United States Institute of Peace

The Iran Primer

Obama on Iran at GCC Summit

On April 21, President Barack Obama assured leaders from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries that the United States will “deter and confront external aggression” against them. “Our nations committed to continuing to interdict illegal Iranian arms shipments in the region, impose costs on Iran for its ballistic missile program, and oppose Iran's destabilizing actions in the region,” he said. But the president told reporters that the greatest area of “tactical” differences between Washington and the GCC centered on how to deal with Iran. Several GCC countries have accused Iran of meddling in their domestic affairs and supporting terror.

Some GCC allies warned against being “naïve” regarding Iran. Obama, however, argued that the nuclear deal is proof that dialogue could work. He also called for building a strong defense against Iran while reaching out to “the more reasonable forces in Iran so we don’t see an escalation in proxy fights across the region.”

The president arrived in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on April 20. Before the summit, he met with King Salman for two hours and had a “very open and honest discussion” that covered issues that the two differ on, according to Ben Rhodes, Obama’s deputy national security advisor. The following are excerpted remarks by Obama and administration officials on Iran.
President Barack Obama
“Well, I think that a lot of the strain [between Washington and the GCC] was always overblown.  The fact of the matter is, is that the friendship and cooperation that exist between the United States and the Gulf countries has been consistent for decades.  During the course of our administration, the GCC countries have extensively cooperated with us on counterterrorism, on curbing the financing of terrorist activities.  They are part of the counter-ISIL coalition that has made progress both in Syria and in Iraq.”
“In Yemen, we now have a cessation of hostilities that allows us to build a peace process that can relieve the suffering of the people inside of Yemen.  That would not have happened had it not been for the GCC-U.S. cooperation.  We would not have gotten an Iran deal to get their nuclear weapons had not the GCC been supportive of it.
“So what is true between the United States and the GCC, as is true with all of our allies and friends, is that at any point in time, there are going to be differences in tactics.”
“I think it is no doubt true that when we entered into the negotiations with Iran around the nuclear deal, there was concern that in the interest of getting the deal done, we would somehow look the other way with respect to their other destabilizing activities.  And in fact, what we are able to report is not only have we seen Iran do what it was supposed to do under the deal and the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon is greatly reduced, but what we’ve also seen, what the GCC has seen, is our continued cooperation in, for example, interdicting Iranian efforts to arm the Houthi militias inside of Yemen. That, I think, has created some confidence.
“But one of the things, at a time when the region is so fraught with so many different problems and challenges, is the need for more consistent institutionalized communication at every level of government.  And that’s part of what we’ve been able to achieve through these two summits.  And my hope is, is that it will continue into the next administration.  I think it has been highly useful, because the possibilities of misunderstanding increase when there’s so much activity taking place.
“I’ll give you one last example.  Inside of Iraq, there are understandable concerns about Iranian influence in the Iraqi government at a time when the Iraqi government is also critical for us fighting ISIL.  It was very important I think for us to describe our assessment that Prime Minister Abadi is in fact effectively fighting against ISIL and trying to reach out to Sunnis inside of Iraq, while acknowledging that there are significant problems in terms of government stability inside of Baghdad.  And that’s a reason for us not to withdraw, but rather to get more involved in helping to stabilize areas like Anbar, where we’ve not cleared out ISIL but the towns that they were governing have been left devastated.  If we want Sunni communities to be able to rebuild themselves and to get back into the lives they were leading before ISIL took over, then we’re going to have to help the Iraqi government respond.”
“Obviously, ultimately it's up to the Iraqis to make these decisions.  It's not up to us, it's not up to the Iranians, it's not up to GCC countries.  It's up to the Iraqi people to determine the government that they form.”
“Probably the biggest area where there's been tactical differences has been with respect to Iran.  And the issue is not the need for shared cooperation to deter against Iranian provocations -- on that, we're all agreed.  I think that there has been concern, even when we were working on the Iran nuclear deal, that if we were in discussions with them about these issues, that somehow Iran would feel emboldened to act more provocatively in the region.
“And what I've said to them is we have to have a dual track.  We have to be effective in our defenses and hold Iran to account where it is acting in ways that are contrary to international rules and norms.  But we also have to have the capacity to enter into a dialogue to reduce tensions and to identify ways in which the more reasonable forces inside of Iran can negotiate with the countries in the region, with its neighbors, so that we don't see an escalation of proxy fights across the region.
“And I think that that view is one that is consistent with how many in the GCC view it, but because there's been so much mistrust that's been built up -- in part because of Iranian provocations -- that people are cautious and want to make sure that nobody is naïve about what Iran may be doing to stir up problems in other countries.
