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US Sanctions Iranian Official for Censorship

            On May 23, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Iranian official Morteza Tamaddon for involvement in censorship. “The United States is keenly focused on promoting opportunities for the Iranian people to fully exercise their universal rights,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13628, which authorizes Treasury to designate those who engage in censorship or other activities that limit the freedom of expression or assembly of the Iranian people. The following is an excerpt from the press release.

 
            Morteza Tamaddon is currently the head of the Tehran Provincial Public Security Council. As former Governor-General of Tehran Province, he used his authority to penalize the exercise of and limit Iranians’ freedom of expression and assembly following the disputed 2009 elections in Iran. Tamaddon has been personally responsible for the harassment of Iranian political opposition leaders Mehdi Karroubi and Mir-Hossein Mousavi. In addition, he used his position to cut off mobile phone communications during political demonstrations and to silence and intimidate Iranian citizens in 2012 by publicly threatening political protestors.
 
           Tamaddon has been placed on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. All property and interests in property in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons in which the individual designated today has an interest are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with him. In addition, any foreign financial institution or person that facilitates significant transactions or provides material support to the designated entities or individuals may have their access to the U.S. financial system severed or their property and interests in property under U.S. jurisdiction blocked.
 
Identifying Information
 
Individual:      Morteza Tamaddon
DOB:              1959
POB:               Shahr Kord-Isfahan, Iran
 
 

How the US Decides on Whom to Impose Sanctions

            The following is an excerpt from the U.S. Government Accountability Office's letter to the chair of the House of Representative’s foreign affairs committee detailing the process to determine whether to impose sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act.

            U.S. sanctions on Iran include those specified in the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Iran Sanctions Act). Section 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act authorizes sanctions on persons engaging in various activities that involve weapons of mass destruction or other military capabilities and are related to Iran. You requested that we review how the Department of State (State) has implemented the sanctions provisions in Section 5(b). This report describes the process State and other relevant U.S. agencies use to determine whether to sanction persons under Section 5(b).
 
            To determine the process State and other relevant U.S. agencies use to determine whether to sanction persons under Section 5(b), we obtained documentation and interviewed State officials. We interviewed agency officials at the Department of Energy and the Department of Commerce (agencies identified by State as relevant to the sanctions determination process), and obtained corroborating documentation about their roles in making this determination. In addition, we compared the agencies’ criteria with the relevant requirements in Section 5(b). We obtained documentation from State about the number of sanctions imposed under Section 5(b). We interviewed State officials to obtain additional context relating to the sanctions process. We also reviewed the Federal Register for notifications of Section 5(b) sanctions for the time period August 10, 2012, to May 20, 2014.
 
           We conducted this performance audit from January 2014 to May 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
 
Background
 
           Section 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act requires the President to impose sanctions on any person who has engaged in a transaction that meets all of the following criteria:
• The activity must have occurred on or after August 10, 2012.
• A person must have exported or transferred, or permitted or otherwise facilitated the transshipment of, any goods, services, or technology or other items to any other person.
• The person must have known or should have known that the export, transfer, or transshipment of the goods, services, technology, or other items would likely result in another person exporting, transferring, transshipping, or otherwise providing the goods, services, or technology or other items to Iran.
• The person must have known or should have known that the export, transfer, transshipment, or other provision of the goods, services, technology, or other items to Iran would contribute materially to the ability of Iran to (I) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies or (II) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.
 
            Section 5(b) also requires the President to impose sanctions on persons engaged in certain joint ventures linked to Iran and involving the mining, production, or transportation of uranium. The President has delegated the decision to impose Section 5(b) sanctions to the Secretary of State.
 
State Leads the Process to Determine Whether to Sanction Persons under Section 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act
 
            State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation’s Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives leads an interagency process to evaluate whether a person’s activities are potentially sanctionable under Section 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act or under one or more of other multiple Iran-related sanctions authorities.8Figure 1 illustrates the process for identifying persons meeting sanctions requirements under Section 5(b). The process begins with four State-led interagency working groups. These groups are the Nuclear Interdiction Action Group, the SHIELD Chemical and Biological Weapons Group, the Technology Transfer Working Group, and the Missile Trade Analysis Group.
 
