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Reports: Crackdown on Iran’s Journalists

            The crackdown on journalists that began in that aftermath of Iran’s disputed 2009 presidential election is continuing today, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists. “Iran has ranked among the world's top three worst jailers of the press every year” since 2009. The Islamic Republic imprisoned at least 35 journalists in prison in 2013.
           
Since late May, authorities have targeted several journalists for charges such as “propaganda against the state” and “disrupting public order through participation in gatherings.” The International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran reported that prominent journalists Marzieh Rasouli was summoned to Evin Prison to receive 50 lashes and serve two years in prison for those two charges.
           
The following are excerpts from reports by the Committee to Protect Journalists and the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran.

 
Committee to Protect Journalists
 
• On June 28, 2014, Iranian journalist and CPJ International Press Freedom Awardee Mashallah Shamsolvaezin wrote on his Facebook page that he had been charged with "propaganda against the state" related to his interviews with media and speeches he gave at two regional and international journalism conferences. He said he was released on bail of 2 billion riyals (approximately US$80,000).
 
• On June 21, 2014, Reihaneh Tabatabei, a journalist who worked for Shargh and Bahar, was summoned to Evin Prison to begin serving a six-month prison sentence for prior charges related to "publishing news about the Green Movement," according to reports.
 
• On June 20, 2014, critical blogger Mehdi Khazali was arrested while on a trip to the north of Iran, according to news reports. Reports said the arrest could be in connection with a critical blog post Khazali wrote that accused Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani of corruption and embezzlement. Kani is the head of the Assembly of Experts, the clerical body charged with electing the Supreme Leader. It is not clear if Khazali has been charged.
 
• On June 19, 2014, the Kerman province prosecutor announced that 11 staff members of Pat Shargh Govashir, a company that owns the popular Iranian technology news website Narenji and its sister sites, Nardebaan and Negahbaan, had been sentenced to between one and 11 years in prison on charges of receiving training from and producing content for the BBC, according to news reports.
 
• On June 7, 2014, Iranian documentary filmmaker Mahnaz Mohammadi reported to Evin Prison to begin serving a five-year prison sentence, according to news reports. The government charged Mohammadi with propaganda and collusion against the state, claiming she was cooperating with the BBC, but she denied ever working with the channel, the reports said.
 
• On May 28, 2014, Saba Azarpeik, a reformist journalist with the weekly Tejarat-e Farda and daily Etemad, was arrested at the Tejarat-e Farda offices, according to news reports. Azarpeik, who was arrested previously in 2013, has often written critically of conservative officials and human rights abuses in the country, the reports said.
 
Click here for more information.
 
International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran
 
The prominent journalist Marzieh Rasouli was summoned to Evin Prison on July 8, 2014, for the implementation of her sentence of 50 lashes and two years’ imprisonment, she announced on Twitter, even though Rasouli has not yet received confirmation of the initial sentence from the appeals court.
 
“They quickly want to implement the sentence,” she added on Twitter.
 
Her case is one of many recently, reflecting a current wave of arrests, prosecution under vague national security grounds, and imprisonment of journalists in Iran.
 
Rasouli was arrested on the eve of January 17, 2012, at her home in Tehran. She was detained for 40 days in Section 2-A of Evin Prison under the supervision of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards. She was released on payment of bail set at 300 million tomans (about $100,000) but was found guilty of “propaganda against the state” and “disturbing public order by participating in gatherings,” for which she received the two years and 50 lashes sentence.
 
Rasouli is a veteran journalist who has worked for several reformist publications, including Shargh, Kargozaran, and Etemad newspapers. She writes on culture, music, and literature and has not been involved in any political activities.
 
On April 21, 2014, the journalist Hossein Nouraninejad was arrested by security forces and taken to IRGC’s Ward 2-A at Evin Prison. He was released nearly two months later on June 16, on 200 million toman bail ($77,600), and is awaiting sentencing on charges of “propaganda against the state” and “acting against national security.”
 
