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Where Does Nuclear Diplomacy Stand Now?

Interview with Michael Adler by Garrett Nada

What was the outcome of the talks in Kazakhstan and why?
            The talks were basically a failure because the six world powers did not receive an answer to the proposal they made to Iran in February. In those talks, also in Kazakhstan, the United States, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom ― the so-called P5+1 ― had presented a compromise formula to move negotiations forward. It included:
 

Iran would suspend all 20 percent enrichment of uranium, including enrichment at the Fordo facility near the northern city of Qom. Fordo is a heavily reinforced site that could be impregnable to air attack.

The international community would lift some punitive restrictions, allowing Tehran to trade gold and other currencies, which would help Iran get around sanctions on its banking sector.
 
      But at the April 5-6 talks, Iran instead countered with an offer based on a proposal it had put forward in Moscow last June. The specific new plan was not released but Tehran’s proposal in June included:
 
           •Stage 1: The P5+1 would recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium. In return, Iran would
             emphasize its commitments under the Non-proliferation Treaty and its opposition to nuclear
             weapons.
           •Stage 2: The P5+1 would lift unilateral and multilateral sanctions on Iran outside of U.N.
             Security Council resolutions. In return, Iran would continue to cooperate with the U.N.
             nuclear watchdog and answer questions about possible military dimensions of its program.
           •Stage 3: U.N. sanctions would be lifted, and Iran’s nuclear file would be removed from the
             Security Council’s agenda. In return, Iran would cooperate with the P5+1 to provide
             enriched fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor.
           •Stage 4: The parties would cooperate in designing and building nuclear power plants and
             light water research reactors in Iran.
           •Stage 5: The parties would start cooperating on regional issues that could include Syria,
             narcotics and piracy. 
 
How was this new round different from the earlier rounds of diplomacy?
            The first day of the talks on April 5 was a disaster. Iran presented its own offer instead of a response to the February proposal. It basically reiterated its offer from the Moscow talks in June 2012. But the P5+1 powers had already rejected that 2012 proposal. A senior U.S. diplomat said that Iran was maximizing demands and only proposing minimal action on its part.
 
            The second day of negotiations was not much more productive. Diplomats discussed the same issues, although some said Iran engaged in discussions more seriously than in the past. Instead of repeating rhetoric or prepared speeches, Iranian negotiators reportedly spoke about specific items during question-and-answer sessions. Some diplomats felt this directness was new and even a sign of serious engagement, although they may have been grasping at straws to find a productive outcome.
 
What does the outcome mean?
            The outcome means that the process is likely to continue. Negotiations are by nature slow, tortuous and full of setbacks, a U.S. official said. “There may not have been a breakthrough, but there also was not a breakdown,” the official said.
 
What happens next? What are the prospects for another round of talks?
            No date has been set for another round of talks. But a diplomat close to the negotiations said that another session may happen soon. On the other hand, most analysts do not expect to see progress until after Iran’s June presidential election.
 
What are the major gaps in the two sides’ positions?
            The gap between the two sides is philosophical as well as substantial. The major gap is on the issue of suspension of uranium enrichment, which has always been the key goal of P5+1 countries. The world’s six major powers want Iran to suspend 20 percent enrichment as a confidence-building gesture to clear the way for more substantial negotiations on long-term issues―namely concern about enrichment and possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program.
 
            From the beginning, Iran has demanded that the international community recognize its right to enrichment, which already provides fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor and could provide fuel if Iran were to build a bomb. Tehran also does not want to be singled out or placed under any special scrutiny by the U.N. nuclear watchdog or the U.N. Security Council.
 
            The priorities of the international community and Iran have barely changed over the last decade. The important difference is that Iran was originally enriching to 3.5 percent. Since 2010, it has been enriching to 20 percent. This causes added concern since weapon-grade uranium, enriched to more than 90 percent, is easier to produce from 20 percent enriched uranium than from 3.5 percent enriched uranium.
 
Michael Adler, a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, formerly covered the International Atomic Energy Agency for Agence France-Presse.
 
