Iran Primer's Blog
US Charges Iran More Active Worldwide
June 3, 2013 | 8:48am
On May 31, two senior U.S. officials detailed Iran’s growing role in extremist activities worldwide. Tehran was directly or indirectly involved in the planning of attacks in Europe, Southeast Asia and Africa in 2012, said the officials. The following are excerpts from the background briefing.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Yesterday we released at the State Department the annual Country Reports on Terrorism for 2012. And one of the most noteworthy conclusions when we put that report together was a marked resurgence of terrorist activity by Iran and Hezbollah. The tempo of operational activity was something we haven’t seen since the 1990s, with attacks plotted in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Africa in 2012 alone.
We believe this is an alarming trend. It’s borne out by the facts and it merits closer inspection as we evaluate the landscape of terrorist activity globally. Add to this, of course, is the deepening commitment both Iran and Hezbollah have made to fight and kill on behalf of the Assad regime in Syria. That involvement, of course, is hardening the conflict and threatening to spread the violence across the region.
We believe this is an alarming trend. It’s borne out by the facts and it merits closer inspection as we evaluate the landscape of terrorist activity globally. Add to this, of course, is the deepening commitment both Iran and Hezbollah have made to fight and kill on behalf of the Assad regime in Syria. That involvement, of course, is hardening the conflict and threatening to spread the violence across the region.
Hezbollah and the Iranian leadership share a similar world view and strategic vision and are seeking to exploit the current unrest in the region to their advantage. This approach has increased sectarian tensions and conflict and serves further as a destabilizing force during a time of great change throughout the region.
But there’s also an encouraging trend at work and one I think that’s received relatively little attention in our view, and that’s the increasingly firm response among governments around the world to these actions. We’re seeing prosecutions of Hezbollah operatives in multiple jurisdictions around the world, ongoing investigations, and discussions about proscribing the group as a terrorist organization.
But there’s also an encouraging trend at work and one I think that’s received relatively little attention in our view, and that’s the increasingly firm response among governments around the world to these actions. We’re seeing prosecutions of Hezbollah operatives in multiple jurisdictions around the world, ongoing investigations, and discussions about proscribing the group as a terrorist organization.
Now just to recap a couple of the notable incidents in 2012 that we also covered in our report, in February of this year the Bulgarian Government publicly implicated Hezbollah in a July 2012 bombing in Burgas that killed five Israelis and one Bulgarian citizen and injured 32 others. In March of this year, a court in Cyprus found a Hezbollah operative guilty of charges stemming from surveillance activities carried out in 2012 against Israeli tourists. Thailand is currently prosecuting a Hezbollah member for his role in helping plan a possible terrorist attack in that country. We understand that trial will begin in mid-June. The Qods Force is suspected of directing terrorist attacks in Georgia, India, Thailand, and Kenya in 2012.
You will also recall that the Qods Force was implicated in a 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States in Washington. Manssor Arbabsiar was sentenced yesterday to 25 years in prison for his involvement in that plot. We see no signs of this activity abating in 2013. In fact, our assessment is that Hezbollah and Iran will both continue to maintain a heightened level of terrorist activity and operations in the near future.
Now turning to Syria, Hezbollah has long been involved in the conflict and, of course, is making no – no longer making any effort to disguise or downplay the extent of its commitment to kill or die on behalf of the Assad regime. A large number of Hezbollah fighters are now operating in Syria, even though the Lebanese Government has sought to disassociate Lebanon from the Syrian crisis in the best interest of the Lebanese people. The group is openly undermining that policy and working closely with Iran to provide a range of support to the Assad regime, including fighters, weaponry, and training a large pro-regime militia.
We judge that Iran and Hezbollah have enlisted Alawite, Iraqi, Shia militant and terrorist groups to participate in counter-opposition operations in Syria. All of this support is helping the regime brutally crack down on the opposition, kill civilians, and is contributing to regional instability, notably in Lebanon. And unfortunately, it’s clear that both Hezbollah and Iran’s involvement in Syria is only deepening as they take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that their close ally survives.
Countering these activities continues to be a priority for the U.S. Government, but we’re also seeing other governments begin to take their own actions in response to Hezbollah’s global presence and operational activity. Governments are beginning to see Hezbollah for what it is, and there is a shift underway that we detect in the way that other governments are viewing the organization.
