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"Suffering" in Iran Nearly Doubles to 26%
September 29, 2011 | 10:43am
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Gallup poll reports "suffering" in Iran has nearly doubled, up from 14% in 2008 to 26% in 2011. One factor that may play into this increase is the lack of good jobs, as Gallup finds unemployment in the country above 15% and underemployment exceeding 35%.
Gallup classifies respondents worldwide as "thriving," "struggling," or "suffering" according to how they rate their current and future lives on a ladder scale with steps numbered from 0 to 10 based on the Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale.
The percentage of people suffering in Iran is in the higher range of what Gallup found worldwide in 2010, and on par with levels seen last year in Haiti (27%), Central African Republic (26%), and Cambodia (23%) and this year in Greece (25%). Additionally, 55% of Iranians are struggling, while 20% are thriving. When Gallup first measured wellbeing globally in 2005, 12% in Iran were suffering, while 64% were struggling and 24% were thriving.
Gallup research finds that significant increases in suffering or substantial decreases in thriving often can be leading indicators for civil unrest. Most recently, Gallup found considerable drops in thriving in Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain and a significant increase in suffering in Greece.
In addition, wellbeing worldwide is highly correlated with the percentage of the workforce employed full time for an employer. In Iran, that percentage ranges from 20% to 29%. This lack of good jobs adds to the other political challenges Iran faces, including sanctions from much of the developed world.
The official statistics from the Iranian government put unemployment at about 15%. Gallup finds unemployment in Iran exceeding 15%, and among the highest rates in the world. Further, adding the percentage of the workforce who works part time but wants full-time work puts underemployment in Iran above 35%, which is also one of the highest rates in the world. Gallup also finds that more than 50% of people surveyed in Iran are not in the workforce, meaning they are either students, homemakers, retired, or people who have stopped looking for work.
Bottom Line
Joblessness not only negatively affects gross national wellbeing, but also negatively influences gross national product. As the country engages in the coming war for good jobs, Iran finds itself falling behind.
Read more at GALLUP.com. For complete data sets or custom research from the more than 150 countries Gallup continually surveys, contact SocialandEconomicAnalysis@gallup.com or call 202.715.3030.
Parliament’s Evolving Role
September 28, 2011 | 8:04am
Interview with Ali Reza Eshraghi
Ali Reza Eshraghi was a senior editor at several of Iran’s reformist dailies. He is currently editor of Iran programs at the Institute for War and Peace Reporting and a Rotary World Peace fellow in the Department of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
This is the ninth in a series on parliamentary elections due in March 2012:
- How has parliament’s political role—and authority--been affected by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency?
Revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini said “Majles is at the helm of affairs,” a mantra long used to underscore the importance of the Iranian Parliament. But Ahmadinejad has openly challenged the balance of political power in the Islamic Republic.
His position has not gained wide traction. Yet the president has managed to undermine parliament's authority by refusing to implement new legislation or interpreting them as he pleases. The subsidy reform legislation is one example; it is being implemented far faster than envisioned by the parliament.
- How does parliament’s role today compare to the reformist period under President Mohammad Khatami?
Both parliamentary sessions were raucous in their deliberations but ultimately failed to assert their authority in rivalries with other institutions, such as the Guardian Council.
But a key difference lies in the level of deference or even obedience shown to the supreme leader. During the reform era between 1997 and 2005, 135 lawmakers wrote a bold letter to Ayatollah Khamenei asking him to "drink the poison goblet" and give into political reform. In contrast, the current parliament has turned into a "branch of the supreme leader’s office," according to conservative lawmaker Ali Motahari. Many lawmakers base their vote on what expectations of Khamenei’s wishes.
During the reformist era, unelected institutions– such as the Guardian Council and the judiciary—blocked all efforts by lawmakers to reform laws and political institutions. But the reformists continued to try. In contrast, the current parliament’s conflicts are mostly with the executive branch.