Another prominent journalist and former central council member of the Tahkim Vahdat student organization, Serajeddin Mirdamadi, is in temporary detention at Section 2-A, awaiting trial at Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court on August 2 on charges of “propaganda against the state” and “assembly and collusion against national security.”
 
Click here for more information.
 

Sanctions: What the US Cedes for a Deal

            Since 2006, the United States has imposed more sanctions on Iran than any other country, so it may have to cede the most ground to get a nuclear deal in 2014. Over the years, Republican and Democratic administrations have issued at least 16 executive orders, and Congress has passed 10 statutes imposing punitive sanctions. What does Tehran want? What are the six major powers considering as incentives—and what isn’t on the table? What will the White House and Congress separately have to do to lift them? The following are the main points from an expert panel assembled by eight Washington think tanks held July 8 at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

 
Suzanne Maloney
Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
 
·      Sanctions have significantly contracted Iran’s economy and led to product shortages as well as rising inflation and increasing unemployment. Factories have been shut down.
·      Financial measures have constricted Iran’s ability to repatriate oil revenues, to sell oil abroad and deal with the international financial system generally.
·      Sanctions have had an indirect but serious impact on the pocketbooks of ordinary Iranians and on government revenues.
·      The unprecedented impact of sanctions during the past four years may have led to some overly ambitious understandings of what such punitive measures can achieve.
·      Under sanctions, Iran’s trade is largely restricted to bartering, mostly with countries with which it has significant oil revenue deposits because of the difficulty in repatriating revenues. Iran wants access to its revenues in banks worldwide and the ability to use the SWIFT electronic payments system.
·      Iran is unlikely to receive everything it wants on sanctions relief. Relief would be directly linked to concessions on the nuclear issue and fulfillment of commitments.
·      A nuclear deal would not likely alter the embargo on U.S. business with Iran, which mainly dates from the Clinton era. Sanctions have been applied for many reasons other than the nuclear issue and in many cases predate it.
·      So even in the best circumstances, and only gradually over time, the sanctions regime would end up applying very disproportionately to American businesses while international businesses would have more freedom to transact with Iran.
·      Iran knows how to get around sanctions, but it does not know the complex legalities of them as well as the United States. 
·      The length of a deal is a potential sleeper issue. Iran wants sanctions lifted as soon as possible. But the world’s six major powers —Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States — want to lift sanctions gradually and extend the time period covered by a deal.
 
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle East Affairs, Congressional Research Service
 
·      Separating nuclear-related sanctions from others tied to Iran’s support for terrorism and human rights violations is incredibly difficult. All U.S. sanctions are closely interrelated.
·      Iran likely wants all sanctions that were aimed at bringing it to the negotiating table lifted or suspended, basically all sanctions imposed since U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929. Sanctions were ratcheted up dramatically after it was passed in June 2010.
·      Iran will almost certainly demand that the ceiling on its oil exports be lifted. The sanctions contained in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act cut Iran’s exports down to one million barrels a day from about 2.5 million barrels a day.
·      Iran needs financial, oil, gas, and shipping sanctions lifted at the same time so that it can sell to foreign countries and repatriate revenues.
·      If the two sides come to an agreement, President Obama would likely suspend sanctions using his waiver authority. Almost all of the sanctions laws, due to the constitutional separation of powers, give the president the ability to suspend them. He must certify that suspension is in the national interest, and many of the laws stipulate other certifications.
·      One question about suspending sanctions is whether the president can preemptively issue a blanket waiver that would apply in case of future violations. Current law allows a presidential waiver once a violation has occurred.
·      A precedent for automatically waiving sanctions does exist. In 1998, European companies Total and Petronas were involved in a project to develop Iran’s South Pars gas field that was determined to be in violation of U.S. sanctions. The European Union threatened to take the United States to the World Trade Organization and file a case. They settled the issue by agreeing that if the European Union cooperates with the United States on opposing Iran’s proliferation activities and support for terrorism, all subsequent similar E.U. projects would be waived.
·      After a year or more of compliance with a deal on Iran’s part, it may ask for permanent relief, which would require Congress to repeal or rewrite sanctions laws.