“And what we've consistently shown them is we're not naïve.  But as I pointed out, during the height of the Cold War, both Democratic Presidents like John F. Kennedy and Republican Presidents like Ronald Reagan still negotiated with the Soviet Union.  Even when the Soviet Union was threatening the destruction of the United States, there was still dialogue so that we could find ways to reduce tensions and the dangers of war and chaos.  And that's the same approach that we have to take.  Even as Iran is calling us "The Great Satan," we were able to get a deal done where they got rid of their nuclear stockpiles, and that makes us safer.  That's not a sign of weakness, that's a sign of strength.”
—April 21, 2016, to the press
“I thanked our GCC partners for their support of the comprehensive deal that has now cut off every single one of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear weapon.  That makes the region safer.  We’ll remain vigilant to ensure that Iran fulfills its commitments, just as we will fulfill ours.
“Even with the nuclear deal, we recognize collectively that we continue to have serious concerns about Iranian behavior.   Our nations committed to continuing to interdict illegal Iranian arms shipments in the region, impose costs on Iran for its ballistic missile program, and oppose Iran's destabilizing actions in the region.
“At the same time, as I said at Camp David last year, none of our nations have an interest in conflict with Iran.  We welcome an Iran that plays a responsible role in the region -- one that takes concrete, practical steps to build trust and resolve its differences with its neighbors by peaceful means and abides by international rules and norms.” 
—April 21, 2016, to the press with King Salman after the GCC summit
Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes
Rhodes: The President and Sheikh Al-Sabah [of Kuwait] also exchanged thoughts on how to approach Iran's troubling behavior in the region, but also agreed on the importance of engaging Iran with the aim of moving it toward a different, improved relationship with the Gulf. 
Question: Ben, Saudi and Gulf leaders feel like the Iranian regime really poses an existential threat to them.  So do you think their fear is irrational?  What do you say in these meetings?  And do you understand their frustration that they’re being asked to reach out to a country that is recognized as a state sponsor of terrorism and make nice with them?
Rhodes:  So we made very clear to the leaders last night and today on the subject of Iran that our partners, our friends in this region are in the room with us here, and Iran, on the other hand, has in many ways been confrontational not just to the countries here in the GCC, but to the United States as well, and that we share their concerns about Iran's ballistic missile program, its destabilizing activities in the region, its ongoing support for terrorism. 
And, in fact, many of the capabilities that we're developing on the defense side through this process are focused on countering Iranian actions.  So when you talk about the ability to have enhanced missile defense systems, maritime interdictions, training of Special Forces -- all of these deal with the type of asymmetric threats that we see emanating from Iran in different parts of the region.  And we've been able to have from the United States and several of our partners a number of interdictions, for instance, of Iranian weapon shipments at sea just in recent weeks.
At the same time, I think the point the President makes is that there has to be an opening to have a political resolution to these conflicts, that the perpetual nature of the violence that we see in Yemen, in Syria, in Iraq is not in the interest of anybody, and that in order to resolve these conflicts there has to be a diplomatic effort with the Iranians.  So in Syria, to the extent to which we can bring the Iranians to the table in supporting a political process, that is going to make it more likely that a political process can succeed.
In Iraq, obviously Iran has a series of relationships in Iraq.  They have a degree of influence in Iraq, but that should not cause us to disengage.  On the contrary, that I think raises the interest of the United States and the Gulf partners to support the Iraqi government and to remain engaged inside of Iraq.
So in all these different places, we have a similar assessment of the fact that Iran is engaged in destabilizing activities.  We also just think that even as we are vigilant, even as we develop capabilities to counter Iranian actions, we have to have an openness to pursuing diplomatic solutions or else the region is just going to see a perpetuation of the conflicts that have already caused so much suffering and instability.
Question: Do you think it's irrational for the Saudis to worry that they’re no longer the U.S.’s key ally?
Rhodes: Well, I think on the core of the relationship, that remains very solid, and that includes our commitment to Saudi Arabian security and sovereignty.  They are a country with whom we share significant interests in this region.
So we certainly understand this is their neighborhood.  They’re worried about Iran and what its agenda is, and the actions that they’ve taken.  Our point is simply that that concern with Iran should not foreclose the potential for diplomatic engagement if there’s an ability to resolve problems. And a recent example of course is the nuclear deal where, despite all of our concerns about Iran’s behavior, we were able to see a significant rollback in the Iranian nuclear program because we pursued a diplomatic process.
Question: Ben, I want to ask you about investment in not just armament and airplanes, but also investment in Special Forces and that sort of attack strategy for our Gulf partners.  How does the conversation happen so that the President can get them away from, say, F-15s and more towards real steel on the ground, if you will? 
And a second question is, does the President take his own advice, which is to say, listen, if he wants the Saudis and others to engage with the Iranians directly, will he take a trip to Tehran or maybe engage with them directly?
