The Iran Primer

            On Iran, I think it’s fair to say that we were hoping that there would be a more fulsome presentation in Almaty that would have laid out with greater specificity and greater breadth what could have been done to try to reduce the tensions over Iran’s nuclear program. And clearly, any effort – not unlike the DPRK, where Kim Jong-un has decided to reopen his enrichment procedures by rebuilding a facility that had been part of an agreement to destroy – in the same way as that is provocative, to open up yellowcake production and to make any step that increases the rapidity with which you move towards enriched fissile material raises the potential of questions, if not even threat. And I think that is not constructive.

            So we will have discussions in London about this, yes. And there will be further discussions in Washington, and we’ll take stock of precisely where we are. But I’ll repeat what I said, and have said in several stops: The clock that is ticking on Iran’s program has a stop moment, and it does not tick interminably. We have said again and again that negotiations are not for the sake of negotiations, they are to make progress. And negotiations cannot be allowed to become a process of delay which in and of itself creates greater danger.

            So it is important for the Iranians to make the fundamental choice here: Which direction do they want to move in? If it is a peaceful program, it is very easy to prove it is peaceful. If they want to make the choice to confound that possibility of proving it is peaceful, that is their choice. And President Obama has made it clear he takes no option off the table with respect to what may follow….  April 9, to the press at Ben Gurion International Airport in Israel

 

            Iran cannot have and will not have a nuclear weapon. And the United States of America has made clear that we stand not just with Israel but with the entire international community in making it clear that we are serious, we are open to negotiation, but it is not an open-ended, endless negotiation; it cannot be used as an excuse for other efforts to try to break out with respect to a nuclear weapon. And we are well aware and coordinating very, very closely with respect to all of our assessments regarding that. But President Obama doesn’t bluff; he’s made that very clear to me. And we hope the Iranians will come back to the table with a very serious proposal... April 9 at a press conference in Jerusalem, Israel with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu

 

            No option will be taken off the table. And I confirm to you, Mr. President, that we will continue to seek a diplomatic solution. But our eyes are open, and we understand that the clock is moving. And no one will allow the diplomatic process to stand in the way of whatever choices need to be made to protect the world from yet another nuclear weapon in the wrong hands... April 8 at a press conference in Jerusalem, Israel with President Shimon Peres

 

            With respect to Almaty, Lady Cathy Ashton and Under Secretary Wendy Sherman have made it clear that there was somewhat of a gap that remains, obviously, as a consequence of the discussions that they had in Almaty. And I think that we would hope that we might have been able to move that somewhat closer. But the door is still open to doing that, and yes indeed it is important to continue to talk and to try to find the common ground.

            I think the President has made it clear, and I would reiterate today, that this is not an endless process. This is not something where you can play to the clock. You can’t just delay and talk for the sake of talking. So we would repeat to Iran it is our desire to have a diplomatic solution, but this choice really lies in the hands of Iranians. If you have a peaceful program for nuclear power, as a number of nations do, it is not hard to prove to the world that it is peaceful. Those other nations do that today. 

            The reason that Iran is increasingly finding itself isolated and in a position of being sanctioned is because they have chosen – they have chosen – not to live up to the international requirements and standards with respect to verification about their program. And the international community – not the United States, not a religion, not one particular philosophy, but countries under the United Nations and through the international community have come together and asked Iran, if your program is peaceful, please take the steps that are rational in order to prove it to the world. Now, that’s what we’re waiting for.

            But as I said earlier and repeat again, this is not an interminable process. So we hope that out of Almaty will come a narrowing of some of the differences. Diplomacy is a painful task, and a task for the patient. And you need to take the time to work through some of these things. Obviously, there is an election. That complicates the choices with respect to the politics of Iran. And we’re aware of that. But we will continue, the President is determined to continue to pursue the diplomatic channel. We will continue to have discussions through the P-5+1 process. And we remain open and hopeful that a diplomatic solution can be found… April 7 at a press conference in Istanbul, Turkey

 

 

 

 

 

            While Iran’s narrative of the Islamic Awakening  emphasizes the political developments that have occurred outside of Iran’s borders, it is nevertheless fundamentally rooted in the Islamic Republic’s own domestic ideological context and the regime’s interest in projecting its “soft power.” As such, the importance of this narrative must be analyzed from two different yet related perspectives. The first is in the context of the “soft war,” which is the ongoing ideological conflict within which the regime perceives itself to be engaged. The second is within the broader history of the regime’s focus on the Islamization of the social sciences. Since the Islamic revolution, Iran has stressed the development of models of governance and society alternative to those of the West and the modern social sciences, based on Islamic thought. Accordingly, this section looks at how the narrative of the Islamic Awakening is a logical development of both of these outlooks…

 

            At the time of the regional uprisings in 2011, the Iranian regime was already engaged in a highly ideological campaign which it referred to as the “soft war” (jang-e narm). The campaign represented Iran’s growing fears of “soft” threats to its rule, as demonstrated by the popular mobilization that occurred following the contested June 2009 presidential election. The green movement, led by opposition candidate Mir-Hussein Mousavi, not only produced the largest protests the country had witnessed since the revolution but also fueled an unprecedented degree of infighting within the ruling elite over the very nature of the Islamic regime…

 

            The soft war, however, extends beyond the challenge posed by the green demonstrations. More recently, with respect to the current nuclear standoff, Khamenei declared at a meeting with university students that the target of the soft war “is what is in your heart, in your mind, in your brain—meaning your will. The enemy wants to change your will.” The soft war, in other words, represents the latest ideological framework employed by the regime to analyze the threats and opportunities it faces with respect to a variety of issues. These ideas, moreover, have not remained solely at the level of discourse and political jargon. Just recently, the Armed Forces General Staff declared that it was establishing a Defense Propaganda Staff (setad-e tablighat-e defai), a Soft War Base (gharargah-e jang-e narm), and think tanks devoted to television and cinema…

 

            Iran’s strategic narrative of the Islamic Awakening is relevant to understanding not only Iranian foreign policy (and Middle Eastern foreign affairs generally) but, just as importantly, Iranian domestic politics. The reason is simple and, perhaps, counterintuitive: The development of Iranian thought on the Islamic Awakening—and of soft power more broadly—has been influenced first and foremost by the domestic political scene. Such thinking was spurred on not by geopolitical rivalries or by Iran’s attempts to “export the revolution,” as commonly assumed, but rather by the backlash of theocratic thinkers against their reformist counterparts regarding the very nature of the Islamic regime. Iran’s narrative of the Islamic Awakening is thus one component of the regime’s own ideological campaign to bolster the Islamic Republic and confront oppositional discourse on regime change...

 

            Iran’s main desires are to contribute to the growing Islamization of Arab polities—in whatever shape or form that may take, detached from any specific regime or institutional model—and to encourage the increased independence of Arab states so that they do not toe the line on United States policies, particularly those that intend to isolate Iran regionally. Iran consequently seeks to employ its narrative of the Islamic Awakening that extends beyond the Iranian model to its advantage to expand its reach and pursue its interests in the region more effectively.

 

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