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Iran Election Watch #1

Interview with Yasmin Alem

 
What is Iran’s parliamentary election schedule until the March poll?
 
Election activities began in December as Iran’s Election Commission announced that the Ministry of Interior established election headquarters in all 31 provinces. The key dates are:
 
  • December 24: The candidate registration period begins.
  • December 30: The registration period ends.
  • January: The Guardian Council reviews the credentials of all candidates, a process that usually takes about a month.
  • Late January or early February: The final list of eligible candidates – and disqualified candidates -- should be released. In the past, the majority of candidates have been disqualified for not meeting vague criteria.
  • February 22: The official campaign period begins and lasts eight days.
  • February 29: The official campaign ends. 
  • March 2: Election Day.
 
Who will organize and run Iran’s latest election—and how has control over voting procedures changed over the past three decades?
 
Two bodies are charged with managing and administering election-related activities in Iran:
 
  • The Guardian Council has a broad supervisory role. It vets all candidates, monitors the voting process, and certifies the election results.
  • The Ministry of Interior implements election operations under the council’s authority. It is responsible for the conduct of elections, including establishing and operating polling stations, administering the vote, and tabulating the results.  
 
Iran’s electoral infrastructure has technically not changed much since the 1979 revolution, but in practice the role of the Guardian Council has increasingly marginalized the Ministry of Interior. The twelve-man Council of religious and legal experts has emerged as the main arbiter of election outcomes in two ways. First, the Council has extended its powers to interpret the constitution to include supervising all stages of the elections, including the approval and rejection of candidates.
 
Second, the Council has transformed its temporary supervisory offices staffed with volunteers into permanent offices in every county across the country. Today, Iran has more than 384 Guardian Council supervisory offices operating year-round with full-time staff members. Concurrently, the Council has enjoyed an astronomical budget growth from $480,000 in 2000 to $25 million in 2011. The Guardian Council, dominated by conservatives, has thus morphed into the most omnipotent and omnipresent electoral management body in Iran.
 
What are the political undercurrents and competing interests among the government offices that oversee elections?
 
Over the past three decades, relations between the Guardian Council and the Ministry of Interior have fluctuated—sometimes quite seriously. Occasionally, the two bodies have had common interests, but other times they have been controlled by competing factions. Since its inception, the Council has tied to conservative factions. The Interior Ministry, however, has changed hands as part of the executive branch of government.
 
During the 2004 Majles elections, the conservative-dominated Guardian Council and the reformist-controlled Ministry of Interior were at daggers drawn. But the 2008 Majles elections were organized at a time that both institutions were under conservative control. The upcoming 2012 Majles elections are unique. Although conservative factions control both the ministry and the Council, their rivalries have turned the process into political fratricide.
 
Far from being a homogenous group, conservative factions have generally melded into broad coalitions during electoral events to maximize their share of the votes. At the onset of the 2009 presidential election, competing conservative factions united against the reformists. But after the regime suppressed the Green Movement, brewing tensions over President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s long-term political agenda re-emerged. A public rift between Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad erupted in the spring of 2011 and deepened conflict among conservatives. The president’s staunchest conservative supporters quickly turned into his vocal critics. The president’s associates were charged with corruption and embezzlement and publicly dubbed “political deviants.”
 
Revelations about Iran’s largest banking embezzlement, scandals over corruption in the automotive industry and the alleged plundering of social security pensions fueled the conservatives’ war against Ahmadinejad. Members of Parliament have repeatedly threatened to summon the president to parliament for questioning and some have even proposed to impeach him.
 
In late 2011, Ahmadinejad fought back by threatening opponents with revelations about their own misconduct. He has reportedly also used state resources under his control to win over interest groups. The president and his controversial chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, have reportedly paid between $15,000 to $40,000 to all Friday prayer leaders, who play an important role in mobilizing the faithful.  
 
The open power struggle among disparate conservative factions is likely to make the elections more interesting or contentious than originally expected.
 
What are the various electoral bodies doing to prepare for the March 2012 poll? Will there be different procedures this year?
 
Politically, the two main institutions in charge of elections are implementing strategies intended to tilt the balance of power in their own favor.
 