Rhodes:  Well, first of all, your question is exactly the topic that we’re focused on in terms of military capabilities.  And we really initiated this process in Camp David, and since then, we’ve had a working group that meets regularly to review and develop these defense capabilities.  Ash Carter had a meeting here yesterday with the defense ministers to focus on this.  And we’ve seen some progress in terms of the types of capabilities that GCC countries are investing in.  We’ve aimed to expedite the transfer of certain capabilities to them.
And here’s where the focus is:  The large-scale weapons systems that we’ve sold over many years that are important to Gulf security are not necessarily the capabilities that are best designed to deal with the threats that we face.  So, for instance, if you look at conflicts as diverse as Syria or Yemen, the ability to have a significant Special Forces capability makes a big difference.  And so we’re working to enhance and train and support the development of Gulf Special Forces, and that will be critical in dealing with the types of conflicts that we’ve seen here in the region.
The threat that they see from Iranian weapons shipments going to different groups in the region is best confronted by maritime interdiction capabilities.  And this is often kind of small boats, not large naval movements.  So we’ve been working to develop their maritime capacity.
Iran has a ballistic missile program and has an active cyber program.  And our ability to work with the GCC to have an interoperable missile defense system will guard against that ballistic missile threat, give them greater assurance in their own security, just as they will want to have cyber defenses in the event of any Iranian cyber intrusion.
So we’ve made progress in each of those areas.  We’ve worked to enhance Gulf capabilities in each of those areas.  We have also worked to support interoperability between the GCC countries.  And all of that is going to make them better prepared to deal with these threats.  So these meetings are an opportunity to review that progress and determine what additional steps can be taken to expedite that process. 
Oh, Iran.  Yes.  Well, I think the trip to Cuba was probably enough in terms of breaking a longstanding taboo.  With respect to Iran, I think our approach has been that we will engage with the Iranians where we see an opportunity to make progress.  The main vehicle for that engagement has been Secretary Kerry with Foreign Minister Zarif, not just on the Iranian nuclear issue but on Syria and other regional issues.
The President has always indicated that he is willing to engage the Iranian leadership if he believes that that can make progress on different issues.  He’s spoken to President Rouhani on the phone.  The fact of the matter is we haven't seen from the Iranians I think a desire for that level of engagement. They’ve really focused on the channel between our foreign ministers.  And so that's where I think it's most likely to continue.
But that speaks to what we're trying to foster, which is a dynamic where we can have a diplomatic dialogue with the Iranians on issues related to these regional conflicts.  Precisely because Iran has had a role in these areas, we would like to try to move them in a more constructive direction.  And that requires some amount of dialogue.  It also requires vigilance in the type of military capabilities.
Rhodes: So it’s important now that the U.S., our Gulf partners are reinforcing the importance of this opportunity, and we’re strongly urging Russia to use its influence and, frankly, Iran as well, to try to sustain what has been an opening for the Syrian people to enjoy a greater degree of calm than we’ve of course had the last several years. …
So the specific Supreme Court decision dealt with a question of separation of powers.  And it determined that a bill that was passed through Congress and signed by the President could serve as a means for victims of terrorism to seek assets from the Iranian government.  We, of course, very much support the efforts of those families. …
So given Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, and given the various financial tools that we have to hold them accountable to designated individuals, we believe that part of that is allowing for this type of process to go forward.  The problem with the JASTA legislation is it applies to all countries.  It would suggest that the principle of sovereign immunity does not hold for countries.  And again, that opens the door to potential blowback on the United States. …
Question: You shared the Saudis' assessment with Iran and sharing those fears, but you also mentioned a new and improved relationship with the Gulf.  How far are the Gulf partners willing to go?  Obviously something that this afternoon session will be focused on, but what indications have you gotten from the Gulf partners that they are willing to bring Iran into the fold?
Rhodes:  Yes, I mean, look, I think we share the assessment of Iranian behavior.  We do think that it's imperative that we're focused on the fight against ISIL and that we can have an openness to diplomacy and engagement with Iran in the service of resolving regional conflicts.  I think we've gotten thus far from the Gulf countries and the Saudis yesterday certainly a lot of concerns about Iran, but an openness to that engagement.  They have not expressed an opposition to the notion that they would have some diplomatic contact or dialogue with the Iranians.
I do think that they're very skeptical, and I think that's not a surprise to anybody.  Our point is simply that we can put ourselves in a position of strength, we can do that in part from the development of the capabilities that I talked about.  At the same time, the best way to try to resolve these issues and encourage Iran to move in a more constructive direction is a mix of standing up to Iran when it's necessary but also being open to diplomacy where we can make progress. 
And the fact of the matter is, Iran itself is not monolithic.  There are elements of the Iranian system that are more invested in conflict and that there are elements of the Iranian system that are more open to diplomacy.  And part of what we've indicated is it's important for us to work with those inside of Iran who are more open to a constructive relationship, rather than to allow the hardliners there to dominate the regional engagement.

