Iran Primer's Blog

Hagel’s Past Comments on Iran

January 8, 2013 | 11:27am

On January 7, President Obama nominated former Senator Chuck Hagel to be the Secretary of Defense during his second term. The following are comments by Senator Hagel on Iran since 2005.

“War with Iran is not inevitable, but U.S. national security would be seriously threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran… Our position is fully consistent with the policy of presidents for more than a decade of keeping all options on the table, including the use of military force, thereby increasing pressure on Iran while working toward a political solution. Since the consequences of a military attack are so significant for U.S. interests, we seek to ensure that the spectrum of objectives, as well as potential consequences, is understood.” Sept. 28, 2012 in a co-authored op-ed for The Washington Post

“You cannot push the Iranians into a corner where they can’t get out…You’ve got to find some quiet ways – and you don’t do this in the press or by giving speeches – to give them a couple of face saving ways out of this thing so they get something out of this, too…”

“I don’t think that we are necessarily locked into one of two options. And that’s the way it’s presented. We are great in this country and in our politics of responding to false choices; we love false choices.” March 9, 2012 in an interview with Al-Monitor

“The United States should open a new strategic direction in U.S.-Iran relations by seeking direct, comprehensive and unconditional talks with the government of Iran, including opening a U.S. Interest Section in Tehran. We must avoid backing ourselves into a military conflict with Iran. That need not happen, but it can be a self-fulfilling prophecy.” June 26, 2008 to the The Brookings Institution

“Regime change is desirable, but that should not be our objective. Bilateral talks with Iran would have no conditions and there would be no illusions that progress would be quick or easy, if progress is even possible…”

“In making such an offer to Iran, America would be squarely placing the burden on Iran’s rulers to respond to the opportunity for a new relationship with the United States. Let them think about the substantial carrots of improved relations, not just the sticks, and there may be a deal to be had.” March 25, 2008 in his co-authored book with Peter Kaminsky, “America: Our Next Chapter: Tough Questions, Straight Answers”

“Our differences with Iran are real. Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism and continues to provide material support to Hezbollah and Hamas. The president of Iran publically threatens Israel’s existence and is attempting to develop the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. Iran has not helped stabilize the current chaos in Iraq and is responsible for weapons and explosives being used against U.S. military forces there…”

“We must be clear that our objections are to the actions and policies of the Iranian government, not the Iranian people, and that improved Iran-U.S. relations are a real possibility.” Nov. 8, 2007 to the Center for Strategic and International Studies

“Unilateral sanctions rarely ever work. I just don't think the unilateral approach and giving war speeches helps the situation. It will just drive the Iranians closer together…It escalates the danger of a military confrontation.”

“I certainly think engagement is critical … direct engagement... That’s what great powers do.” Oct. 25, 2007 in his weekly news conference

“Now is the time for the United States to active consider when and how to offer direct, unconditional, and comprehensive talks with Iran. The offer should be made even as we continue to work with our allies on financial pressure, in the U.N. Security Council on a third sanctions resolution, and in the region to support those Middle East countries who share our concerns with Iran...” Oct. 17, 2007 in an alleged private letter to President Bush published by Steven Clemons

“There will be no lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear threat until the broader interests of Iran, the U.S., the region and the world are addressed.”

“We must carefully think through the Iranian challenge - unlike how we proceeded in Iraq. A military option is not a long-term solution to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Attacking Iran and destroying its nuclear facilities would not destroy Iran's ability and knowledge to come back at nuclear capability again and again.” May 8, 2006 in an op-ed for the Financial Times

“To further comment on it would be complete speculation, but I would say that a military strike against Iran, a military option, is not a viable, feasible, responsible option.”

“I believe a political settlement will be the answer. Not a military settlement. All these issues will require a political settlement.” April 13, 2006 at a news conference

“Any lasting solution to Iran’s nuclear weapons program will also require the United States’ direct discussions with Iran. The United States is capable of engaging Iran in direct dialogue without sacrificing any of its interests or objectives.” Nov. 15, 2005 to the Council on Foreign Relations

Tags: Defense, Diplomacy, Hagel, Iran, Negotiations, Nuclear, Terrorism, United States

New Penalties on Iran in Defense Bill

January 7, 2013 | 9:55am

On January 3, President Barack Obama signed a $633 billion defense bill for fiscal year 2013. The comprehensive appropriations bill will help “ensure the United States will continue to have the strongest military in the world,” Obama said.

