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Nuke Talks: Latest from Iran, P5+1

Secretary of State John Kerry met with his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif in Lausanne, Switzerland to discuss Tehran’s controversial nuclear program. On March 16, the first day of talks, Zarif said solutions are “within reach” on certain issues while gaps remain on others. U.S. Secretary of State Energy Ernest Moniz and Iranian Atomic Energy Agency chief Ali Akbar Salehi joined the talks to negotiate technical details. Zarif then flew to Brussels to meet with E.U. officials. The Iranian team returned to Switzerland for more talks with U.S. officials on March 17-18.  After the first session, Salehi said that 90 percent of the technical issues had been resolved. Iran and the so-called P5+1 countries —Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States —aim to agree on a framework by late March and finalize the technical details of a nuclear deal by June 30.

The following are recent excerpted remarks by officials from Iran and the world’s six major powers on the status of nuclear negotiations.

United States
 
President Barack Obama
 
“Obviously there's significant skepticism in Israel generally about Iran. And understandably. Iran has made vile comments, anti-Semitic comments, comments about the destruction of Israel. It is precisely for that reason that even before I became president, I said Iran could not have a nuclear weapon.
 
What is going to have an effect on whether we get a deal done is, number one, is Iran prepared to show, to prove to the world that it is not developing a nuclear weapon, and can we verify that in an intrusive, consistent way.
 
And frankly, they have not yet made the kind of concessions that are I think going to be needed for a final deal to get done. But they have moved, and so there's the possibility.
 
The other thing is going to be me being able to show not just the American people or the Israeli people but the world that, in fact, we have mechanisms in place that will prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon. And that the deal that is made not only is verifiable, but it also makes it much less likely that Iran is able to break out than if we have no deal at all. And that's an argument that we are going to have to make, if we have a deal. But we've still got some more to do.”
 
“Negotiations have broken for a week because of the Nowruz holidays inside of Iran, which gives time for us to make sure that everybody within the P5+1 is comfortable with the current positions that are being taken. It allows them to consult. We'll be back in a week. Our goal though is to get this done in a matter of weeks, not months.”
—March 21, 2015 in an interview with the Huffington Post
 
Secretary of State John Kerry
 
“From the beginning, these talks have been tough and they’ve been intense, and they remain so. And we’ve made some progress, but there are still gaps, important gaps, and important choices that need to be made by Iran in order to be able to move forward.
 
“Now I want to be very clear. Nothing in our deliberations is decided until everything is decided. And the purpose of these negotiations is not just to get any deal; it is to get the right deal. President Obama means it when he says, again and again, that Iran will not be permitted to get a nuclear weapon. As you all know, Iran says it doesn’t want a nuclear weapon, and that is a very welcome statement that the Supreme Leader has, in fact, incorporated into a fatwa. And we have great respect – great respect – for the religious importance of a fatwa. And what we are effectively trying to do is translate that into legal language, into everyday language within the framework of a negotiated agreement that everybody can understand, which requires everybody to have certain obligations and ultimately be able to guarantee that Iran’s program, its nuclear program, will be peaceful now and peaceful forever.
 
“Now sanctions alone can’t achieve that. We need a verifiable set of commitments. And we need an agreed-upon plan that obviously provides the access and the opportunity to be able to know what is happening so that you can have confidence that the program is, indeed, peaceful. That’s what we’re negotiating about. And we need to cover every potential pathway – uranium, plutonium, covert – that there might exist towards a weapon, and only an agreement can do that. 
 
“So what’s the alternative? In previous years, when U.S. policy was not to talk to Iran and insist at the same time that they could have no nuclear program whatsoever, the number of centrifuges skyrocketed. Every time negotiations have broken down in the past, Iran’s nuclear program has advanced. Only the joint plan, which Iran agreed to and fully implemented, has actually succeeded in freezing Iran’s program for the first time in nearly 10 years, and even rolled it back in some cases. And they agreed to that, because they have an interest in proving that their plan is peaceful. 
 
“The comprehensive plan will lock in, with greater specificity and breadth, if we can arrive at it, the ways in which Iran will live up to its international obligations under the NPT for the long term. So we continue to be focused on reaching the right deal, a deal that would protect the world, including the United States and our closest allies and partners, from the threat that a nuclear-armed Iran could pose. We still don’t know whether or not we will get there, and that’s why I will travel to Lausanne in Switzerland tomorrow in order to meet with Foreign Minister Zarif and once again engage in talks to see if we can find a way to get that right deal. 
 
“As I have said previously, it may be that Iran simply can’t say yes to the type of deal that the international community is looking for. But we owe it to the future of everybody in the world to try to find out. If we cannot get to a diplomatic agreement, make no mistake, we obviously do have other options. But those options will mean no transparency, they will mean no verifiable set of commitments, and they don’t close off Iran’s potential pathways to a nuclear weapon for nearly as long as a negotiated agreement can, if it’s the right agreement. And so we will return to these talks, recognizing that time is of the essence, the clock is ticking, and important decisions need to be made.
 