Figure 1: Process for Identifying Persons Meeting Sanctions Requirements under Section 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act
 
            *The four working groups include, for example, members from the Department of Energy, the Department of Commerce, and the intelligence community, among others. These working groups are responsible for identifying potential violations of multiple proliferation-related sanctions authorities, including Section 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act.
 
            Each working group is chaired by a State official and consists of representatives from several U.S. government departments and agencies such as the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Homeland Security, Treasury, and Energy; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and various intelligence community agencies. U.S. government officials who participate as subject matter experts on the working groups said that they advise State on transactions related to their respective areas of focus. For instance, the Nuclear Interdiction Action Group, the SHIELD Chemical and Biological Weapons Group, and the Technology Transfer Working Group are responsible for examining sources, including intelligence reports, that may be relevant to provisions of Section 5(b) related to nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and advanced conventional weapons, respectively. The Missile Trade Analysis Group is responsible for monitoring transfers of missile proliferation concern that are considered relevant to Section 5(b).
 
            Officials from the Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives stated that the working groups are responsible for regularly evaluating reports to identify transactions that are potentially sanctionable under one or more of the multiple Iran-related nonproliferation sanction authorities, including Section 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act. State officials said these reports come from a variety of sources, including the intelligence community. Working group representatives said they are in regular communication and meet biweekly or monthly to discuss these reports and their findings to determine whether transactions meet the criteria for sanctions. According to State and other working group officials, the interagency review process relies on criteria as defined in Section 5(b) when assessing a transaction for the potential application of those sanctions. Officials from the interagency working groups said that State directs them to apply these criteria when assessing transactions for the possible imposition of sanctions under Section 5(b). State is in the process of drafting a document to officially outline its Section 5(b) review procedures and the guidance it provides to the participating working group agencies. State officials also said the groups may stop reviewing transactions if they determine available information does not provide a basis for applying sanctions or is not legally sufficient.
 
            Once a working group determines that a transaction appears to demonstrate sanctionable activity under Section 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act, the working group chair reports the group’s findings and recommendations to State’s Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives. The office further examines the narrowed list of transactions forwarded by the working groups, informally consulting with working group chairs and legal advisors to clarify technical points and answer questions on transactions identified as potentially sanctionable. For those transactions that appear to demonstrate sanctionable activity, the Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives solicits interagency advice, and drafts and circulates a decision memorandum to relevant stakeholders for clearance. Once the stakeholders have fully cleared the memorandum, the Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives forwards it to the Secretary of State or his/her designee for a final sanctions determination. At any stage of this process, State officials may determine that there is no current basis for applying sanctions. The Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives prepares a report on imposed sanctions for publication in the Federal Register.
 
            According to State officials, the interagency working groups have not identified any cases that meet the legal requirements necessary to impose sanctions under Section 5(b) as of May 19, 2014. Our review of the Federal Register confirmed that State has not imposed any such sanctions as of May 20, 2014.
 
Click here for a PDF of the letter.
 

“Happy” Video Dancers Released by Police

            On May 21, six young Iranians detained for appearing in a video singing along to Pharrell William’s “Happy” were released by Tehran police. But the director of the video was not. In the YouTube clip below, three women — without hijab — and three men dance and lip synch to the American pop song.

 

            The clip was viewed more than 100,000 times before the six dancers were detained on May 20. Tehran Police Chief Hossein Sajedinia ordered the arrests of the youth for making an “obscene video clip that offended the public morals,” the Iranian Students’ News Agency reported. “They were identified within two hours, and after six hours they were all arrested,” Sajedinia told media. The six dancers were forced to express remorse on state television for making the YouTube clip. Part of the broadcast is subtitled below.

            Pharell Williams and his fans around the world voiced condemned the arrests on social media. “It is beyond sad that these kids were arrested for trying to spread happiness,” the singer tweeted on May 20. The hashtag #FreeHappyIranians went viral.
 
           
            A tweet on President Hassan Rouhani's semi-official account may have indicated disapproval of the detention. The following quote from 2013 was posted on May 21.  

 

             Rouhani campaigned for better access to information and less government oversight. After his June 2013 election, Rouhani warned, “In the age of digital revolution, one cannot live or govern in a quarantine.” Rouhani’s minister of culture and Islamic guidance, Ali Jannati, has repeatedly called for lifting bans on social media like Facebook and Twitter. But hardliners have sabotaged efforts by Rouhani’s administration to ease web censorship.
 