I mentioned the prosecution a minute ago of Hezbollah operatives in Cyprus and the Bulgarian Government’s finding Hezbollah responsibility for the Burgas attack. These attacks – these activities, of course, led to the most serious discussion we’ve seen within the EU to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Crucially, France and Germany have called for Hezbollah’s military wing to be added to the EU’s terrorism list, and we’re watching that discussion very, very closely.
Recently Bahrain designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and is proposing that the GCC take up similar action across the GCC against Hezbollah. The Arab League Chief Nabil Elaraby recently weighed in on Hezbollah, urging it to stop fighting alongside the Assad regime, urging Hezbollah to reconsider its stance and not get involved in the killing in Syria and stressing that only – the only way to protect Lebanon is to protect Lebanon’s internal unity. That was issued in an Arab League statement, and I think that reflection of Arab League view is certainly a turnaround in the way Hezbollah is being viewed across the Arab world.
Of course, Hezbollah’s actions have been condemned by numerous Lebanese political figures for placing Lebanon at risk and placing the country’s interest and those of – and placing Hezbollah’s interest and those of Iran and Assad above those of the Lebanese people. President Sulayman recently urged Hezbollah to withdraw from Syria.
Looking again at the global picture, in Southeast Asia, in mid-June, the Thai Government will begin its prosecution of a Hezbollah operative who was detained in January 2012 and who led police to a warehouse located outside of the city – outside of Bangkok, where police found several thousand kilograms of explosives and bomb-making material. We’ve also seen countries beginning to crack down on Iran’s terrorist activities with Nigeria and Kenya arresting and prosecuting Iranian operatives who were in their countries engaged in various illicit activities.
I think I’ll stop there, but it does give you a sense of the global scope of activity we’re seeing on both of these – both the – both Iran and Hezbollah’s part, and as was emphasized in our report released yesterday. Thank you.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL TWO: As a result of all of these activities, and actually a lot of other activities, in our efforts to combat its financial support and its financial activities, we’ve adopted over the last couple of years a new approach. Traditionally, over the years, what we’ve focused on is trying to go after the terrorist financing as terrorist financing activities of Hezbollah, and we certainly continue to do that. But what I think you’ve seen over the past several years is expanding the aperture of those efforts in two ways. The first is taking a comprehensive approach to targeting all of Hezbollah’s illicit activities, and secondly, to focus more than ever before on Hezbollah’s financial activities within Lebanon and trying to make even the Lebanese financial system a hostile environment for Hezbollah to be operating in, so again, a comprehensive approach, an approach that focuses not just on the periphery, but challenging Hezbollah’s ability to conduct financial activities through the Lebanese financial system.
We’ve done that a number of ways. First of all, as I said, in the traditional way of focusing on Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, we’ve implemented a number of financial sanctions with respect to Hezbollah targeting their ties with the Iran Qods Force and just their general conduct within Lebanon. And I could be happy to go into some of those designations, if people are interested.
Secondly, we focused on Hezbollah’s activities within Syria and its alliance with the Assad regime and the violence that it’s waging upon the Syrian people and tried to highlight that through our financial and economic sanctions.
And then finally, and what I think is the most innovative aspect of our strategy, is focusing on Hezbollah’s illicit financial activities, to include its links with narcotics trafficking. We’ve taken a number of actions in which Hezbollah has been implicated under our drug kingpin sanctions program, and using Section 311 of the Patriot Act to target financial institutions within Lebanon that have been involved in these narcotics money-laundering activities and that have had links to Hezbollah. These include actions we’ve taken against the Lebanese Canadian Bank, and just within the past couple of months, against two exchange houses within Lebanon – the Rmeiti Exchange and the Halawi Exchange.
We’ve combined this with intense engagement with the Lebanese Government to try to ensure that all Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Rules and regulations and international standards are being applied throughout the Lebanese financial system to ensure the Lebanese financial system is clean and safe and integrated into the international financial system appropriately. But we’ve also made clear that if Lebanon is unable to apply Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing laws and regulations and international standards in an appropriate fashion, then it puts its access to the international financial system at risk.