The conduct of elections provides the sole avenue for President Ahmadinejad and his supporters to influence the election outcome. So, for the first time, the Interior Ministry is conducting training seminars for local authorities in Iran’s provincial capitals. The training is designed to enhance the technical knowledge of election officials, but it also appears to be politically motivated.
 
Ahmadinejad’s rivals have not been idle. The judiciary has also set up special judicial branches in Iran’s provincial capitals to ensure the implementation of election rules and the swift prosecution of electoral violators. The judiciary is, notably, headed by Sadeq Larijani, a former Guardian Council member and brother of the parliamentary speaker. State Prosecutor General Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, a bitter foe of Ahmadinejad, heads this initiative. The Guardian Council has warned the “deviant current” against trying to manipulate the election. The new judicial procedure is widely seen as a means of providing the Guardian Council and forces close to the supreme leader with additional levers of pressure against the president and his supporters.
 
Yasmin Alem, an independent Iran analyst, is the author of Duality by Design: The Iranian Electoral System published by the International Foundation of ElectoralSystems. 
 
Tags: Elections

Tehran's Growing Tensions with the West

The following is an interview by the Council on Foreign Relations with USIP fellow and Iran Primer editor Robin Wright:



The attack on the UK embassy in Tehran (BBC) on November 28 reportedly by Iran's Basij militia, a volunteer paramilitary wing, has led to heightened tensions between Iran and the West. The rampage, which was in protest over the UK's new sanctions against Iranian banks, could not have taken place without the order or complicity of the Iranian government, says expert Robin Wright. She says the attack also signals a larger message of noncooperation from Iran's government, including on its nuclear program, which has prompted increasing concern since an IAEA report in November.
 
What was behind this trashing of the British embassy, which has led to a virtual rupture in relations between UK and Iran?
 
The new tensions between Britain and Iran stem from Iran's refusal to cooperate with the international community on its controversial nuclear program, which has triggered various countries to take joint and unilateral actions. On November 21, Britain put a ban on dealing with any Iranian banks, including the central bank. This was a move more sweeping than anything the United States has done on financial institutions. Iran responded in two ways. Its parliament pressed on November 27 to have relations downgraded and the British ambassador expelled. After the trashing of the British embassy on November 29, the British government took the unanticipated step of expelling Iranian diplomats and closing Iran's mission in London, which is, again, further than any other country has gone.
These steps by the British are important because Britain was an important conduit for information between Iran and the United States. But Britain has long been a target of Iranian anger because of its own independent role in Iran over the past two centuries. And in many ways, there's been longer antipathy toward Britain than even toward the United States.
 
Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, gave a speech sharply attacking Britain, even before this trashing occurred, right?

 
Yes, the Iranian resentment toward Britain goes back a couple of centuries now, and it is not just the revolutionary leadership that shares suspicions of Britain's motives. There are many Iranians who don't like the Iranian regime but who also don't look fondly on Britain. The same is true regarding Russia, because before World War II, Britain and Russia were major players in Iran.
 
This goes back more recently to the coup d'état in 1953, right?

 
Britain and the United States were responsible in 1953 for an intelligence operation that ousted a popularly elected prime minister, Mohammad Mossadeq, and that put the shah [Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi] back on the throne.
It is clear that the Iranian government either ordered or was complicit in the storming of the British embassy.
That was one of the most sensitive junctures in modern Iranian history. And many people feel that the British and American operation aborted an evolutionary political process, aimed at democratic openings that then forced a revolution in 1979.
 
How was this attack organized? Was it ordered by the Iranian government?
 
It is clear that the Iranian government either ordered or was complicit in the storming of the British embassy. Under the Vienna convention, every host government has to provide security and protection for all foreign diplomatic missions. From looking at the videos of the attack, it's clear that the police did virtually nothing to stop the protesters from taking over not just one, but two British diplomatic offices simultaneously.
Coming thirty-two years after the takeover of the U.S. embassy in 1979, it signals that nothing has changed, that this government is not prepared to cooperate with international treaties, to which it's a signatory, whether it's protection of diplomats or cooperation on its nuclear program. So there's a bigger message here than simply what happened to the British government or the British embassy.
 
This comes a couple of weeks after the IAEA issued a damning report on Iran's potential nuclear weapons program. Is this a sign that the leadership of Iran is saying to the West, "You can publish all the reports you want, but we're going to do what we're going to do?"
 