“[T]he deadline is approaching. As you all know, we have set the end of the month as the deadline. And so we will be going into this understanding that time is critical. I can’t tell you whether or not we can get a deal or whether we’re close. And one reason I can’t tell you is because we have heard some comments from the Supreme Leader regarding the letter that was sent by the 47 senators. And until I engage in those conversations, I cannot gauge on a personal level that reaction – though I can tell you from common sense that when the United States Senate sends a letter such as the 47 senators chose to send the other day it is a direct interference in the negotiations of the executive department. It is completely without precedent, and it is almost inevitable that it will raise questions in the minds of the folks with whom we are negotiating as to whether or not they are negotiating with the executive department and the President, which is what the Constitution says, or whether there are 535 members of Congress. 
 
“Let me make clear to Iran, to our P5+1 counterparts who are deeply involved in this negotiation, that, from our point of view, this letter – the letter was, in fact, incorrect in its statements about what power they do have. It was incorrect in its assessments of what type of agreement this is. And as far as we are concerned, the Congress has no ability to change an executive agreement per se. So we will approach these negotiations in the same way that we have approached them to date, not affected externally but looking at as this Administration, according to President Obama’s instructions, to get the right deal that will accomplish what we need to for the security interest of the United States, our friends and allies in the region, and for the long-term security of everybody who cares about nonproliferation.”
—March 14, 2015 at a press briefing in Egypt
 
Margaret Brennan (CBS News): The president wants a deal by the end of March. If you can't meet that timetable, what happens? … Would there be an extension?
 
Kerry: Well, the president's view -- and I share this view completely -- is that we have been at this for over two years now.
 
And Iran has said its program is peaceful. In the time that we have had, the fundamental framework of decisions necessary to prove your program is peaceful should be possible. So, we believe very much that there's not anything that's going to change in April or May or June that suggests that, at that time, a decision you can't make now will be made then.
 
If it's peaceful, let's get it done. And my hope is that, in the next days, that will be possible.
 
Brennan: But if these talks fail, do you think there is a risk that Iran will make the choice to build a bomb?
 
Kerry: Of course there's that risk, obviously.
 
Brennan:: But is that really what is at stake?
 
Kerry: Well, look, if they moved along the road to decide suddenly to break out and rush to try to have enough fissile material to build a bomb, we have a number of options available to us.
President Obama has said they are all on the table. And he has also pledged very publicly and very clearly on a number of occasions Iran will not be allowed to get a nuclear weapon.
—March 15, 2015 in an interview with CBS News
 
"Over the past few days, I’ve had lengthy negotiations with the Iranian team about the steps that Iran must take to demonstrate that its nuclear program now and ongoing in the future is exclusively for peaceful purposes. Over the past months, the P5+1 have made substantial progress towards that fundamental goal, though important gaps remain. In London, we will share ideas this evening about how to resolve the remaining sticking points, as I did yesterday on the telephone with Foreign Minister Lavrov and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. We will coordinate our strategy, as we have, as we approach the end of the March deadline, to reach an understanding on the major issues. And those of us meeting tonight will then return to our respective capitals for consultations before coming back to Lausanne next week to determine whether or not an agreement is possible.
 
I want to emphasize: In my conversations with Foreign Minister Zarif, and indeed over the last 16 months since the Joint Plan of Action took effect, we have made genuine progress. We have all kept the commitments that we made in the Joint Plan, and we have all lived up to our obligations. We have worked long and hard to achieve a comprehensive agreement that resolves international concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. The stakes are high and the issues are complicated, highly technical, and all interrelated.
 
Once again, let me also be clear we don’t want just any deal. If we had, we could have announced something a long time ago. And clearly, since the Joint Plan of Action was agreed, we are not rushing. This has been a two and a half year or more process. But we recognize that fundamental decisions have to be made now, and they don’t get any easier as time goes by. It is time to make hard decisions. We want the right deal that would make the world, including the United States and our closest allies and partners, safer and more secure, and that is our test. President Obama has been clear that the best way to achieve that security, that safety, is through a comprehensive and durable agreement that all parties are committed to upholding, and whose implementation is not based on trust, but it is based on intensive verification, on the ability to know and understand what is happening.
 
