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Israeli Support Wanes for Iran Strike
December 3, 2012 | 5:10pm
Support for an Israeli strike on Iran has waned over the last year, according to a new study. Only one in five Israelis polled support a unilateral strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Half of the respondents said they believed that Iran will eventually acquire nuclear weapons, while just as many said Iran is somewhat likely or unlikely to acquire a bomb. Israelis were also evenly divided over a diplomatic deal that would allow Iran to maintain nuclear energy for electricity under U.N. supervision—with 46 percent approving and 47 percent not supporting such a deal.
The following are excerpts from the report by the Brookings Institution, the University of Maryland and the Program on International Policy Studies, with a link to the full text at the bottom.
Iran’s Nuclear Program
Concerns about Iran appear to have moderated a bit. While a majority of Israelis thinks it is very likely that Iran will develop nuclear weapons, among Israeli Jews this is down 8 points over the last year. Opposition to a military attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities has risen modestly, and only one in five Israelis now favor attacking without U.S. support. Only one in four believe that an attack would delay Iran’s ability for more than five years.
A substantial majority of Israelis favor a Middle East Nuclear Free Zone that would include Israel, though among Israeli Jews this is down a bit from a year ago. Israelis are divided on a possible U.N. deal whereby Iran would be allowed to enrich uranium at low levels provided that it allows intrusive inspections to ensure that it is not developing nuclear weapons.
Israelis continue to show a pessimistic view in regard to the likelihood that Iran will develop nuclear weapons. Asked “How likely do you think it is that Iran will eventually develop nuclear weapons?” 51% of Israelis called it very likely, with another 36% calling it somewhat likely (not very likely, 7%; not at all likely, 3%).
However there has been an eight point drop among Israeli Jews holding this pessimistic view over the last year, with the number saying it is very likely dropping from 62% in 2011 to 54 percent today. Reminded that “there is talk of a possible Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities” and asked whether they would support or oppose it, half of Israelis overall (50%) oppose such an attack while 38% support it.
Among Israeli Jews opposition has risen from 41% a year ago to 46% today, with 41% now supporting it. But when asked explicitly in another question about whether to proceed with an attack unilaterally, only with U.S. support, or not at all, only one in five Israelis favor proceeding without U.S. support. Among Israeli Jews, those ready to proceed without U.S. support has dropped from 22% a year ago to 18% now.
Given the importance to Israelis of not acting alone, it is interesting to note Israelis’ expectations of how the United States would react if Israel did go ahead with a strike on Iranian facilities. Only one in four Israelis (24%) think the United States “would join the war on Israel’s behalf.” Almost half (46%) think the United States “would support Israel diplomatically, but not provide military assistance.” Another quarter thought the United States would either stay neutral (14%) or “would punish Israel by withdrawing its current support” (11%). Among Israeli Jews, it should be noted that those expecting the United States would join Israel in fighting have dropped from 28 to 21% over the last year.
Only one in four Israelis believe that a military attack would delay Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons by more than five years [see chart].
But there has been some increase among Israeli Jews in the belief that it would have some effect. The number of Israelis who think a strike would create a one-to-two year delay in Iran’s capabilities has risen from 9 to 19%; those who would expect a three-to-five year delay have also risen slightly, from 22% to 26%. However, those who would expect a delay longer than five years were stable at 23%. Another fifth thought a strike would either have no effect (8%, down from 19%) or would accelerate Iran’s program (11%, unchanged).
Possible Agreement with Iran
Israelis are divided on a possible U.N. deal whereby Iran would be allowed to enrich uranium at low levels, provided that it allows intrusive inspections to ensure that it is not developing nuclear weapons. Respondents were reminded that “there is some talk about possible negotiations between Iran and the United States about Iran’s nuclear program” and asked to consider the following proposal:
If Iran were to allow U.N. inspectors permanent and full access throughout Iran, to make sure it is not developing nuclear weapons, do you think Iran should or should not be allowed to produce low level nuclear fuel that could only be used for producing electricity? Forty-six percent of Israelis said they would approve such a deal, while 47 percent said they would not.
Click here for the full text.
U.S. Sanctions Iran's Shipping and Energy Sectors
November 30, 2012 | 2:03pm
On November 30, the U.S. Senate unanimously approved new sanctions on Iran’s energy and shipping sectors. Foreign financial institutions will face stiff penalties for facilitating the sale, supply or transfer of goods or services from Iranian energy and shipping companies. The sanctions may also stem the transfer of gold from Turkey to Iran, which is helping Tehran buy foreign goods. Senators voted 94-0 to add the new sanctions into the annual defense policy bill. “We must be clear to the Iranians that toughing it out and waiting it out is not an option, that it will only get worse,” said Democratic Senator Robert Menendez, a co-author of the amendment containing the sanctions. The following are excerpts from the bill.
Except as provided in this section, the President shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that the President determines knowingly, on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, conducts or facilitates a significant financial transaction for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of goods or services described in paragraph (3).
(3) GOODS AND SERVICES DESCRIBED.--Goods or services described in this paragraph are goods or services used in connection with the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran, including the National Iranian Oil Company, the National Iranian Tanker Company, and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines.