 
Photo credit: Saeed Jalili (Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator) by Parmida76 on Flickr
 
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U.S. Offers Earthquake Aid to Iran

            On April 10, the United States offered aid to Iran one day after a 6.1 magnitude earthquake hit the country’s south. The quake hit within 60 miles of Bushehr, a town on the Persian Gulf coast that is home to Iran’s nuclear power plant. Iranian officials claimed that the plant was not damaged. Bushehr’s provincial governor told state television that at least 37 people had died, and 850 were injured. The following is the full text of the statement by National Security Council Spokesperson Caitlin Hayden, and a remark by State Department Acting Deputy Spokesperson Patrick Ventrell.

April 10 Statement by NSC Spokesperson Caitlin Hayden
            The American people extend condolences to the people of Iran for the devastation that resulted from the recent earthquake and aftershocks in southern Iran, particularly to those whose loved ones were injured or lost their lives.  We are deeply saddened by the loss of life and the destruction that’s been caused by this disaster, and stand ready to help the Iranian people in this time of need.
 
April 9 Remark by Patrick Ventrell at the Daily State Department Press Briefing
            We have seen the reports of an earthquake and are monitoring the situation. We understand this was near Bushehr. We refer you to the IAEA for further comment. I think they put out a statement already, given that there was – part of Iran’s nuclear program is near there. But our understanding is that – we do send our condolences to those who lost loved ones, and we understand there are some casualties.
 

Kerry on Nuke Talks: What’s Next?

            Iran and the world’s six major powers failed to compromise on Tehran’s controversial nuclear program in the fifth round of talks since 2011. The following are remarks by Secretary of State Kerry on the nuclear talks in Almaty, Kazakhstan on April 5 and 6.

            On Iran, I think it’s fair to say that we were hoping that there would be a more fulsome presentation in Almaty that would have laid out with greater specificity and greater breadth what could have been done to try to reduce the tensions over Iran’s nuclear program. And clearly, any effort – not unlike the DPRK, where Kim Jong-un has decided to reopen his enrichment procedures by rebuilding a facility that had been part of an agreement to destroy – in the same way as that is provocative, to open up yellowcake production and to make any step that increases the rapidity with which you move towards enriched fissile material raises the potential of questions, if not even threat. And I think that is not constructive.
            So we will have discussions in London about this, yes. And there will be further discussions in Washington, and we’ll take stock of precisely where we are. But I’ll repeat what I said, and have said in several stops: The clock that is ticking on Iran’s program has a stop moment, and it does not tick interminably. We have said again and again that negotiations are not for the sake of negotiations, they are to make progress. And negotiations cannot be allowed to become a process of delay which in and of itself creates greater danger.
            So it is important for the Iranians to make the fundamental choice here: Which direction do they want to move in? If it is a peaceful program, it is very easy to prove it is peaceful. If they want to make the choice to confound that possibility of proving it is peaceful, that is their choice. And President Obama has made it clear he takes no option off the table with respect to what may follow….  April 9, to the press at Ben Gurion International Airport in Israel
 
            Iran cannot have and will not have a nuclear weapon. And the United States of America has made clear that we stand not just with Israel but with the entire international community in making it clear that we are serious, we are open to negotiation, but it is not an open-ended, endless negotiation; it cannot be used as an excuse for other efforts to try to break out with respect to a nuclear weapon. And we are well aware and coordinating very, very closely with respect to all of our assessments regarding that. But President Obama doesn’t bluff; he’s made that very clear to me. And we hope the Iranians will come back to the table with a very serious proposal... April 9 at a press conference in Jerusalem, Israel with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
 
            No option will be taken off the table. And I confirm to you, Mr. President, that we will continue to seek a diplomatic solution. But our eyes are open, and we understand that the clock is moving. And no one will allow the diplomatic process to stand in the way of whatever choices need to be made to protect the world from yet another nuclear weapon in the wrong hands... April 8 at a press conference in Jerusalem, Israel with President Shimon Peres
 
