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Iranian Women Flaunt Hijab on Facebook

            Since May 1, hundreds of women have flaunted Iran’s tough Islamic laws by posting their pictures without a hijab, or veil, on Facebook. Masih Alinejad, an Iranian journalist based in London, sparked the movement by posting a photo of herself. “Hijab is being forced on women not only by the Morality Police, but also out of consideration for family, through wanting to keep a job and because of fear of judgment from others,” she wrote on her Facebook page. Alinejad created a separate page—“My Stealthy Freedom” –-after Iranian women responded by posting their photos, all free of hijab, on her page. Within three weeks, she received more than 1,000 photos, which produced more than 400,000 comments on Facebook.  “When I was in Iran, taking my veil off was like thumbing my nose at authority,” Alinejad told The Washington Post. The following is a sampling of the postings on “My Stealthy Freedom.”

            The caption reads: “Stealthy freedom means I have no share of freedom in my country.”
 
 
            The caption reads: “After a few years of being away from my nation, I stepped on its vast plains again; not stealthily though. Hoping for the day when all my nation’s women can taste freedom with their whole bodies and souls.”
 
      The caption posted with the photo reads: “Real freedom does not mean doing whatever we feel like doing; it means being able to do what we have the right to do.”
 

 

            
 
 
 

 

Click here to view the Facebook page. 

 

Report: Evin Prison Raid

            Security officials assaulted dozens of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience in Tehran’s infamous Evin Prison on April 17, according to a report by Amnesty International. The perpetrators, who included Ministry of Intelligence officials and Revolutionary Guards, reportedly beat prisoners with batons over several hours. They were ostensibly searching the prisoners’ cells. Amnesty International based its findings on information from prisoners’ open letters and from family members who met with prisoners after the assault on Section 350. The following are excerpts from the report.

The April 17 Incident
           According to information received by Amnesty International, a large force of security officials, including uniformed prison guards and men in plain clothes, believed to be Ministry of Intelligence officials and members of the IRGC entered Section 350 of Evin Prison in the early hours of 17 April. Some reportedly wore masks and sunglasses apparently to conceal their identity, and some carried cameras or other recording equipment. Their aim, it appears was to conduct a search of Section 350. However, since previous searches of the prison section had reportedly resulted in the seizure of or damage to prisoners’ legitimate possessions, the prisoners demanded that they be allowed to remain present while the search operation was conducted. They made this demand peacefully, according to the information available to Amnesty International, but they were met with unwarranted use of force by the security officials, who beat them using batons.
 
           According to the prisoners’ accounts given to their families, which are consistent with this version of events, most of the prisoners were subjected to body searches and then forced into the prison yard, but others – those accommodated in rooms one and three of Section 350 – were kept indoors but outside these rooms while they were searched. Once room three had been searched, the prisoners who had been accommodated there sought to return to it but encountered security officials swearing and verbally abusing the inmates of room one, and then starting to beat them while making them run the gauntlet of baton-wielding prison guards. When inmates of room three protested against the beatings of other prisoners, the security officials started to beat them.
 
           According to information available to Amnesty International, prison guards blindfolded and handcuffed many prisoners before forcing them to run the gauntlet of the “baton tunnel”, where they were repeatedly struck on their backs, heads and faces. Some were then taken by minibus to another section of Evin Prison, Section 240, which is used to hold prisoners in solitary confinement. They did not receive medical attention, despite their injuries, but rather were subjected to forcible shaving of their heads and facial hair and then placed in solitary confinement. They launched a hunger strike in protest, which was joined by tens of prisoners who remained in Section 350 and spread to Raja’i Shahr Prison in north-west Tehran, where at least seven prisoners went on hunger strike to express their solidarity with the Evin Prison inmates.
 
Inadequate Official Response
            The first official comments in response to the reports of the assaults emerging from Evin Prison were made by Gholamhossein Esma’ili in his capacity as Head of Iran’s Prisons Organization. On the same day, he dismissed the reports, telling the media “we should not take note of the news of the anti-revolutionaries.” Three days later, Mostafa Pourmohammadi, Iran’s Minister of Justice, told a press conference that the “inspection” that security officials had carried out in Section 350 of Evin Prison had been “aimed at finding sharp objects and illegal devices such as mobile phones and SIM-cards. A number of prohibited items were discovered in Section 350.” He added that, “in two rooms, prisoners resisted but no serious confrontation happened. One or two prisoners sustained minor bruises or injuries who were treated.”
 