The legislation also contained tightened sanctions on Iran’s energy, shipbuilding and shipping sectors for producing revenue used for nuclear proliferation. In the bill, Congress expressed support for the Iranian people’s efforts to build a democratic political system and access information freely. The following are excerpts from the bill related to Iran, followed by a link to the full text.

Subtitle C—Matters Relating to Iran

SEC. 1231. REPORT ON UNITED STATES CAPABILITIES IN RELATION

TO CHINA, NORTH KOREA, AND IRAN.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than March 31, 2014, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the

commanders of the relevant geographical and functional combatant commands, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on United States capabilities in relation to the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and the Republic of Iran…

SEC. 1233. SENSE OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN.

It is the sense of Congress that the United States should be prepared to take all necessary measures, including military action if required, to prevent Iran from threatening the United

States, its allies, or Iran’s neighbors with a nuclear weapon.

SEC. 1234. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the use of force against Iran.

Subtitle D—Iran Sanctions

SEC. 1241. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘Iran Freedom and Counter-

Proliferation Act of 2012’’…

SEC. 1243. SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY IRAN.

(a) FINDING.—Congress finds that the interests of the United States and international peace are threatened by the ongoing and destabilizing actions of the Government of Iran, including its massive, systematic, and extraordinary violations of the human rights of its own citizens.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that

the United States should—

(1) deny the Government of Iran the ability to continue to oppress the people of Iran and to use violence and executions against pro-democracy protestors and regime opponents;

(2) fully and publicly support efforts made by the people of Iran to promote the establishment of basic freedoms that build the foundation for the emergence of a freely elected,

open, and democratic political system;

(3) help the people of Iran produce, access, and share information freely and safely via the Internet and through other media; and

(4) defeat all attempts by the Government of Iran to jam

or otherwise obstruct international satellite broadcast signals.

SEC. 1244. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE

ENERGY, SHIPPING, AND SHIPBUILDING SECTORS OF

IRAN.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Iran’s energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors and Iran’s ports are facilitating the Government of Iran’s nuclear proliferation activities by providing revenue to support proliferation activities…

(A) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of any person described in paragraph

(2) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United

States person.

(B) EXCEPTION.—The requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under subparagraph (A) shall not include the authority to impose sanctions on the importation of goods…

(e) HUMANITARIAN EXCEPTION.—The President may not impose sanctions under this section with respect to any person for conducting or facilitating a transaction for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran or for the provision of humanitarian assistance to the people of Iran…

SEC. 1245. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE SALE,

SUPPLY, OR TRANSFER OF CERTAIN MATERIALS TO OR

FROM IRAN.

(a) SALE, SUPPLY, OR TRANSFER OF CERTAIN MATERIALS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) with respect to a person if the President determines that the person knowingly, on or after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, sells, supplies, or transfers,

directly or indirectly, to or from Iran—

(A) a precious metal;

(B) a material described in subsection (d) determined pursuant to subsection (e)(1) to be used by Iran as described in that subsection;

(i) the material is—

(I) to be used in connection with the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran or any

sector of the economy of Iran determined pursuant to subsection (e)(2) to be controlled directly or indirectly by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps;

(II) sold, supplied, or transferred to or from an Iranian person included on the list of specially

designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury (other than an Iranian financial institution described in subsection

(b)); or

(III) determined pursuant to subsection (e)(3) to be used in connection with the nuclear, military, or ballistic missile programs of Iran; or

(ii) the material is resold, retransferred, or otherwise

supplied—

(I) to an end-user in a sector described in

subclause (I) of clause (i);

(II) to a person described in subclause (II)

of that clause; or

(III) for a program described in subclause (III)

of that clause.

(2) EXCEPTION.—The requirement to impose sanctions under paragraph (1) shall not include the authority to impose sanctions relating to the importation of goods under paragraph

(8)(A) or (12) of section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996,

and any sanction relating to the importation of goods shall

not count for purposes of the requirement to impose sanctions

under paragraph (1).

(b) IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS DESCRIBED.—An Iranian financial institution described in this subsection is an Iranian financial institution that has not been designated for the imposition of sanctions in connection with—

(1) Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or

delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction;

(2) Iran’s support for international terrorism; or

(3) Iran’s abuses of human rights…

SEC. 1247. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT FACILITATE FINANCIAL

TRANSACTIONS ON BEHALF OF SPECIALLY DESIGNATED

NATIONALS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in this section, the President shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that the President determines has, on or after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly facilitated a significant financial transaction on behalf of any Iranian person included on the list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury (other than an Iranian financial institution described in subsection (b)).