So in the days ahead, we will stay at this. We will continue to exercise the judgment and the patience to defend our interests, to uphold our core principles, and maintain our sense of urgency. We have not yet reached the finish line. But make no mistake, we have the opportunity to try to get this right. It’s a matter of political will and tough decision making. It’s a matter of choices, and we must all choose wisely in the days ahead."
—March 21, 2015 in a press release
 
White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest
 
"We are in a situation where we are, at best, it’s a 50/50 proposition that a deal will be completed before the end of March.  There are a couple of reasons for that.  The first is, the President is driving a very hard bargain and Iran is going to have to make some very tough and specific commitments as it relates to resolving the international community’s concerns with their nuclear program as well as agreeing to a set of extraordinarily intrusive inspections.  And that’s the only way that we’re going to get to an agreement, and that’s why the President is realistic about how difficult it will be to arrive at an agreement…
 
"The second reason that we continue to believe that our odds of reaching this agreement are at best 50/50 is that it is going to require the Iranian leadership, including those who aren’t at the table, to sign on to this agreement.  And the fact is, from our vantage point it's difficult to predict what exactly they’ll conclude.  And so that is an X factor in these negotiations...
 
"There’s no doubt that they’ve made substantial progress over the course of the last year.  And that is an indication that Iran took very seriously their participation in these negotiations.  But what is also true in the context of these negotiations is that as they encounter stumbling blocks, they just delay them to the end, which means that in the context of these negotiations some of the most difficult issues, some of the issues that they’ve been struggling with for the longest period of time, are the issues that have yet to be resolved.  So that is how it's possible that we’ve made substantial progress while acknowledging that significant gaps remain."
—March 17, 2015 in a press briefing
 
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Iran still needs to make some very tough and necessary choices to address the significant concerns that remain about its nuclear program, concerns that we and the P5+1 share. Indeed, the whole point of this is so that Iran can show – in essence, prove – to the international community that its program is exclusively peaceful. As the President has said, this is the time when we’ll be able to determine whether or not Iran is able to accept a deal to prove that, in fact, that program is exclusively peaceful. We’re trying to get there. But quite frankly, we still do not know if we will be able to.

 

QUESTION: I wanted to ask if you were familiar with reports that had come out this weekend out of Iran where Salehi was quoted as saying that now they want to keep Fordow open and that they also don’t want to convert Arak anymore. ... And also, at the end of this process by the end of March, if you do get an agreement, do you expect to have a written piece of paper, a public document that you will share with people?
 
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So I haven’t seen the reports, Indira, so I’m not going to comment on them. Probably wouldn’t comment on them even if I had seen them. But what I can say is that we’ve been very clear about what we have to accomplish in this agreement: We have to shut down all the pathways to fissile material for a nuclear weapon – that’s the highly-enriched uranium pathway at Natanz and Fordow; the weapons-grade plutonium pathway potential at Arak; and the covert pathway. And so those are the metrics for seeing, in fact – and we have to do that for an extended period of time because the international community has to gain confidence over time that in fact this is an exclusively peaceful program. So those are the metrics that we will use for whatever gets decided here.
 
As far as a written commitment, as I’ve said to our team, this would be a high-class – what we call a high-class problem. If we are fortunate to get to an agreement that meets the metrics the President has set out and assures the world that Iran has an exclusively peaceful program and cannot get a nuclear weapon, then we will figure out how to communicate best. Obviously, there will have to be detailed, classified consultations with the Congress; that’s an obligation we have. We will have to have a way to communicate with our partners around the world. And we will, of course, have to say something publicly about where we are. How detailed that will be and how – what form it will take is not yet decided because we aren’t there.
 
QUESTION: Can I just ask you without explaining to us where you are, because I know you won’t do that, on the sanctions component, is there a general understanding on the structure of how you’d go about scaling back sanctions in an agreement?
 
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we have said before that from our perspective we believe that sanctions relief has to come in a phased way as Iran undertakes its commitments so that it would be more of a step-by-step process similar to the Joint Plan of Action, which I think is a good guidepost for how we’re approaching the joint comprehensive plan of action, which is, of course, much more complicated and long-term. So that is our frame for how we’re doing this.
—March 16, 2015 in a special briefing in Lausanne, Switzerland
 
Senior Administration Official
 
“I’ll just say in our interactions with Salehi… have been very, very professional; I think fruitful, in terms of, again, identifying the technical issues, clarifying them, sharpening them, and looking at what are the options on the table for a potential agreement. And it’s – again, he’s very knowledgeable. He’s very accomplished. He has a Ph.D. in nuclear engineering from a terrific school. And so I think very – again, the word that I would mostly use is extremely professional, in terms of our discussion.”
—March 17, 2015 in a second special briefing in Lausanne, Switzerland
 
State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki
 
“We're obviously in crunch time right now, and the next couple of days leading up to this weekend will be key.
 
“We fully expect we will take to the end of the month to determine if we can get to an agreement that both sides can live by.”
—March 16, 2015 in remarks to CNN
 
Iran
 
President Hassan Rouhani
 
Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif
 
“We are discussing the details, which needs a lot of work ... We are trying to overcome the differences. We can make progress if the other party shows political will.”
—March 18, 2015 to the press
 
“On some issues we are closer to a solution and based on this we can say solutions are within reach. At the same time, we are apart on some issues.”
—March 16, 2015 to the press
 
“I believe we can hold talks with the US and produce the [intended] results from such talks.
 
