Report: Sanctions Empower Regime

            Sanctions have had  the unintended consequence of empowering the Iranian regime, according to a new report by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Sanctions have signaled international opposition to Iran’s proliferation activities. But Iran has continued to defy demands by the international community to halt sensitive aspects of its nuclear program.
           
Tehran’s negotiators have stipulated that they will not make concessions without the lifting of sanctions. Yet the multilayered set of measures would “be difficult to lift in the timely, sequential way that a compromise would require,” according to the report. Increased emphasis on sanctions could be impeding a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The following are excerpts, followed by a link to the full report.

Political Impact
            Inadvertently helping the government and its allies: Sanctions have helped the existing Iranian regime to consolidate its power and help its allies. The state has taken a
more active interventionist role in the economy to manage the economic turbulence induced by
sanctions, and it has been able to allocate favors and take other measures that keep its supporters from feeling the full pain of sanctions. On the whole, it is likely that this dynamic
has increased reliance on the state which, in turn, may have the indirect effect of blunting
criticism of the government and its policies...
 
Have Sanctions Affected Iran’s Nuclear Decision-Making?
            Sanctions signal international resolve & commitment to a peaceful resolution: A key way in which sanctions have succeeded is as a signaling mechanism: sanctions show that the international community is united against Iran’s continued defiance, and that it is willing to take significant action to facilitatea negotiated solution. The unprecedented degree of international unity against Iran’s nuclear program can be seen in the imposition of UN Security Council sanctions, which require approval by Russia and China, nations which have previously been reluctant to sanction Iran.
            However, Iran has not halted its nuclear development: Iran has not yet acceded to the desired limits on its nuclear program –it has continued to enrich uranium to levelsclose to weapons-grade, and it has proceeded with the upgrading and expansion of nuclear facilities. This continued progress suggests that sanctions alone are unlikely to convince Iran to change course: robust negotiations in which incentives (including sanctions relief) are offered to Iran will be necessary to persuade Iran to comply with international demands.
            There are some signs that Iran will be persuaded: In recent months, despite some shows of grandiose anti-Western rhetoric from Iranian leaders, there are some indications of a willingness to make a deal. For instance, in November 2012, a report from Iran’s ministry of intelligence argued that diplomacy was a “necessary” way to resolve the problem and avoid a military attack.
            More recently, in talks with the P5+1 countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China) in late February in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Iranian officials appeared less hostile and more open to the negotiating process, and gave signals that they would be willing to accept some of the international community’s demands, such as the suspension of 20% enriched uranium fuel.
            Compared with previous negotiations, in Almaty, the P5+1 exhibited increased willingness to ease sanctions. This shift in the Western negotiating position, notably described as a “turning point” by Iranian foreign minister Saeed Jalili, contributed to a positive shift in the tone of the negotiations, although the talks ultimately yielded no concrete results. However, an increasing reliance on sanctions and the apparent inflexibility of the measures have created doubts in Iran about Western intentions: Sanctions have increased in both scope and number, and the sanctioners’ willingness to lift the measures has appeared dubious, with therecent limited exception of the first round of Almaty talks in February.
            In this way, the complexity of the set of sanctions may be impeding negotiations by creating doubts in Iran about whether negotiations in fact will lead to significant reductions.
There are two main reasons that an increased emphasis on sanctions could be impeding a negotiated solution. First, existing sanctions overlap with one another in complex ways, which means it will be difficult to start rolling them back, even if Iran does start to make the desired concessions…
            Second, and more importantly in the long term, many sanctions have been imposed on Iran for actions unrelated to nuclear proliferation, such as support for terrorist groups and human rights abuses. This means that making concessions on its nuclear program is unlikely to help Iran get the full relief from sanctions it seeks. From Iran’s perspective, there may be no useful alternative to waiting out the sanctions and continuing its nuclear development to increase its bargaining power.
            For sanctions to serve as a true tool of leverage, sanctioning nations need to be able to credibly promise that they will lift sanctions if they get what they want, which is a key weakness of current Iran policy. According to the International Crisis Group, under the current “Spider Web” of sanctions, the international communityhas given up the “nimbleness” it needs to make sanctions an effective tool at the negotiating table.