QUESTION: Two questions: One, is there any estimate of the – obviously Iran is making a large effort to supply Assad with arms, Qods Force personnel, advisors, and the like. Is there an estimate of what, in terms of resources, how much Iran is spending on this, how many billions, for example, per year? And two, there was a recent episode that’s come to light through Israeli and Nigerian officials, where they claim to have nabbed a Hezbollah cell in Nigeria that was planning attacks on Western targets and Israeli targets. Do you have any information on that?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: We are watching very closely those reports coming out of Nigeria. We don’t have anything further than what is – has been announced, both by the Nigerian and the Israeli Governments. But it, again, is reflective of this global scope of operational activity that we’ve been encountering over these last 18, 24 months, and it’s something that we’re very concerned about. Africa, across the continent, has been an area that Hezbollah in particular has been active. Of course, they’ve used Africa for fundraising and traditionally, but they’ve been operationally active in a number of African countries, as have the Iranians, as we saw in the case in Kenya recently.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL TWO: With respect to Hezbollah financing, Iran has always been and remains the primary financial supporter of Hezbollah, and Hezbollah survives on the resources that it derives from its Iranian support. That’s not to say that it doesn’t derive funds from other places…But Iran still is vital to all of that. This is one of the reasons, as I said before, why we focus so heavily on ensuring that the Lebanese financial system is not a conducive environment for Hezbollah financial activities.
QUESTION: Homeland Security in November was talking about the links of Hezbollah with drug traffic organizations in Mexico. Are you not concerned about that at all?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: We are quite concerned about Hezbollah and its global reach. We don’t have evidence of an operational network – Hezbollah across South America, but it’s something that we watch for very, very, very closely. We know that Hezbollah as an organization does benefit from fundraising activity or commercial activity that ultimately benefits the organization back in Lebanon. But as for an operational link to activities in South America, Central America, or Mexico, we don’t have that.
QUESTION: I was wondering if you have any estimate on the number of fighters that Hezbollah has in Syria right now. And I know you said you expect more terrorism in the next year from Hezbollah, but given their involvement in Syria, how will this shape you think Hezbollah’s military calculation going into war with Israel or other conventional things they’ve done in the last few years?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: I don’t think we have an estimate on the number of fighters. I mean there are, of course, a lot of people trying to look at this question. I think it’s fair to say, however, that the organization has made an all-in commitment to defend and support the Assad regime and is throwing whatever resources are required at that, and of course as reports indicate is suffering the consequences as well in terms of fighters being killed in Syria as well. But we don’t have an estimate of the numbers.
With regard to what these trends indicate for what we can expect for the future and what this means for Hezbollah’s – the potential for destabilizing activity with regard to Israel, I mean I think that’s something that the organization has made a part of its identity. It is a destabilizing force within the region. It certainly is so within Lebanon and its actions in Syria and its declarations to essentially define the Syrian conflict as a sectarian conflict, which of course is sparking an intensified fight within the country of a sectarian nature. These are further indications that the organization itself plays a destabilizing role within Lebanon and then more broadly in the region if we needed further evidence of that.
QUESTION: Two questions: Firstly, do you see any connection between what’s happening in Syria and the sort of surge of sectarian violence in Iraq, number one? And number two, you said we don’t have any evidence of operational networks in Central or South America or Mexico. Did you have evidence of operational networks in Thailand, Bulgaria, Cyprus, prior to the commission of these attacks last year? Were you surprised that they had this ability to launch these attacks in these places?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: When we released the report, we noted that the increase in activity is something we haven’t seen since the 1990s. And the 1990s was a period, of course, where Hezbollah also was operationally active, committing attacks in multiple parts of the world, to include Europe. So the fact that Hezbollah had operational networks historically in Europe is not new to us, is not surprising. And in fact, we were already in the spring of 2012 having numerous conversations with European governments about the danger that Hezbollah was posing, and that was on the basis of information we were aware of that indicated an increased operational tempo in Europe. And those conversations coincided then with the events that played out in the summer to include the attack in Bulgaria. So we were not surprised that – when – ultimately when we started to see the evidence play out and then in the course of the court case in Cyprus.
QUESTION: Iran announced a couple of days ago that it is extending a $4 billion line of credit to Syria. They’re saying that it’s for economic purposes, for reconstruction, and development of business and things like that. Do you think something like this, given the situation on the ground in Syria, is plausible? Is it even possible, considering that Iran is heavily under sanctions, financial sanctions, and Syria to some extent as well?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL TWO: It’s an important issue to point out that while the Iranian economy is going down the tubes as a result of its own mismanagement of its economy and as a result of comprehensive international sanctions, and while the Iranian people are suffering as a result of that, that Iran still manages to find resources to send to terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and to support the Assad regime’s violence against its own people in Syria.
