Iran Primer's Blog

Why is Parchin Important (or Not)?

January 24, 2013 | 4:16pm

Iran and the U.N. nuclear watchdog failed to strike a deal after two days of negotiations from January 16-17. The U.N. demand to access the Parchin military complex near Tehran has been a divisive issue in previous talks. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) suspects Iran conducted experiments at Parchin related to nuclear weapons production.
But a new report argues that Parchin may not be a critical site. The allegations that Iran carried out weapons-related experiments there “have questionable technical credibility,” according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Author Robert Kelley spent more than 35 years working in the U.S. Department of Energy’s nuclear complex. The following are excerpts from his report, with a link to the full text at the end.

Has Iran carried out any suspicious experiments?

The IAEA says that Iran did very complex experiments involving explosives and many fibre-optic detectors and possibly uranium. However, the IAEA says these experiments were not done at Parchin but rather 500 km away at Marivan. In any case, the experiments at Marivan described in great detail by the IAEA would not use uranium.

Can high explosive tests using uranium be detected later?

Yes. Uranium in an explosion will burn and produce a fine oxide powder. This is slightly radioactive and will persist for years, especially inside a chamber or a building, but also outdoors…

Has Iran demolished the building at Parchin that the IAEA wants to visit?

No. Some reports implied that Iran had destroyed the building, but this is incorrect. The IAEA claims that five buildings on this site have been demolished but this cannot be seen in satellite imagery. Iran did demolish a small outbuilding on the same site that appears to have been a garage. It was probably demolished to make way for a new road that is being built at the Parchin complex. Another small structure, probably a garage or material store was reported destroyed but is still in place in the latest satellite imagery.

Is Iran bulldozing the site and covering it with earth to prevent the IAEA from detecting uranium contamination?

Iran has engaged in large-scale bulldozing operations on about 25 hectares near the Parchin building. This includes the bulldozing of old dirt piles to level a field 500 metres north of the building of interest. However, there has been no such activity in the area west of the building, except for removing some parking pads within about 10 m of it. The fact that the building’s immediate vicinity has been largely untouched on the west side strongly suggests that the purpose of the earth-moving operations was for construction and renovation work and not for ‘sanitizing’ the site by covering up contamination. In any event, the IAEA should not be collecting samples of dirt or dead vegetation to detect tiny uranium traces…

Conclusions

The impasse over the Parchin visit has taken on a symbolic importance that is distracting attention from the IAEA’s efforts to address a range of questions about the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The IAEA has invested considerable time and effort trying to persuade Iran to allow it to visit one building at the huge Parchin military complex. For its part, Iran has been less than constructive by refusing the agency access to the building at Parchin without negotiating modalities that would let the IAEA conduct its visit and report its findings. The bitterness and squabbling over Parchin, in which statements and conclusions have got out of hand, is not productive—and it impedes the IAEA’s main mission.

Click here for the full text

Tags: IAEA, Iran, Nuclear, Parchin, U.N.

Tehran’s Mixed Messages on U.N. Nuclear Talks

January 24, 2013 | 4:13pm

Iranian and U.N. officials failed to produce an agreement after intensive talks in Tehran from January 16-17. Iran has sent mixed messages on negotiations with the International Atomic Energy (IAEA). Ambassador to the IAEA Ali Asghar Soltanieh claimed the two sides bridged some gaps during the talks. But later he said Iran would not stop uranium enrichment “even for a moment” and that the IAEA should cope with reality by accepting Iran’s nuclear rights.
IAEA Deputy Director General said “differences remain” and that Iran did not grant access to the Parchin military complex. The IAEA suspects Iran conducted tests at Parchin related to building a nuclear bomb. Negotiators may revisit the issue in the next round of talks scheduled for February 13. The following are statements by U.N. and Iranian officials on the nuclear talks.

IAEA Deputy Director General for the Department of Safeguards Herman Nackaerts

“We had two days of intensive discussions…Differences remain, so we could not finalize the structured approach to resolve the outstanding issues regarding possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program... What I can also say is that on this occasion no access was granted to Parchin.” January 18

Iranian Ambassador to the IAEA Ali Asghar Soltanieh

“Success in the talks between Iran and the G5+1 [six world powers] depends on the IAEA coping with realities and accepting Iran’s nuclear rights.”

“Everybody knows that the allegations against Iranian peaceful nuclear activities are made with political motives… Iran is ready to offers its nuclear experiences, through the IAEA, to those developing countries that are willing to have the know-how.” January 23 to IRNA

Iran will not stop uranium enrichment “even for a moment.” January 19 to IRNA

“Some of the differences were solved but it is very complex issue… No agreement has been signed but the negotiations are progressing…We hope that they take our considerations into the document; it is good opportunity to reach an agreement...”