—April 21, 2016, during the U.S.-GCC summit 


Supreme Court Orders Iran to Compensate Terror Victims

On April 20, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a judgement that held Iran financially responsible for terrorist attacks dating back to the 1983 Marine Corps barracks bombing in Beirut. The lead plaintiff, Deborah Peterson, is the sister of Lance Cpl. James C. Knipple, who was killed in Beirut. The court ruled 6-2 in favor of more than 1,300 relatives of the 241 service members who were killed in Lebanon as well as other victims of attacks that courts have linked to Iran, such as the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia.
Iran refused to comply with past judgments, which led lawyers to search for Iranian assets held in the United States. This case, Bank Markazi (Iran’s central bank) v. Peterson, involved some $1.75 billion in bonds, plus accumulating interest, held by Citibank in New York.
Bank Markazi had challenged a 2014 ruling by the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals that said the Iranian assets should be turned over to the families. The bank argued that Congress overstepped its jurisdiction when it passed a 2012 law that directed the banks’ assets to be turned over to the families of victims. President Barack Obama had issued an executive order earlier that year freezing the bank’s assets in the United States. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the court. The 2012 law, Ginsburg wrote, “does not transgress restraints placed on Congress and the president by the Constitution.” The Obama administration, as well as both Democrats and Republicans in Congress, supported compensation for families.
On April 21, Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Hossein Jaberi Ansari said the ruling “amounts to appropriation of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s property.” He warned that it “increases the distrust between Tehran and Washington.” On April 25, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif warned that Iran would move to sue the United States at the International Court of Justice at The Hague to prevent the distribution of nearly $2 billion in Iranian assets. The following are excerpts from the court’s opinion with reactions by Iranian officials.  
[April 20, 2016]
JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.*
A provision of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 22 U. S. C. §8772, makes  available for postjudgment execution a set of assets held at a New York bank for Bank Markazi, the Central Bank of Iran. The assets would partially satisfy judgments gained in separate actions by over 1,000 victims of terrorist acts sponsored by Iran. The judgments remain unpaid. Section 8772 is an unusual statute: It designates a particular set of assets and renders them available to satisfy the liability and damages judgments underlying a consolidated enforcement proceeding that the statute identifies by the District Court’s docket number. The question raised by petitioner Bank Markazi: Does §8772 violate the separation of powers by purporting to change the law for, and directing a particular result in, a single pending case?
Section 8772, we hold, does not transgress constraints placed on Congress and the President by the Constitution. The statute, we point out, is not fairly portrayed as a “one-case-only regime.” Brief for Petitioner  27.    Rather,  it covers  a  category  of  postjudgment  execution  claims  filed by  numerous  plaintiffs  who,  in  multiple  civil  actions, obtained  evidence-based  judgments  against  Iran  together amounting to billions of dollars.  Section 8772 subjects the designated  assets  to  execution  “to  satisfy  any  judgment” against  Iran  for  damages  caused  by  specified  acts  of  terrorism.    §8772(a)(1)  (emphasis  added).    Congress,  our decisions  make  clear,  may  amend  the  law  and  make  the change   applicable   to   pending   cases,   even   when   the amendment is outcome determinative.
Adding weight to our decision, Congress passed, and the President signed, §8772 in furtherance of their stance on a matter of foreign policy. Action in that realm warrants  respectful review by courts. The Executive has historically made case-specific sovereign-immunity determinations to which courts have deferred. And exercise by Congress and the President of control over claims against foreign governments, as well as foreign-government-owned property in the United States, is hardly a novelty. In accord with the courts below, we perceive in §8772 no violation of separation-of-powers principles, and no threat to the independence of the Judiciary.
We set out  here  statutory  provisions  relevant  to  this  case.  American nationals may file suit against state sponsors of terrorism in the courts of the United States.  See 28
U.S.C.   §1605A.      Specifically,   they   may   seek   “money   damages . . . against a foreign state for personal injury or death  that  was  caused  by”  acts  of  terrorism,  including  “torture,  extrajudicial  killing,  aircraft  sabotage,  hostage taking,  or  the  provision  of  material  support”  to  terrorist activities.    §1605A(a)(1).    This  authorization—known  as  the  “terrorism  exception”—is  among  enumerated  exceptions  prescribed  in  the  Foreign  Sovereign  Immunities  Act of 1976 (FSIA) to the general rule of sovereign immunity.