The fact of the matter is, is that Iran and organizations like Hezbollah are acting irresponsibly in this regard and we have a whole wide array of sanctions that we are prepared to deploy when we see financial institutions or other types of institutions around the world that are engaged in sanction-able activity. And we’ve demonstrated that we’re prepared to use that, and we implement financial sanctions all the time with respect to entities that are involved in financial activities with Iran.
Iran is often big on promises. If we see financial activity that is sanction-able – and that’s an awful lot of different types of financial activity with Iran – we will certainly exercise our tools and ensure that the financial institutions involved are isolated from the international financial system.
Latest on the Race: How to Follow Candidates
May 28, 2013 | 5:14pm
By late May 2013, all eight presidential candidates had set up campaign websites or social media websites. Some of their campaigns even appeared to have made Twitter and Facebook accounts, both of which are blocked in Iran. The candidates’ supporters have also launched dozens of unofficial blogs, websites and social media accounts. The following is a rundown of the candidates’ websites and social media.
Saeed Jalili
Hassan Rouhani
Mohsen Rezaei
Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf
Mohammad Reza Aref
Ali Akbar Velayati
Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel
Mohammad Gharazi
Photo Credits:
Mohsen Rezaei by درفش کاویانی (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons
Hassan Rouhani by Mojtaba Salimi (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0 )], via Wikimedia Commons
Online news media are welcome to republish original blog postings from this website in full, with a citation and link back to The Iran Primer website (www.iranprimer.com) as the original source. Any edits must be authorized by the author. Permission to reprint excerpts from The Iran Primer book should be directed to permissions@usip.org
Kerry Chastises Iran on Election
May 24, 2013 | 3:59pm
On May 24, Secretary of State John Kerry criticized Iran for limiting candidates allowed to run for president. He also expressed concern about "troubling signs" that the regime is slowing internet access and the free flow of information during the campaign. The secretary also said “the clock is ticking” on negotiations between Iran and the world’s six major powers on its controversial nuclear program. But he also noted that the Obama administration remains committed to a “peaceful resolution” that will in turn lift sanctions on Iran and begin better relations. The following is an excerpt from Kerry's press conference during his Middle East tour.
I can’t think of anybody in the world looking at Iran’s election who wouldn’t be amazed by a process by which an unelected Guardian Council, which is unaccountable to the Iranian people, has actually disqualified hundreds of candidates, potential candidates, according to very vague criteria, which the Iranian people are not privileged to know or judge by. The council narrowed a list of almost 700 potential candidates down to the sort of officials of their choice based solely on who represents the regime’s interests, obviously, rather than who might represent some different point of view among the Iranian people. That is hardly an election by standards which most people in most countries judge free, fair, open, accessible, accountable elections. The lack of transparency obviously makes it highly unlikely that that slate of candidates is either going to represent the broad will of the Iranian people or represent a change of any legitimate kind.
So in addition to that, there are some troubling signs that Iranian Government is now taking steps to slow down or even cut off internet access, which is the process by which people can take part in the sharing of information and the exchange of ideas in an election. So ultimately, the Iranian people will be prevented not only from choosing someone who might have reflected their point of view, but also taking part in a way that is essential to any kind of legitimate democracy.
So we’ll have to see what develops, but it’s our hope still that the Supreme Leader and the Iranian leadership will come to the table in a serious way with a serious offer in order to prove that their nuclear program, which they profess is peaceful, is indeed peaceful. And I would reiterate – and I’ve said this before, and now it is almost a month or so even later – the clock is clearly ticking. And even today there are reports from the IAEA of its dissatisfaction with its access, and we know of the continued efforts of Iranian development of its program.
So this is an issue which is very, very much on our radar screen. We think about it and look at it every single day, take stock of it on a regular basis, and our hope is, for the sake of the region, the world, the Iranian people, ourselves, that we can have a peaceful resolution. But it is going to have to be demonstrated much more affirmatively than it has been to date that Iran is interested in that kind of a solution and that they are, indeed, prepared to prove that their program is peaceful.