           The six dancers from the YouTube clip were released on May 21. But the director reportedly remains in custody. The detention came amid an outpouring of support for a Facebook page — “My Stealthy Freedom” — featuring hundreds of pictures of Iranian women without their hijabs. The page has generated more than 400,000 comments on Facebook.
 

Political Chasm Deepens Over Nuke Program

Nima Gerami

            Iran’s political elite has become increasingly divided over the course of nuclear negotiations with the world’s six major powers, which began last fall. The current debate appears to fall into three camps:
 
Nuclear supporters. This faction reportedly includes Revolutionary Guards officials, personnel from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), and members of the conservative Steadfast Front and its spiritual leader Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah-Yazdi. They criticize suspension and temporary constraints on nuclear capabilities. They also reject prospects that the outside world will dictate Iran’s security needs.
 
            “The most advanced weapons must be produced inside our country even if our enemies don’t like it. There is no reason that [our enemies] have the right to produce a special type of weapon, while other countries are deprived of it,” Mesbah-Yazdi said in 2005.
 
     The Revolutionary Guards, led by Major General Ali Jafari, and AEOI personnel have both a political and economic interest in maintaining Iran’s international isolation. “The government entered into negotiations with heroic flexibility in keeping with its principles to ease the pressure of sanctions. Either the country’s officials succeed or they get disillusioned with the West and focus on our domestic potential, Jafari said in February 2014. “In both cases we are the winners. But the Supreme Leader has set red lines that [the government] cannot cross and he will not let it do so.”
 
     But nuclear supporters span the political spectrum and also include noted reformists who maintain that Iran does not need to bow to Western demands over its nuclear program. They also oppose full domestic transparency or accountability on the nuclear issue.
 
Nuclear centrists. Led by President Hassan Rouhani and former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, nuclear centrists argue that Tehran should be flexible in its interaction with the West. They appeal to mantiq (or rationality). They also believe that isolationist policies will ultimately weaken Iran’s economic and political standing in the world.
 
      “It is good to have centrifuges running, provided people’s lives and livelihoods are also running,” Rouhani said in 2013.
 
     The centrists appear more willing to accept constraints on the nuclear program to end Iran’s international isolation, improve the economy, and preserve regime stability. They also appear more flexible on issues such as capping uranium enrichment levels and modifying the Arak heavy water reactor to reduce the amount of plutonium produced.
 
 
 
 
Nuclear detractors. Comprised mostly of former government officials and academics affiliated with the banned reformist Islamic Iran Participation Front, nuclear detractors question the practical need for a civil nuclear energy program, given the cost of sanctions and other national priorities.
 
           “Contrary to its claims, the regime is secretly preparing to produce weapons of mass destruction…This whole issue has turned into a point of weakness for the country, and the foreign powers are using it to exert pressure on us. In other words, instead of generating power and strength for Iran, the nuclear issue has only weakened it,” said Dr. Ahmad Shirzad, former parliamentarian and professor of physics at the Isfahan University of Technology in 2003.
 
      After his election in 2005, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad began to purge reformists from government. But the detractors continued to challenge the need for a nuclear program. Former Interior Minister Abdollah Nouri called for a national referendum on the issue in 2012. And Nouri’s former deputy, Mostafa Tajzadeh, a prominent reformist arrested after the disputed 2009 presidential election, continues to publish open letters from Evin Prison criticizing Tehran’s nuclear policies. 
 
      President Rouhani has taken several steps to sideline his domestic critics. He reshuffled the AEOI leadership and moved several officials who had opposed nuclear negotiations, according to an AEOI spokesman. In September 2013, Rouhani also transferred the nuclear file from the Supreme National Security Council to the foreign ministry. The switch made Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif the chief nuclear negotiator and improved the atmospherics of nuclear talks. Rouhani has also tried to persuade the Supreme Leader to curb the economic and political influence of the Revolutionary Guards, whose leaders have been consistent critics of Rouhani’s engagement with the West.
 