            On 21 April, Iranian state television’s Channel Two broadcast what it described as a “documentary” in its “20:30” programme containing video footage apparently filmed during the course of the search of Section 350 on 17 April. In the programme, interviewed by a State-TV journalist, Gholamhossein Esma’ili denied that the officials conducting the search had used force and that anyone had been injured, while claiming that “the search was conducted in order to discover the secret channels of communications between prisoners and foreign media such as BBC and Voice of America.”
 
            On 20 April, a number of prisoners’ families gathered outside the Iranian parliament in Tehran to express concern for the safety of their relatives in Evin Prison and to protest against the lack of information from the authorities concerning the events three days earlier. Despite the early promises of an investigation made to the families by Tehran MP Ali Motahari, the reaction of the parliamentarians has thus far been divided. On 22 April, nine MPs used an open parliamentary session to issue a formal notice reprimanding the Minister of Justice over the alleged beatings of prisoners in Section 350 of Evin Prison. The same nine MPs urged the Parliament delegate an investigative committee to visit Evin Prison and examine the allegations. At the time of writing, however, it remains unclear whether the Parliament has acted on this recommendation or taken any other steps to investigate the alleged assaults at Evin Prison.
 
Calls for a Judicial Investigation
            Under the Executive Regulations for the Prisons Organization, the Prisons Organization, which functions under the direct authority of the Head of the Judiciary, is responsible for the management of all prison affairs. The Code of Criminal Procedures, asserts that the Prosecutor has responsibility for overseeing the conduct of law enforcement officials in prisons, including the heads of prisons, their deputies and other prison personnel.
 
             On 19 April 2014, 74 prisoners held in Section 350 addressed a letter to the Prosecutor of Tehran in which they described what had occurred at Evin Prison on 17 April and listed alleged breaches of Prison Regulations committed by security officials and prison guards, including beatings of prisoners resulting in injuries that had been documented by prison medics. They asked the Prosecutor to initiate a prompt judicial investigation. On 23 April, the prisoners sent the Prosecutor an Addendum to their initial letter urging him to act immediately in order to prevent the loss of forensic evidence with the passage of time.
 
            Under Iranian law, these letters of complaint could provide the legal ground for judicial officials to open official investigations into allegations made by prisoners; however, it remains unclear to Amnesty International whether the Tehran Prosecutor and his office have taken any steps in response to the Evin prisoners’ complaint and to investigate their allegations.
 
Arrests and Harassment of Prisoner’s Families
           Since 17 April, family members of some of the Section 350 prisoners have been arrested, harassed or subjected to intimidation by the security authorities apparently to deter or prevent them from continuing to speak out on behalf of their imprisoned relatives and to call for an independent investigation into the abuses allegedly committed against them by officials and guards at Evin Prison.
 
Click here for the full report. 
 

Tough Nuke Talks: No Progress in Vienna

            On May 16, the fourth round of nuclear talks between Iran and the world’s six major powers ended without any tangible progress. But negotiators from both sides emphasized that another round of talks will take place in June and that they still aim to draft a final agreement by the July 20 deadline. “In any negotiation there are good days and bad days, and there are ups and downs,” said a senior U.S. official. “Discussions are moving forward in a spirit of goodwill, but they are moving very slowly and with difficulty,” said Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi. The following are excerpts from a State Department briefing and a press conference with Araqchi.

Senior U.S. Administration Official on Nuclear Talks
 
SENIOR U.S. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Unlike the previous rounds, we are now in the drafting and negotiating phase, which is very different than the previous rounds.  And this is really an ongoing process and will be an ongoing process.  There are no longer discrete rounds with opening and closing sessions, discrete set agendas.  All the issues are on the table and we are negotiating on all of them. 
 
As we’ve said, it’s not really appropriate to assess where the negotiations are at each moment, but suffice to say again all the issues are on the table and are being discussed in an integrated and an interdependent way. 
 
The discussions this week have been useful, but they’ve also been at times difficult, which we knew they would be.  We’ve said this repeatedly throughout this process, that this would be difficult.  We are just at the beginning of the drafting process, and we have a significant way to go.  There are significant gaps.  These are complicated issues.  As we’ve said, if this were easy to solve, it would have been done a long time ago. 
 