The IAEA report was the most damning yet because it provided specific evidence of military planning, but it only applies to Iran's program until 2003. The specific evidence does not come from programs that can be proved to have continued since 2003. If you talk to the UN weapons inspectors, both current and past, the physicists who know the nuclear issue, they will point out that there is more to worry about than in the past, but we have to be careful about fully understanding what Iran is doing today.
 
Iran is thumbing its nose at the outside world with its failure to cooperate, despite repeated resolutions at the United Nations under both the Bush and the Obama administrations calling on it to do so. It's also thumbing its nose at the international community in saying, "We are playing by our own rules, even on basic things like protection for diplomats," because they have to know that this will complicate all diplomacy on Iran in an attempt to find a compromise on Iran's nuclear program.
 
Some analysts speculate that this underscores the split in the leadership between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Khamenei and his followers. What do you think?
 
The political divide in Iran has not been this deep since the early days after the revolution. This time it's playing out among those in power, not between those who are out of power and those who are in power. This is playing out between conservatives and hardliners in the run-up to two pivotal elections, parliamentary elections in March 2012 and a presidential election in 2013, which is particularly important because Iran has a two-term limit on the presidency and Ahmadinejad cannot run again. So the stakes are who controls Iran next, and there are very different visions, even among the hardliners. The revolution is at a stage that it's begun to eat itself up.
 
Explain that a bit more for people who don't follow this, because Ahmadinejad has been portrayed as a real hardliner. On the other hand, he's being portrayed as a bit of a softy by hardliners.
 
The deep divisions play out on a host of issues, and it's not always logical to the outside world. For example, President Ahmadinejad has questioned the Holocaust and Israel's right to exist. But he also was the one who accepted a deal with the international community on Iran's nuclear program in October 2009, only to find that the senior leadership--basically meaning Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the inner circle--rejected it, and Iran had to back away from it.
 
[T]he stakes are who controls Iran next, and there are very different visions, even among the hardliners.
 
So the divisions play out on lots of different levels, including the economy, which is arguably the most divisive issue for Iran today. We focus on Iran's foreign policy, but it's the economy that is defining many of the debates. There are also debates over who should have power in Iran. Khamenei has suggested recently that the president should not be popularly elected, but elected by parliament, and this would change, effectively, the president's powers and the people's ability to influence political life.
 
People get confused because Khamenei got right in the middle of the disputed 2009 presidential election to ensure Ahmadinejad's reelection.
 
Yes. In 2009, Khamenei put his political reputation on the line by backing the disputed reelection of Ahmadinejad, when millions were turning out on the streets to challenge what they thought was a fraudulent vote. Today however, just two years later, you see the supreme leader and the president with very different visions on a number of issues. And the supreme leader is even questioning whether the president should be popularly elected, in effect, diminishing the president's power if it is indeed given to parliament to select, and effectively increasing his own power.
 
And the supreme leader is in charge of the Revolutionary Guards.

 
The supreme leader has control of defense policy, but also domestic policy, in that his office can question legislation, approve or disapprove of judicial appointments, and basically controls the National Security Council, which deals with a range of pivotal issues. The supreme leader is effectively an infallible political pope.
 
And there's no question that the British embassy would not have been attacked if he had not given his approval?
 
I don't know that for sure, but it is clear that someone in a position of authority over the Basij, over the Revolutionary Guards, had to have either ordered or been complicit, because this could not have happened without approval or encouragement by the government at some level.
 
http://www.cfr.org/iran/tehrans-growing-tensions-west/p26654

 

 

Gallup: Few Iranians Approve of U.S., European Leadership

According to a 2011 Gallup poll, the U.K., U.S., and EU did not enjoy much approval in Iran even before they tightened sanctions there, escalating tensions. Nine percent of Iranians approved of U.K. and U.S. leadership when Gallup surveyed in February and March 2011 and not many more approved of the EU's leadership (12%). Iranians were just as unlikely to approve of the leadership of Germany (11%) and Russia (13%), but they are more approving of key trade partners China (18%) and Turkey (24%).
 