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Iranian Officials

*via The New York Times
Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif
“We hold the U.S. administration responsible for preservation of Iranian funds, and if they are plundered, we will lodge a complaint with the I.C.J. for reparation.”
—April 25, 2016, to the press
“I have lost every respect for U.S. justice. The judgment by the Supreme Court and the other, even more absurd judgment by a New York circuit court deciding that Iran should pay damages for 9/11 are the height of absurdity.
“People can legislate in other countries to confiscate American assets. Would you be happy with that? … The Supreme Court is the Supreme Court of the United States, not the Supreme Court of the world. We’re not under its jurisdiction, nor is our money.
“It is a theft. Huge theft. It is highway robbery. And believe you me, we will get it back.”
—April 21, 2016, in an interview with The New Yorker
Foreign Ministry spokesman Hossein Jaberi Ansari
“The ruling has mocked [international] law,” and “amounts to appropriation of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s property.”
—April 21, 2016, to the press


Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei


Zarif Op-Ed in Washington Post

On April 20, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif published an op-ed in The Washington Post criticizing its Sunni Gulf neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia, for spending huge sums of money on arms and allegedly supporting militant extremism. He criticized the West for raising alarms about Iran’s development of military technology while hardly discussing Saudi Arabia’s arms procurement or bombing of Yemen.  
Zarif wrote that the Iranian people “want nothing more than peace and cooperation” with their neighbors and the world at large. But he also defended Iran’s development of defensive military technology, recalling Saddam Hussein’s use of missiles and chemical weapons during the devastating 1980-1988 war with Iraq. “We have no other choice, as we continue to face major hurdles in fulfilling our military hardware needs from abroad, even as our neighbors procure such hardware in mind-boggling quantities,” he wrote. Zarif’s op-ed coincides with President Barack Obama’s visit to Saudi Arabia. Obama met with Saudi King Salman on April 20 and will meet with leaders from other Gulf states on April 21. The following are excerpts from Zarif’s op-ed.
Nearly three years ago, the newly elected Iranian president called for constructive engagement on a momentous undertaking: resolving the nuclear crisis dividing Iran and the West. The fruit of 22 months of unprecedented diplomacy — the historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — was formally implemented in January. Yet despite this important achievement, the worrying reality is that we now face a far greater challenge. …
Some of those who agitated against the JCPOA were blatant in their efforts to drag the region into yet another disastrous war. They did — and continue to do — their utmost to convince their Western allies to return to the broken taboo against engaging with Iran. They have repeatedly resorted publicly to raising the specter of military — even nuclear — attack on my country, in blatant disregard for international law.
Others have been less blatant. Amid their backroom efforts to thwart the constructive engagement between Iran and six world powers, they resorted to a rapid build-up of their already excessive military hardware. Alarmingly, some also boosted their support for militant extremism, in the belief that it could serve as a tool to achieve short-term political aims. The disastrous outcome of these efforts are clear for all to see.
Having spent a staggering amount of their peoples’ petrodollars on weapons-hoarding, these actors are now seeing their literal, and political, fortunes plummet in step with oil prices. Meanwhile, the extremist lost souls they have empowered are no longer terrorizing only others in the region and the wider world but are also biting the very hands that feed them.
Perplexingly, amid these disturbing developments — including the recent tragedies in Paris and Brussels — the West does not appear to be focused on joining hands to eradicate militant extremism. Neither is there much discussion of how a country such as Saudi Arabia has become the world’s third-biggest military spender, overtaking Russia. And rather than focusing on how Yemen was bombed to rubble for 12 relentless months — and thus turned into a tinderbox of famine and poverty and a breeding ground for al-Qaeda — scare-mongering about Iran and its defensive capabilities is back in full swing. …
In 1980, in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein launched a war against Iran fully supported financially and militarily by almost all of our Arab neighbors and by the West. Unable to secure a quick victory, Hussein used chemical weapons against our soldiers and civilians. …
On top of this, having listened to the outdated U.S. mantra of “all options are on the table” for 37 years, our people understand that we need to be prepared to prevent that illegal and absurd threat from ever becoming a reality. …
It is against this backdrop that we develop and test our indigenous defensive capabilities. We have no other choice, as we continue to face major hurdles in fulfilling our military hardware needs from abroad, even as our neighbors procure such hardware in mind-boggling quantities. …
Our people want nothing more than peace and cooperation with our neighbors and the world at large. We have not launched a war in more than two centuries and continue to make an unequivocal commitment of never commencing such foolishness. We challenge all our detractors — large and small — to commit likewise. …