This has, candidly, been a very slow and difficult process, and we are concerned with the short amount of time that is left.  But let me be very clear:  We believe we can still get it done.  It’s important to remember that we’re at the beginning, and the parties are all at the table talking in a serious way.  But we do not know yet, as we’ve always said, if we will be able at the end of this to conclude a comprehensive agreement.
 
In any negotiation there are good days and bad days, and there are ups and downs.  This has been a moment of great difficulty, but one that was not entirely unexpected.  If you remember, we had moments like this one when we were negotiating the Joint Plan of Action as well.  Many of you wrote in those moments that you didn’t know if we would be able to get this done, and you saw how that turned out.  So again, not entirely unexpected; we knew this would happen.
 
We’re focused now on how the process proceeds with the next step and how the discussions go from here.  We will be back in June talking at the political director level.  I’ll let the EU announce the dates for that.  And our experts will continue talking, as they do all the time every day about these issues.
 
Everyone is serious here.  We know that.  But we believe there needs to be some additional realism at this point.  As I said, significant gaps remain.  We need to see more progress being  made.  Time is not unlimited here, and we’re still tracking towards the July 20th date to see if we can get this done.
 
As we’ve said repeatedly and I will remind folks many times over the coming months, what we’re looking for in a comprehensive agreement is a package, not a checklist.  We’re focused on how all of the elements fit together to ensure Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon and that its program is for entirely peaceful purposes. 
 
And as we have always been clear, we will take the time to do this right.  We will not rush into a bad deal.  As the President and the Secretary and many other people have said, no deal is better than a bad deal.  We know this will take time.  We are committed to working to see if we can get it done.
 
QUESTION:  Are the two sides any closer on the end goals?  Is there agreement that Iran should have only what it needs for a peaceful program (inaudible) agreement that the idea of extending breakout time is a proper protocol?
 
SENIOR U.S. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, in terms of goals, I would start by pointing you back to the Joint Plan of Action, which began to outline what the goals were for a comprehensive plan of action and what that would look like.  We have been very clear throughout this process of what our goal is, what the P5+1’s goal is, and that hasn’t changed in any way – again, that Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon and that their program is entirely for peaceful purposes.  Some of the details of what that might look like are in the JPOA if you go back and read it, so I don’t think I’d go much further than that.  Again, that’s what we’re focused on doing, that’s what we’re at the table talking about how to do.
 
QUESTION:  (Inaudible) process (inaudible) it seems like (inaudible) to say (inaudible) know what all the issues are (inaudible), let’s just throw (inaudible)?
 
SENIOR U.S. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  On the first question – look, we’re not going to go through the nitty-gritty of how logistically we’re working through the issues.  As you know, many of them are related in some ways.  None of them operate in a vacuum, which is why we talk about this package.  But the process through which we work through them, both at the experts level and the political director level, we’re just not going to get into that level of detail to preserve the nature of the negotiations.
 
I would remind people that what was really different about this round from the previous rounds, process-wise, right, is that in the first round we set the agenda and the framework for how the six months was going to go.  In the second and third rounds, we put all of the issues on the table, we spent time laying out all of the issues and getting them out on the table.  Now we’re talking about ways to actually bridge those gaps.  So it shouldn’t be surprising to people that’s a more difficult conversation than putting the issue itself just on the table, right?  So I think when you’re getting your head around why maybe this was more difficult now, why it was different, I think that’s probably a part of it.
  
QUESTION:  The meetings seemed to start a day later than anticipated (inaudible) seems like something (inaudible) fair to say (inaudible) don’t have much time left.  You guys are the only ones who feel a sense of urgency.  How did you explain that to (inaudible)?
 
SENIOR U.S. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I obviously refer to the EU, who sets up the schedule for this, but it’s my understanding that it was just a scheduling issue.  But you’re right that we’re not going to resolve all of the differences in four days in Vienna.  That’s unrealistic, and we’re certainly not operating under that assumption.  That’s why in between the sessions when we meet, we have continual expert discussions on the phone, over email, some in person – you know experts were in New York last week for talks – and also at the political director level.  So it’s not like we just come to Vienna and then go back home and don’t work on it in between rounds.  
I also think you’ll see increasing in-person meetings probably at a high level coming over the next few months as well as we move forward in the process.
 