     The Supreme Leader has the final say on the nuclear issue and, so far, he has been both supportive and skeptical about negotiations— creating distance and deniability if diplomacy fails. He has set red lines for Rouhani’s negotiating team, warning that any comprehensive agreement should not forfeit Iran’s nuclear research and development activities, including its “right” to enrich uranium and its ballistic missile program.
 
      Rouhani has bet heavily on resolving Iran’s economic crisis through nuclear negotiations. But sanctions relief and Rouhani’s economic policies have produced only marginal improvements in reducing and stabilizing inflation. Meanwhile, the administration’s subsidy reforms have led to a surge in gasoline prices, stoking fears of unrest. And the clock is ticking on diplomacy. The same domestic critics of nuclear talks, particularly within the Steadfast Front, have sought to sow discord by stepping up criticism of Rouhani’s social and cultural policies. Public discontent could carry high political costs for Rouhani and potentially even convince the Supreme Leader to further distance himself from any nuclear deal.
 
            Despite being portrayed as a core national interest, Tehran’s nuclear policies are subject to little rigorous, well-informed public debate. Since 2004, the Supreme National Security Council, Iran’s highest formal decision-making body, has issued censorship rules limiting official comments on the nuclear program. Many aspects of the nuclear program remain shrouded in secrecy. Members of Parliament have complained that Iran’s nuclear facilities have been funded outside normal budgetary channels, with little to no parliamentary oversight on either sites or diplomacy.
 
            In his 2011 memoir, Rouhani describes differences among the political elite, particularly on engagement with the West, which frustrated nuclear talks with the European Union between 2003 and 2005. Internal divisions made decision-making difficult and prevented Iran from negotiating from a position of strength, according to Rouhani. His memoir provoked criticism from political opponents, including former nuclear negotiator and presidential candidate Saeed Jalili. Jalili’s campaign manager accused Rouhani of disclosing classified information in his controversial memoir.
 
            Elite divisions could again undermine Iran’s diplomacy if the Supreme Leader concludes that the political costs of alienating the regime’s power base—including the Revolutionary Guards, intelligence services, and the paramilitary Basij—outweigh the economic benefits of a comprehensive agreement with the West. Whether the Supreme Leader consents to a Rouhani-brokered deal will be heavily influenced by the views and attitudes of Iran’s political elite.
 

Click here for Nima Gerami’s monograph, “Leadership Divided: The Domestic Politics of Iran’s Nuclear Debate.”

 
Nima Gerami is a research fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University. The views expressed in this article do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the US government.
 
Photo credits:Ali Jafari via Leader.ir, Hassan Rouhani via President.ir, Abdollah Nouri by Meysam Khezri via Qom_IRAN and Flickr, Ali Khamenei via Khamenei.ir
 
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Iran and IAEA: On Past Military Dimensions

           On May 21, Iran and the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency reached an agreement on five additional measures to be implemented by August 25. Tehran committed to providing relevant information on past high explosive experiment and research and development. The new list of measures follows a list of seven that were agreed three months ago. The following includes the joint statement by Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency, followed by an analysis of the announcement and a fact sheet on the possible military dimensions of the nuclear program by Iran Fact File.

 
PRACTICAL MEASURES IN RELATION TO THE FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATION AS AGREED ON 20 MAY 2014
 
           The Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed on the following practical measures to be implemented, pursuant to the Framework for Cooperation, by Iran by 25 August 2014.
 
1. Exchanging information with the Agency with respect to the allegations related to the initiation of high explosives, including the conduct of large scale high explosives experimentation in Iran.
 
2. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and explanations related to studies made and/or papers published in Iran in relation to neutron transport and associated modelling and calculations and their alleged application to compressed materials.
 
3. Providing mutually agreed information and arranging a technical visit to a centrifuge research and development centre.
 