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Photo credit: Robin Wright


Iran Pushes the United States

Iranian officials are pushing Washington to do more to fulfill its obligations under the nuclear deal. U.S. officials must be “much more proactive” in assuring other countries that they can do business with Iran without risking penalties from the United States, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif told The New York Times on April 20. 
On April 19, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and Secretary of State John Kerry met in New York to discuss implementation of the deal. The two met for more than two and a half hours behind closed doors. Afterwards, Zarif told reporters they focused on how “to make sure that we will draw the benefits that Iran is entitled to.” A reporter asked Kerry if he reached an agreement on the issue. Kerry responded:
“We agreed to – we’re both working at making sure that the JCPOA, the Iran agreement – nuclear agreement – is implemented in exactly the way that it was meant to be and that all the parties to that agreement get the benefits that they are supposed to get out of the agreement.  So we worked on a number of key things today, achieved progress on it, and we agreed to meet on Friday.  After the signing of the climate change agreement, we will meet again to sort of solidify what we talked about today.”
On the same day, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce (R-CA) introduced legislation to prevent the Obama administration from allowing access to transactions involving the U.S. dollar as long as continues to engage in illicit activities, including developing ballistic missiles and supporting terror. It was the fourth bill targeting dollar transactions introduced in April. 
Zarif has said that Iran has not specifically asked for access to the U.S. financial system. But Valiollah Seif, Governor of the Central Bank of Iran, has said that it might be necessary to make the implement the nuclear deal. “Almost nothing” has happened since the nuclear deal was implemented in January, he said at the Council on Foreign Relations on April 15. “Unless serious efforts are made by our partners to make the JCPOA work, in my view they have not honored their obligations… If it means more face to face contacts with the international banks assuring them they do not penalize them working in Iran, if it means making changes to their laws and regulations to give access to the U.S. financial systems, allow U Turn, what ever is needed, they need to do that; otherwise the JCPOA breaks up under its own terms.”
Kerry’s meeting with Zarif follows the first bilateral with U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew and Seif, which opened a new channel for U.S.-Iran interaction. Kerry and Zarif forged a close working relationship during 18 months of difficult negotiations that resulted in a final nuclear deal in July 2015. Direct communications between the counterparts has become routine and helped ensure the quick release of U.S. sailors in January 2016.

