Iran Primer's Blog

Kerry’s Past Comments on Iran

December 21, 2012 | 4:48pm

On December 21, President Barack Obama nominated Senator John Kerry to be the Secretary of State during his second term. The following are comments by Senator Kerry on Iran since 2004.

“If I can just say to you and to the people of Israel: I hope there is no doubt about President Obama's seriousness and commitment that Iran should not have and cannot have a nuclear weapon. The President has made it clear that he is not talking about containment he is talking about prevention." May 1, 2012 to Israeli President Shimon Peres

“I join this debate because the nuclear issue with Iran is deadly serious business. It should invite sobriety and thoughtfulness, not sloganeering and sound bites. The stakes are far too high for it to become just another applause line on the stump. Idle talk of war only helps Iran by spooking the tight oil market and increasing the price of the Iranian crude that pays for its nuclear program.” March 7, 2012 in an op-ed for The Washington Post

“Iran is also divided internally and isolated diplomatically like never before. Iran’s most important ally, Syria, is facing regime collapse, which a former director of Israel’s Mossad recently said could be a bigger strategic setback for Iran than a military strike against it.” March 6, 2012 in a Senate floor statement

“In the Middle East, China's interests are threatened as much as ours are by Iran's nuclear ambitions. Iran is China's third largest supplier of oil, and a war in the Persian Gulf would wreak havoc on China's economy. The United States and China need to pool our economic and political leverage to convince Iran to abandon its illicit nuclear activities and end its defiance of the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency.” Feb. 22, 2012 in an op-ed for the San Francisco Chronicle

“This accord [the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] imposes no restriction on our ability to defend ourselves. In fact, the administration has been clear that we will not be limited in any way in plans to continue to build missile defenses to protect America from Iran and North Korea.” May 25, 2010 in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on strategic arms control

“The Bush administration [argument of] no enrichment was ridiculous . . . because it seemed so unreasonable to people… It was bombastic diplomacy. It was wasted energy. It sort of hardened the lines, if you will… They [Iranians] have a right to peaceful nuclear power and to enrichment in that purpose.” Early June 2009 in an interview with the Financial Times

"I don't have time [to visit Iran] and we were not able to make arrangements in the short time span we had but I would be willing to go…at the appropriate time, at some point.” Dec. 15, 2006 to reporters in Cairo, Egypt

“I think the United States should have offered the opportunity to provide the nuclear fuel, test them [the Iranians], see whether or not they were actually looking for it for peaceful purposes. If they weren't willing to work a deal, then we could have put sanctions together. The president did nothing.” Sept. 30, 2004 in a foreign policy debate with former President George W. Bush

Tags: China, Iran, North Korea, Nuclear, Sanctions, U.S. Policy

More U.S. Sanctions for Proliferation

December 21, 2012 | 1:41pm

On December 21, the U.S. Treasury froze the assets of four Iranian companies and one executive for links to Tehran’s missile and nuclear programs. SAD Import Export Company was also sanctioned for supplying weapons to Syria’s government, which is cracking down on its civilian population. The United States will “hold Iran accountable for its failure to meet its international non-proliferation obligations and to expose its support of the Assad regime’s violence,” said Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. U.S. companies were also barred from doing business with these Iranian entities. The following are excerpts from the U.S. Treasury’s announcement.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated four companies and one individual pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters. The SAD Import Export Company, Chemical Industries and Development of Materials Group, and Marine Industries Organization were designated for their ties to Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) or Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Mustafa Esbati, the director of Marine Industries Organization, was also designated today. In addition, Doostan International Company was designated for its support to Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) which was identified as a WMD proliferator by the President in the Annex to E.O. 13382. The United Nations Sanctions Committee also designated the SAD Import Export Company yesterday under the U.N. asset freeze authority of Security Council Resolution 1737 dealing with Iran.