Parliament is clearly unhappy with Ahmadinejad’s conduct in refusing to implement laws. In May, 100 lawmakers demanded that Ahmadinejad be summoned for questioning. But parliament has lacked the will to pressure the administration to change its ways. For example, parliament impeached two of Ahmadinejad’s cabinet ministers, but eight other impeachment attempts failed as lawmakers withdrew their signatures from the motions. The high number of reversals set a record in the Islamic Republic’s eight parliamentary sessions. Many current lawmakers have also declined to oppose Ahmadinejad out of fear that it would benefit their common enemy—the reformist opposition.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei has also been reluctant to back parliament against the president—so far. The motion to question Ahmadinejad had sufficient numbers, but was set aside by the parliamentary leadership due to the lack of Khamenei’s support.
- What are the key issues triggering tensions between the presidency and parliament?
The clash between the administration and the majority of Majles lawmakers is complicated. Initially, the conservative bloc had no choice but to endorse Ahmadinejad in both the 2005 and 2009 presidential elections. Many saw him as the only candidate who could bring in enough votes to counter reformists.
But since coming to power, Ahmadinejad and his cohorts have tried to become independent players in Iranian politics. The president’s allies have even claimed that the vote he received in the national election was independent of conservative allies and was instead based on his own popular appeal. Conservatives are now worried that they will be pushed aside by Ahmadinejad.
- How are Iran’s diverse factions preparing for the parliamentary elections?
There are still 6 months left until the parliamentary elections and political dynamics remain fluid. The shifting balance of power in Iran may also create new alliances. Still, chances for reformist participation are slim. Reformists, many of whom are considered part of the Green Movement opposition, are demanding free and fair elections as well as release of political prisoners. Khamenei has so far resisted all their demands. But reformists are still likely to generate some noise in the months leading up to the elections.
Hadi Khamenei—the supreme leader’s brother—is expected to be named president of the Coordination Council for Reformist Parties, a rotating position. This choice shows that the reformists plan to at least symbolically confront the ruling conservative bloc.
- What role will the Guardian Council play in the 2012 election? Do you expect it to vary from the past?
In 2009, the Guardian Council and Interior Ministry cooperated to affirm disputed presidential election results. But the two bodies are currently controlled by competing sides: the Interior Ministry by the pro-Ahmadinejad allies and the Guardian Council by the conservatives.
Therefore, these two bodies may compete in the upcoming election to assure the victory of their respective sides. One will be doing it through its supervisory role by vetting of candidates and perhaps even disqualifying the votes on various grounds, and the other through the use of state funds and its numerous human resources as the body in charge of holding elections.
Online news media are welcome to republish original blog postings from this website in full, with a citation and link back to The Iran Primer website (www.iranprimer.com) as the original source. Any edits must be authorized by the author. Permission to reprint excerpts from The Iran Primer book should be directed to permissions@usip.org
Youth Game-Changers in Elections
September 26, 2011 | 8:11am
Kevan Harris
This is the eighth in a series on parliamentary elections due in March 2012:
- What role does Iran’s youth play in elections?
After the 1979 revolution, the voting age was lowered to 15 which automatically made youth important in elections. But since the mid-1990s, Iranian youth have been particularly pivotal to both the campaigns and turnout in major elections. Student organizations were critical to the birth of the reform movement, symbolized by the 1997 election of Mohammad Khatami as president. They operated as de facto campaign staffs in towns outside of Tehran, where Khatami was basically unknown.
The 1999 student protests in Tehran and elsewhere were sparked by the closure of a popular reformist newspaper. But they reflected widespread frustration, especially among new students in the expanded public and private university system, at the slow pace of political reform. The demonstrations were quelled but student activism laid the seeds for a national opposition movement a decade later.
In 2005, some student organizations called for a boycott of the presidential election, which was won by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in a second round of voting. In 2009, however, young Iranians were widely visible in the campaigns of reform candidates Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi — and in six months of street protests after the government announced Ahmadinejad had been reelected.
Iran does not have a system of political parties, so endorsements by student organizations with a nationwide network can be immensely important to any candidate.