4. Providing mutually agreed information and managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities.
 
5. Concluding the safeguards approach for the IR-40 reactor.
 
Iran and the IAEA Announce Progress
 
Jon Wolfsthal
 
      Iran has been accused of pursuing a suite of activities during the 1980s to 2000s related to the development of nuclear weapons. In a potential sign of further progress in resolving the nuclear standoff with the west, Iran has just agreed to provide additional information to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN’s investigative agency for nuclear matters, on two of the most sensitive of these areas. While far from resolving the 20+ year stand off, any agreement to engage on these issues – issues Iran has steadfastly denied were part of an effort to develop nuclear weapons – may be a sign that Tehran’s leaders are willing to compromise in order to reach a boarder agreement on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.
           The IAEA has documented a dozen areas where it has received or discovered evidence of a possible military dimensions to Iran’s past nuclear efforts.These areas are detailed in an IranFactFile fact sheet and drawn from an IAEA Director General report to the IAEA Board of Governors from 2011. The areas Iran has agreed to discuss include two of the most sensitive – that of developing fast acting explosive detonators and computer modeling and studies useful in producing a nuclear implosion device. The detonator issue related to Iran possible efforts to produce the non-nuclear components needed to produce a workable nuclear weapon, and the modeling and studies are an area where Iran could have advanced a nuclear design to the point of being usable either without a full test or for delivery by a ballistic missile.  To be sure, other areas uncovered by the IAEA are important in understanding Iran’s nuclear past, but these are two of the most important issues if a negotiated agreement with Iran is to truly restrict Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon in the future. Some of the ongoing investigations by the IAEA relate purely to historical information that may not give Iran a quick start in pursuing some future nuclear efforts. The modeling and detonator issues, however, if fully investigated and resolved could delay any future effort by Iran to build a nuclear weapon.
            Observers would be wise to take today’s announcement from Vienna with a grain of salt. We have seen false starts between Iran and the IAEA before. However, given the ongoing historic talks between Iran and the United States, any additional signs of flexibility could be promising and may offer the hope of a real breakthrough.
 
Fact Sheet:
The Possible Military Dimensions of Iran’s Nuclear Program
 
            The United States and a number of other countries have provided evidence to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran secretly sought to develop the materials and technology to produce nuclear weapons over the past several decades. There is substantial evidence that Iran acquired expertise, information and technology from the nuclear black market run out of Pakistan by nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan. The IAEA is trying to determine whether this evidence is accurate and how far Iran has progressed in developing nuclear weapons. There is no evidence that Iran has or has ever built a nuclear weapon or that it has enough nuclear material to do so now. The IAEA’s investigation is based on information provided by other countries and its own work. This information suggests that Iran has previously pursued development of a nuclear implosion device, a design similar to that used in the arsenals of most nuclear weapon states. (See figure one below.)
            An implosion device – in simplistic terms – involves compressing a sphere of uranium or plutonium into a smaller but symmetrical sphere through the use of shaped explosive lenses. The concept is similar to trying to compress a soccer ball into a baseball with dynamite.
            Each step in designing, testing, producing and delivering this kind of device requires highly specialized materials, equipment and expertise. Over the past decade, the IAEA has investigated the extent to which Tehran has pursued, developed and perfected many of the steps associated with the production of such a device.
 
Figure 1. Implosion Weapon Design Concept
Source: 2011 Nuclear Weapons Handbook, DOD
 
            The bulk of what the IAEA has learned is referred to by the Agency as the “possible military dimension” of Iran’s nuclear program. A detailed summary of the issues being assessed by the IAEA was reported by IAEA Director General Yukia Amano to the IAEA Board of Governors in November 2011[1] and is summarized below.
 
The Joint Plan of Action and the IAEA
            The political negotiations taking place between Iran on the one hand and the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, Germany (known as the P-5+1) and the European Union on the other seek to negotiate a comprehensive agreement that will limit Iran’s nuclear program while enabling it to enjoy the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology. To do so, Iran must enable full and effective safeguards as implemented by the IAEA. To date, the Agency has reported that Iran is in full compliance with its obligations for special monitoring under the terms of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA).
            Iran has, however, been found in non-compliance with its safeguard agreement obligations[2] required under the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. For over a decade, the IAEA has been seeking to clarify a number of outstanding issues related to Iran’s past nuclear activities, catalogued below. It remains unclear whether a comprehensive settlement of the remaining issues with Iran can be achieved without Iran also satisfying all of the IAEA’s outstanding concerns about its nuclear past. At the very least, states will continue to have doubts about Iran’s peaceful intentions as long as the IAEA is not satisfied that its investigations are complete.
            The JPOA agreed to by Iran and the P-5+1 on November 24, 2013 states that a “Joint Commission of E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of the near-term measures [under the JPOA] and address issues that may arise, with the IAEA responsible for verification of nuclear-related measures. The Joint Commission will work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern.” However, the State Department has recently clarified that the issue of past weapon-related activities is a matter for the IAEA to investigate and is not a matter for the special commission[3].
            IAEA and Iranian officials have continued to meet since the JPOA was completed and implemented. As yet, these discussions have not resolve the issues listed below. At some point the IAEA will likely be asked to judge whether its concerns have been addressed, and how any remaining unresolved issues might affect the IAEA’s ability to carry out its inspection mandate to verify that Iran’s nuclear activities are of an exclusively peaceful nature.
 