QUESTION:  (Inaudible) said in the past that (inaudible) Iran to make (inaudible).  Are you more or less optimistic now that you'll be able to do that? 
 
SENIOR U.S. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It’s not about being optimistic or not optimistic; it’s about being realistic.  We’ve always said that.  The President said it’s 50-50.  I don’t think I’m probably going to disagree with him on this or anything else.  But we do know that there are tough decisions that have to be made.  We all need to be realistic about the issues at hand and how we can be assured we – not just the United States, but the international community - can be assured that Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon and that its program is entirely peaceful. So that’s part of why this is so hard.  But we’re going to keep working at it.
 
QUESTION:  The differences between the P5+1 meeting with Iran on things like centrifuges, (inaudible) issues like missiles, and we know that there are nuances within the P5+1 that – without talking about specific issues in general, is there a sense on your end that the Iranians have not shown or demonstrated a willingness to approach it in a holistic way, the way you guys are emphasizing must be made?
 
SENIOR U.S. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  you mentioned P5+1 unity.  We have remained unified as these talks have progressed.  We’ve said that for months now and that hasn’t changed.  Second, it’s just a fact that the issues are linked, right.  None of them operates in a vacuum.  It’s not like you can go down a checklist and say, “Okay, once we’ve dealt with this, we can deal with this,” because in so many ways, they’re linked.  So it’s just a fact that they’re related.
 
And we, as I said, are talking about these things in an interdependent way, in an interlinked way.  And as we made very clear in the JPOA, which everyone signed up to, all of our concerns have to be met in order to get to a comprehensive agreement, and that’s certainly what we’re working towards.
 
QUESTION:  The joint commission outlined in the JPOA, it set up to facilitate a condition (inaudible) issues of concern.  There’s an epistemological (inaudible) IAEA.
 
SENIOR U.S. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, let me correct one thing you’ve said.  The joint commission as set up in the JPOA was intended to address issues if they arose during implementation.  I don’t think it was specifically intended to address past and present issues.
 
QUESTION:  Well, it says the joint commission will work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern.
 
SENIOR U.S. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: .  We’ll work with them, but it’s my understanding – and correct me if I’m wrong, experts – that it was set up as part of the JPOA to address concerns if they arose during implementation.
 
QUESTION:  if it’s no comment, that’s fine, but there’s a bottleneck above past issues of concern that the IAEA is, of course, independent, and yet the IAEA is very conscious of requesting member input into the resolution issues.  The U.S., as the most influential, most powerful member of the agency, is in a position to weigh in on the secretariat to gauge the authenticity of Iran’s explanations.  So is there a plan?  Was the joint commission discussed?  What’s the (inaudible) of the joint commission’s (inaudible) to resolve these issues?
 
SENIOR U.S. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  On the general question of past and present concerns in the IAEA, I mean, we said, every time we’re asked about this, that they have the lead role to play on these issues, and that they – that Iran needs to work with them.  Obviously, we work very closely with the IAEA, but we really need to see progress through that mechanism on some of these issues, which is really the best place to address them even as part of these discussions.
 
 
QUESTION:  But just as a follow-up, the IAEA then refers back to its membership.  So you’re facing a circular argument potentially that without some sort of outside intervention by the joint commission or membership the IAEA (inaudible).
 
SENIOR U.S. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I will check with some of the experts on this.  I think you’re focused on the joint commission in a little way that’s not entirely correct in terms of the role it should be playing on this.  And I don’t think it’s circular just because we’re a member of the IAEA.  The IAEA is a body that is tasked with dealing with these issues and has been working with Iran on this for some time, even though we’re a member of it.  So they have a mandate separate and apart from what we’re doing here, but obviously related to it.  So if there’s more on the joint commission to share, I’m happy to get back to you on that.
 
QUESTION:  Araghchi, the Iranian negotiator, said that they – it hasn’t actually started the drafting process. 
 
SENIOR U.S. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, I’m not going to get into sort of details about what’s on paper and what’s not.  As I said, we’ve started the negotiating drafting process, which is a process that will take some time.  But I’m not going to get into details about what that looks like inside the room.
 
QUESTION:  Mr. Araghchi was talking to the Iranian (inaudible) and he said if we cannot come up with an agreement by July 20th, that’s okay.  We know it’s not a catastrophe.  We still have six months.  I mean, does that suggest that the sense of urgency might not be there?
 