- What role is Iranian youth or the activist generation likely to play in the 2012 parliamentary elections?
Iran’s young are not homogenous in their views or level of activism. On one end of the spectrum, many youth in the Basij militia supported Ahmadinejad in the 2009 election because they believed he represented their national interests. On the other end, young members of the Green Movement supported Mousavi for the same reasons. There are both engaged and apathetic youth—with the majority both, depending on the month. During the 2009 post-election protests, it was mostly young people that were beating up and shooting at other young people.
The debate for the 2012 parliamentary elections is largely about participation versus boycott. A central issue is whether voting in the election in turn bestows legitimacy on the entire political system. It is the subject of many conversations at dinner tables, coffee houses, and hookah bars all over Iran. People generally make up their minds about whether or not to vote right before the elections.
- What is the origin of the youth factor in Iran's politics?
The numerical importance of young Iranians dates from the early years of the revolution. During the monarchy’s final decade in the 1970s, Iran’s birth rate decreased moderately. But under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic regarded population control as a sort of Western conspiracy and encouraged large families in the early 1980s. The new government also viewed an expanding population as good for defense of the nation and the revolution, especially during the eight-year war with Iraq.
By 1980, the average number of children per family had risen to seven children. In 1986, the ratio of Iranians aged 0-4 to the rest of the population was the highest it had been in 30 years.
The growing numbers, particularly data in the 1986 Iranian census conducted while Mousavi was prime minister, began to alarm the political elite. The war- ravaged economy could not easily cover the costs of feeding, educating, housing and eventually employing the new baby boomers. With the voting age at 15, the young also loomed as a disproportionately decisive political factor in the post-war era.
After a vigorous public debate, the regime introduced an innovative family planning program in the late 1980s that included religious fatwas encouraging contraception and a lower family size. Family planning services, which covered prenatal health and marriage counseling, quickly expanded in Iran through the construction of village clinics and urban community centers. Growing literacy among females also contributed to raising the average age of marriage which also limited family sizes.
Iran's average birth rate witnessed an astounding decline down to two children by 2000. As a result, the demographic bulge from the 1980s has not been repeated. In 2007, the regime raised the voting age to 18. Yet that baby boom generation—now between its mid-twenties and early thirties in age— is in its prime in terms of education and jobs. (Many young Iranians enter university later than their Western counterparts.)
- How have political and economic issues evolved for Iran’s baby boom generation in ways that could impact elections?
Iran’s economy has not been able to absorb the baby boom generation, which is more educated and skilled than any previous Iranian generation. The Ahmadinejad government frequently discusses the issue of youth unemployment, but the large numbers of new jobs it promised have failed to materialize. And an already bloated public sector cannot hire all of the jobless youth either.
Iran's baby boom generation is well connected to global culture and technology. They are in turn transforming Iranian society. Religious music stores in Tehran offer hundreds of low-budget CDs and DVDs featuring famous devout young male singers. Several New Age styled self-help books have been translated from English into Persian. These are popular among young and educated individuals who reject heavy public displays of religiosity but want to retain spiritual ideas as part of their identity. The newly opened concert hall attached to Tehran's Milad Tower recently had its first heavy metal show, which sold out.
As this generation ages, Iran faces problems down the road of social security and health care. Iran’s major health issues are no longer tuberculosis or cholera but diseases of the elderly - high blood pressure, depression, diabetes and obesity. Although Iranians are living longer, the country's public health care system is not set up to handle these kinds of diseases, which are costlier to treat and require a more efficient and universal social safety net. These concerns are not far beneath the surface of Iranian politics already—and are likely to become more important with each future election.
Kevan Harris, who visited Iran in June, is a Ph.D. candidate in sociology at Johns Hopkins University and a 2011-12 USIP Jennings Randolph Peace Fellow. He writes a weblog called “The Thirsty Fish."
