IAEA Report on Iran’s Compliance

June 2, 2016
By
Garrett Nada
On May 27, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran has been living up to its commitments as part of the nuclear deal, specifically as codified in U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231. In its second report on Tehran’s compliance, the U.N. nuclear watchdog said that Iran accepted additional inspectors and provided complementary access to sites and facilities under the Additional Protocol. The report, however, was short on specifics, according to David Albright, Serena Kelleher-Vergantini and Andrea Stricker from the Institute for Science and International Security. For example, the IAEA did not specify how much low enriched uranium Iran has or in what form. It also does not provide specifics on centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment plant or at the Fordo research center. The following are excerpts from the IAEA report.
 
Verification and Monitoring Activities
 
Activities Related to Heavy Water and Reprocessing
 
6. Iran has not pursued the construction of the existing Arak heavy water research reactor (IR-40 Reactor) based on its original design. Iran has not produced or tested natural uranium pellets, fuel pins or fuel assemblies specifically designed for the support of the IR-40 Reactor as originally designed, and all existing natural uranium pellets and fuel assemblies have remained in storage under continuous Agency monitoring (paras 3 and 10).
 
7. Iran has continued to inform the Agency about the inventory of heavy water in Iran and the production of heavy water at the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) and allowed the Agency to monitor the quantities of Iran’s heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced at the HWPP (para. 15). On 21 April 2016, the Agency verified the quantity of heavy water shipped out of Iran on 24 February 2016. On 9 May 2016, the Agency verified that Iran’s stock of heavy water had reached 116.7 metric tonnes. Throughout the reporting period, Iran had no more than 130 metric tonnes of heavy water (para. 14).
 
8. Iran has not carried out activities related to reprocessing at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility or at any of the other declared facilities (para. 18).
 
Activities Related to Enrichment and Fuel
 
9. At the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, 5060 IR-1 centrifuges have remained installed in 30 cascades in their configurations in the operating units at the time the JCPOA was agreed (para. 27). Iran has not withdrawn any IR-1 centrifuges from those held in storage (see para. 15 below) for the replacement of damaged or failed IR-1 centrifuges installed at FEP (para. 29.1).
 
10. Iran has continued the enrichment of UF6 at FEP. Throughout the reporting period, Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U–235 (para. 28).
 
11. Iran has recovered, under Agency monitoring, some of the enriched uranium that it had stated as recoverable from the process lines at the Enriched UO2 Powder Plant (EUPP) at Esfahan. On 23 and 24 April 2016, the Agency verified that the recovered quantity of uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 35.7 kg. Between 5 March and 8 May 2016, the Agency verified that Iran downblended 6.1 kg of uranium in the form of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 to the level of natural uranium and, between 16 and 24 May 2016, the Agency verified that Iran downblended 5.9 kg of uranium contained in liquid and solid scrap enriched up to 3.67% U-235 to the level of natural uranium.
 
13. Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile did not exceed 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56).
 
14. At the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), 1044 IR-1 centrifuges have been maintained in six cascades in one wing of the facility (para. 46); Iran has not conducted any uranium enrichment or related research and development (R&D) activities; and there has not been any nuclear material at the plant (para. 45).
 
15. All centrifuges and associated infrastructure in storage have remained under continuous Agency monitoring (paras 29, 47, 48 and 70).13 The Agency has continued to have regular access to relevant buildings at Natanz, including all of FEP and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment plant (PFEP), and performed daily access upon Agency request (para. 71).
 
16. Iran has conducted its enrichment activities in line with its long term enrichment and R&D enrichment plan, as provided to the Agency on 16 January 2016 (para. 52).
 
17. Iran has not operated any of its declared facilities for the purpose of re-converting fuel plates or scrap into UF6, nor has it informed the Agency that it has built any new facilities for such a purpose (para. 58).
 
Centrifuge Research & Development, Manufacturing and Inventory
 
18. No enriched uranium has been accumulated through enrichment R&D activities, and Iran’s enrichment R&D with and without uranium has been conducted using centrifuges within the limits defined in the JCPOA (paras 32–42).
 
19. Iran has provided declarations to the Agency, subsequent to those reported in the Director General’s previous report, of Iran’s production and inventory of centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows and permitted the Agency to verify the items in the inventory (para. 80.1). The Agency has conducted continuous monitoring, including through the use of containment and surveillance measures, and verified that the declared equipment has been used for the production of rotor tubes and bellows to manufacture centrifuges only for the activities specified in the JCPOA (para. 80.2). Iran has not produced any IR-1 centrifuges to replace those that have been damaged or failed (para. 62). All declared rotor tubes, bellows and rotor assemblies have been under continuous monitoring by the Agency, including those rotor tubes and bellows manufactured since Implementation Day (para. 70).
 
On 7 March 2016, the Agency verified Iran’s declaration that it had ceased manufacturing rotor tubes. In a letter dated 2 May 2016, Iran informed the Agency of its intention to resume the manufacture of rotor tubes. As of 22 May 2016, the Agency had verified that such manufacturing had not resumed. Verification by the Agency in relation to the manufacturing of rotors and bellows will take place at its next visit. Related technical discussions between the Agency and Iran have taken place.
 
D. Transparency Measures
 
20. Iran has continued to permit the Agency to use on-line enrichment monitors and electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to Agency inspectors, and to facilitate the automated collection of Agency measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices (para. 67.1). Iran has issued long-term visas to Agency inspectors designated for Iran as requested by the Agency and provided proper working space for the Agency at nuclear sites and facilitated the use of working space at locations near nuclear sites in Iran (para. 67.2). Iran has accepted additional Agency inspectors designated for Iran (para. 67.3).
 
21. Iran has continued to permit the Agency to monitor - through measures agreed with Iran, including containment and surveillance measures - all uranium ore concentrate (UOC) produced in Iran or obtained from any other source, and reported by Iran to the Agency. Iran also provided the Agency with all information necessary to enable the Agency to verify the production of UOC and the inventory of UOC produced in Iran or obtained from any other source (para. 69).
 

Click here for the full report.  

 

By
Garrett Nada