Iran Targets Political Elites

Garrett Nada
Over the past four decades, Iran’s revolutionaries have often been targets of their own revolution. Dozens have been pushed aside, discredited, banned from running for office, or isolated. Many have ended up in jail or faced prolonged house arrest. A few have been executed. The rivalries and reprisals among disparate revolutionary factions has been the backdrop of most major political developments, in both domestic and foreign policy, in the Islamic Republic.
Among the early victims was Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, a close aide to revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini during his exile. He was executed in 1982 after being charged with trying to overthrow the Islamic Republic. Abolhassan Bani Sadr, the first president after the 1979 revolution, was impeached in 1981. He went underground and fled to Paris. In 1987, Mehdi Hashemi, who had headed the Revolutionary Guards liaison with foreign Islamic movements, was executed for sedition. In 1989, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the designated successor to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was forced to resign after he criticized the execution of political prisoners and fell out of favor with Khomeini. 
Since the 2009 presidential election, top officials have been punished or imprisoned for ties to the Green Movement protests. Among those taken to court in mass Stalin-esque trials were former Vice President Mohammad Abtahi and Mohsen Mirdamadi, former chairman of Parliament’s foreign affairs committee and leader of the Islamic Iran Participation Front, a reformist party. Former Deputy Speaker of Parliament Behzad Nabavi and former government spokesman Abdollah Ramezanzadeh were also tried and convicted. All four were sentenced to jail terms.
The most famous current case involves two men who ran for president in 2009: former Speaker of Parliament Mehdi Karroubi and former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi. Both challenged the election results, which gave President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a second term, despite hundreds of formal complaints of voter fraud. Both were leaders of the subsequent Green Movement protests, which raged sporadically until early 2010. Both men were put under house arrest—banished from public view or mention in the press—in 2011.
Over the past five years, hardliners have repeatedly charged both men with “sedition.” During the 2013 presidential campaign, Hassan Rouhani pledged to end the politically fraught saga. But he failed to make headway.
In a bold challenge to the Islamic regime, Karroubi issued an open letter to President Rouhani in April 2016 pleading to be formally charged and tried. “I want you to ask the despotic regime to grant me a public trial based on Article 168 of the constitution,” he wrote. “It will show which side continues in the path of the revolution and is honorable.”
Many other revolutionaries with prestigious pedigrees have been targeted by Iran’s judiciary or security apparatus. So have their families. Three of Khomeini’s grandsons and one granddaughter have been disqualified from running in elections since 2004. The following is sampling of Iran’s political elite —reformers, centrists and hardliners — who have faced restrictions in recent years.
Khomeini Family
Ayatollah Khomeini’s name still carries great symbolic weight four decades after he led the 1979 revolution. He was the ultimate authority for a decade, until his death. Yet several of late leader’s grandchildren have been banned from running for office. At least seven of his 15 grandchildren have been active politically since the mid-1990s. They have openly criticized laws, electoral practices or the leadership.
Hassan Khomeini, is a mid-ranking cleric and widely considered the late revolutionary leader’s heir apparent. In February 2016, the Guardian Council barred Khomeini from running for a seat in the Assembly of Experts, an 88-man clerical body charged with appointing, supervising and dismissing the supreme leader.
In an Instagram post, Khomeini’s 19-year-old son, Ahmad, charged that the Guardian Council ignored testimonies from top clerics that endorsed his father’s qualifications. The reason for the disqualification was “clear for all,” he said, implying that the council’s ruling was political. Khomeini had the backing of both reformist and centrist political elites. He appealed the rejection, but was again rejected, reportedly for not having requisite Islamic knowledge.
The Guardian Council barred another Khomeini grandson, Morteza Eshraghi, from running for parliament in February 2016. He is also a mid-ranking cleric.
In 2008, the Guardian Council initially barred Khomeini grandson Ali Eshraghi from running for parliament. The council eventually reversed its decision and reinstated Eshraghi, who was part of a reformist coalition, and some 280 other candidates. But he eventually withdrew at the request of the Khomeini family after a smear campaign was waged against him.
In 2004, Khomeini granddaughter Zahra Eshraghi and about 2,000 other reformists were barred from running in parliamentary elections. Eshraghi is an outspoken women’s rights activist who is married to prominent reformist Reza Khatami, the younger brother of former President Mohammad Khatami.
Hossein Khomeini has been a rebel since the early days of the Islamic Republic. He was put under virtual house arrest in 1981 after he charged that “the new dictatorship established in religious form is worse than that of the Shah and the Mongols.” In a 2003 BBC interview, he claimed that his grandfather would have opposed Iran’s leaders if he were still alive. Khomeini even supported the idea of U.S. or foreign intervention to force regime change. He was reportedly under surveillance and banned from giving interviews to Iranian media.
Rafsanjani Family
Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, former Speaker of Parliament and two-term President (1989-1997), helped rebuild Iran after its devastating war with Iraq. He still chairs the Expediency Council. Hardliners opposed Rafsanjani’s pragmatic approach to domestic and foreign affairs, while critics alleged that his family used political connections to amass significant wealth. He was dislodged from the Assembly of Experts chairmanship in 2011. In 2013, the Guardian Council barred him from running for president again.
Rafsanjani’s children have also been marginalized politically. Two were charged with acting against the government after the 2009 presidential election. His daughter Faezeh Hashemi, a former Member of Parliament and vice president of Iran’s Olympic committee, was charged with “spreading propaganda.” She spent six months in prison; she was released in March 2013.
Rafsanjani’s son, Mehdi Hashemi, left Iran after the disputed 2009 elections for Britain. He was arrested on his return and jailed for three months for corruption and inciting unrest against the regime. He was released in December 2012. In 2015, he was convicted of new charges of embezzlement, bribery and security offenses. He began serving a 10-year jail term in August 2015.
In 2016, the Guardian Council disqualified two of Rafsanjani’s children from running for parliament. Fatemeh Hashemi had been outspoken in her criticism of President Ahmadinejad’s economic mismanagement. Mohsen Hashemi, who had served on Tehran’s city council,was also barred from running. Both had reformist views.  
The Guardian Council did allow Rafsanjani to run for the Assembly of Experts, however. In February 2016, he led a slate of centrists and moderate conservatives in the Assembly of Experts election. He placed first in the race for 16 available seats in Tehran. Rafsanjani is widely believed to covet the job of supreme leader.