(1) Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or

delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction;

(2) Iran’s support for international terrorism; or

(3) Iran’s abuses of human rights…

SEC. 1248. IMPOSITIONS OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN BROADCASTING.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting has contributed to the infringement of individuals’ human rights by broadcasting forced televised confession and show trials.

(2) In March 2012, the European Council imposed sanctions on the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Ezzatollah Zargami, for broadcasting forced confessions of

detainees and a series of ‘‘show trials’’ in August 2009 and December 2011 that constituted a clear violation of international law with respect to the right to a fair trial and due process.

(b) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall, after the date of

the enactment of this Act—

(A) impose sanctions described in section 105(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8514(c)) with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting and the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Ezzatollah Zargami; and

(B) include the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting and the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Ezzatollah Zargami, on the list of specially designated

nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury.

(2) EXCEPTION.—The requirement to impose sanctions under paragraph (1)(A) shall not include the authority to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

Click here for the full text of the bill.

Tags: Defense, Human Rights, Iran, Nuclear, Sanctions, U.S. Policy, U.S. Policy

Iran’s Economy Faces Grim 2013

January 3, 2013 | 1:01pm

Kevan Harris

What is the state of Iran’s economy in 2013 compared to a year ago?

Iran's economy enters 2013 significantly worse than a year ago, particularly with higher inflation and unemployment than at the beginning of 2012. The rial also plunged from around 11,000 to the dollar at the beginning of 2012 down to between 22,500 and 31,000 at the beginning of 2013, depending on the type of transaction. The past year was probably the most tumultuous economically for Iran since 1994, when an external debt crisis triggered a serious inflationary shock and a recession.

At the outset of 2012, many Iranians expected another economic shock due to the growing array of sanctions on Tehran’s oil sales and financial transactions led by the United States and European Union. In 2013, many now expect the international economic cordon to be further tightened. The 2012 squeeze did not produce a hyperinflationary spiral, but annual overall inflation in 2012 was estimated to hit between 40 percent and 60 percent, according to Iran’s business media. Tehran was forced to limit foreign exchange transactions and the export of strategic goods in response to the effect of sanctions on Iran’s currency market.

Due to sanctions, Iran's oil exports were also basically cut in half in 2012, from 2.3 million barrels a day at the beginning of 2012 down to around 1 million barrels a day at year’s end, according to the International Energy Agency. The accumulated impact of revenue declines is likely to produce two additional problems in 2013.

First, the national budget deficit is expected to increase to around 30 percent of the current budget (in the Persian year ending in March 2013), which means that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will be forced next year to cut spending, raise revenue, and prop up state banks with new cash injections. Iran’s parliament wants to put as much control over the government budget as it can, since many members of parliament contend that Ahmadinejad's use of revenue is opaque at best.

Second, further changes in subsidies for basic commodities—which date back to hardships during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s—are on hold. Ahmadinejad introduced changes to this subsidy program over 2011-2012, including liberalization of some prices combined with monthly stipends for the entire Iranian population. But he only got through one round of subsidy cuts before Iran’s parliament halted further increases in fuel prices as well as higher stipends. Inflation had whittled away the benefits of both, although the idea is not dead.

Iranian economists are divided about subsidy reforms. Some think the subsidy cutbacks generated an inflationary shock at a time that the domestic economy—both the manufacturing and agricultural sectors—were unprepared for higher production and raw material costs that they then either had to absorb or pass along to consumers. So sanctions were not the only driver of inflation in 2012.

Other economists are more sanguine about the reforms, given the difficulties of enacting any economic policy changes in Iran. The ill-effects are temporary, they contend, and many other developing countries use stipends as part of their welfare programs. A diplomatic solution about Iran’s controversial nuclear program over the next year, they say, would lessen the pain and other subsidies could then be removed.

What is the debate within the government over what to do about the current economic situation?

The admission of economic woes by most of Iran’s political class has opened up space for debate over economic policy. Some officials, including the president, now argue that reducing Iran’s reliance on oil revenues, a byproduct of international sanctions, is a blessing in disguise. Private sector representatives in Iran’s Chamber of Commerce counter that they could manage the economy better than the state does. Both claims are seriously exaggerated, but the rival positions reflect the political impact of the deepening economic crisis in a presidential election year.