Online news media are welcome to republish original blog postings from this website (www.iranprimer.com) in full, with a citation and link back to The Iran Primer website (www.iranprimer.com) as the original source. Any edits must be authorized by the author. Permission to reprint excerpts from The Iran Primer book should be directed to permissions@usip.org
Obama on Release of American Hikers
September 21, 2011 | 5:12pm
Statement from the President
on the Release of Shane Bauer and Josh Fattal
I welcome the release of Shane Bauer and Josh Fattal from detention in Iran and am very pleased that they are being reunited with their loved ones. The tireless advocacy of their families over these two years has won my admiration, and is now coming to an end with Josh and Shane back in their arms. All Americans join their families and friends in celebrating their long-awaited return home.
We are deeply grateful to His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, the Swiss government, and to all our partners and allies around the world who have worked steadfastly over the past two years to secure the release of Shane and Josh.
###
Statement by Secretary Clinton
on the Release of Shane Bauer and Joshua Fattal
I join President Obama in welcoming the decision made by Iranian authorities to release Shane Bauer and Joshua Fattal from detention. After more than two years, they will finally be reunited with their friends and families.
I am grateful for the efforts of all those who have worked for their release, in particular the Swiss Protecting Power in Tehran, the Omani government, the Iraqi government, and the many other world leaders who have raised their voices in support, as well as those inside Iran who pushed for justice.
I am grateful for the efforts of all those who have worked for their release, in particular the Swiss Protecting Power in Tehran, the Omani government, the Iraqi government, and the many other world leaders who have raised their voices in support, as well as those inside Iran who pushed for justice.
###
Women Struggle in Parliament
September 20, 2011 | 9:19am
Interview with Fatemeh Haghighatjoo
By Semira N. Nikou
Dr. Fatemeh Haghighatjoo is a former member of Iran’s parliament (2000-2004). She is currently a visiting professor at the University of Massachusetts in Boston.
This is the seventh in a series on parliamentary elections due in March 2012:
- What role have women played in Iran's parliament since the 1979 revolution?
Women in parliament can be divided into two groups: those who have a feminist conscientiousness or awareness, and those who do not.
Once we, the reformists, won the election in 2000, we began having meetings and seminars with women’s rights activists. Our promise during the sixth parliament (between 2000 and 2004) was to change discriminatory laws against women.
There were women and men who defended women’s rights. On one bill related to women’s issues, one of our male colleagues told us, “It is important that as a member of the clergy, I defend this bill, rather than you women having to defend it.” So the sixth parliament had a very different atmosphere than subsequent parliaments.
Zahra Rahnavard—then president of Al Zahra University and wife of opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi—sponsored one of our seminars. It explored which women’s issues should be prioritized in parliament. All of the female MPs formed a caucus to address these issues. Even though some of the 13 women had values, they had all been elected on a reformist platform.
But women have played different roles since in the seventh (2004 to 2008) and eighth parliaments (since 2008). In both parliaments, women have been very patriarchal. Unfortunately, they have not challenged any gender inequalities that are justified in the name of Islam. For instance, they defend polygamy because they consider it an Islamic value. They also defend segregation and the gender division of labor.
In another example, Eshragh Shaegh—a representative from Tabriz in the seventh parliament—said that if ten prostitutes were executed, there would not be any more prostitution in the country since it would be considered too dangerous or criminal.
- Why did conservative women dominate the recent parliaments?
There is an unwritten rule that some women have to be candidates for parliamentary elections. Since the 1979 revolution, most political parties have included at least two women in their lists for Tehran and other large cities.
But the Guardian Council, which acts as a vetting body, banned reformists from participating in 2004 and 2008. More than 2,500 reformist candidates were disqualified. Only those seen as loyal to the regime were allowed to run. So conservative women won.
- What type of women--political affiliation, religious background, social class--generally run as candidates?
Non-Islamic women cannot run for parliamentary elections, which is the case for both men and women. Only those who are loyal to the regime and the supreme leader (velayat-e faqih) can participate. So from the ideological perspective, we can say that only religious women can run.
In terms of social background, we often see women from the middle class. For example, many teachers have run as candidates.