 
Elizabeth Rosenberg
Senior Fellow and Director of Energy, Environment and Security Program, Center for a New American Security
 
·      Iran is an attractive business investment opportunity with a well-educated and relatively young population of 80 million. Its large middle class is interested in buying foreign consumer goods. And it has the world’s fourth-largest proven oil reserves and second-largest natural gas reserves.
·      Iran has been courting investors, hosting foreign trade delegations and sending people abroad to discuss new business opportunities. Sanctions relief under a comprehensive nuclear deal could be a game changer for Iran’s economy.
·      International businesses, however, would not likely flood Iran the day after a deal for five key reasons:
1)      Businesses and investors would hesitate unless they are convinced that an agreement will hold and that Iran’s government will enforce it over time.
 
2)      The sanctions regime would not immediately evaporate the day after a deal. Nuclear sanctions would be lifted gradually, and sanctions for terrorism support, human rights violations and attempts at regional destabilization would stay in place. Also, compliance  is complicated for companies because a range of measures apply to various private and government entities in Iran.
 
3)      Violating sanctions is expensive and damaging to reputations of international companies. In June, French bank BNP had to pay $9 billion for sanctions violations and agree to cease U.S. dollar clearing activities for a period of time. HSBC had to pay $1.9 billion in 2012. 

4)      Iran presents a challenging business environment. Corruption is widespread. The government would need to make changes to its investment and regulatory regimes to be hospitable to international investors. Relationships would take time to be rebuilt.
 
5)      Congress could undermine a potential deal by either rejecting an agreement or by imposing new sanctions not related to the nuclear issue. Tehran would likely interpret any new sanctions as ill will aimed at sabotaging a deal.
 
·      The private sector would prefer a coordinated lifting of sanctions by the international community. For example, a company that conducts business in both Europe and the United States could risk losing its U.S. business by investing in Iran if the European Union lifts sanctions before the United States.
·      The so-called P5+1 powers should be careful to overpromise on sanctions relief. Underperformance by the private sector could create a credibility problem for the P5+1 if Iran does not feel the other side is fulfilling its obligations.
 
Robin Wright (Moderator and discussant)
Joint Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace and the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars
 
·      Sanctions have not had the same impact that they did during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, when the government was faced with huge shortages of gasoline, meat and other basic commodities. 
·      Enormous wealth still exists in some sectors. Porsche dealers in Tehran are selling 911 S Carreras for $300,000, and they cannot keep them in stock.
·      At the same time, Ahmadinejad did major damage to the economy— even though more than half of Iran’s oil revenues since the discovery of oil were earned under his presidency.
·      Mismanagement may have been just as important a factor as sanctions in ruining the economy.
·      The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (recently renamed the Islamic State) may be a dark horse factor in negotiations. A circle of Salafi or Wahhabi militant organizations, including the Taliban, now surrounds Iran. Ironically, Tehran feels less secure after U.S. withdrawals from Afghanistan and Iraq.
 
            To assess this period of pivotal diplomacy, an unprecedented coalition of eight Washington think tanks and organizations is hosting discussions to coincide with the last rounds of talks.
            Click here for a rundown of the first event on the disparate issues to be resolved and the many formulations for potential solutions.
            Click here for a rundown of the second event on U.S.-Iran tensions over timetables and terms.
 
           The coalition includes the U.S. Institute of Peace, RAND, the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Arms Control Association, the Center for a New American Security, the Stimson Center, the Partnership for a Secure America, and the Ploughshares Fund.