“If we fail to arrive at an agreement, the US miscalculation would be to blame; the Americans [wrongly] thought that they could pursue their agenda though piling pressure [on Iran]. There is still one good opportunity to reach a deal, one which allows Iran to hold on to its rights and maintain its interests.”
—March 2015 in an interview with Khorosan daily (translation via Iran Front Page)
 
“In the [general] meeting, it was decided that the political directors of the three European countries along with their Chinese and Russian counterparts join the [Iranian, E.U. and U.S.) negotiators so as to help the negotiations [move forward] in the final days of this round.”
“The European sides stated that they would have an active presence in Lausanne to reach a final agreement.”
—March 17, 2015 to the press
 
Deputy Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araqchi
 
“That is the point to say that we were able to reach a solution and to open the locks; now, three months later, we must continue to end the differences and bridge the gaps.
 
“[I]f we conclude the locks still remain in place, we may then decide not to continue; when we cannot open the locks, we will not reach any solutions on the details, either.”
—March 16, 2015 to the press
 
“There is a faction in U.S. politics who believe a deal with Iran will help American interests and security.”
 
“We used to say we have a 50-percent chance of success in the talks, now it's definitely more than 50 percent.”
—March 17, 2015 to Iranian weekly Mosalas
 
Iranian Atomic Energy Agency chief Ali Akbar Salehi
 
“We have agreed on 90 percent of technical issues. There has only remained one very important point of difference that we will try to resolve in the evening talks.”
—March 17, 2015 to the press
 
“I'm very optimistic [about negotiations].”
—March 16, 2015 to the press after bilateral talks with U.S. officials
 
“The function and nature of the Arak Heavy-Water Reactor…will remain unchanged as a heavy water facility.”
 
“We are determined to make use of this site [Fordo uranium enrichment plant near the city of Qom] according to the guidelines of Iran's Supreme Leader (Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei) and AEOI's technical needs.”
 
“Our long-term strategy is to materializing the macro-scale policies specified by the Supreme Leader.”
—March 14, 2015 according to Fars News

 

United Kingdom
 
Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond
 
“We are closer than we were but there is still a long way to go. There are areas where we have made progress and areas where we have yet to make any progress.”
—March 16, 2015 to the press
 
"It remains the case that Iran has to make significant further movement if we are going to be able to secure an agreement."
 
"There are a lot of complex and difficult issues that remain to be resolved before a deal can be agreed. Reaching a comprehensive, lasting and verifiable deal will be extremely challenging but remains in all our interests."
 
"The right deal is one that allows Iran to have a civilian nuclear program but prevents it from developing a nuclear weapon capability. It remains our position that no deal is better than a bad deal."
—March 23, 2015 according to the press
 
China

Foreign Minister Wang Yi
 
"The Iran nuclear talks have reached the final sprint in the marathon."
 
"Reaching an agreement is the trend of the times and the will of the people, which accords with the joint and long-term interests of all sides, including Iran."
—March 24, 2015 according to the press
 
The Elders
 
The independent group of global leaders, founded by Nelson Mandela and chaired by Kofi Annan, includes Martti Ahtisaari, Ela Bhatt, Lakhdar Brahimi, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Fernando H Cardoso, Jimmy Carter, Hina Jilani, Graça Machel, Mary Robinson, Desmond Tutu and Ernesto Zedillo.
 
The Elders believe that an agreement between Iran and the “P5+1” powers on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme is a realistic aspiration and could herald genuine and far-reaching improvements for peace and stability.
 
The Elders strongly encourage all parties to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement that ensures safety and security.
 
Kofi Annan, Chair of The Elders, said:
“This requires commitment, patience and persistence. There is too much at stake to allow the process to fail.”
 
At this sensitive time The Elders urge political actors on all sides to avoid any public statements that undermine the peace negotiations. Negotiations cannot advance if they face a constant barrage of criticism and second guessing; the negotiators should be given the time and space to complete their work before judgements are made.
 
The Elders hope all stakeholders will seize this historic opportunity to help stabilise the Middle East and usher in an era of security cooperation that transcends national rivalries and sectarian divisions.
—March 18, 2015 in a statement
 
Photo credit: Robin Wright
 

 

Zarif on Nuke Talks End Game

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif told Khorosan daily that there is "still one good opportunity to reach a deal” on the nuclear issue with the world’s six major powers." But if talks fail, the "U.S. miscalculation would be to blame," he warned in an interview. The following are excerpted translations by Iran Front Page from the paper’s Nowruz, or Persian New Year, supplement.

In the past, the West assumed or acted as if Iran’s enrichment program was geared toward making a bomb. Although those allegations are still repeated, now experts with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Western political, technical and scientific circles acknowledge that there is a technical way to make sure enrichment does not lead to development of nuclear weapons. This is an achievement and now it is up to the other side to carry the ball and display political will.
 