DIO has been linked by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) to Iran’s centrifuge production and was previously designated in March 2007 pursuant to E.O. 13382 for its involvement in the Iranian nuclear program. DIO is also identified in the Annex to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737. In addition to its involvement in Iran’s WMD program, DIO has been used by the Iranian government to assist the Asad regime’s violent crackdown in Syria. SAD Import Export Company shipped weapons to the Syrian Armed Forces, on behalf of DIO. These shipments were designed to assist the Syrian government’s production of mortars and missiles, which have been used against the civilian population of Syria…

These designations generally prohibit transactions between the named entities and any U.S. person, and freeze any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction. The designations of these entities and individual under E.O. 13382 also carry consequences under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA). As of today’s actions, foreign financial institutions that facilitate significant transactions or provide significant financial services for the sanctioned entities and individual can face the loss of their access to the U.S. financial system.

SAD Import Export Company

SAD Import Export Company was designated pursuant E.O. 13382 for acting on behalf of DIO.

In addition to shipping arms to the Syrian armed forces in 2011, SAD Import Export sent aluminum and other goods, on behalf of DIO, to Syria’s Mechanical Construction Factory, a front company for the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC). The goods were part of a larger contract between DIO and other Syria’s Industrial Establishment for Defense to provide fuel, fuses, charges, aluminum, and other goods necessary for the production of full mortar projectiles to Syria. In 2010, SAD Import Export Company shipped materials and equipment to Syria’s Mechanical Construction Factory for the ultimate benefit of the SSRC, on behalf of DIO. These goods were likely used in the manufacture of solid propellant for rockets and missiles.

The SSRC was listed in the Annex to E.O. 13382 in June 2005 for its ties to Syria’s WMD proliferation activities. The SSRC is the Syrian government agency responsible for developing and producing non-conventional weapons and the missiles to deliver them. The SSRC also has a public civilian research function; however, its activities focus on the development of biological weapons, chemical weapons, and missiles.

Marine Industries Organization

Marine Industries Organization was designated pursuant to E.O. 13882 because it is owned or controlled by Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).

MODAFL was designated under E.O. 13382 on October 25, 2007 for its WMD proliferation-related activities. Marine Industries Organization is responsible for marine military acquisitions for Iran’s Navy, as well as MODAFL and Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Mustafa Esbati

Mustafa Esbati was designated pursuant to E.O. 13882 because he acts on behalf of Marine Industries Organization, by virtue of his position as the Director of Marine Industries Organization.

Chemical Industries and Development of Materials Group

Iran’s Chemical Industries and Development of Materials Group (CIDMG) was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 because it is owned or controlled by DIO. CIDMG is one of the major industries overseen by DIO. CIDMG produces military and civil chemical products and materials for the production of powders, propellant charges, and mine explosive materials.

Doostan International Company

Doostan International Company was designated pursuant to E.O. 13882 for providing services to Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). AIO is the Iranian organization that oversees all of Iran’s missile industries, including those involved in Iran’s ballistic missile program, and was listed in the Annex to E.O. 13382.

Tags: Iran, Military, Sanctions, Syria, Treasury, U.S. Policy, U.S. Policy

Panetta: New U.S. Strategy to Counter Iran

December 21, 2012 | 1:38pm

On December 18, Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta outlined a new U.S. defense strategy that will counter “the continuing threat from Iran.” If Tehran attempts to close the Straits of Hormuz, “we must be capable of being able to respond decisively,” he said. Panetta also warned that the United States needs to monitor Iran’s development of surveillance drones. The following are excerpts from his remarks at the National Press Club, followed by a link to the full transcript.

North Korea, Iran continue to pose a proliferation threat and are engaged in activities that are destabilizing Northeast Asia and the Middle East. The conflict in Syria is bringing a violent end to a regime that harbors a large stockpile of chemical and biological weapons, and extremists seek to destabilize a nuclear-armed Pakistan. Increasing military spending by rising powers in the Asia Pacific region and turmoil across the Middle East and North Africa are altering the strategic landscape.