            With respect to Almaty, Lady Cathy Ashton and Under Secretary Wendy Sherman have made it clear that there was somewhat of a gap that remains, obviously, as a consequence of the discussions that they had in Almaty. And I think that we would hope that we might have been able to move that somewhat closer. But the door is still open to doing that, and yes indeed it is important to continue to talk and to try to find the common ground.
            I think the President has made it clear, and I would reiterate today, that this is not an endless process. This is not something where you can play to the clock. You can’t just delay and talk for the sake of talking. So we would repeat to Iran it is our desire to have a diplomatic solution, but this choice really lies in the hands of Iranians. If you have a peaceful program for nuclear power, as a number of nations do, it is not hard to prove to the world that it is peaceful. Those other nations do that today. 
            The reason that Iran is increasingly finding itself isolated and in a position of being sanctioned is because they have chosen – they have chosen – not to live up to the international requirements and standards with respect to verification about their program. And the international community – not the United States, not a religion, not one particular philosophy, but countries under the United Nations and through the international community have come together and asked Iran, if your program is peaceful, please take the steps that are rational in order to prove it to the world. Now, that’s what we’re waiting for.
            But as I said earlier and repeat again, this is not an interminable process. So we hope that out of Almaty will come a narrowing of some of the differences. Diplomacy is a painful task, and a task for the patient. And you need to take the time to work through some of these things. Obviously, there is an election. That complicates the choices with respect to the politics of Iran. And we’re aware of that. But we will continue, the President is determined to continue to pursue the diplomatic channel. We will continue to have discussions through the P-5+1 process. And we remain open and hopeful that a diplomatic solution can be found… April 7 at a press conference in Istanbul, Turkey
 
 

Little Progress at Fifth Round of Nuke Talks

            Iran and the world’s six major powers failed to compromise on Tehran’s controversial nuclear program in the fifth round of talks since 2011. The United States, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom ― the so-called P5+1― met with Iran in Almaty, Kazakhstan on April 5 and 6. The following are remarks by officials on the talks.

Iran
Supreme National Security Council Secretary and chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili
            “Of course there is some distance between the positions of the two sides. The Islamic Republic of Iran has announced on numerous occasions - stressing the rights of the Iranian people including the right to enrich and an end to behaviors which are a sign of enmity towards the people of Iran - based on these two points, the proposal was tabled to help us to proceed in a constructive fashion…
            We think that in this round of talks, some good negotiations were conducted, and now in consideration to our new proposals, it is now up to the 5+1 to demonstrate its willingness and sincerity to take proportionate confidence building steps.” April 6 in an official statement
 
            “[R]recognition of Iran’s right to [uranium] enrichment and putting an end to hostile behaviors” towards Iran are ways to build its confidence. April 6 to media
 
Member of Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Alaeddin Boroujerdi
            The talks were “considered effective and a step forward,” but Iran will never stop its nuclear program. April 7 to ISNA
 
Supreme National Security Council Deputy Secretary Ali Baqeri
            “[C]onfidence-building measures should be considered as part of a comprehensive plan, not separate from it.”  April 5 to the press after the first day of negotiations
 