Possible Military Dimensions of Iran’s Nuclear Program
            Much of the evidence that Iran pursued a secret nuclear weapons development program comes from the United States and other IAEA member states. IAEA reports indicate that at least ten member states have provided evidence to the IAEA related to Iran’s past nuclear activities. In addition, IAEA documents suggest that some of the evidence about Iran’s past activities come from interviews with Pakistani sources, including possibly A.Q. Khan. None of the publicly available evidence in and of itself proves that Iran had a nuclear weapon program. It is also not clear that Iran has continued any of these activities, and it is not publicly known how far this alleged work progressed before it was reportedly stopped in 2003[4].
 
Procurement Activities
            The IAEA has evidence that from the 1980s until the early 2000s, Iran acquired nuclear expertise and related materials outside of normal procurement channels, including through a black market network run by A. Q. Khan. Iranian officials claim they were forced to seek nuclear items on the black market because it was blocked from pursuing “legitimate” nuclear efforts by the United States and other western powers. However, the fact that much of the procurement efforts were run by military organizations, including the Ministry of Defense, has suggests that the nuclear efforts being pursued by Iran were military in nature. Moreover, the links between procurement and other military application programs, including ballistic missile programs, undermines but does not disprove Iran’s argument that its program is entirely peaceful. The IAEA continues to try to understand the full nature of Iran’s procurement activities.
 
Nuclear Material Acquisition Activities
            The IAEA has evidence that during the 1990s and early 2000s, Iran pursued the development of clandestine nuclear facilities for the processing and enrichment of uranium. The Natanz and Fordow uranium enrichment sites were only declared after they were uncovered by western intelligence or outside sources. Iran also had an active program to acquire uranium outside of IAEA safeguards, for possible use in these previously clandestine facilities. The IAEA has evidence that Iran planned to secretly acquire and enrich uranium at non-declared nuclear facilities and this evidence remains under investigation by the IAEA.
 
Detonator Development
            The IAEA has evidence that Iran pursued studies and received documentation for the development of fast-functioning devices known as “exploding bridgewire detonators.” These devices have limited uses outside of detonating explosive charges associated with nuclear weapons. Iran acknowledges that it has developed EBW for civilian and conventional military applications, but has not explained to the IAEA what these applications are. As such, the IAEA continues to consider this effort a “matter of concern.” Moreover, as noted below, the IAEA has information that Iran has considered the reliability of EBW in the possible testing of nuclear weapons.
 
Nuclear Components for an Explosive Device
            Key to the IAEA’s investigation is a document reportedly provided to Iran by the Pakistani black marketers related to the conversion of uranium into metallic form and the shaping of uranium metal into hemispheres. It also appears likely that Iran acquired designs for nuclear weapons, as did other customers of the Pakistani network, including Libya. The IAEA also has evidence that Iran did work preparing to produce components for such a device. This matter remains of high interest to the IAEA.
 
Initiation of High Explosives
            IAEA member states have provided information that Iran had access to information about multipoint initiation systems. Such systems are necessary for the operation of an implosion device, such as the one Iran may have pursued.   Iran has acknowledged access to the information, but claims the document was “not understandable” to their experts and has not conducted activities referred to in the information. This stance is contradicted by information provide to the IAEA by member states and appears to be related to a possible experiment carried out by Iran in 2003[5].
 