Latest on Nuke Talks: What Iran, P5+1 Say

            Leaders from Iran and the six major powers have indicated that significant gaps remain between the two sides in the run-up to the July 20 deadline for a nuclear deal. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has insisted that Iran would need to expand its uranium enrichment program to satisfy its long-term energy needs. Enrichment is one of the most divisive issues in the negotiations. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius has also reported a difference in Russia’s approach compared to Britain, China, France, Germany and the United States’ positions. The following are excerpted remarks by officials on the Vienna nuclear talks, which began on July 3.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
            “As for nuclear issue, the other side is pressuring Iran to be content with the least. In negotiations, the country’s future needs should be considered. We trust the nuclear negotiating team; they will not allow encroaching on the nation’s rights.
            “On the issue of enrichment capacity, their [the West's] aim is make Iran accept 10,000 SWU (separative work units). Our officials say we need 190,000 SWU. We might not need this [capacity] this year or in the next two or five years but this is our absolute need and we need to meet this need."
             July 7, 2014 in a meeting with government officials
 
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif
           “We haven’t resolved any problem, but we have made some important headway in probably removing some of the misconceptions and moving forward with making more serious decisions.”
            July 13, 2014 to the press            
 
            “Of course, we are not ready to achieve a solution at any cost. We insist on our rights and at the same time try to achieve an acceptable, dignified, logical, long-term and lasting solution.”
            July 9, 2014 according to Press TV
 

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani
           “We have a win-win strategy but if the enemy raises excessive demands, the world will know that the side which has raised excessive demands should merely be blamed for the possible failure of the negotiations.”
           July 7, 2014 in a meeting with Supreme Leader Khamenei

Chief of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization Ali Akbar Salehi
            “Our needs for an agreed time frame, for the next eight years, to secure annual fuel for Bushehr nuclear power plant, is approximately 190,000 SWU, so that after the end of the contract with Russia, fuel for this power plant, the Tehran research center and the Arak reactor is secure.
            “We don’t define the enrichment needs on the basis of the number of centrifuge machines, but based on their units, meaning we define it by its SWU. It is based on the type of centrifuge machine to see how much centrifuge machines equals 190,000 SWU.
“If the capacity of each centrifuge is three SWU, approximately 60,000 centrifuges are needed. If the ability of each centrifuge is 10 SWU, we need 19,000 centrifuges. If the machines of the centrifuge from our latest generation have the ability of 24 SWU, we need less than 10,000 centrifuges.”
            July 8, 2014 to Iranian news agencies (translation via Al Monitor)
 
French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius
            “We had some profound discussions on the Iranian nuclear issue but we still don't have an agreement. We will continue talking but I think these discussions were useful.”
          July 13, 2014 to the press
 
            “Until now the P5+1 (six powers) were homogenous, but over the last few days my representatives in the negotiations have seen a certain number of different approaches - and I hope they won't remain - between some of the P5+1 and our Russian partners.
            “We want to preserve the unity among the P5+1 because that is how we reached a deal before.”
            July 8, 2014 to parliament
 
British Foreign Minister William Hague
            “Achieving an agreement is far from certain. Significant differences remain ... which are yet to be bridged. But I am convinced that the current negotiations are the best opportunity we have had in years to resolve this issue.”
            June 10, 2014 in an interview with Austrian newspaper Wiener Zeitung
 
E.U. spokesperson Michael Mann
            The group of six major powers “has been united and is still united. We are working very hard, we are working on drafting the text. But there are still obvious, serious gaps to close and we are determined to work hard to try and close those gaps.”
            E.U. foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton is “thinking about when to engage the ministers as we move the process forward. It would be an opportunity to take stock of where we are in the process.”
            June 9, 2014 to reporters
 
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson
            “The discussions are extremely difficult but on the face of it there is some progress. We hope to work out a final text of the agreement - despite all the difficulties - by the July 20 deadline.”
            July 10, 2014 in a news conference
 

Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Li Baodong
          
“We urge all the parties to show their flexibility and a political will to reach an agreement as soon as possible and also we have hope… that we can achieve that...of course we have some difficulties, some hurdles so that is why we have to work together and in the spirit of cooperation and mutual respect.”
            July 13, 2014 to the press

 

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier
            “We discussed all proposals today once again. The main thing is for everyone on the part of the P5+1 who conducts talks to work out a single position and reach out with it to Iran. It happened today.
           “It is time when an agreement could be struck for the decade of talks.”
           July 14, 2014 according to press
 

Congress Asks Obama for Consultation on Iran

            On July 10, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chief Ed Royce (R-CA) and the Committee’s Ranking Member Eliot Engel (D-NY), along with 342 other House Members, sent a letter to President Obama emphasizing that any permanent sanctions relief for Iran would require congressional approval. The letter called for closer consultation as the July 20 deadline for a nuclear deal approaches. The following is the full text of the letter with a link to the list of signers.

 
Dear Mr. President:
 
Iran’s nuclear program poses a grave threat to the national security of the United States and our allies. As the July 20th deadline for a “comprehensive solution” to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon approaches, we urge greater consultation with Congress on a potential sanctions relief package that may be part of a final agreement.
 
Our two branches of government have long been partners in working to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. However, as these hugely consequential national security decisions are made, greater cooperation between Congress and the Executive Branch is essential, given that any permanent sanctions relief demands congressional approval.
 
When asked if your Administration would come to Congress to secure legislative relief of sanctions in a final agreement with Iran, in a recent Congressional hearing, Secretary of State John Kerry responded: “(w)ell, of course. We would be obligated to under the law.” He added that “what we do will have to pass muster with Congress.” We strongly agree with the Secretary’s assessment, and believe the final agreement must verifiably ensure that Iran is denied an undetectable nuclear weapons breakout capability.
 
Your Administration has committed to comprehensively lifting “nuclear-related” sanctions as part of a final P5+1 agreement with Tehran. Yet the concept of an exclusively defined “nuclear-related” sanction on Iran does not exist in U.S. law. Almost all sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program are also related to Tehran’s advancing ballistic missile program, intensifying support for international terrorism, and other unconventional weapons programs. Similarly, many of these sanctions are aimed at preventing Iranian banks involved in proliferation, terrorism, money laundering and other activities from utilizing the U.S. and global financial systems to advance these destructive policies.
 
Iran's permanent and verifiable termination of all of these activities - not just some - is a prerequisite for permanently lifting most congressionally-mandated sanctions. This often unnoted reality necessitates extensive engagement with Congress before offers of relief are made to Iran, and requires Congressional action if sanctions are to be permanently lifted. With the July 20 negotiating deadline on the near horizon, we hope that your Administration will now engage in substantive consultations with Congress on the scope of acceptable sanctions relief.
 
It would be wise for Congress and the Executive Branch to work closely together to end the threat that Iran’s efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability pose to U.S. national security. We look forward to working constructively with your Administration on a solution to the Iranian nuclear threat. Thank you for your attention to our concerns.
 
Click here for a list of signers.
 

Sanctions Factsheet: What the US Cedes

            Sanctions have been the policy tool of choice used by six presidents to deal with Iran. Since the 1979 revolution, the White House has issued at least 16 executive orders, and Congress has passed ten statutes imposing punitive sanctions on Iran in four waves, according to Ali Vaez, of the International Crisis Group, in The Iran Primer.