I will repeat what I’ve said previously: Notwithstanding my criticism that I just made of the election process, the President of the United States has from day one said that he is open to trying to work towards a relationship with Iran that sees them rejoin the community of nations, lift sanctions, move to participation in international organizations, and assume a role like other nations that is responsible and accountable to the rule of law that we live by in the international community. That is the preferred hope of the American people and I think people in the world.
The Iranian leadership needs to make its decisions whether or not it wants to go down that road or the alternative. And the alternative is obviously one that none of us are looking for or want to contemplate. But the President has made it clear it is not one that he shies away from, if that is the only option that is left to him.
US Targets Iran Oil, Sanctions Evaders
May 24, 2013 | 2:25pm
On May 31, the United States targeted Iranian petrochemical companies for the first time. It also imposed sanctions on five foreign companies helping Iran evade sanctions on its oil and air industries. The Treasury and the State Department targeted Ferland Company Limited, a Cyprus and Ukraine based company that was involved in an illicit ship-to-ship transfer of Iranian oil. The Treasury also sanctioned eight Iranian petrochemical companies, and several companies and individuals involved in Iran’s aircraft procurement network. “We are committed to intensifying the pressure against Iran, not only by adopting new sanctions, but also by actively enforcing our sanctions and preventing sanctions evasion,” said Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. The following are excerpts from the press releases, with links to the full text at the end.
Targeting Sanctions Evaders
The Treasury Department imposed sanctions on Cyprus and Ukraine-based Ferland Company Limited (Ferland) because it has facilitated deceptive transactions for or on behalf of the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), which was identified by Treasury as a Government of Iran entity in July 2012. This Treasury action is the first use of sanctions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13608, which targets Foreign Sanctions Evaders, including those that facilitate deceptive transactions for or on behalf of persons sanctioned in connection with Iran or Syria. As a result of Treasury’s action, transactions with Ferland that are subject to U.S. jurisdiction are generally prohibited, including transactions by U.S. persons, wherever located.
In March 2013, Ferland and NITC cooperated in a scheme to sell Iranian crude oil deceptively in order to help Iran evade international sanctions which also involved a vessel owned by Dimitris Cambis. The scheme involved ship-to-ship transfers of oil between three oil tankers: Blackstone, a NITC vessel, Zap, a vessel controlled by Dimitris Cambis, and Aldawha, which was chartered by Ferland. Treasury identified Cambis and his business network, which includes the Zap and other vessels, as working on behalf of Iran in March 2013. For details on that action click here. The Blackstone conducted a ship-to-ship transfer of oil with the Zap on March 12. The Zap then conducted a ship-to-ship transfer of oil, between March 15 and 17, with the Aldawha off Khor Fakkan, United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). The details of the ship-to-ship operations were arranged by a NITC manager and a representative of Ferland. Ferland later furnished a falsified certificate of origin as part of its cargo documentation, claiming that the crude oil loaded onto the Aldawha was a “product of Iraq.”
Petrochemical Companies
The Treasury Department is also identifying eight Iranian petrochemical companies that are owned or controlled by the Government of Iran, including Bandar Imam Petrochemical Company, Bou Ali Sina Petrochemical Company, Mobin Petrochemical Company, Nouri Petrochemical Company, Pars Petrochemical Company, Shahid Tondgooyan Petrochemical Company, Shazand Petrochemical Company, and Tabriz Petrochemical Company. These identifications made pursuant to E.O. 13599, which targets the government of Iran.
The Department of State also sanctioned two companies for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase or acquisition of petrochemical products from Iran.
Aircraft Procurement and Support Network
Today, the Treasury Department also designated key companies and individuals located in Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and the U.A.E. that are leasing and selling aircraft to Mahan Air and Iran Air as they attempt to circumvent sanctions and support Iran’s worldwide illicit activities. Mahan Air was designated in October, 2011 pursuant to E.O. 13224 for providing financial, material and technological support to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and has transported personnel, weapons and goods on behalf of Lebanese Hizballah. Iran Air was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in June 2011 for providing support and services to Iran’s IRGC, Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces (MODAFL), and Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)…
Statement by State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki
Companies Sanctioned under Iran Sanctions Authorities
The Administration took action today under a variety of authorities against companies helping Iran to evade U.S. sanctions and doing illicit business with Iran.