Iranians' approval of other countries' leadership
 
Iranians were most likely to disapprove of the leadership of the U.S. (65%) and the U.K. (62%), the countries with the stiffest sanctions imposed against Iran. Disapproval of trade partners was lower, but in every case, Iranians were still more likely to disapprove than approve, and at least one in four Iranians didn't know or refused to voice an opinion.
 
Tensions between Iran and Europe reignited this week after Iranian students attacked the British embassy in Tehran to protest new sanctions on Iran's energy and financial sectors. The U.K. withdrew its diplomats in response and the EU restricted the assets and travel of 180 Iranian officials and companies. The U.S. Senate Friday approved stricter sanctions against Iran's central bank. Russia and China cautioned against aggravating Iran, and Turkey expressed worry for its own security, after Iran threatened to hit NATO's missile shield if provoked.
 
While Iranians' approval of the leadership of all these countries and the EU is relatively low, the most educated Iranians are more likely to approve than less educated Iranians, regardless of income. Approval of leadership of the U.K., the U.S., Germany, and the EU at least triples among those Iranians with four years of education beyond high school. The increase is similar for Russia and China and the percentage still more than doubles in Turkey.
 
Approval of other countries' leadership, by education
 
 
Younger Iranians tend to approve of the leadership in the countries measured and the EU more than older Iranians, but this relationship is not as strong as the relationship with education, and ratings are still low. Approval ratings among the oldest Iranians are about half of what they are among the youngest Iranians for nearly all countries except Turkey.
 
Approval of other countries' leadership, by age
 
 
Implications
Iranians' dim views of the leadership of key Western powers and their trade partners highlight the difficult situation Iranians are in as their leadership battles diplomatically on the global stage. One in four Iranians are "suffering" in terms of how they rate their lives, and Gallup finds unemployment in Iran to be among the highest in the world. Still, Iranians do not appear to have a high opinion of important global powers. Iranians are the most approving, on a relative basis, of Turkey, but approval is still so low that it is difficult to assess how much clout the country holds in Iranians' eyes.
 
While more educated and younger Iranians are slightly more approving of the leadership of each of the countries measured and the EU, their approval ratings are too low to find much comfort in. As such, world leaders seeking to pursue diplomacy with Iran should tread carefully as not to further damage their reputations among the Iranian people.
 
Tp view the report on Gallup's website, click here.
 
 
Tags: Poll, Reports

Defense Secretary Warns Iran

On Dec. 2, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta made extensive remarks about Iran to the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center. The following are excerpts.
 
        Iran’s continued drive to develop nuclear capabilities, including troubling enrichment activities and past work on weaponization that has now been documented by the IAEA, and its continued support to groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist organizations make clear that the regime in Tehran remains a very grave threat to all of us…        
   
       Iran must ultimately realize that its quest for nuclear weapons will make it less, not more, secure.  These efforts are increasing Tehran’s isolation and I continue to believe that pressure – economic pressure, diplomatic pressure – and strengthened collective defenses are the right approach.  Still, it is my department’s responsibility to plan for all contingencies and to provide the president with a wide range of military options should they become necessary.  
           
       That is a responsibility I take very seriously because when it comes to the threat posed by Iran, the president has made it very clear that we have not taken any options off the table…
       
        Iran is isolating itself from the rest of the world.  It is truly becoming, particularly as a result of the attack on the British Embassy, a pariah in that region.  Their own government is off balance in terms of really trying to establish any kind of stability even within Iran…  
 
[Question:] Mr. Secretary, how long do you believe a military attack on Iran would postpone it from getting a bomb? 
 
       At best it might postpone it maybe one, possibly two years.  It depends on the ability to truly get the targets that they’re after.  Frankly, some of those targets are very difficult to get at.  
           
       That kind of, that kind of shot would only, I think, ultimately not destroy their ability to produce an atomic weapon, but simply delay it – number one.  Of greater concern to me are the unintended consequences, which would be that ultimately it would have a backlash and the regime that is weak now, a regime that is isolated would suddenly be able to reestablish itself, suddenly be able to get support in the region, and suddenly instead of being isolated would get the greater support in a region that right now views it as a pariah.  
           
        Thirdly, the United States would obviously be blamed and we could possibly be the target of retaliation from Iran, striking our ships, striking our military bases.  Fourthly – there are economic consequences to that attack – severe economic consequences that could impact a very fragile economy in Europe and a fragile economy here in the United States.  
           