At the same time, the nature of military conflict is changing because of the new technologies, like cyber and the proliferation of missiles and WMD. We are seeing potential adversaries -- state and non-state actors alike -- acquire more advanced hybrid and high-end capabilities designed to frustrate the conventional advantages of our armed forces. This means that the military services must remain vigilant, they must remain strong, they must remain prepared to operate in a way that differs significantly from the past…

The second element of our defense strategy is to maintain our force projection where we need it, in the Middle East and in the Asia Pacific region. The Asia Pacific region is, obviously, an area of growing importance to our economy and our security. And the Middle East, obviously, represents continuing threats to our security, as well. Even after the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, we have maintained a substantial military presence in the Middle East in order to deter aggression, respond to crisis, ensure regional stability in the face of historic unrest and the continuing threat from Iran…

The fourth element of the new defense strategy is that we must always remain capable of being able to confront and defeat aggression from more than one adversary at a time anywhere, anytime. That means if we're engaged in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula and Iran attempts to close the Straits of Hormuz, we must be capable of being able to respond decisively to both locations.

With the strategy we've developed, we believe we have that capability. We're maintaining our ability to simultaneously operate in multiple theaters by investing in critical power projection capabilities, our aircraft carrier fleet, our big-deck amphibious fleet, a new afloat forward staging base, and long-range strike capabilities…

Having said that, we do have to keep track of other countries that decide to get into the UAV business. And they are. Iran, other countries in the Middle East are also beginning to develop that capability. We have got to be able -- as they do -- to be able to track where those UAVs are and take steps to ensure that -- particularly when it comes to surveillance -- that we can do everything possible to try to make sure that they are not capable of surveilling what -- you know, what they're after. That requires a lot of technology and development, but it is an area that we are focused on in order to protect ourselves in the future…

The real question is, how do we continue to bring pressure on Iran not to take that step? The international community has come together. It's come together in a very effective effort to bring sanctions, to bring diplomatic pressure, economic pressure on Iran, to penalize it for its efforts to develop a nuclear capability.

And the end result of that is to try to push them to the negotiating table, to try to see if we can resolve these issues diplomatically. Even the prime minister of Israel has said that when it comes to dealing with Iran, that war ought to be the last option, not the first option, and that we ought to try to exhaust every effort at trying to determine whether or not diplomatically and through negotiations we can resolve this issue.

We are now in that effort. And hopefully, that will be the way we resolve it. But, please, make no mistake: If we determine that they are -- have made the decision to proceed with developing a nuclear weapon, the United States considers that to be a red line.

Click here for the full transcript.

Tags: Drones, Iran, Military, North Korea, Nuclear, Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, U.S. Policy, U.S. Policy

Iran Boosts North Korean Missile Program

December 21, 2012 | 1:33pm

Iran may have helped North Korea launch a multistage rocket and put a satellite into orbit on December 12, according to a new report by John S. Park. “What started as a transactional relationship, where Iran provided much-needed cash to North Korea in return for missile parts and technology, has evolved into an increasingly effective partnership.” The report also warns that the United States needs to identify and track Iranian and North Korean state trading companies to disrupt the supply chains of North Korea’s missile program. The following are excerpts, with link to the full text from The National Bureau of Asian Research at the end.

Client Becomes Partner

Although sporadic cooperation between North Korea and Iran on missile development has been well documented, analysts viewed this interaction largely through the lens of serial commercial transactions. The conventional wisdom was that cash-starved North Korea found a lucrative client in Iran. As a result, analysts tended to view the two pariahs’ long-range missile development programs as largely independent endeavors. However, North Korea’s sudden success on December 12 was not the result of good fortune but rather was the fruition of its increasing institutional cooperation with Iran. In September 2012, North Korea and Iran signed a scientific and technological cooperation agreement. Largely dismissed as a propaganda ploy, it provided an organizational framework to set up joint laboratories and exchange programs for scientific teams, as well as to transfer technology in the fields of information technology, engineering, biotechnology, renewable energy, and the environment…