In recent years, Iran has had the greatest cooperation with the IAEA . Perhaps nowhere else in the world – Japan excluded – has the IAEA been that much active; this comes as Iran has only 17 atomic sites and Japan is home to 170 nuclear facilities.
 
If you take a look at the agency’s 2013 report, you will learn that Iran’s reported negligence equals that of Japan which is below one percent. In the case of some countries that figure is as high as 20 or 30 percent. There are a couple of cases where the negligence figure is 100 percent. […]
 
I believe we can hold talks with the US and produce the [intended] results from such talks.
 
If we fail to arrive at an agreement, the US miscalculation would be to blame; the Americans [wrongly] thought that they could pursue their agenda though piling pressure [on Iran]. There is still one good opportunity to reach a deal, one which allows Iran to hold on to its rights and maintain its interests.
 
[…] I have repeatedly said that we do not hold talks only with the US. There are two reasons why negotiations with the US have been highlighted: First, it is the first time the Islamic Republic of Iran has entered official talks with the US; second and more importantly, the nuclear issue is the only subject about which we hold talks with the US.
 
[…]
If the talks result in a breakthrough, it won’t mean that all problems have been removed. From the start, I told my colleagues at the Foreign Ministry that conclusion of the Geneva deal marked the beginning of our job and that it would increase the problems and challenges down the road. In case talks break down, we have made other arrangements.
 
Mr. Obama said in a speech in [the Brookings Institution’s annual] Saban [Forum in December], ‘If I had an option, if we could create an option in which Iran eliminated every single nut and bolt of their nuclear program, and foreswore the possibility of ever having a nuclear program, and, for that matter, got rid of all its military capabilities, I would take it. But that particular option is not available.’
 
His remarks [back then] were viewed as an affront to Iran. They could have been viewed as inevitability, on the US part, to get along with the Iranian people. This is how I read Mr. Obama’s remarks, although I am not under any illusion that the US has changed course.
 
The Supreme Leader gets involved [in the nuclear issue] any time he deems it expedient. That the leader gets involved does not mean that the Foreign Ministry has failed to undertake its responsibility.
 
I’m sure that when [Secretary John] Kerry was taking a walk [in Geneva] with me, he felt that he was talking with a man who had strong belief in his country’s establishment and revolution. During the talks I repeatedly went to a corner in the negotiating room to say my prayers and later said [to the other parties to the talks] that I said my prayers to remember that there is one superior power in the world and other powers are not as mighty as Him.
 
I do not think that the American or other delegations could find any moment in the talks in which my colleagues or I have dropped our revolutionary principles and beliefs. In addition, the other side is convinced that Iran is after interaction, dialogue and logic to stick to its rights. Iran is not after war, conflict or tension, but we will stand up to bullying.
 
I hope the world will come to its senses next year [Iranian New Year that starts on March 21] to confront extremism and realize that acts of extremism cannot be treated selectively.
 
[…] I am certain that the West, including the US, has no option but arrive at a deal with Iran which is based on dialogue and mutual respect. They may make mistakes. Even in that case, I hope the Iranian people are not affected by their possible mistakes.
 
 

Report: Proposed Laws Could Restrict Women’s Reproductive and Divorce Rights

Two proposed laws could restrict women’s reproductive rights in Iran, according to a new report by Amnesty International. One law would outlaw sterilization and restrict access to information about contraception. The other would disadvantage women without children in the labor market and make it more difficult for women to get divorced. The following are excerpts from the report.  

Two proposed laws pose a major threat to the human rights and fundamental freedoms of women and girls in Iran. The Bills, part of the government’s drive to increase population growth, are being considered by the authorities at a time when women and girls are already suffering increased discrimination and violence.
 
The Bill to Increase Fertility Rates and Prevent Population Decline (Bill 446) threatens women’s right to sexual and reproductive health. If passed, the law would curb women’s use of modern contraceptives, outlaw voluntary sterilization, ban the provision of information on contraceptive methods, and dismantle state-funded family planning programmes, the very programmes that have been so widely praised for improving women’s access to contraceptive goods and information, including in remote and poverty-stricken areas of the country.
 
Respect for women’s autonomy to decide freely whether and when to have children is a human right and is fundamental to the realization of other human rights, including women’s enjoyment of physical, mental and social well-being. Yet in Iran, as elsewhere in the world, women and girls continue to be stripped of their physical and mental integrity and autonomy by laws that criminalize or place undue restrictions on their sexual and reproductive rights.
 
The roll-back of women’s sexual and reproductive rights in Iran comes in the wake of a striking shift in official population policies that have contributed, since their inauguration in 1989, to a steady decline in the country’s fertility rate – from 7.0 births per women in 1980 to 5.5 in 1988, 2.8 in 1996 and 1.85 in 2014. As a result, Iran’s population policies are coming full circle, once again embracing the restrictive contraception approach that was pursued in the first decade following Iran’s 1979 Revolution to promote population growth, with little or no regard for the life, health and dignity of women and girls.
 