“All together there were eight members of the delegation. We held, in a very constructive friendly environment, intensive talks about all aspects of this [nuclear] matter. I have to say that, we have gone forward…”

“We had two days of intensive talks and we were able to in fact bridge the gap to some extent, but whether we were able to finally sign it; no, which is very natural because we will do it only when both sides come to the conclusion that major concerns are incorporated.” January 18

Member of Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Alaeddin Boroujerdi

“If the agency [IAEA] gives up the game and puzzle of the Western countries, it can act successfully in its negotiations with Iran… It is the Islamic Republic of Iran’s expectation from the international body to act within the IAEA regulations and the Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT) so that talks will be fruitful.” January 23 to parliamentary news agency ICANA

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast

“Obligations of the other party must be clearly specified. If a claim is to be raised on a spot in Iran every day and [the IAEA] seeks to visit our military facilities under such a pretext ... this issue will be unending.” January 16

Tags: IAEA, Iran, Negotiations, Nuclear, Soltanieh, U.N.

Profile: Revolutionary Guards Chief Gen. Jafari

January 21, 2013 | 11:31am

Alireza Nader

As commander of the Revolutionary Guards, General Mohammad Ali Jafari is one of the dozen most powerful men in Iran. He is a hard-line ideologue loyal to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He rose to power through a combination of ideological commitment and military vision. Jafari now commands one of the most feared militaries in the Middle East, which is also far better equipped than Iran’s conventional army, navy and air force.

Jafari has an estimated 150,000 troops under his control. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps has its own powerful army (between 100,000 and 125,000), navy (up to 20,000) and air force (about 20,000). It also oversees several thousand members in the elite Qods Force, which trains and supports foreign insurgent organizations.

Yet Jafari also commands a force divided by personal and political rivalries and under pressure from unprecedented sanctions that specifically target him, the top military leadership and the many military and economic wings of the Revolutionary Guards. He still has to prove whether he can protect and preserve an increasingly exposed regime.

Jafari now has two pivotal missions: First, to defend Iran from external threats, including a military strike by Israel or the United States. Second, to defend the Islamic Republic from internal challenges, including from the reformist movement. His re-organization of the Guards in recent years was designed to achieve both objectives.

The Revolutionary Guards chief has used some of the toughest language in describing the dangers of attacking Iran. “If a war breaks out where one side is Iran and the other side is the West and U.S., it's natural that a problem should occur in the Strait of Hormuz. Export of energy will be harmed. It's natural that this will happen,” he said in September 2012.

He also warned that Iran might withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and attack U.S. bases in the Middle East. In the September news conference, he said Iran could obliterate Israel if it hit Iran. "Our response to Israel is clear: I think nothing will remain of Israel [should it attack Iran]. Given Israel's small land area and its vulnerability to a massive volume of Iran's missiles, I don't think any spot in Israel will remain safe," he said.

Appointed commander in 2007, Jafari has implemented ideas developed in previous positions, including asymmetric tactics in case of conflict with the United States or Israel. “Given the enemy's numerical or technological superiority, the IRGC would use asymmetrical warfare capabilities, such as those used by Hezbollah in its 2006 war with Israel in Lebanon. Iranian strategy would also reflect the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq,” he said three days after his appointment.

One of his key moves was dividing Iran’s military command-and-control into 31 distinct units, each of which could function independently in the case others were hit or destroyed. He also merged the Basij—which can mobilize hundreds of thousands of paramilitary forces—under the Guards command.

Jafari’s restructuring of the Revolutionary Guards enhanced Tehran’s ability to counter an outside military attack. But it also helped the regime counter internal disturbances. The regime experienced its most serious challenge after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s disputed re-election in 2009, when millions of protesters took to the streets throughout Iran to contest the outcome.

Jafari has since framed the 2009 protests as “sedition” against the Islamic Republic. In 2010, he said, “The root cause of what happened in the election and over the past eight months" reflected differences between "two fundamentally different views, one Islamic, and the other one materialistic." He has repeatedly pledged that the Guards would oppose reformists participating in future elections. But he has also distanced himself from Ahmadinejad over the president’s political challenges to the supreme leader.

Jafari has come a long way under the revolutionary regime. He was born to a poor family in the central city of Yazd. He participated in demonstrations against the monarchy. After the shah’s overthrow, he joined the new Revolutionary Guards intelligence unit and served in the western Kurdish region. After Iraq’s invasion, Jafari held several senior positions during the eight-year war, a key credential in his rise to power.

