The Iran Primer

 

            International concern over Iran’s nuclear intentions escalated in August 2002, after an Iranian dissident group revealed a secret uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water facility at Arak. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) launched an investigation into Iran’s nuclear program. In November 2003, the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency determined that for the previous 18 years, Iran had secretly developed technologies to produce highly enriched uranium. The IAEA reported that Iran had failed to declare several of its nuclear-related activities as required by the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

 

            In October 2003, during the IAEA investigation, Britain, France and Germany negotiated an agreement with Iran known as the Tehran Declaration. The Islamic Republic agreed to voluntarily suspend uranium enrichment during negotiations over its nuclear program, fully cooperate with the IAEA, and implement an additional protocol to build confidence in its peaceful nuclear intentions. A key part of the deal was Iran’s agreement to provide details on its secret program over the previous 18 years. But negotiations stalled in February 2005 over Iran’s right to uranium enrichment. The United States and the European powers wanted Iran to permanently relinquish uranium enrichment; Iran said it would not stop a process granted to all signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Tehran claimed the demand challenged its sovereign rights.

 

           Tensions that ultimately led to U.N. sanctions began in 2005. After negotiations with Britain, France and Germany broke down, Iran resumed its uranium enrichment program in mid-2005 under newly-elected President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The IAEA Board of Governors voted in February 2006 to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council for non-compliance with the NPT, which Iran had signed in 1968. On July 31, 2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1696, the first of what grew into six resolutions demanding that Iran cooperate with the IAEA and stop enriching uranium. Iran indicated a willingness to negotiate, but refused to suspend enrichment.

 

            The Security Council passed Resolution1696 by a 14 to 1 vote on July 31, 2006. The resolution demanded that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities within one month. Itdid not impose sanctions, but vowed that the Security Council would adopt “appropriate measures” if Iran failed to comply. Russia expressed concern that the resolution could be interpreted as authorization for the eventual use of military force against Iran. The final resolution addressed this issue by specifying that the council was acting under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter, which empowers it to use measures not involving the use of armed force to enact its decisions. Qatar voted against the resolution after voicing concern about its potential effects on Middle East stability in the middle of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war in Lebanon.

 

            Iran called the resolution unlawful, destructive and unwarranted. Its U.N. envoy noted that Iran’s supreme leader had issued a religious decree in August 2005 against the development, production, stockpiling or use of nuclear weapons. He said nuclear weapons had no place in Iran’s military doctrine. Tehran did not comply with the resolution’s deadline.

 

 

            In response, the Iranian foreign ministry spokesman warned that cooperation with the IAEA would worsen. And Iran’s U.N. ambassador accused the Security Council of attempting to force Iran to abandon its rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. He said the council should instead focus its attention on Israel, which had not rejected the use of nuclear weapons or declared its secret program.

 

 

 

            The Security Council passed Resolution 1803 on March 3, 2008 by a vote of 14-0-1 after intense debate. A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate issued in December 2007 concluded “with high confidence” that Iran’s nuclear program had been suspended in the fall of 2003. As a result, several council members initially questioned the need for further sanctions against Iran. Libya, South Africa, Indonesia and Vietnam were especially hesitant to pursue new punitive measures, arguing that Iran had begun to cooperate with IAEA inspections. However, U.S. and European officials wanted to tighten existing measures because of Iran’s failure to comply with earlier resolutions.

 

            Resolution 1803 contained several suggested measures for member states, but few mandatory actions. It called on states to “exercise vigilance” when providing export credits, guarantees and insurance to Iranian entities. It also called on states to voluntarily limit their interaction with Iranian banks operating in their territories. The resolution specifically urged states to cut ties with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, which the United States accused of providing financial services for Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, in addition to facilitating money transfers to terrorist organizations. Resolution 1803 subjected 13 individuals and 12 companies to travel restrictions and asset freezes. Finally, it authorized inspections of air and sea cargo traveling to or from Iran if “reasonable grounds” suggested the vessel was transporting illicit materials.

 

           Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country, abstained from the vote on Resolution 1803. Iran’s Ambassador to the IAEA called the resolution “irresponsible,” and described the agency’s information on its nuclear program as “forged and fabricated.”

 

 

 

            Resolution 1929 passed on June 9, 2010 by a 12-2-1vote, after months of intense and sometimes bitter diplomacy. Negotiations over the resolution followed two key events: First, revelations in September 2009 that Iran had built a secret uranium enrichment facility at Qom. And second, Tehran’s rejection in October 2009 of a deal designed both to meet Iran’s pressing medical needs and serve as a confidence-building measure to allow time for negotiations over the long-term nuclear controversy. The plan called for Iran to send uranium enriched at a low-level to Russia for further enrichment and then to France to be turned into nuclear fuel rods. Iran would receive the finished rods, which would be extremely difficult to use in a nuclear weapon, but would fulfill its energy and research needs. After Iran rejected the offer, U.S. and European officials pushed for new sanctions. Russia and China initially balked, but ultimately agreed to support a new resolution – the first under President Barack Obama. In last-ditch diplomacy, Turkey and Brazil won Iran’s approval for a modified “fuel swap” arrangement, but key nations said the deal fell short because it did not account for the near doubling of Iran’s enriched uranium since October 2009. Turkey and Brazil opposed the resolution, and Lebanon abstained.

 

            Resolution 1929 required U.N. member states to prevent the transfer of missile-related technology to Iran. It prohibited Iran from acquiring commercial interest in uranium mining or producing nuclear materials in other countries. It enhanced previous travel sanctions by requiring states to prevent designated individuals from entering their territories, and calls on states to inspect ships bound to or from Iran if they suspect banned cargo is aboard. The resolution especially targeted the Revolutionary Guards and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), a state-owned shipping conglomerate that was allegedly involved in transporting items related to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile development. It called on the international community to refuse financial and insurance services to both the IRGC and IRISL. Finally, it urged member states to ban new branches of all Iranian banks in their countries and prevent financial institutions operating in their territories from doing business in Iran.

 

            In addition to imposing new sanctions, the Security Council listed several proposed areas of cooperation with which it would be willing to engage Iran to end the nuclear impasse. The proposal, which was initially presented to Tehran by the permanent five Security Council members plus Germany in mid-2008, offered several energy, economic, agricultural, civil aviation, political and humanitarian incentives, if Tehran agreed to verifiably suspend uranium enrichment. Iran’s U.N. ambassador responded that no amount of pressure would break his nation’s determination to pursue its legal and inalienable right to enrichment.