Hydrodynamic Experiments
            Hydrodynamic experiments are full-scale model tests of nuclear implosion devices that substitute non-fissile materials to uranium or plutonium. Member states have provided information to the IAEA indicating Iran has manufactured “simulated nuclear explosive components using high density materials” – presumably to simulate uranium metal. This, together with Iran’s activities related to the use of high-speed diagnostic equipment, including flash x-ray technology, raise concerns about nuclear weapons-related work.
            This area of investigation has spawned one of the most contentious[6] areas of the IAEA’s work – that related to the facility at Parchin. The IAEA has received information from member states that Iran acquired information about, and may have built, a large explosives containment vessel in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments. There is some evidence that Iran built and installed such a device at Parchin. Two visits to Parchin by the IAEA in 2005 failed to identify this site, but not all facilities were visited by the Agency at the time. Iran has since made large scale changes to the site, a move that could be related to concealment efforts of its past activities.
            Aside from site access, Iran has yet to fully explain or effectively refute the evidence that has been made available to the IAEA on this matter and it remains of concern to the IAEA. The Agency states that it has had direct access to the source of some of this expertise for Iran, believed to be a former Soviet weapons-scientist[7].
 
Neutron Initiation
            Iran may, according to evidence provided to the IAEA, have undertaken work to build neutron initiators for use in nuclear weapons. In an implosion device, a small source of additional neutrons can be inserted inside the sphere to be compressed, releasing a boost of neutrons at the exact moment of implosion.   This can help ensure that fission takes place and also increase the yield of a nuclear device.
 
Modeling and Calculations
            The design of nuclear weapons can be achieved by using advanced calculations and computer-based modeling. Iran has reportedly sought access to calculation and nuclear modeling training. The IAEA has evidence that representatives from Iran “met with officials from an institute in a nuclear-weapon state to request training courses in the fields of neutron cross section calculations using computer codes.” Such models can be used in civil as well military nuclear applications. Iran has denied these allegations in writing to the IAEA.
 
Nuclear Test Planning
            Iran may have made plans to test a nuclear device. There is evidence that Iran may have “conducted a number of practical tests to see whether its EBW firing equipment could function” over long distances between a firing point and a deep test shaft – commonly used in underground nuclear tests. The IAEA has also received documents from member states in Farsi discussing possible logistics associated with such a test.
 
Work to Modify a Missile Payload Area
            The IAEA has information that Iran conducted engineering studies on how to integrate a “new spherical payload into the existing payload chamber which would be mounted in the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab-3 missile.” The Shahab-3 missile is an Iranian version of the North Korean No-Dong system with a reported range of almost 1,300 kilometers or 800 miles. The work allegedly includes the production of component prototypes as well as modeling work on at least 14 different progressive design iterations. Iran has told the IAEA it believes the information it has received are forgeries, but the IAEA has stated the “quantity of the documentation, and the scope and contents of the work covered in the documentation, are sufficiently comprehensive and complex that in the Agency’s view, it is not likely to have been the result of forgery or fabrication.”
 
Fusing, Arming and Firing
            The alleged studies and documents noted above also indicate that Iran pursued design work on developing a prototype firing system to enable both air and ground detonation of the payload. Iran dismissed the information as an “animation game.” The Agency has worked with member state experts to determine that the most likely application of the designed air burst system would be for a nuclear system and that the alternative possible use (for chemical weapons-use) could be ruled out.
            Taken together, this information and analysis does not prove that Iran had a nuclear weapon program. However, US and other foreign officials are convinced of Iran’s past illegal activities. Regardless, if a final comprehensive settlement is to be reached, Iran and the IAEA will have to find a politically acceptable way to resolve the outstanding matters under investigation.
 
Click here for resources from Iran Fact File.

 

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[1] IAEA Report, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” November 8, 2011 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-65.pdf
[2] September 24, 2005 IAEA Board of Governors Resolution GOV/2005/77 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf
[3] February 17, 2014 Background Briefing, Senior Administration Official, Vienna, Austriahttp://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/02/20140218293187.html#axzz2tmkRefbb
[4] “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities”, National Intelligence Estimate, National Intelligence Council, November 2007, http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/20071203_release.pdf
[5] Joby Warrick, “Russian scientist Vyacheslav Danilenko’s aid to Iran offers peek at nuclear program” The Washington Post November 13, 2011 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-scientist-vyacheslav-danilenkos-aid-to-iran-offers-peek-at-nuclear-program/2011/11/12/gIQAeuiCJN_story.html
[6] http://www.sipri.org/media/expert-comments/the-iaea-and-parchin-do-the-claims-add-up
[7] Ibid
 
 

 

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