This bilateral partnership—and mutual reliance—is unique in the international community, especially given that North Korea and Iran lack any common ideology, religion, geographic space, or ethnicity. An overlooked reality is that each has helped the other cope during national emergencies. For Iran, North Korea was a vital supplier of conventional arms during the Iran-Iraq War. For North Korea, Iran has been a long-standing linchpin in Pyongyang’s vitally important procurement activities in the Middle East and Eastern Europe—a role that China is now increasingly playing as a result of more foreign companies setting up production facilities targeting the growing Chinese market.

Conclusion

What is to be done? The U.S. response to the fused North Korean and Iranian missile programs will require innovation and adaptation to better understand this new reality. The following initiatives could help bridge gaps resulting from obsolete frameworks of analysis:

The United States needs to identify and track the primary North Korean and Iranian state trading companies engaged in operationalizing the September 2012 agreement. Many analysts have traditionally examined supply chains, logistics, and procurement as separate activities. An integrated approach to analyzing the full life cycle of a North Korean–Iranian transaction is long overdue—and now possible given access to key defectors in Seoul who have worked in North Korean state trading companies.
Building on improved understanding of how the fused missile development programs function, policymakers can structure new incentives to disrupt critical sections in the life cycle. Rather than rely solely on a sanctions-based policy of “strategic patience,” the United States should consider innovative programs to incentivize private Chinese companies in third-party countries that serve as vital middlemen in key transactions.

Click here for the full text.

Read John S. Park’s chapter on Iran and China in “The Iran Primer”

John S. Park is a Junior Faculty Fellow with the Stanton Nuclear Security Fellowship program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Tags: Iran, Missile, North Korea, Nuclear, Reports, Satellite

The U.S.-Iran Covert War

December 20, 2012 | 12:02pm

Ari Ratner

What is the U.S.-Iran covert war? What is the United States doing? What is Iran doing? And why?

During both the Bush and Obama administrations, Iran and the United States have engaged in a shadow war that relies more on technology and human intelligence than conventional weaponry. Their covert campaigns include cyber attacks, espionage, and high-tech sabotage. Their common goal is to signal their resolve, impact each other’s capabilities, and demonstrate the credibility of their deterrence – in turn swaying each other’s decision-making.

The United States and Israel have reportedly worked together on a series of cyber attacks to slow or disrupt Iran’s nuclear program since at least 2008. Although their origins are officially unknown, the Stuxnet worm reportedly attacked centrifuge production in late 2009 or early 2010, while the Flame virus collected information on Iranian officials in 2012.

Iran is also widely suspected of engaging in cyber warfare. It may be linked to cyber attacks on energy companies in Saudi Arabia and Qatar in summer 2012. Iran’s goal was to intimidate these important American allies by demonstrating its ability to cripple global energy supplies in the event of an airstrike on its nuclear facilities.

How is each using drone technology? And what is the impact?

The United States and Iran have used drones to gather intelligence and signal their offensive, defensive, and deterrent capabilities against each other.

Drone technology has been an increasingly integral part of the United States intelligence and military arsenal over the past two decades. U.S. drones are far more advanced; they have been reportedly deployed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan and Yemen.

U.S. drone operations over Iran began after the start of the Afghanistan war; they reportedly increased after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Specifics are classified but drones almost certainly monitored anti-American insurgent activity organized on Iranian territory. Over the last few years, drones may have spied on a wider array of Tehran’s assets, including its nuclear program.

Iran’s drone technology has also improved in recent years, possibly with help from Russia and China. Tehran unveiled the Karrar —its first home-made long-range drone—in August 2010. But experts have been skeptical about its capabilities and Iran’s ability to guide the drone over long distances. In September 2012, the Revolutionary Guards unveiled the Shahed 129, an attack and surveillance drone with a purported range of up to 1,200 miles.