The authorities are also seeking to accelerate population growth through the Comprehensive Population and Exaltation of Family Bill (Bill 315). This proposes various harmful and discriminatory measures aimed at encouraging early marriage, repeated childbearing and lower divorce rates, at the risk of trapping women in abusive relationships. The Bill allows discrimination against female job applicants, particularly if they are single or without children; makes divorce more difficult for men and women; and discourages police and judicial intervention in family disputes, including those involving violence against women.
 
The Bill also entrusts multiple state bodies with developing and promoting “an IslamicIranian life style” rooted in “traditional” family values and gender-role stereotypes that present women’s primary role as wives and mothers, based on the “guidelines” of the Supreme Leader. If passed, this law would entrench the discrimination suffered by women in Iran and further breach Iran’s international human rights obligations in this regard.
 
Iran has ratified several treaties that outlaw discrimination, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Once ratified, international treaties are accorded the force of law under Article 9 of Iran’s Civil Code, yet key human rights guarantees contained in the two Covenants and other treaties have not been incorporated into domestic law. In 2011, the UN Human Rights Committee observed: “the status of international human rights treaties in domestic law is not specified in the legal system, which hinders the full implementation of the rights contained in the Covenant.” Iran is not party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Iran is also one of the 179 member states that signed the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in 1994, committing to provide universal access to family planning and sexual and reproductive health services and guarantee reproductive rights. The ICPD Programme of Action recognized that efforts to control women’s sexuality affect both women’s health and their status in society.
 
The latest shift in official population policies began in July 2012 after Supreme Leader Ayatollah Syed Ali Khamenei denounced, in a televised speech, existing policies as an imitation of Western lifestyle. He exhorted the authorities to increase Iran’s population to 150 to 200 million (from around 78.5 million), including by cutting subsidies for contraceptive methods and dismantling the state’s Family and Population Planning Programme. His orders reflected growing concern in Iran’s leadership about the country’s declining rate of population growth and the perceived impact of this on the leadership’s aspiration to establish Iran as a dominant regional power with an overwhelmingly Shia population.
 
Click here for the full report
 
Tags: Women, Reports

White House Warns Senate on Iran Bill

On March 14, the White House warned senators against passing the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, introduced by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker (R-TN). The legislation “would potentially prevent any deal from succeeding by suggesting that Congress must vote to ‘approve’ any deal, and by removing existing sanctions waiver authorities that have already been granted to the President,” Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff Denis McDonough wrote in a letter to Corker. The full text is below.
 
Dear Chairman Corker:
 
Thank you for your March 12 letter to the President regarding Iran. I am responding on his behalf. The Administration has welcomed Congress’ important role in the United States’ policy towards Iran and takes seriously our continued engagement with Congress on this issue. Since October 2013, senior Administration officials from the White House, the Departments of State, Treasury, Energy, Defense and the Intelligence Community have conducted more than 200 meetings, hearings, classified briefings, and calls with Senate and House Members and their staffs on Iran, over half of which have been conducted since January 2015. Officials who have participated in these briefings range from the President, Vice President and cabinet officials, to the sanctions and nuclear experts who are members of our negotiating team.
 
We agree that Congress will have a role to play — and will have to take a vote — as a part of any comprehensive deal that the United States and our international partners reach with Iran. As we have repeatedly said, even if a deal is reached, only Congress can terminate the existing Iran statutory sanctions. We also agree that the existing statutory sanctions should remain in place, even as we suspend some of them using waivers included by Congress in the Iran sanctions statutes that it has enacted, until after Iran has complied with its commitments for an extended period of time, so that we retain the capability to re-impose sanctions if Iran does not comply with a deal, and so that Congress has the benefit of seeing whether Iran lived up to its commitments before taking actions.
 
However, the legislation you have introduced in the Senate goes well beyond ensuring that Congress has a role to play in any deal with Iran. Instead, the legislation would potentially prevent any deal from succeeding by suggesting that Congress must vote to “approve” any deal, and by removing existing sanctions waiver authorities that have already been granted to the President. We believe that the legislation would likely have a profoundly negative impact on the ongoing negotiations — emboldening Iranian hard-liners, inviting a counter-productive response from the Iranian majiles; differentiating the U.S. position from our allies in the negotiations; and once again calling into question our ability to negotiate this deal. This would therefore complicate the possibility of achieving a peaceful resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue if legislative action is taken before a deal is completed. Moreover, if congressional action is perceived as preventing us from reaching a deal, it will create divisions within the international community, putting at risk the very international cooperation that has been essential to our ability to pressure Iran. Put simply, it would potentially make it impossible to secure international cooperation for additional sanctions, while putting at risk the existing multilateral sanctions regime.
 