·         The first wave of U.S. sanctions, from 1979 to 1995, was a response to the U.S. embassy hostage crisis and Tehran’s support for extremist groups in the region.
·         The second wave of sanctions, from 1995 to 2006, sought to weaken the Islamic Republic by targeting its oil and gas industry and denying it access to nuclear and missile technology. U.S. sanctions also targeted any company in a third country that invested in Iran’s energy sector, a move to compel allies to adopt a unified stance against Iran.
·         The third wave, from 2006 to 2010, was imposed chiefly due to concerns over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, but also included punitive measures for Iran’s human rights violations.
·         The latest wave of sanctions, since 2010 includes, some of the toughest restrictions the United States has ever imposed on any country. They target Iran’s Central Bank and its ability to repatriate oil revenues as well as many transportation, insurance, manufacturing and financial sectors.
            The first two waves of sanctions were unilaterally imposed by Washington. But the last two included similar measures imposed by U.S. allies and the United Nations, generating almost a global sanctions regime against Iran. Many U.S. sanctions are tied to Iran’s non-nuclear policies, such as human rights abuses and support for terrorism. 
 
Quick Factoids: Sanctions Impact
·         U.S. and E.U. sanctions have cost Iran over $100 billion in lost sales since 2011. Treasury Undersecretary David S. Cohen April 2014
·         Iran’s economy contracted by about six percent in 2013 and is expected to perform badly in 2014 as well. Treasury Undersecretary David S. Cohen April 2014
·         Sanctions have cut oil export earnings by more than 60 percent since 2011. State Department Undersecretary Wendy Sherman February 2014
·         Oil revenues plummeted from $100 billion in 2011 to $35 billion in 2013.  Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service   May 2014
·         Iran’s currency, the rial, has lost about 60 percent of its value since 2011. State Department briefing November 2013
 
Congressional Sanctions
·         The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992: Sanctions foreign countries that transfer goods or technology that knowingly contribute to Iran acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear or advanced conventional weapons.
·         Iran Sanctions Act of 1996: Sanctions investment in Iran’s energy sector. (Amended and expanded since then.)
·         Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000: Sanctions foreign individuals and entities helping Iran with developing weapons of mass of destruction.
·         Iran Freedom Support Act of 2006: Sanctions entities that contribute to Iran’s ability to acquire chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. 
·         Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010: Sanctions sale of gasoline and gasoline production equipment to Iran, sanctions banks that transact with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, and blacklists individuals involved with human rights abuses related to the crackdown on protestors following the June 2009 presidential election.
·         Iran-Syria-North Korea Nonproliferation Act of 2011: Sanctions entities and individuals supporting weapons of mass destruction or cruise or ballistic missile programs.
·         Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act: Identifies Iran as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern and prohibits the opening or maintaining of correspondent accounts by any domestic financial institution or agency for or on behalf of a foreign banking institution, if the account involves Iran.
·         National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012: Sanctions foreign banks that transact with Iran’s Central Bank. Exemptions can be issued to banks whose parent countries have substantially curtailed purchases of Iranian oil.
·         Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012: Expands sanctions on foreign banks dealing in Iran’s energy sector and on entities involved with human rights abuses in Syria
·         National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013: Expands sanctions on energy, shipping and shipbuilding sectors for ties to proliferation activities.
 
White House Executive Orders
Executive Order 12170 (November 1979): Declares a national emergency related to the events of 1979 and blocks Iranian government property subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
 
Executive Order 12957 (March 1995): Prohibits persons under U.S. jurisdiction from entering into certain transactions with respect to Iranian petroleum resources.
 
Executive Order 12959 (May 1995): Expands national emergency set forth in E.O. 12957 and prohibits entering into new investment with Iran. Food and medical products are exempt.
Executive Order 13059 (August 1997): Prohibits most imports from Iran, exports to Iran, new investment, transactions relating to Iran-origin goods regardless of their location.
 
Executive Order 13224 (September 2001): Declares a national emergency in aftermath of September 11, and blocks property and prohibits transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.
 
Executive Order 13382 (June 2005): Expands national emergency set forth in E.O. 12938; blocks property of WMD proliferators and their supporters.
 