SENIOR U.S. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, the sense of urgency is certainly here among us.  I think it’s there in the room as well.  And as I said, we’re tracking towards July 20th.  That is the date we’re focused on right now. 
 
SENIOR U.S. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, I’ll say a few things.  I have no – I’m not even going to pretend to get into the head of the Iranian negotiators.  I don’t think you want me to.  But I will say a few things.  Look, we have been clear that past and present concerns have to be addressed.  I am not going to outline what that will look like, entertain hypotheticals about what that might look like in terms of what the public discourse is at that time.
 
But I’ll say a few things about Congress, quite frankly, and you’ve heard others say this as well:  We believe if we can get a comprehensive agreement that ensures Iran cannot get a nuclear weapon, that its program is entirely peaceful, that addresses the issues we laid out very clearly in the JPOA, that we will be able – that Congress will be supportive of it.  I’m not saying there won’t be tough conversations.  You all know the political system as well as I do.
 
But we know that this is the best chance we’ve ever had to resolve this diplomatically.  We have an obligation to test this moment, and if we can get to a comprehensive agreement that we are satisfied with, we will not make a bad deal.  We have been clear about that.  We will not rush into one; we will take the time to get a good one, and that if we do, we will be able to work with the United States Congress on that at that time.
 
QUESTION: With the long bilateral this morning, was this basically people are saying that you need to move more quickly, you need to make more progress?
 
SENIOR U.S. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Look, it was a long meeting.  We had a three-hour bilateral with the Iranian delegation this morning here at the Coburg.  And it won’t surprise you I’m not going to outline the details of what we talked about in that meeting.  It was a straightforward conversation.  Those conversations will continue.  But we say the same things privately that we say publicly, that we’re saying right now – that this process needs to move.  It needs to move faster.  We need to see progress.  Those are messages we’re certainly very clear about in all forms.
 
QUESTION:  So I noticed that you don’t use a lot of the words that [other senior US administration officials] usually use, like “productive,” “useful,” all those kinds of things.
 
SENIOR U.S. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, I think I was clear in the opening remarks that this is a difficult moment.  I think we use the words we find most appropriate.  But again, they’re reasons we all knew this moment would come.  Why we – we saw them when we did the JPOA.  This was not unexpected.  There is a path forward here for the negotiations, period.  But I appreciate the wordsmithing,  the work, the attention to the words.
 
QUESTION:  Can we go back to the issue of missiles?  Do you know the Iranians even said that they don’t want this to be part of the discussions.  It’s been an ongoing decision, but the Russians also came out and said that, again, that they don’t believe it should be part – it should be on the agenda, at least (inaudible) interview (inaudible) Russia Today, and their (inaudible) training with Iran is a well-known fact.  How difficult is that going to be for you going forward?  I mean, getting Russia and U.S. to agree on --
 
QUESTION:  I understand this is much, much (inaudible), but even though (inaudible) after that (inaudible) has the U.S. (inaudible) who, as I understand, hasn’t happened outside (inaudible) this year. 
 
SENIOR U.S. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I think this is just a different negotiation.  It’s a much harder one.  It’s a comprehensive agreement that we’re trying to get.  The first step was a tough one to get, as you know.  But this – we’ve always said this would be harder.  We did not expect to get it done in the same amount of time that it took to do the Joint Plan of Action.  So I don’t think we’re surprised by it.  We’re focused on the meetings we’re having here with all of the work our experts are doing to really dig into the issues, and that’s what we’ll keep working on.
 
 
 
Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi
 
            “The nuclear talks ended an hour ago, and the negotiations were very serious.
            “It's a good atmosphere and discussions are moving forward in a spirit of goodwill, but they are moving very slowly and with difficulty.
            “Our discussions were more or less free from tension, and everyone favors attainment of a final agreement.
            “The generalities, the framework and principles have already been agreed in the Geneva deal. Thus, we intended to start drafting the deal, but we couldn't due to some major differences.
            “Drafting the deal will be impossible until we reach a single view about all issues.
            “The trend of the talks is good and constructive, but has not led to any specific result yet. The talks continue and have not failed.
            “Differences exist; were there no difference, there wouldn't be any need to negotiation. Our duty is resolving these differences, bringing views closer and working out a single text. There was no specific progress in the first session, and this is not unnatural; we hope to make up for that in other sessions.
            “We stand firm on our rights. We will have 6 more months if we fail to work out a deal by July 20.
            “Our defense equipment can no way go under discussion in the negotiations.
            “There is no push to obtain an agreement by July 20 at any price.
            “We [will only] concede to an agreement which will be in line with our interests, meet our demands and establish the Iranian nation's rights.
            “Yet, there is still a chance for striking a deal by July 20 only if our demands are met and our people's nuclear rights are observed.
            “If we come to conclude such an agreement by July 20, it will be good, but if we won't, that would not mean a catastrophe and that wouldn't be the end of the world, we will have 6 more months to negotiate.
            “We hope that the talks continue in a logical, rational and realistic manner and yield result within the deadline.
            “All parties, including the Russian side, want the talks to remain unaffected by any other issue, including the Ukrainian issue.
 