A viable solution may depend less on economic policy than on the outcome of Iran’s negotiations on its nuclear program, several Iranian officials have admitted publicly. Iranian officials are now gearing up for talks with the world’s major powers—the so-called P5+1—from the United States, Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia. Iranian negotiators want sanctions relief in exchange for any concessions limiting its nuclear program.

How much influence does the economic situation have on the presidential election due in June 2013?

The economy will clearly be one of the main issues in the election. Unlike many developing countries, however, Iran does not have a large external debt. It has a porous, open economy, which helps the country's 79 million people deal with the negative effects of financial sanctions. So the situation is not yet dire. But people may vote for a candidate who they believe can actually get something done in the economic arena.

Many candidates will likely run against Ahmadinejad—notably his economic policies—even though he is not allowed to run again under a constitutional limit of two consecutive terms. Across the political spectrum, Ahmadinejad’s administration is now widely associated with failed policies and gross mismanagement. In 2012, most conservative media blasted the president and his staff for Iran’s growing economic woes.

Indeed, Iran’s economic policy debate has often served as a cover for political criticism since the 1979 revolution. The 2013 presidential election will almost certainly follow the same pattern, given growing economic woes and the linking of their alleviation with a resolution of the nuclear issue.

Kevan Harris, a post-doctoral research associate at Princeton University’s Department of Near Eastern Studies, visited Iran in October 2012.

Read Kevan Harris' chapter on the bazaar in "The Iran Primer"

*Photograph of the Tajrish bazaar provided by Wikimedia Commons.

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Tags: 2013, Currency, Economy, Election, Inflation, Iran, Oil, President, Rial, Sanctions, Subsidies, Subsidy

Kerry’s Past Comments on Iran

December 21, 2012 | 4:48pm

On December 21, President Barack Obama nominated Senator John Kerry to be the Secretary of State during his second term. The following are comments by Senator Kerry on Iran since 2004.

“If I can just say to you and to the people of Israel: I hope there is no doubt about President Obama's seriousness and commitment that Iran should not have and cannot have a nuclear weapon. The President has made it clear that he is not talking about containment he is talking about prevention." May 1, 2012 to Israeli President Shimon Peres

“I join this debate because the nuclear issue with Iran is deadly serious business. It should invite sobriety and thoughtfulness, not sloganeering and sound bites. The stakes are far too high for it to become just another applause line on the stump. Idle talk of war only helps Iran by spooking the tight oil market and increasing the price of the Iranian crude that pays for its nuclear program.” March 7, 2012 in an op-ed for The Washington Post

“Iran is also divided internally and isolated diplomatically like never before. Iran’s most important ally, Syria, is facing regime collapse, which a former director of Israel’s Mossad recently said could be a bigger strategic setback for Iran than a military strike against it.” March 6, 2012 in a Senate floor statement

“In the Middle East, China's interests are threatened as much as ours are by Iran's nuclear ambitions. Iran is China's third largest supplier of oil, and a war in the Persian Gulf would wreak havoc on China's economy. The United States and China need to pool our economic and political leverage to convince Iran to abandon its illicit nuclear activities and end its defiance of the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency.” Feb. 22, 2012 in an op-ed for the San Francisco Chronicle

“This accord [the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] imposes no restriction on our ability to defend ourselves. In fact, the administration has been clear that we will not be limited in any way in plans to continue to build missile defenses to protect America from Iran and North Korea.” May 25, 2010 in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on strategic arms control

“The Bush administration [argument of] no enrichment was ridiculous . . . because it seemed so unreasonable to people… It was bombastic diplomacy. It was wasted energy. It sort of hardened the lines, if you will… They [Iranians] have a right to peaceful nuclear power and to enrichment in that purpose.” Early June 2009 in an interview with the Financial Times

"I don't have time [to visit Iran] and we were not able to make arrangements in the short time span we had but I would be willing to go…at the appropriate time, at some point.” Dec. 15, 2006 to reporters in Cairo, Egypt

“I think the United States should have offered the opportunity to provide the nuclear fuel, test them [the Iranians], see whether or not they were actually looking for it for peaceful purposes. If they weren't willing to work a deal, then we could have put sanctions together. The president did nothing.” Sept. 30, 2004 in a foreign policy debate with former President George W. Bush