Executive Orders 13622 and 13599:
The Administration imposed sanctions today under Executive Orders (E.O.) 13622 and 13599 on a series of companies related to Iran’s petrochemical industry. These actions underscore U.S. resolve to cut off funds from the Iranian petrochemical sector as the second largest revenue source for Iran’s illicit nuclear program.
The Department of State imposed sanctions on Jam Petrochemical Company and Niksima Food and Beverage JLT pursuant to E.O. 13622 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase or acquisition of petrochemical products from Iran. Jam Petrochemical Company is an Iranian manufacturer and seller of petrochemicals. Niksima Food and Beverage JLT received payments on behalf of Jam Petrochemical Company. The sanctions selected for both companies prohibit: financial transactions subject to U.S. jurisdiction, transactions with respect to property and interests in property under U.S. jurisdiction, and foreign exchange transactions subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
In addition to these entities, the Department of the Treasury also identified eight Iranian petrochemical companies as owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.
US Report on Iran's Support of Extremism
May 24, 2013 | 2:24pm
Iran significantly increased its sponsorship of terrorism in 2012, according to a new report by the State Department. It claims that attacks in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, South Asia and the Far East were linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force or Iran’s ally in Lebanon, Hezbollah. The armed wing of the extremist Shiite political movement has also facilitated the training of Syrian government forces by Iran’s Qods Force. The following excerpts detail actions linked to Iran in several Middle Eastern countries . A link to the full report is included at the end.
In 2012, there was a clear resurgence of Iran’s state sponsorship of terrorism, through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), its Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and Tehran’s ally Hizballah, who remained a significant threat to the stability of Lebanon and the broader region... In fact, Hizballah’s terrorist activity has reached a tempo unseen since the 1990s with attacks plotted in Southeast Asia, Europe, and Africa.
ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK, AND GAZA
Israel faced a wave of plots and attacks against its interests abroad that Israeli officials linked to Iran and Hizballah. Arms smuggling continued from Iran through Egypt into Gaza to Palestinian terrorist organizations…
On the Northern Border, Israeli security officials remained concerned about the terrorist threat posed to Israel from Hizballah and its Iranian patron, arguing that Iran, primarily through the efforts of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force, continued to transfer arms to Hizballah in Lebanon… Terrorist plots were also uncovered against Israeli targets in Thailand, Azerbaijan, and Cyprus, and an attack was foiled in Georgia. Israeli officials publicly linked many of these plots and attacks to Hizballah and its Iranian sponsors…
On October 6, the Israeli Air Force shot down an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that entered Israeli airspace, and the IDF posted a video clip of the interception online. According to press, Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah, in televised remarks on October 11, acknowledged that the group had sent the drone, and claimed its parts were manufactured in Iran and assembled by Hizballah in Lebanon.
KUWAIT
On May 28, Kuwait’s Court of Appeals commuted the death sentences of three defendants (two Iranians and a Kuwaiti), convicted of belonging to an Iranian espionage cell, to life in prison. The court also upheld the life imprisonment sentence for the fourth defendant (a stateless man) and the acquittal of two other Iranians, but overturned the life sentence imposed by a lower court against a Syrian defendant and acquitted him. The cell’s seven members (four Iranians, a Kuwaiti, a Syrian, and a stateless man) were apprehended in May 2010 on charges of espionage, terrorist plotting, and vandalism. The Court of Appeal’s verdicts are not final, and are expected to be challenged at the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court equivalent), whose rulings are final.
LEBANON
Hizballah, with deep roots among Lebanon’s Shia community and significant backing from the Iranian government, remained the most dangerous and prominent terrorist group in Lebanon… Hizballah has directly trained Syrian government personnel inside Syria, has facilitated the training of Syrian forces by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force, and played a substantial role in efforts to expel Syrian opposition forces from areas within Syria…
YEMEN
Yemeni government officials accused some pro-secessionist members of the Southern Movement (Hirak), of carrying out violent acts in the south. Senior security and military officials accused Hirak in the south and Houthi groups in the north of receiving weapons and funding from Iran in an effort to destabilize Yemen. They also accused Iranian elements of raising political and sectarian tensions through disinformation that promoted and encouraged violent extremism.
Click here for the full report.
The Islamists Are Coming
The Islamists Are Coming, edited by Robin Wright, surveys the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region more than any other political bloc. Yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.
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