Hagel in Saudi Arabia and Israel on Iran

      Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel spoke extensively  about Iran at two stops of his Middle East tour. On May 14, Hagel assured Arab Gulf states that a nuclear deal with Iran would not harm their security. “We will continue to hold Iran accountable for its destabilizing activities across the region,” he said at the U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Defense Dialogue in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Hagel continued to Jordan and then to Israel. He pledged to preserve Jerusalem’s qualitative military edge so that it could counter challenges like Tehran’s ballistic missiles. Both Israel and the Gulf states are concerned about Iran’s latent nuclear capabilities and its potential reemergence as a regional player. The following are excerpted remarks from Hagel’s trip.

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel
            “By strengthening the GCC, you will ensure that your collective defense is more than the sum of its parts. You will strengthen your ability to prevent and deter aggression. You will strengthen, not weaken, each of your nations’ sovereignty. And you will expand your common interests – not just in defense, but in a more stable, peaceful, and prosperous future.
            “This approach is how the region must continue to address the threats posed by Iran.
            “As we meet here today, diplomats from the United States and other P5+1 nations are in Vienna. They are in Vienna to see if our concerns with Iran’s nuclear program can be resolved diplomatically.     
            “We got to Vienna thanks to our collective efforts to isolate Iran diplomatically and economically, and to deter it militarily. And as negotiations progress, I want to assure you of two things.
            “First, these negotiations will under no circumstances trade away regional security for concessions on Iran’s nuclear program. Our commitment to Gulf security and stability is unwavering.
            “Second, while our strong preference is for a diplomatic solution, the United States will remain postured and prepared to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon – and that Iran abides by the terms of any potential agreement.
            “No matter the outcome of the nuclear negotiations, the United States remains committed to our Gulf partners’ security. We will continue to consult closely with you as these negotiations progress – as I am here today. We will continue to hold Iran accountable for its destabilizing activities across the region. And we will continue working closely with all of our friends and partners in the Gulf to reinforce their defenses against these destabilizing activities. My proposals today – focused on air and missile defense, maritime security, and cyber security – should make America’s commitment clear.”   
            May 14, 2014 in remarks to the U.S.-GCC Defense Dialogue in Jeddah
 
            “We reaffirmed our commitment to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon – and ensuring that its program is exclusively peaceful. While we noted that Iran’s diplomatic engagement has been a positive development, we continue to share deep concerns about Iran’s destabilizing activities throughout this region, including its sponsorship of terrorism, its support for the Assad regime in Syria, and its efforts to undermine stability in GCC member nations. That is why we committed to continuing to work together to reinforce GCC defenses and capabilities.”   
            May 14, 2014 to media at the U.S.-GCC Defense Dialogue in Jeddah
 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
            “We’ve been saying all along that Iran is trying to pull the wool over the eyes of the international community, so I wasn’t surprised and I’m sure you weren’t surprised by the recent U.N. report on Iran’s ongoing efforts to deceive the international community, to continue to develop its ICBMs and to continually violate its commitments of Security Council stipulations on forbidding it to develop certain parts of its nuclear program.
            “They [Iranians] continue to do that, and I think that requires very clear and firm policy on the part of the world powers, the P5+1, and I think as the talks with Iran continue, one thing must guide the international community, and that is we must not let the Ayatollahs win. We must not let the foremost terrorist state of our time, Iran, develop the capability to produce nuclear weapons.”
            May 16, 2014 in a meeting with Secretary Hagel
 