In addition to its impact on the negotiations, this legislation would also set a potentially damaging precedent for constraining future Presidents of either party from pursuing the conduct of essential diplomatic negotiations, making it much harder for future Presidents to negotiate similar political commitments. These factors have led the President to determine that he would veto this legislation, were it to pass the Congress.
 
It is also important to note that, despite the recent commentary that some of your colleagues addressed to the Iranian leadership, non-binding arrangements — like the deal we are negotiating with Iran and the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China, and the European Union — are an essential element of international diplomacy and do not require congressional approval. Presidents from both parties have relied on such arrangements to address sensitive national security matters, including nonproliferation. The United States has implemented numerous similar arms-control and nonproliferation arrangements. A few examples include:
 
·         The 2013 U.S.-Russia framework to remove chemical weapons from Syria, which was not legally binding and was not subject to congressional approval, outlined the steps for eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons and helped lay the groundwork for a successful multilateral effort to rid the world of these dangerous weapons.
·         A variety of multilateral initiatives, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (a multilateral effort involving over 100 countries aimed at stopping the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction), the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines (a set of principles that govern nuclear trade for peaceful purposes), the Missile Technology Control Regime (a voluntary association of countries that coordinate on export licensing efforts to prevent the proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction), the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (a multilateral arrangement involving over 100 countries to curb ballistic missile proliferation worldwide and to further delegitimize such proliferation), the Vienna Declaration on nuclear safety (a 2015 initiative to prevent nuclear accidents and mitigate their radiological consequences), and a series of instruments related to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (including the Helsinki Final Act and the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures).
·         A variety of bilateral cooperative arrangements — to take a few recent examples, a 2015 exchange of letters with the Government of Vietnam on cooperative threat reduction, a 2014 memorandum of understanding with Canada on nuclear forensics, a memorandum of cooperation between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and China from 2007, and a 2006 memorandum of understanding between the Department of Energy and China implementing the 123 Agreement.
·         Political commitments that were developed at major multilateral nonproliferation conferences also often result in the development of important, non-binding political commitments. For example, the Nuclear Security Summit hosted by the United States in 2010 resulted in the development of a Communique and Work Plan in which participants committed to ensure effective security of all nuclear materials under their control, to consolidate or reduce the use of weapons-usable materials in civilian applications, and to work cooperatively to advance nuclear security.
 
These types of arrangements are also common in other areas of diplomacy and foreign policy. To cite just a few examples: the Atlantic Charter, negotiated by President Roosevelt in 1941, was a joint declaration with Great Britain addressing objectives for World War II and the post-war international order. The Shanghai Communique, negotiated by President Nixon in 1972, was a joint declaration with China on principles governing bilateral relations and led to the normalization of relations. Other examples, which are too numerous to list in this letter, include bilateral commitments on issues ranging from foreign taxation to intelligence cooperation and defense measures. Additionally, the deal we are negotiating will allow us to retain significant leverage, as Iran would face severe consequences for any violation since we would have the capacity to swiftly re-impose punishing sanctions if Iran does not meet its commitments.
 
The United Nations Security Council will also have a role to play in any deal with Iran. Just as it is true that only Congress can terminate U.S. statutory sanctions on Iran, only the Security Council can terminate the Security Council’s sanctions on Iran. Because the principal negotiators of an arrangement with Iran are the five permanent members of the Security Council, we anticipate that the Security Council would pass a resolution to register its support for any deal and increase its international legitimacy. A resolution would also increase the international pressure on Iran to live up to the deal and would expand the risks if they failed to do so.
 
The Administration’s request to the Congress is simple: let us complete the negotiations before the Congress acts on legislation. The Administration is committed to sharing the details and technical documents related to a long-term comprehensive deal with Congress. If we successfully negotiate a framework by the end of this month, and a final deal by the end of June, we expect a robust debate in Congress. We will aggressively seek public and congressional support for a deal — if we reach one — because we believe a good deal is far better than the alternatives available to the United States. We understand that Congress will make its own determinations about how to respond, but we do not believe that the country’s interests are served by congressional attempts to weigh in prematurely on this sensitive and consequential ongoing international negotiation aimed at achieving a goal that we all share: using diplomacy to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.
 
I look forward to continuing our dialogue on this important issue.
 
Respectfully,

Denis McDonough
Assistant to the President and
Chief of Staff
 
Click here for a PDF version.
 

UN Angle on Nuclear Deal

One of the major questions emerging about a nuclear deal with Iran is what role the United Nations might play in endorsing or codifying it in a Security Council Resolution. U.S. officials have suggested that the deal would not exactly be legally binding, referencing the 2013 U.S.-Russian framework on removing chemical weapons from Syria. That plan was endorsed by the U.N. Security Council. The possibility of a similar arrangement has become a source of debate, as reflected in the following statements and letters.

