Iran Primer's Blog
On December 21, President Barack Obama nominated Senator John Kerry to be the Secretary of State during his second term. The following are comments by Senator Kerry on Iran since 2004.
“I think the United States should have offered the opportunity to provide the nuclear fuel, test them [the Iranians], see whether or not they were actually looking for it for peaceful purposes. If they weren't willing to work a deal, then we could have put sanctions together. The president did nothing.” Sept. 30, 2004 in a foreign policy debate with former President George W. Bush
On December 21, the U.S. Treasury froze the assets of four Iranian companies and one executive for links to Tehran’s missile and nuclear programs. SAD Import Export Company was also sanctioned for supplying weapons to Syria’s government, which is cracking down on its civilian population. The United States will “hold Iran accountable for its failure to meet its international non-proliferation obligations and to expose its support of the Assad regime’s violence,” said Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. U.S. companies were also barred from doing business with these Iranian entities. The following are excerpts from the U.S. Treasury’s announcement.
Doostan International Company was designated pursuant to E.O. 13882 for providing services to Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). AIO is the Iranian organization that oversees all of Iran’s missile industries, including those involved in Iran’s ballistic missile program, and was listed in the Annex to E.O. 13382.
On December 18, Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta outlined a new U.S. defense strategy that will counter “the continuing threat from Iran.” If Tehran attempts to close the Straits of Hormuz, “we must be capable of being able to respond decisively,” he said. Panetta also warned that the United States needs to monitor Iran’s development of surveillance drones. The following are excerpts from his remarks at the National Press Club, followed by a link to the full transcript.
Click here for the full transcript.
Iran may have helped North Korea launch a multistage rocket and put a satellite into orbit on December 12, according to a new report by John S. Park. “What started as a transactional relationship, where Iran provided much-needed cash to North Korea in return for missile parts and technology, has evolved into an increasingly effective partnership.” The report also warns that the United States needs to identify and track Iranian and North Korean state trading companies to disrupt the supply chains of North Korea’s missile program. The following are excerpts, with link to the full text from The National Bureau of Asian Research at the end.
- The United States needs to identify and track the primary North Korean and Iranian state trading companies engaged in operationalizing the September 2012 agreement. Many analysts have traditionally examined supply chains, logistics, and procurement as separate activities. An integrated approach to analyzing the full life cycle of a North Korean–Iranian transaction is long overdue—and now possible given access to key defectors in Seoul who have worked in North Korean state trading companies.
- Building on improved understanding of how the fused missile development programs function, policymakers can structure new incentives to disrupt critical sections in the life cycle. Rather than rely solely on a sanctions-based policy of “strategic patience,” the United States should consider innovative programs to incentivize private Chinese companies in third-party countries that serve as vital middlemen in key transactions.
John S. Park is a Junior Faculty Fellow with the Stanton Nuclear Security Fellowship program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The United States and Israel have reportedly worked together on a series of cyber attacks to slow or disrupt Iran’s nuclear program since at least 2008. Although their origins are officially unknown, the Stuxnet worm reportedly attacked centrifuge production in late 2009 or early 2010, while the Flame virus collected information on Iranian officials in 2012.
Drone technology has been an increasingly integral part of the United States intelligence and military arsenal over the past two decades. U.S. drones are far more advanced; they have been reportedly deployed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan and Yemen.
U.S. drone operations over Iran began after the start of the Afghanistan war; they reportedly increased after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Specifics are classified but drones almost certainly monitored anti-American insurgent activity organized on Iranian territory. Over the last few years, drones may have spied on a wider array of Tehran’s assets, including its nuclear program.
Iran’s drone technology has also improved in recent years, possibly with help from Russia and China. Tehran unveiled the Karrar —its first home-made long-range drone—in August 2010. But experts have been skeptical about its capabilities and Iran’s ability to guide the drone over long distances. In September 2012, the Revolutionary Guards unveiled the Shahed 129, an attack and surveillance drone with a purported range of up to 1,200 miles.
Tehran reportedly captured a U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel drone in late 2011 and subsequently claimed to have decoded its data and copied its technology. In late 2012, Iran claimed that it captured a U.S. ScanEagle drone, which the United States denied. But in December 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta warned that the United States needs to keep track of the surveillance capability of Iran’s drones.
Like many military platforms, drones can accomplish a variety of objectives. In October 2012, Israel shot down an Iranian drone reportedly near Dimona, where Israel’s nuclear weapons program is believed to be based. The drone was reportedly launched by the Lebanese militia Hezbollah, which is supplied by Iran. The use of this drone may have been intended to gather intelligence and test Israeli defensive capabilities, but also to signal the potential for an Iranian strike on Dimona in retaliation for a future U.S. or Israeli attack on Iran.
Military activities always entail the risk of an unintentional escalation. Iranian fighter jets reportedly fired on a U.S. drone over the Persian Gulf on November 1, but they failed to hit it. While no escalation developed in this case, the increasing build-up of opposing forces in the Gulf has raised the risk of an entanglement. Escalation would be even more likely to occur if one side attacks a military objective in international waters.
Proportion is important. And the magnitude of American-Iranian tensions, while still extremely dangerous, is significantly smaller than the Cold War. Iran is a powerful regional player, but it is not a superpower with the global ambitions of the former Soviet Union. Iran’s gross domestic product pales in comparison to some individual U.S. states. It has limited ability to project beyond its borders, other than through proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas.
Iran’s theocratic system of government also does not hold significant appeal internationally, unlike the Soviet Union, which attracted ideological adherents worldwide. Tehran has minimal influence in international institutions, and it has been isolated by the majority of the international community for its nuclear activities. Iran is not even popular in most of the Middle East, according to public opinion polls.
This conflict could be easier to solve than the Cold War due to its relatively narrow scope. Washington has repeatedly offered Tehran an opportunity to rejoin the community of responsible nations by living up to its international obligations, and that offer still stands. If Iran were to fulfill its obligations, much of the tension would subside.
But the current struggle between Iran and the United States does mirror the Cold War in some respects. Washington and Tehran are also engaged in a strategic struggle with each side seeking to promote starkly different visions of the region’s future. Iran has threatened or tried to undermine U.S. allies, including Israel and key Gulf states, by supporting opposition or proxies.
Iran’s audience is the United States, Israel and the Gulf states as well as its own population. Tehran wants to impose costs on the United States and Israel for their covert programs and to block or dissuade their further moves against the Islamic Republic. Iran’s actions also demonstrate its ability to fight back unconventionally tit-for-tat.
Iran is also signaling to key players in the Gulf, notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, that their help in any attack on Iran could carry hidden or unanticipated costs. Iran’s actions are also probably driven by domestic politics. The government would have risked a loss of credibility if it had not responded to cyber attacks and assassinations of scientists.
Covert campaigns are integral to both U.S. and Iranian efforts. But they almost certainly cannot achieve the long-term objectives of either country. U.S. covert action is unlikely to compel Iran to fulfill its international obligations on its nuclear program. Iranian covert action is also unlikely to undermine U.S. resolve either.
The Islamists Are Coming
The Islamists Are Coming, edited by Robin Wright, surveys the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region more than any other political bloc. Yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.
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