SEC. 1255. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE SALE, SUPPLY, OR TRANSFER OF CERTAIN MATERIALS TO OR FROM IRAN.
(a) Sale, Supply, or Transfer of Certain Materials.--The President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) with respect to a person if the President determines that the person knowingly, on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, sells, supplies, or transfers, directly or indirectly, to or from Iran--
(1) a precious metal;
(2) a material described in subsection (c) determined pursuant to subsection (d)(1) to be used by Iran as described in that subsection;
(3) any other material described in subsection (c) if--
(A) the material is--
(i) to be used in connection with the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran or any sector of the economy of Iran controlled directly or indirectly by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps;
(ii) sold, supplied, or transferred to or from an Iranian person included on the list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury; or
(iii) relevant to the nuclear, military, or ballistic missile programs of Iran; or
(B) the material is resold, retransferred, or otherwise supplied--
(i) to an end-user in a sector described in clause (i) of subparagraph (A);
(ii) to a person described in clause (ii) of that subparagraph; or
(iii) for a program described in clause (iii) of that subparagraph.
Click here for the full text of the defense bill.
Clinton: U.S. Must Test Diplomatic Option
November 30, 2012 | 12:46pm
On November 29, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that “it’s imperative that we do everything we can – unilaterally, bilaterally, multilaterally–” to reach an agreement with Iran on its nuclear program. The key word may have been "bilateral," indicating that Washington is open to direct talks with Tehran. She made the remarks after a speech at a join event hosted by the State Department and the Foreign Policy Group. The following is a transcript of her exchange with Robin Wright.
ROBIN WRIGHT: I want to ask you about Iran, and to speak with the same kind of candor you did about Syria. This morning, Dennis Ross said that he thought this year was going to be a decisive year. Apparently, one of the U.S. representatives in Vienna today said that we’re talking about a March deadline – if you could explain that a little bit further.
And tell us realistically what prospects you think there is for compromise with Iran, given the past year of efforts by the United States.
And also, if you believe that Israel is fully on board in letting the United States take the lead and not going off on its own path.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, as to the last question, I’m not going to speak to any country’s security decisions other than our own. Obviously, that’s up to Israel to decide. However, I will say that we continue to believe that there is still a window of opportunity to reach some kind of resolution over Iran’s nuclear program. Now, I’m not a wild-eyed optimist about it, but I think it’s imperative that we do everything we can – unilaterally, bilaterally, multilaterally – to test that proposition.
I think what was meant about the March reference was either about the IAEA and its continuing work or the fact that we finished our election and now would be a good time to test the proposition that there can be some good-faith serious negotiations before the Iranians get into their elections, which are going to heat up probably around the March period, heading toward a June election.
I think that it’s a difficult matter to predict, because it really depends upon how serious the Iranians are about making a decision that removes the possibility of their being able to acquire a nuclear weapon or the components of one that can be in effect on a shelf somewhere and still serve as a basis for intimidation.
We get differing reports, as I’m sure you have seen, as to how serious the Supreme Leader is about that, but we want to test the proposition. This President came into office saying he was prepared to engage with Iran, reached out to Iran, without much reciprocity. We put together this unprecedented coalition to impose these very tough sanctions on Iran. We know they’re having an effect internally. But I think that we’ll see in the next few months whether there’s a chance for any kind of a serious negotiation. And right now, I’m not sure that it can happen, but I certainly hope it does.
U.S. Sets March Deadline for Iran’s Cooperation
November 29, 2012 | 4:38pm
On November 29, Ambassador Robert Wood set a March 2013 deadline for Iran to begin cooperating with the U.N. nuclear watchdog. He warned that the United States may otherwise refer the nuclear issue to the U.N. Security Council. “Iran cannot be allowed to indefinitely ignore its obligations,” Wood told the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors.
IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano criticized Iran for continuing to enrich uranium despite U.N. resolutions. In his statement to the board, Amano again requested that Iran provide access to the Parchin nuclear site. Satellite imagery suggests that Iran may be attempting to remove evidence of undeclared activities there.
The following are excerpts from statements by U.S. Ambassador Robert Wood and IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano.
U.S. Ambassador Robert Wood
We regret that we cannot speak of any progress on this urgent matter during the intervening year. Instead, Iran chose to spend the past twelve months refusing to cooperate with the IAEA Secretariat to address the serious unresolved issues and taking steps to seriously undermine the Agency's verifications activities. Therefore, one year on, we find ourselves still facing a series of unanswered questions, Iran's ongoing intransigence, and Iran's continuing refusal to cooperate…
One step Iran could have taken over the past year was to provide the IAEA access to the Parchin site, which the Director General described in the annex to his November 2011 report as housing a large explosives containment vessel for conducting hydrodynamic experiments that appears consistent with input Iran may have received from a foreign expert with previous experience in nuclear weapons-related research…
Iran has not only refused to comply with its obligation to suspend uranium enrichment; it has provocatively snubbed the international community by expanding its enrichment capacity in defiance of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions…
Iran cannot be allowed to indefinitely ignore its obligations by attempting to make negotiation of a structured approach on PMD an endless process. Iran must act now, in substance…
If by March Iran has not begun substantive cooperation with the IAEA, the United States will work with other Board members to pursue appropriate Board action, and would urge the Board to consider reporting this lack of progress to the U.N. Security Council.
IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano
Mr. Chairman, the Agency has continued its intensive efforts to resolve all of the outstanding issues related to Iran's nuclear programme. However, no concrete results have been achieved. I am unable to report any progress on clarifying the issues relating to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme…
Satellite imagery shows that extensive activities, including the removal and replacement of considerable quantities of earth, have taken place at this location. I am concerned that these activities will have seriously undermined the Agency's ability to undertake effective verification. I reiterate my request that Iran, without further delay, provide access to that location and substantive answers to the Agency's detailed questions regarding the Parchin site and the foreign expert…
The IAEA is firmly committed to dialogue. There is an opportunity to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue diplomatically. Now is the time for all of us to work with a sense of urgency and seize the opportunity for a diplomatic solution.
Click here for the full text of Ambassador Wood's statement.
Click here for the full text of Director General Amano's statement.
Striking Iran: An Avoidable Disaster?
November 28, 2012 | 2:47pm
Iran’s most advanced missiles cannot reliably reach Israel, according to a new study by the Middle East Policy Council. It concludes that an Israeli pre-emptive strike would also probably rally domestic support for the Iranian government- and potentially even fail to destroy Tehran’s nuclear know-how. The study warns that Iranian retaliation could negate the short-term benefits of a strike. The following are excerpts from the paper, with a link to the full text at the end.
The Iranian Missile Program
There is no doubt that Iran has an active missile program as well as an active space-launcher program. However, the exact number, range, reliability and accuracy of deployed Iranian missiles, as well as the program's status and its dependence on foreign help and proliferation, are controversial.5
Iran obviously has access to Scud B missiles (Iranian designation, Shahab 1), which were fired at targets in Iraq in the 1980s. It also seems that a longer-range version of this missile, the Scud C (Shahab 2), is available in Iran.6 But with a maximum range of 500 km, these missiles are insufficient for an attack on Israel. The distance between Iran and Israel is twice that…The more "attractive" targets are also located in central Israel. Therefore, the nominal range requirement increases to more than 1,100 km.
With little more than 900 km, the range of the basic Shahab 3 missile is therefore insufficient for this task.7 This might have been a reason for Iran's decision to start work in the early 2000s on a modified Shahab 3, with an extended range of more than 1,300 km… According to open sources, it seems that this missile has not been launched for some years now. It is plausible to assume that the program was stopped and the gained insights incorporated into the Iranian Safir satellite launcher.
In the mid-2000s, Iran apparently started a program for a two-stage, solid-fuel missile with a nominal range of about 2,000 km. This missile, known at first as Ashura and later Sejil, was launched fewer than half a dozen times in the last five years, apparently with mixed success… However, judging from the slow pace of roughly one launch per year, it seems that the program either has encountered enormous difficulties or is not being given the highest priority…
Currently, regarding ballistic missiles that can threaten Israel, Iran has little to offer except for rhetorical threats. However, this might change if efforts were increased and programs accelerated. This might also indicate an Iranian ambition to gain an operational nuclear-weapons capability. Therefore, the situation should be closely monitored.
Iranian Retaliation against Israel, Targets in the Gulf and Beyond
It is highly likely that Iran's reaction to an Israeli pre-emptive strike will go beyond an increase in support for anti-Israeli proxies. Possible Iranian alternatives include the following:
(1) Singular Iranian missile attacks against Israel could not be ruled out. However, as mentioned above, the operationality and accuracy of Iranian mid-range missiles is highly doubtful.
(2) Iran would likely engage in intensified attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets worldwide. Depending on the (perceived) involvement of the United States in the attack against Iran, U.S. individuals and installations could also be targeted.
(3) Again, depending on U.S. involvement in an Israeli pre-emptive strike, Iran could launch attacks against U.S. Navy ships in the Gulf. The fact that Iran has several submarines and that the shallow waters of the Gulf are not ideal for large U.S. carrier groups to maneuver might increase the damage Iran could cause. Nonetheless, the United States is militarily far superior to its Iranian counterpart. In any case, the attacks on U.S. Navy vessels would draw the United States into a direct military confrontation with Iran.
(4) Iran has repeatedly threatened to attack its neighbor states in the Gulf if they were deemed to be complicit in an attack against its nuclear installations. Likely targets would be the oil and gas installations on the Arabian Gulf coast as well as pipeline systems, ports and desalination plants. These attacks could either be conducted conventionally or through acts of sabotage and terrorism and could have massive economic consequences.
(5) Iran could attempt to disrupt the oil and gas export routes in the Gulf by mining or otherwise blocking (e.g., by sinking or setting on fire tanker ships) the Strait of Hormuz, or by initiating a new tanker war by attacking tanker ships in the Gulf with short-range missiles or navy vessels or by sabotage. The economic consequences of such actions could be very grave.
Click here for the full text.
The Islamists Are Coming
The Islamists Are Coming, edited by Robin Wright, surveys the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region more than any other political bloc. Yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.
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