            “My Israeli counterpart and I “also discussed America's unwavering pledge to preserve Israel's qualitative military edge, including the provision of some of America's most advanced capabilities, such as the V-22 Osprey, the F-35, and sophisticated aircraft radar. We addressed ways to strengthen our nations' cooperation on a host of security challenges, ranging from the conflict in Syria, to Iranian ballistic missiles.”
            May 15, 2014 at a joint press conference with Israel’s minister of defense
 
Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe Ya’alon
             “I believe the United States and Israel share the same goal: not to allow a military nuclear Iran. And I believe that we share the same assessment regarding intelligence, predicting what might come out in the future. We might have differences, even disputes regarding how to get to it. But we have the open channels as we have Secretary of Defense and myself, Ambassador Rice, while she was here, speaking with our prime minister, and other channels.
            “The bottom line is that Israel should be ready to defend itself by itself.”
            May 15, 2014 at a joint press conference with Secretary Hagel
 

Event: Rubik’s Cube™ of a Final Agreement

            The clock is ticking on a nuclear deal with Iran. The deadline is July 20. An unprecedented coalition of eight Washington think tanks is hosting three discussions on the pivotal diplomacy to coincide with the last three rounds of talks. The first event — "The Rubik’s Cube™ of a Final Agreement" — on May 13 explored the disparate issues to be resolved and the many formulations for potential solutions. Speakers included (from left to right) Colin Kahl, Robert Einhorn, Joe Cirincione and Alireza Nader.

            The coalition includes the U.S. Institute of Peace, RAND, the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Arms Control Association, the Center for a New American Security, the Stimson Center, the Partnership for a Secure America, the Ploughshares Fund, and staff from the Brookings Institution and the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies.
           The following is a webcast of the event and key takeaways from the speakers' remarks.
 
 
Robert Einhorn 
• A final deal is possible, but very hard to get by the July 20 deadline.
• A key requirement for a deal is implementing a monitoring mechanism that can quickly detect any breakout steps towards a bomb.
• Iran wants to expand its uranium enrichment capabilities while the P5+1 wants to limit them.
• Iran could produce enough uranium to fuel a weapon in two months. Breakout time needs to be lengthened.
• Iran needs to understand that it will pay a heavy price if it violates a deal by moving to produce a bomb.
• The United States will probably have to demonstrate its Gulf allies and Israel that it is still resolutely committed to their security.
 
Alireza Nader
• Mutual trust is not a requirement for a successful deal.  Stringent inspections and firm commitments to sanctions relief can make up for the trust gap.
• So far, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has supported negotiations and given President Hassan Rouhani considerable space to maneuver. Both are interested in lifting sanctions.
• Both Iran and the United States have vested interests in resolving the nuclear dispute.
• Sanctions aren’t necessarily empowering Iran’s government and hurting the population. The situation is actually more complicated. The government is running out of money and some people are making money off sanctions.
• The United States could still have lots of problems with the Islamic Republic even after a deal.
• Iranian hardliners have accused their negotiators of selling the country’s nuclear rights. Ultra-conservatives fear a nuclear deal because they think it will open Iran’s culture to more Western influence.
• President Hassan Rouhani wants a better relationship with the United States but many Iranians are not ready. Building trust will be a decades-long process.
 
Joe Cirincione
• Every aspect of the talks is difficult, but we have never been closer to an agreement.
• The nuclear deal is step number one. Afterwards, Washington and Tehran could cooperate on shared concerns in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and elsewhere.
• This deal is not about trust. This is a contract.
• Iran needs a face-saving way to frame the deal because it has invested so much in its nuclear program. A deal would need to assure Iran that sanctions will really be lifted. 
• Imposing sanctions is much easier than lifting them. So the deal will likely be an action for action arrangement.
• Iran’s ballistic missiles are not the list of items to negotiate. Adding too many items to the list might overload the cart.
 
Colin Kahl
• The two sides differ on the preferred length of the agreement. The United States and others are pushing for decades while Iran is pressing for a few years.
• Iran’s enrichment capability will likely need to be capped at five percent, the level suitable for civilian nuclear power. Weapons grade is 90 percent. 
• A nuclear deal must be sellable in both the United States and Iran.
• Tehran will need to account for possible military dimension of its program and what experiments it conducted.
• The concern about the heavy water reactor at Arak is that it could produce one to two bombs worth of plutonium a year if completed.
•Iran needs about one year to construct a crude nuclear device and then a few more years to fit it onto a ballistic missile.
 

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