation system has a distributed array of explosive filled channels on an aluminum hemisphere which terminate at holes containing explosive pellets. The pellets simultaneously explode to initiate the entire outer surface of a high explosive component in hemispherical form. The experiments used a multitude of fiber optic cables and a high speed streak camera to measure the time of arrival of first light across the inner surface of an explosive component, thereby deducing the smoothness of the detonation front at this surface…
On November 10, 2011, Reuters reported on an interview with Danilenko by the Russian newspaper, Kommersant. He reportedly stated to Kommersant, “I am not a nuclear physicist and am not the founder of the Iranian nuclear program.” He reportedly refused to provide any additional information. It is not clear what questions Kommersant asked Danilenko, but the November IAEA safeguards report does not allege that Danilenko is a “founder” of Iran’s nuclear program, as the program pre-dates the start of his assistance to Iran in the mid-1990s. Similarly, the IAEA never alleges that Danilenko is a nuclear physicist, but rather that he may have assisted Iran in the development of a spherical high explosives multipoint initiation system. It remains for Danilenko to more fully explain his assistance to Iran.
For the full report, click here.
Poll: Most Americans Back Diplomacy on Iran
November 14, 2011 | 9:29am
The following is an excerpt from a CBS News poll on what Americans favor on U.S. policy preferences on Iran.
"Most Americans support a diplomatic approach when it comes to dealing with Iran; 55% think Iran is a threat to the U.S. that can be contained with diplomacy. Only 15% say Iran is a threat that requires military action now, and another 17% do not consider Iran a threat. Americans across the political spectrum support diplomacy with Iran rather than military action, but Republicans are more than twice as likely as Democrats to say Iran is a threat that requires military action."
How Great a Threat is Iran?
Requires military action now 15% 22% 10% 14%
Can be contained with diplomacy 55% 52% 60% 53%
Not a threat at this time 17% 17% 17% 16%
Poll of 1,182 adults. Margin of error: +/- 3%
To view the entire CBS foreign policy poll, click here.
The Islamists Are Coming
The Islamists Are Coming, edited by Robin Wright, surveys the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region more than any other political bloc. Yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.
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