Tags: China, Iran, North Korea, Nuclear, Sanctions, U.S. Policy

More U.S. Sanctions for Proliferation

December 21, 2012 | 1:41pm

On December 21, the U.S. Treasury froze the assets of four Iranian companies and one executive for links to Tehran’s missile and nuclear programs. SAD Import Export Company was also sanctioned for supplying weapons to Syria’s government, which is cracking down on its civilian population. The United States will “hold Iran accountable for its failure to meet its international non-proliferation obligations and to expose its support of the Assad regime’s violence,” said Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. U.S. companies were also barred from doing business with these Iranian entities. The following are excerpts from the U.S. Treasury’s announcement.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated four companies and one individual pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters. The SAD Import Export Company, Chemical Industries and Development of Materials Group, and Marine Industries Organization were designated for their ties to Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) or Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Mustafa Esbati, the director of Marine Industries Organization, was also designated today. In addition, Doostan International Company was designated for its support to Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) which was identified as a WMD proliferator by the President in the Annex to E.O. 13382. The United Nations Sanctions Committee also designated the SAD Import Export Company yesterday under the U.N. asset freeze authority of Security Council Resolution 1737 dealing with Iran.

DIO has been linked by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) to Iran’s centrifuge production and was previously designated in March 2007 pursuant to E.O. 13382 for its involvement in the Iranian nuclear program. DIO is also identified in the Annex to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737. In addition to its involvement in Iran’s WMD program, DIO has been used by the Iranian government to assist the Asad regime’s violent crackdown in Syria. SAD Import Export Company shipped weapons to the Syrian Armed Forces, on behalf of DIO. These shipments were designed to assist the Syrian government’s production of mortars and missiles, which have been used against the civilian population of Syria…

These designations generally prohibit transactions between the named entities and any U.S. person, and freeze any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction. The designations of these entities and individual under E.O. 13382 also carry consequences under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA). As of today’s actions, foreign financial institutions that facilitate significant transactions or provide significant financial services for the sanctioned entities and individual can face the loss of their access to the U.S. financial system.

SAD Import Export Company

SAD Import Export Company was designated pursuant E.O. 13382 for acting on behalf of DIO.

In addition to shipping arms to the Syrian armed forces in 2011, SAD Import Export sent aluminum and other goods, on behalf of DIO, to Syria’s Mechanical Construction Factory, a front company for the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC). The goods were part of a larger contract between DIO and other Syria’s Industrial Establishment for Defense to provide fuel, fuses, charges, aluminum, and other goods necessary for the production of full mortar projectiles to Syria. In 2010, SAD Import Export Company shipped materials and equipment to Syria’s Mechanical Construction Factory for the ultimate benefit of the SSRC, on behalf of DIO. These goods were likely used in the manufacture of solid propellant for rockets and missiles.

The SSRC was listed in the Annex to E.O. 13382 in June 2005 for its ties to Syria’s WMD proliferation activities. The SSRC is the Syrian government agency responsible for developing and producing non-conventional weapons and the missiles to deliver them. The SSRC also has a public civilian research function; however, its activities focus on the development of biological weapons, chemical weapons, and missiles.

Marine Industries Organization

Marine Industries Organization was designated pursuant to E.O. 13882 because it is owned or controlled by Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).

MODAFL was designated under E.O. 13382 on October 25, 2007 for its WMD proliferation-related activities. Marine Industries Organization is responsible for marine military acquisitions for Iran’s Navy, as well as MODAFL and Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Mustafa Esbati

Mustafa Esbati was designated pursuant to E.O. 13882 because he acts on behalf of Marine Industries Organization, by virtue of his position as the Director of Marine Industries Organization.

Chemical Industries and Development of Materials Group

Iran’s Chemical Industries and Development of Materials Group (CIDMG) was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 because it is owned or controlled by DIO. CIDMG is one of the major industries overseen by DIO. CIDMG produces military and civil chemical products and materials for the production of powders, propellant charges, and mine explosive materials.

Doostan International Company

Doostan International Company was designated pursuant to E.O. 13882 for providing services to Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). AIO is the Iranian organization that oversees all of Iran’s missile industries, including those involved in Iran’s ballistic missile program, and was listed in the Annex to E.O. 13382.

Tags: Iran, Military, Sanctions, Syria, Treasury, U.S. Policy, U.S. Policy

The Islamists Are Coming

The Islamists Are Coming, edited by Robin Wright, surveys the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region more than any other political bloc. Yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.

United States Institute of Peace

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