Executive Order 13553 (September 2010): Expands national emergency set forth in E.O. 12957; blocks property of certain persons with respect to human rights abuses by the government of Iran. Generates a list of designated individuals for whom property under U.S. jurisdiction is blocked. Imposes sanctions on those who enter into transactions with designated individuals.
 
Executive Order 13572 (April 2011): Blocks property of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps for human rights abuses in Syria.
 
Executive Order 13574 (May 2011): Expands national emergency set forth in E.O. 12957; implements new sanctions added to ISA. Prohibits U.S. financial institutions from making loans or credits, or engaging in foreign exchange transactions. Prohibits imports from, and blocks property of, sanctioned persons.
 
Executive Order 13590 (November 2011): Expands national emergency set forth in E.O. 12957; blocks property of those who trade in goods, services, technology, or support for Iran’s energy and petrochemical sectors. Prohibits Ex-Im Bank from entering into transactions with sanctioned persons. Requires Federal Reserve to deny goods and services. Prohibits U.S. financial institutions from making most loans or credits.
 
Executive Order 13599 (February 2012): Expands national emergency set forth in E.O. 12957; blocks property of the government of Iran and Iranian financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Iran.
 
Executive Order 13606 (April 2012): Expands national emergency set forth in E.O. 12957; blocks property and suspends entry into the U.S of Iranian and Syrian officials engaged in human rights abuses.
 
Executive Order 13608 (May 2012): Expands national emergency set forth in E.O. 12957; prohibits transactions with and suspends entry into the U.S. foreign sanctions evaders.
 
Executive Order 13622 (July 2012): Expands national emergency set forth in E.O. 12957; authorizes sanctions on foreign financial institutions that finance activities with National Iranian Oil Company. Prohibits Ex-Im Bank financing, designation as a primary dealer of U.S. debt instruments, access to U.S. financial institutions. Blocks property, denies imports and exports.
 
Executive Order 13628 (October 2012): Expands national emergency set forth in E.O. 12957. Further prohibits U.S. financial institutions from making loans or credits, foreign exchange transactions, and transfers or credits between financial institutions. Blocks property of those who deal in equity or debt instruments of a sanctioned person. Prohibits imports, exports. Extends sanctions to other officers of sanctioned entities. Blocks property affiliated with human rights abusers. Denies access to certain financing tools, property, and imports, if one engaged in expansion of Iran’s refined petroleum sector. Blocks entry into the U.S. of those engaged in human rights abuses.

Executive Order 13645 (June 2013): Expands national emergency in E.O. 12957; imposes restrictions on foreign financial institutions engaged in transactions relating to, or maintaining accounts dominated by, Iran’s currency. Prohibits opening or maintaining U.S.-based payable-through correspondent accounts. Blocks property under U.S. jurisdiction. Imposes restrictions on those, including foreign financial institutions, found to be materially assisting in any way an Iran-related specially designated natinoal. Imposes restrictions on those found to engage in transactions related to Iran’s petroleum or related products. Requires the Secretary of State to impose restrictions on financing (Federal Reserve, Ex-Im Bank, commercial banks) on those found to engage in significant transactions related to Iran’s automotive sector. Blocks property of those found to have engaged in diversion of goods and services intended for Iran’s people.
 
4 United Nations resolutions
UNSC Resolution 1737 (December 2006)
UNSC Council Resolution 1747 (March 2007)
UNSC Council Resolution 1803 (March 2008)
UNSC Council Resolution 1929 (June 2010)
            The four Security Council resolutions include the following sanctions:
·         Imposing asset freezes on individuals and companies for involvement in ballistic missile programs and nuclear programs.
·         Imposing asset freezes on individuals, companies and banks affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards.
·         Requires states to prohibit procurement of arms and related material from Iran and require states to restrict supply of specified arms and combat equipment to Iran.
·         Calls on states to exercise vigilance in entering new public financial support commitments with Iran.
·         Calls on states to exercise vigilance over Iranian bank transactions in their territories.
 
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