Tehran reportedly captured a U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel drone in late 2011 and subsequently claimed to have decoded its data and copied its technology. In late 2012, Iran claimed that it captured a U.S. ScanEagle drone, which the United States denied. But in December 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta warned that the United States needs to keep track of the surveillance capability of Iran’s drones.

Like many military platforms, drones can accomplish a variety of objectives. In October 2012, Israel shot down an Iranian drone reportedly near Dimona, where Israel’s nuclear weapons program is believed to be based. The drone was reportedly launched by the Lebanese militia Hezbollah, which is supplied by Iran. The use of this drone may have been intended to gather intelligence and test Israeli defensive capabilities, but also to signal the potential for an Iranian strike on Dimona in retaliation for a future U.S. or Israeli attack on Iran.

What are the dangers of a small incident sparking a wider military conflict?

Military activities always entail the risk of an unintentional escalation. Iranian fighter jets reportedly fired on a U.S. drone over the Persian Gulf on November 1, but they failed to hit it. While no escalation developed in this case, the increasing build-up of opposing forces in the Gulf has raised the risk of an entanglement. Escalation would be even more likely to occur if one side attacks a military objective in international waters.

How is the covert war between the United States and Iran different from the Cold War? What are the similarities?

Proportion is important. And the magnitude of American-Iranian tensions, while still extremely dangerous, is significantly smaller than the Cold War. Iran is a powerful regional player, but it is not a superpower with the global ambitions of the former Soviet Union. Iran’s gross domestic product pales in comparison to some individual U.S. states. It has limited ability to project beyond its borders, other than through proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas.

Iran’s theocratic system of government also does not hold significant appeal internationally, unlike the Soviet Union, which attracted ideological adherents worldwide. Tehran has minimal influence in international institutions, and it has been isolated by the majority of the international community for its nuclear activities. Iran is not even popular in most of the Middle East, according to public opinion polls.

This conflict could be easier to solve than the Cold War due to its relatively narrow scope. Washington has repeatedly offered Tehran an opportunity to rejoin the community of responsible nations by living up to its international obligations, and that offer still stands. If Iran were to fulfill its obligations, much of the tension would subside.

But the current struggle between Iran and the United States does mirror the Cold War in some respects. Washington and Tehran are also engaged in a strategic struggle with each side seeking to promote starkly different visions of the region’s future. Iran has threatened or tried to undermine U.S. allies, including Israel and key Gulf states, by supporting opposition or proxies.

What messages is Iran sending to the Gulf States, the United States and Israel through these covert actions?

Iran’s audience is the United States, Israel and the Gulf states as well as its own population. Tehran wants to impose costs on the United States and Israel for their covert programs and to block or dissuade their further moves against the Islamic Republic. Iran’s actions also demonstrate its ability to fight back unconventionally tit-for-tat.

Iran is also signaling to key players in the Gulf, notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, that their help in any attack on Iran could carry hidden or unanticipated costs. Iran’s actions are also probably driven by domestic politics. The government would have risked a loss of credibility if it had not responded to cyber attacks and assassinations of scientists.

How important is covert war to the effort of either nation? Could it be decisive in any way?

Covert campaigns are integral to both U.S. and Iranian efforts. But they almost certainly cannot achieve the long-term objectives of either country. U.S. covert action is unlikely to compel Iran to fulfill its international obligations on its nuclear program. Iranian covert action is also unlikely to undermine U.S. resolve either.

Ari Ratner is a former Obama administration appointee at the State Department where he served as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment. He is currently a Fellow at the Truman National Security Project. His Twitter handle is @amratner

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Tags: Covert, Cyber, Drones, Iran, Israel, Nuclear, Qatar, Sanctions, Saudi Arabia, U.S., UAE

The Islamists Are Coming

The Islamists Are Coming, edited by Robin Wright, surveys the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region more than any other political bloc. Yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.

United States Institute of Peace

The Iran Primer