Some female candidates have also been relative to authorities, such as:
- Gohar Dastgheib (daughter of Grand Ayatollah Dastgheib)
- Ategheh Rajai (wife of former President MohammadAli Rajai)
- Faezeh Hashemi (daughter of former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani)
- Azam Taleghani (daughter of Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani)
- Jamileh Kadivar (wife of former minister Ata’ollah Mohajerani and sister of Mohsen Kadivar)
- Fatemeh Karoubi (wife of former speaker of Majles and opposition leader Mehdi Karoubi).
In politics, family ties are is important, and not just for women. For example, Mohammad Reza Khatami got the most votes in the sixth Majles because of his relation to the (then President) Mohammad Khatami. The two are brothers.
For example, Soheyla Jelodarzadeh (member of the fifth, sixth, and seventh parliaments) had no family connections. She represented the Islamic Labor Party (Hezb-e Eslamieh Kar) in parliament. I represented the Islamic Iran Participation Front (Jebheye Mosharekate Iran-e Eslami) as well as the student movement. I was active as a student, which led to my inclusion on the political list. In most cases you have to be supported by one of the political wings.
But Iran has also had independent women who do are not affiliated with a political party and do not have a family relation.
- Which women tend to get more votes?
It depends on the period. Different types of women have been voted into office, based on the atmosphere of society at the time.
For example, Faezeh Hashemi came in near the top of the list of candidates from Tehran in the fifth parliament (1996-2000) not just because she was the daughter of former President Rafsanjani, but because her campaign promises and personal actions—such as riding a bicycle—were attractive, particularly to young women.
But even though she did well in the fifth parliament election, she lost in the next election]. She played the family card; she ran as the daughter of Rafsanjani--a move that was not popular at the time.
- Why has the number of female parliamentarians decreased since 2004?
The role conservative women played in the seventh parliament (2004 to 2008) caused women to question whether female parliamentarians would in fact work in their favor. The patriarchal positions of conservative parliamentarians probably affected the voting pattern. As a result, Iran did not have female candidates who could represent women’s needs and issues in the seventh and eighth parliaments.
- What positions do female parliamentarians generally hold on issues affecting women—such as on divorce or controversial family laws?
Changes favoring women have often been drafted by female parliamentarians. As a general pattern, women in all parliaments have tried to liberalize the law—even if by a little bit-- in favor of women. Personal status laws, such as divorce laws, have been the main issues that female MPs have tried to revise. But each time they have only made minor changes. We still have not been able to bring equality in divorce.
The controversial family protection bill (that would allow men to marry additional women without the consent of their first wife, among other issues) introduced to the seventh parliament actually came from the government--the judiciary and the president's office.
The women’s movement in Iran has played an important role in influencing parliamentary positions on women’s issues, especially on the family protection bill. But female parliamentarians are not necessarily sympathetic toward the women’s movement. The women in the seventh parliament (2004 to 2008) and eighth parliament (since 2008) are very traditional; many support polygamy.
The women’s movement has been able to organize and speak with unity—from the secularists to the Islamists as well as from the left to the right—against issues such as polygamy, which would be allowed under the family protection bill. Why do you think the family protection bill of has been sitting in parliament for the past seven years? It has not passed because of the independent women’s movement’s opposition.
This women’s activism in society and the bottom-up pressure on the parliament and the clergy have been a success story for the independent women’s movement. They reflect how even the conservative parliament can be pushed toward policies favoring women.
Source: Duality by Design: The Iranian Electoral System published by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems.
Click here to read Iran's Revolutionary Guards Soar in Parliament
Online news media are welcome to republish original blog postings from this website in full, with a citation and link back to The Iran Primer website (www.iranprimer.com) as the original source. Any edits must be authorized by the author. Permission to reprint excerpts from The Iran Primer book should be directed to permissions@usip.org
The Islamists Are Coming
The Islamists Are Coming, edited by Robin Wright, surveys the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region more than any other political bloc. Yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.
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