Senator Bob Corker (R-TN)
 
Dear Mr. President:
 
In recent days, senior members of your administration—including Vice President Joe Biden—have stated that your administration is negotiating a nuclear agreement with Iran that you intend to “take effect without congressional approval.”  Yesterday, at a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State John Kerry alluded to this same concept.
 
These statements stand in stark contrast to the repeated assertions made by your administration—including Secretary Kerry—that any deal with Iran would have to “pass muster with Congress.”
 
As you are also aware, there is significant and growing bipartisan support for Congress to consider and, as appropriate, vote on any agreement that seeks to relieve the very statutory sanctions imposed by Congress that were instrumental in bringing Iran to the negotiating table. 
 
There are now reports that your administration is contemplating taking an agreement, or aspects of it, to the United Nations Security Council for a vote.  Enabling the United Nations to consider an agreement or portions of it, while simultaneously threatening to veto legislation that would enable Congress to do the same, is a direct affront to the American people and seeks to undermine Congress’s appropriate role.
Please advise us as to whether you are considering going to the United Nations Security Council without coming to Congress first.
 
Sincerely,
 
Bob Corker                                                              
Chairman                            
—March 12, 2015 in a letter
 
Vice President Joe Biden
 
Around the world, America’s influence depends on its ability to honor its commitments. Some of these are made in international agreements approved by Congress. However, as the authors of this letter must know, the vast majority of our international commitments take effect without Congressional approval. And that will be the case should the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany reach an understanding with Iran. There are numerous similar cases. The recent U.S.-Russia framework [which included a U.N. Security Council resolution] to remove chemical weapons from Syria is only one recent example. Arrangements such as these are often what provide the protections that U.S. troops around the world rely on every day. They allow for the basing of our forces in places like Afghanistan. They help us disrupt the proliferation by sea of weapons of mass destruction. They are essential tools to the conduct of our foreign policy, and they ensure the continuity that enables the United States to maintain our credibility and global leadership even as Presidents and Congresses come and go.
—March 9, 2015 in a statement
                        
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif

He emphasized that if the current negotiation with P5+1 [Britain, China, France, Germany Russia and the United States] result in a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, it will not be a bilateral agreement between Iran and the US, but rather one that will be concluded with the participation of five other countries, including all permanent members of the Security Council, and will also be endorsed by a Security Council resolution.
—March 9, 2015 in a press release from Iran’s U.N. mission
 
Secretary of State John Kerry
 
“We’ve been clear from the beginning: We’re not negotiating a, quote, legally binding plan.”
 
“We’re negotiating a plan that will have in it the capacity for enforcement. We don’t even have diplomatic relations with Iran right now.”
 
“The vast majority of international arrangements and agreements do not” require ratification by two-thirds of the Senate.
 
“And around the world today we have all kinds of executive agreements that we deal with… any number of noncontroversial, broadly supported foreign policy goals.”
—March 11, 2015 in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing
 
“We are negotiating under the auspices to some degree of the United Nations. So, just as Congress has to vote to lift sanctions -- so Congress does have a vote -- so does the United Nations have to lift some sanctions at some point in time.”
—March 15, 2015 in an interview with CBS News
 
National Security Council Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan
 
The United States will not be “converting U.S. political commitments under a deal with Iran into legally binding obligations through a UN Security Council resolution.”
 
“[W]e would fully expect the UNSC to ‘endorse’ any deal with Iran and encourage its full implementation so as to resolve international concerns about Iran’s nuclear program.”
—March 12, 2015 in a statement to BuzzFeed News
 
State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki
 
“[I]f we’re able to reach a joint comprehensive plan of action between the P5+1 and Iran, an endorsement vote would be held by the UN Security Council, and that should really come as no surprise given the permanent members of the Security Council are the ones negotiating the deal with Iran. 
 
“[G]iven that these sanctions were put in place through UN Security Council resolutions, they would need to – there would be action required to pull them back.  But of course the timing and how that would work is not yet determined. 
 
“We would expect to retain many of the UN Security Council provisions even under a deal with Iran.  Obviously, they’re not all related to nuclear sanctions.
 
“Any UN Security Council resolution would likely include elements that would be adopted under Chapter 7 as any decision to suspend or modify the sanctions that were previously imposed by the council under Chapter 7 would require new council action under the chapter. 
“Obviously, there would be action that would be taken by Congress at the appropriate time to roll back sanctions that are U.S. sanctions.
 
“[T]he Security Council would not impose new binding obligations on the United States that would limit our flexibility in any way to respond to future Iranian noncompliance.
—March 13, 2015 in a press briefing
 
“This [U.S.-Russia] framework was not legally binding and was not subject to congressional approval. It outlined steps for eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons and helped lay the groundwork for successful multilateral efforts to move forward.”
 
It “went to the U.N. to the Security Council vote.”
—March 10, 2015 in a press briefing
 

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