The United States
Secretary of State John Kerry
            “With respect to Almaty, Lady Cathy Ashton and Under Secretary Wendy Sherman have made it clear that there was somewhat of a gap that remains, obviously, as a consequence of the discussions that they had in Almaty. And I think that we would hope that we might have been able to move that somewhat closer. But the door is still open to doing that, and yes indeed it is important to continue to talk and to try to find the common ground.
            I think the President has made it clear, and I would reiterate today, that this is not an endless process. This is not something where you can play to the clock. You can’t just delay and talk for the sake of talking. So we would repeat to Iran it is our desire to have a diplomatic solution, but this choice really lies in the hands of Iranians. If you have a peaceful program for nuclear power, as a number of nations do, it is not hard to prove to the world that it is peaceful. Those other nations do that today. 
            The reason that Iran is increasingly finding itself isolated and in a position of being sanctioned is because they have chosen – they have chosen – not to live up to the international requirements and standards with respect to verification about their program. And the international community – not the United States, not a religion, not one particular philosophy, but countries under the United Nations and through the international community have come together and asked Iran, if your program is peaceful, please take the steps that are rational in order to prove it to the world. Now, that’s what we’re waiting for.
            But as I said earlier and repeat again, this is not an interminable process. So we hope that out of Almaty will come a narrowing of some of the differences. Diplomacy is a painful task, and a task for the patient. And you need to take the time to work through some of these things. Obviously, there is an election. That complicates the choices with respect to the politics of Iran. And we’re aware of that. But we will continue, the President is determined to continue to pursue the diplomatic channel. We will continue to have discussions through the P-5+1 process. And we remain open and hopeful that a diplomatic solution can be found…” April 7 at a press conference in Istanbul, Turkey
            “No option will be taken off the table. And I confirm to you, Mr. President, that we will continue to seek a diplomatic solution. But our eyes are open, and we understand that the clock is moving. And no one will allow the diplomatic process to stand in the way of whatever choices need to be made to protect the world from yet another nuclear weapon in the wrong hands...” April 8 at a press conference in Jerusalem, Israel with President Shimon Peres
 
            “Iran cannot have and will not have a nuclear weapon. And the United States of America has made clear that we stand not just with Israel but with the entire international community in making it clear that we are serious, we are open to negotiation, but it is not an open-ended, endless negotiation; it cannot be used as an excuse for other efforts to try to break out with respect to a nuclear weapon. And we are well aware and coordinating very, very closely with respect to all of our assessments regarding that. But President Obama doesn’t bluff; he’s made that very clear to me. And we hope the Iranians will come back to the table with a very serious proposal...” April 9 at a press conference in Jerusalem, Israel with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
 
The European Union
High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton
            We “had long and intensive discussions on the issues,” during which “it became clear that the positions of the E3+3 and Iran remain far apart on the substance… We have therefore agreed that all sides will go back to capitals to evaluate where we stand in the process… I will be in touch with Dr. Jalili soon in order to see how to go forward.” April 6 in an official statement
 
British Foreign Secretary William Hague
            “Lengthy discussions took place on some issues, but a wide gap remains between the parties. Iran's current position falls far short of what is needed to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough…
            We look to Iran to consider carefully whether it wants to continue on its current course, and face increasing pressure and isolation from the international community, or to enter into meaningful negotiations…” April 6, 2013 in a press statement
 
Russia
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov
            “[Russia] considers that it's necessary to recognize all rights of Iran, including enrichment... Certainly these talks were a step forward… Unfortunately we were unable to achieve a breakthrough and are still on the threshold… The parties are ready to maintain contacts and hold a new round of talks…
            We worked hard to improve the Baghdad package. We realize that the further the talks go and the closer the key issues are, the more difficult decisions are taken. That is why we don’t seek to dramatize the lack of a compromise.  April 6 to the press
 
China
Deputy Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu
            “We are entering hard talks in this regard. More obstacles are lying ahead of us. I think all parties should make this dialogue continue and resolve the disputes with a practical manner and with mutual respect.” April 6 to the press
 
Israel
Minister of Strategic and Intelligence Affairs Yuval Steinitz
            The international community should give Iran an ultimatum of “ a few weeks, a month” to stop enriching uranium or face a possible military strike. “The Iranians are playing games and laughing all the way to the bomb… It is time to present the Iranians with a military threat or some kind of red line, an unequivocal ultimatum from the entire world, (which must be delivered) by the United States and the West...
            North Korea was somehow allowed by the international community to gain nuclear weapons and it is threatening to use (them) against South Korea, Japan and even the United States. Imagine what could happen within two or three years not only to Israel but to Europe, the United States and the whole world if the fanatical and extreme regime in Tehran attains nuclear weapons…” April 7 to Israeli army radio
 
 

 

The Arab Uprisings in Iranian Politics

            Iran hailed the 2011 Arab uprisings as an “Islamic Awakening” and considered the overthrow of U.S.-backed dictators a continuation of its own 1979 revolution. A new report claims that Tehran’s goals are to foster political Islam in the Arab world and Arab independence from U.S. influence—both elements of a broader strategic narrative ultimately radiating from Iran.
 