In 1992, after the war, Jafari was appointed commander of the Guards ground forces, in addition to commanding Tehran’s Sarallah unit that is responsible for protecting Tehran. He was reportedly deeply affected by the 1999 Tehran student riots, the largest internal disturbance since the 1979 revolution up to that point. Jafari was one of 29 Revolutionary Guards officers who wrote a letter to then President Mohammad Khatami implicitly threatening a coup if Khatami continued his reformist agenda.

Jafari became the director of the Guards’ Center for Strategic Studies in 2005. During his tenure, he identified two critical threats to the Islamic Republic: a foreign attempt to foment a “soft revolution” through support of Iranian NGOs and activists and a U.S. military attack that could topple the regime. He used those experiences to craft Iran’s current military strategy—at what could be a pivotal turning point in the nuclear crisis.

Alireza Nader is a senior policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and a lecturer on Iranian politics at the George Washington University.

Read Alireza Nader's chapter on the Revolutionary Guards in "The Iran Primer"

Photo Credits: U.S. State Department and Wikimedia IRGC logo by user Shahin.

Online news media are welcome to republish original blog postings from this website in full, with a citation and link back to The Iran Primer website (www.iranprimer.com) as the original source. Any edits must be authorized by the author. Permission to reprint excerpts from The Iran Primer book should be directed to permissions@usip.org

Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan After U.S. Pullout

January 17, 2013 | 10:41am

Omar Samad

Has Iran's influence in Afghanistan changed since the U.S. troop surge in 2010? What steps has it taken in anticipation of the U.S. withdrawal planned for 2014?

The Islamic Republic considers the U.S. presence in Afghanistan a major security concern along its 600-mile eastern border. It was deeply suspicious of the 2010 U.S. surge to dislodge Taliban forces from southern Afghanistan. Iranian leaders are now more concerned about a residual U.S. presence—albeit in smaller numbers—after 2014. On January 11, President Hamid Karzai visited the White House and announced that coalition forces will transition to a support role this spring. Tehran is keeping a close eye on the Bilateral Security Agreement under negotiation between Kabul and Washington, and actively trying to influence that debate inside Afghanistan as well as at the regional level.

Iran’s influence since 2001—when it supported the U.N.-backed effort to topple the Taliban and establish a new political order—has gone through different phases. It used mainly soft power to strengthen its foothold in Afghanistan through investment, trade and cultural linkages. Over the years, Iranian security and intelligence institutions have become increasingly active in prodding a Western withdrawal and shaping Afghan politics.

What are the key issues on which Afghanistan and Iran agree and disagree?

The five main drivers of contemporary Afghan-Iranian relations are:

● Narcotics: Iran is not only a transit point for the Afghan narcotics business, but also a major consumer market for opiates. The United Nations estimates that the Islamic Republic has 1.2 million drug addicts but others think there could be millions more. Iranian forces crack down on the drug trade by fighting heavily armed traffickers and patrolling the border. Tehran claims to spend $1 billion annually on its war on drugs. Iranian leaders critique the Afghan government and its Western allies for failing to cease the cultivation and production of narcotics.

● Refugees: Iran is increasingly politicizing the presence of illegal Afghan workers and refugees, estimated at more than one million. Authorities have reportedly mistreated Afghan refugees and deported thousands since 2007. Kabul is increasingly frustrated and resentful of Tehran’s policy toward refugees. The U.N. estimated that Iran deported 711 Afghan refugees per day during the first half of 2012. But nearly all of the deportees were single males who entered illegally to find work.

● Water sharing: While Afghanistan and Iran have a comprehensive treaty on the Helmand River water rights dating to 1973, there are tensions about the lack of verification and enforcement of the flow of water into Iran. The Kamal Khan Dam, which regulates the flow of water to Iran’s Sistan Balochistan Province, is a source of animosity on both sides.

● Cultural and religious influence peddling: There is increasing unease in Afghan political and cultural communities about unregulated Iranian funding of cultural, media and religious activities in Afghanistan, mainly to the Shiite Hazara, an ethnic minority. The Taliban systematically killed and displaced thousands of Hazara before 2001. Over the last decade, Iranian relief organizations and businesses have reportedly funded construction of houses, libraries, roads, schools and clinics in several Afghan provinces, including Herat.

● Trade, investment and currency: While both countries are in favor of expanded economic and business ties, the Afghan economy’s weak base has mostly benefited surrounding countries, including Iran. It has flooded Afghan markets with low-quality goods. The trade imbalance is further compounded by heavy Iranian investment in western Afghanistan. Iran has also destabilized Afghan markets by purchasing large amounts of foreign currency, a counter-measure against international sanctions on its nuclear program.

What influence does Tehran have on President Hamid Karzai and his government?