Khatami Family
Former President Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) pledged political and social reforms while in office, but was largely thwarted by hardliners. Since the 2009 presidential election, he has been sidelined by hardliner critics for supporting opposition leaders Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. Since 2010, he has been banned from leaving the country and barred from public events or quotes in the media.
For the February 2016 elections, Khatami skirted the ban by using social media. He released a video encouraging Iranians to vote for the “List of Hope” for parliament and the “People’s Experts” for the Assembly of Experts—both slates of reformers and centrists. The “List of Hope” took all 30 seats in parliament for Tehran.
The Guardian Council has tried to isolate Khatami’s younger brother, Mohammad Reza Khatami, who was deputy speaker of parliament from 2000 to 2004. He was barred from running for parliament in 2004. Khatami is married to Zahra Eshraghi, granddaughter of Ayatollah Khomeini. Both supported reformist candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi in the 2009 presidential election. Police reportedly detained the couple in 2010 amid protests by the Green Movement. He is also banned from leaving the country.
Mousavi Family
Mir Hossein Mousavi served as prime minister (1981-1989) during the Iran-Iraq war. From 1989 to 2009, he served as an advisor to Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami. In 2009, he ran for president and contested incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s victory. His protest of the official results sparked the Green Movement protests. Mousavi and his wife, women’s rights activist Zahra Rahnavard, were placed under house arrest in February 2011 for their role in the opposition.
In February 2013, the couple’s daughters Zahra and Narges Mousavi were detained for questioning after publishing a letter demanding release of their parents. Mousavi and his wife not allowed to attend the wedding of their daughter in March 2016.
Karroubi Family
Mehdi Karroubi, former parliamentary speaker (1989-1992, 2000-2004), ran for president in 2009. He too contested the official results and, with Mousavi, led the opposition Green Movement. Karroubi was particularly outspoken about harsh treatment of protestors by security forces. In February 2011, he was placed under house arrest, at the same time as Mousavi and Rhanavard. Neither has been formally charged with any crimes.
In 2009, Karroubi’s son, Mohammad Hossein Karroubi, was sentenced to six months in jail for speaking to foreign media about alleged abuses of prisoners. The sentence was suspended on the condition that he not commit a crime for five years. He was reportedly detained on Feb. 11, 2013, the same day as the Mousavi daughters.
Ahmadinejad and His Circle

Former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) began to see his status deteriorate even before leaving office. In May 2011, some two dozen individuals close to Ahmadinejad, including his chief of staff and protégé Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, were arrested and charged with being “magicians.” Ahmadinejad and his cohort were labeled “the deviationist current.”
In 2013, the Guardian Council barred Mashaei from running for president. Ahmadinejad said the decision was an act of “oppression.” He appealed to the supreme leader to intervene, but to no avail.
In February 2015, a former vice president and top aid to Ahmadinejad, Mohammad Reza Rahimi, began serving a five-year prison term for “acquiring wealth through illicit methods.” He was also ordered to pay compensation.

Garrett Nada is the assistant editor of The Iran Primer at the U.S. Institute of Peace. 


Photo credits: Abolhassan Bani Sadr by Christoph Braun (Own work) [CC0], via Wikimedia Commons; Mir Hossein Mousavi by Mardetanha with special thanks to Mr.Salar Nayerhoda for kind helps (Own work) [GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html), CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/) or CC BY-SA 2.5-2.0-1.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5-2.0-1.0)], via Wikimedia Commons; Mehdi Karroubi by Mardetanha [GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html), CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/) or CC BY-SA 2.5-2.0-1.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5-2.0-1.0)], via Wikimedia Commons; Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani via HashemiRafsanjani.ir; Mohammad Khatami by World Economic Forum (www.weforum.org), swiss-image.ch/Photo by Remy Steinegger (World Economic Forum Annual Meeting Davos 2007) [CC BY-SA 2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons; Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009 by Kremlin.ru [CC BY 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), CC BY 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0) or CC BY 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons 

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