IAEA Responds to Israeli Claims

May 1, 2018

IAEA FlagOn May 1, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) responded to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's claims about Iran's efforts to design, produce and test nuclear weapons. The IAEA statement pointed to its 2015 report that covered many of the same issues.  "The Agency’s overall assessment was that a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003," the IAEA said. "The Board of Governors declared that its consideration of this issue was closed." The following is the IAEA's statement and excerpts from the 2015 report.

 

The International Atomic Energy Agency

In December 2015, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano presented the Final Assessment on past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme to the IAEA Board of Governors.

In the report, the Agency assessed that, before the end of 2003, an organizational structure was in place in Iran suitable for the coordination of a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. Although some activities took place after 2003, they were not part of a coordinated effort. The Agency’s overall assessment was that a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003. The Agency also assessed that these activities did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities. The same report stated that the Agency had no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009. Based on the Director General’s report, the Board of Governors declared that its consideration of this issue was closed.

In line with standard IAEA practice, the IAEA evaluates all safeguards-relevant information available to it. However, it is not the practice of the IAEA to publicly discuss issues related to any such information.

May 1, 2018, in a statement

 

Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear Programme

F. Overall Assessment

77. Based on all the information available to the Agency relating to nuclear material acquisition, including from the particular verification activities specified under the Framework for Cooperation (including the managed access to the Gchine mine) and the JPA, the Agency has not found indications of an undeclared nuclear fuel cycle in Iran, beyond those activities declared retrospectively by Iran. The Agency assesses that any quantity of nuclear material that may have been available to Iran under the AMAD Plan would have been within the uncertainties associated with nuclear material accountancy and related measurements. 

78. Based on all the information available to it relating to nuclear components for an explosive device, the Agency has found no indications of Iran having conducted activities which can be directly traced to the ‘uranium metal document’ or to design information for a nuclear explosive device from the clandestine nuclear supply network.

79. The Agency assesses that explosive bridgewire (EBW) detonators developed by Iran have characteristics relevant to a nuclear explosive device. The Agency acknowledges that there is a growing use of EBW detonators for civilian and conventional military purposes. The Agency also assesses that the multipoint initiator (MPI) technology developed by Iran has characteristics relevant to a nuclear explosive device, as well as to a small number of alternative applications. 

80. Information available to the Agency in relation to hydrodynamic testing indicated that Iran made and installed a large cylinder at the Parchin military complex in 2000. Other information indicated that this cylinder matched the parameters of an explosives firing chamber featured in publications of the foreign expert. The information available to the Agency, including the results of the analysis of the samples and the satellite images, does not support Iran’s statements on the purpose of the building. Activities implemented under the Road-map have established that the cylinder is not in the main building of interest. The Agency assesses that the extensive activities undertaken by Iran since February 2012 at the particular location of interest to the Agency seriously undermined the Agency’s ability to conduct effective verification.

81. Based on all the information available to the Agency on modelling and calculations, including from the implementation of the Road-map, the Agency assesses that Iran conducted computer modelling of a nuclear explosive device prior to 2004 and between 2005 and 2009. The Agency notes, however, the incomplete and fragmented nature of those calculations. The Agency also notes the applicability of some hydrodynamic modelling to conventional military explosive devices.

82. The Agency has verified the existence in Iran of two of the workshops referred to in the alleged studies documentation on the integration into a missile delivery vehicle, but has not received any other information on this area since the 2011 Annex.

83. The Agency has not received information additional to that contained in the alleged studies documentation on conducting a test or on fuzing, arming and firing systems since the 2011 Annex.

84. The Agency assesses that, before the end of 2003, an organizational structure was in place in Iran suitable for the coordination of a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. Although some activities took place after 2003, they were not part of a coordinated effort.

85. The Agency’s overall assessment is that a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003. The Agency also assesses that these activities did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities. The Agency has no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009. 

G. Summary 

86. All the activities contained in the Road-map were implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule. Iran provided explanations in writing and related documents on past and present outstanding issues, the Agency submitted questions on ambiguities relating to Iran’s explanations and technical-expert meetings were held. The Agency conducted safeguards activities at particular locations of interest to the Agency, including at the Parchin site, and a wrap-up meeting was held. The implementation of the Road-map facilitated a more substantive engagement between the Agency and Iran. 

87. The Agency assesses that a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003. The Agency also assesses that these activities did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities. The Agency has no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009. 

88. The Agency has found no credible indications of the diversion of nuclear material in connection with the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. 

Read the full report here

 

Click here for information about Prime Minister Netanyahu's revelations about Iran's nuclear program. 

Click here for Iranian reactions to Israel's claims. 

Click here for Europe's response to Israeli allegations. 

Click here for the U.S. statements and remarks. 

Click here for responses from experts and former officials.