Officially, Afghan-Iranian relations are portrayed as normal and friendly. Afghans express appreciation for Iranian assistance against the Soviets during the 1980s and against the Taliban during the 1990s. However, tensions simmer under the surface, especially about the treatment of Afghan refugees in Iran and, more recently, about Iranian agents fuelling parts of the armed insurgency.

Hamid Karzai, weary of Pakistan’s meddling in favor of the Taliban over the years, has attempted to maintain a more balanced approach toward Iran. He likes to portray himself as a nationalist president rather than a U.S.-supported leader. He has also taken into consideration Iranian recommendations, accepted Iranian aid, unsuccessfully tried to be a broker between Iran and the West, and avoided rattling relations with Tehran on contentious bilateral issues.

What is Iran's vision for Afghanistan's future? What are its goals in the short term and long term?

  Iran’s vision for Afghanistan and its own role is in flux and now tied to other factors, such the nuclear standoff, the Saudi Arabian and Arab dynamics, the U.S. presence post-2014, regional alignments and rivalries, the state of its economy and domestic political stability.

  It would prefer not to have to be concerned about Afghanistan. To this end, it is focusing on carving its sphere of influence, accelerating a Western withdrawal, and assuring that its interests are protected.

Iran is probably not in favor of a Western-influenced , democratic, affluent Afghanistan, but at the same time, is concerned that an unstable, opium producing and radicalized Afghanistan can also pause a major threat to its interests, as experienced in the 1990s.

Torn between these two conflicting scenarios, and taking into consideration all other factors, it will try to prioritize its strategic and security needs in order to influence the course of events to the best of its abilities and given the resources at its disposal.

Omar Samad, President of Silkroad Consulting and previous Senior Afghan Expert at the United States Institute of Peace, was Afghanistan’s Ambassador to France (2009-2011) and Canada (2004-2009).

Photo Credit: Pahari Sahib (Image:BlankMap-World-v5.png) [GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html) or CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/)], via Wikimedia Commons

Tags: Afghanistan, Drugs, Iran, Karzai, Narcotics, NATO, Opium, Refugees, U.S, United States, Water

Ahmadinejad Urges Parliament to Cut Reliance on Oil

January 17, 2013 | 9:53am

On January 16, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told Parliament that Iran needs to cut reliance on petrodollars “once and for all.” Iran’s oil revenues have dropped 45 percent in the last nine months, according to parliament’s budget committee chief. Ahmadinejad also admitted that international sanctions have slowed economic growth, disrupted foreign trade and widened the gap between rich and poor.
The president called for deeper cuts to energy subsidies to solve the budget crisis. But he left before lawmakers could question him further, claiming his schedule was full. Parliament has opposed subsidy cuts in the past, claiming inflation would soar. We are “tired from hearing these empty promises… All of it is repetitive chatter,” member ofparliament Gholamali Jaffarzadeh told Mehr News Agency. The following are excerpts from Ahmadinejad’s speech.

Economic Reforms

“We need to cut reliance on petrodollars in the government's spending budget. We have to finish this once and for all.”

“We have to change the flow of wealth and capital into the country. Problems will remain as long as this doesn't change ... 25 percent of gross national product is concentrated in Tehran. We need to make sure that the money is invested not just in one city but all over the country.”

“One of the best development measures to ensure sustainable growth and circumvent the sanctions and neutralize the enemy's pressures has been the targeted subsidies plan.”

“If this plan is fully implemented, wealth will be fairly distributed, national capital will be preserved, production efficiency will go up, the government's dependency on oil income will be reduced and poverty will be eradicated.”

International Sanctions and the Nuclear Issue

“That is part of the enemies' objectives because price fluctuations and some irregular hikes in prices will impose pressure on a large part of the people who have fixed income.”

"The nuclear issue and human rights are their excuse for hostility towards us. We have explained the nuclear issues to them several times and there is no more ambiguity in our nuclear issue for the world."

“Who can claim in the world that he/she has materialized his nation's rights completely? Is human rights their main problem or our progress and might?"

“They have imposed pressures and continue to pressure us under such excuses."

“Naturally the sanctions create a series of problems, including a slowdown in the country's growth, pressure on wide swathes of people who have a fixed income, disruption in foreign trade, and certainly a gap between classes.”

Cooperation with Parliament

The legislative and executive branches share a “commitment which is working to safeguard the country's sacred values, serve people and promote principles such as justice, respecting national dignity and removing deprivations."

Tags: 2013, Ahmadinejad, Budget, Economy, Iran, Majlis, Nuclear, Parliament, Sanctions, Subsidies, Subsidy

The Islamists Are Coming

The Islamists Are Coming, edited by Robin Wright, surveys the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region more than any other political bloc. Yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.

United States Institute of Peace

The Iran Primer