            Tehran saw the uprisings as an opportunity to “brandish its ideology, point up the success of its ruling system, and counter U.S. strategic communication,” according to Payam Mohseni of Brandeis University. The regime cited the electoral success of Islamist parties as evidence of the regime’s success at home and abroad.
 
            But many supporters of the 2009 Green Movement―the opposition born after the disputed 2009 presidential election― saw the Arab uprisings as a continuation of their demonstrations against the government. The following are excerpts from the brief published by Brandeis University’s Crown Center for Middle East Studies, with a link to the full text at the end.
 
Iran’s Domestic Ideological Context
            While Iran’s narrative of the Islamic Awakening  emphasizes the political developments that have occurred outside of Iran’s borders, it is nevertheless fundamentally rooted in the Islamic Republic’s own domestic ideological context and the regime’s interest in projecting its “soft power.” As such, the importance of this narrative must be analyzed from two different yet related perspectives. The first is in the context of the “soft war,” which is the ongoing ideological conflict within which the regime perceives itself to be engaged. The second is within the broader history of the regime’s focus on the Islamization of the social sciences. Since the Islamic revolution, Iran has stressed the development of models of governance and society alternative to those of the West and the modern social sciences, based on Islamic thought. Accordingly, this section looks at how the narrative of the Islamic Awakening is a logical development of both of these outlooks…
 
The “Soft War”
            At the time of the regional uprisings in 2011, the Iranian regime was already engaged in a highly ideological campaign which it referred to as the “soft war” (jang-e narm). The campaign represented Iran’s growing fears of “soft” threats to its rule, as demonstrated by the popular mobilization that occurred following the contested June 2009 presidential election. The green movement, led by opposition candidate Mir-Hussein Mousavi, not only produced the largest protests the country had witnessed since the revolution but also fueled an unprecedented degree of infighting within the ruling elite over the very nature of the Islamic regime…
 
            The soft war, however, extends beyond the challenge posed by the green demonstrations. More recently, with respect to the current nuclear standoff, Khamenei declared at a meeting with university students that the target of the soft war “is what is in your heart, in your mind, in your brain—meaning your will. The enemy wants to change your will.” The soft war, in other words, represents the latest ideological framework employed by the regime to analyze the threats and opportunities it faces with respect to a variety of issues. These ideas, moreover, have not remained solely at the level of discourse and political jargon. Just recently, the Armed Forces General Staff declared that it was establishing a Defense Propaganda Staff (setad-e tablighat-e defai), a Soft War Base (gharargah-e jang-e narm), and think tanks devoted to television and cinema…
 
Implications of Iran’s Grand Narrative
            Iran’s strategic narrative of the Islamic Awakening is relevant to understanding not only Iranian foreign policy (and Middle Eastern foreign affairs generally) but, just as importantly, Iranian domestic politics. The reason is simple and, perhaps, counterintuitive: The development of Iranian thought on the Islamic Awakening—and of soft power more broadly—has been influenced first and foremost by the domestic political scene. Such thinking was spurred on not by geopolitical rivalries or by Iran’s attempts to “export the revolution,” as commonly assumed, but rather by the backlash of theocratic thinkers against their reformist counterparts regarding the very nature of the Islamic regime. Iran’s narrative of the Islamic Awakening is thus one component of the regime’s own ideological campaign to bolster the Islamic Republic and confront oppositional discourse on regime change...
 
            Iran’s main desires are to contribute to the growing Islamization of Arab polities—in whatever shape or form that may take, detached from any specific regime or institutional model—and to encourage the increased independence of Arab states so that they do not toe the line on United States policies, particularly those that intend to isolate Iran regionally. Iran consequently seeks to employ its narrative of the Islamic Awakening that extends beyond the Iranian model to its advantage to expand its reach and pursue its interests in the region more effectively.
 
Click here for the full text.

The Islamists Are Coming

The Islamists Are Coming, edited by Robin Wright, surveys the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region more than any other political bloc. Yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.

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