        And lastly I think that the consequence could be that we would have an escalation that would take place that would not only involve many lives, but I think could consume the Middle East in a confrontation and a conflict that we would regret.   So we have to be careful about the unintended consequences of that kind of an attack… 
           
        In addition, once Iran gets a nuclear weapon, then they’re not – you will have an arms race in the Middle East.  What’s to stop Saudi Arabia from getting a nuclear weapon?  What’s to stop other countries from getting nuclear weapons in that part of the world?  Suddenly we have an escalation of these horrible weapons that, you know, I think create even greater devastation in the Middle East.  
           
         So a key for all of us – for all of us is to work together – together – to ensure that that does not happen.  We have made good progress in these efforts.  We continue to make good progress in these efforts.  That’s where we ought to continue to put our pressures, our efforts, our diplomatic, our economic, experts working together to make sure that that does not happen.  
           
         You always have as a last resort – as the prime minister said – the last resort of military action, but it must be the last resort, not the first. 
           
[Question:] Is the chief priority of U.S. policy toward Iran to moderate the nuclear ambitions of the Iranian regime, or to change the Iranian regime?  Will this regime be willing to change its behavior? 
 
         The effort that we’re concerned about is to make sure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon, first.  Secondly, we would like to have an Iran that becomes part of the international community and that it decides that it is going to engage with the rest of the world, as opposed to isolating itself, as opposed to supporting terrorists, as opposed to trying to influence and support those that attack our country and attack others in that region. 
 
 

New European Sanctions on Iran

On Dec. 1, the European Union issued the following statement to explain its new sanctions on Iran:
 
The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. "The Council reiterates its serious and deepening concerns over the nature of Iran's nuclear
programme, and in particular over the findings on Iranian activities relating to the
development of military nuclear technology, as reflected in the latest IAEA report. In this
regard, the Council strongly supports  the resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of
Governors, which expresses deep and increasing concerns about unresolved issues and
stresses the grave concern posed by Iran’s continued refusal to comply with its international
obligations and to fully co-operate with the IAEA.
 
2. In the light of these concerns, the Council has today designated a further 180 entities and
individuals to be subject to restrictive measures. These designations include entities and
individuals directly involved in Iran’s nuclear activities, which are in violation of UNSC
resolutions; entities and individuals owned, controlled or acting on behalf of the Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Line (IRISL); and members of, as well as entities controlled by, the
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
 
3. In accordance with the European Council Declaration of 23 October, the Council further
agreed that, given the seriousness of the situation, including the acceleration of the near 20%
uranium enrichment activities by Iran, in violation of six UNSC resolutions and eleven IAEA
Board resolutions, and the installation of centrifuges at a previously undeclared and deeply
buried site near Qom, as detailed in the IAEA report, the EU should extend the scope of its
restrictive measures against Iran.
 
4. In particular, the Council agreed to broaden existing sanctions by examining, in close
coordination with international partners, additional measures including measures  aimed at
severely affecting the Iranian financial system, in the transport sector, in the energy sector,
measures against the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, as well as in other areas. The
Council tasked preparatory Council bodies to further elaborate these measures for adoption,
no later than by the next Foreign Affairs Council.
 
5. The Council again reaffirmed the longstanding commitment of the European Union to work
for a diplomatic solution of the Iranian nuclear issue in accordance with the dual track
approach. The Council welcomes and fully supports the continuing efforts of the EU High
Representative on behalf of the E3+3 aimed at convincing Iran to enter into meaningful talks
on concrete confidence building measures. The Council calls upon Iran to respond positively
to the offer of negotiations in the EU High Representative’s latest letter by demonstrating its
readiness to seriously address existing concerns on the nuclear issue.
 
6. The Council reaffirms that the objective of the EU remains to achieve a comprehensive and
long-term settlement which would build international confidence in the exclusively peaceful
nature of the Iranian nuclear program, while respecting Iran’s legitimate rights to the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the NPT."

 

Tags: EU, Sanctions

The Islamists Are Coming

The Islamists Are Coming, edited by Robin Wright, surveys the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region more than any other political bloc. Yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.

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