Alireza Nader's Blog

Ties Grow Between Iran and China

May 3, 2012 | 3:57pm

The following is an excerpt from a new report by Alireza Nader and Scott Harold entitled “China and Iran: Economic, Political, and Military Relations” issued May 3, 2012 by the Rand Corporation. The full link is at the bottom.

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s possible pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability presents a serious challenge to U.S. interests in the Middle East. The U.S. strategy to dissuade Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability has relied heavily on international sanctions, in addition to diplomatic engagement with the Islamic Republic.

No other country is as critical in this effort as the People’s Republic of China. Winning China’s cooperation on sanctions has been difficult, in large part due to the broad and deep partnership between China and Iran. In the past decade, China has become Iran’s number one trading partner. Collaboration between Beijing and Tehran centers on China’s energy needs and Iran’s abundant resources but also includes significant non-energy economic ties, arms sales and defense cooperation, and geostrategic balancing against the United States.

Understanding the nature and range of Chinese-Iranian cooperation is important to crafting a successful U.S. strategy toward Iran. China’s policies have hampered U.S. and international efforts to shape Iran’s decisions on its nuclear program, and continued ChineseIranian cooperation will hinder U.S. attempts to pressure Iran.

The United States has limited options to influence China’s relationship with Iran. Some observers have proposed that the United States use positive inducements to reduce Chinese cooperation with Iran, such as significantly enhancing bilateral relations with China or trading key U.S. interests. However, these policy moves would involve costly trade-offs and are probably politically unfeasible. The United States could also use negative inducements, such as sanctions against Chinese firms, though such measures are also of limited use given China’s economic power. A third approach has been to build a broad international sanctions coalition against Iran, which has raised the diplomatic pressure on China to stop doing business with Iran but increased Iran’s incentive to reach out to Beijing. While China may decrease business ties with Iran, it will nevertheless continue to see Iran as a central actor shaping Chinese interests in the Middle East. The increasing U.S.-Chinese competition in the Pacific region will also have a direct impact on China’s willingness to cooperate with the United States on Iran.

Nevertheless, China and Iran face divergent interests across a number of issues, which could provide opportunities to contain their growing relationship. While some in China see value in leveraging Iran to tie the U.S. down strategically, China is generally reluctant to embrace Iran too tightly for fear of precipitating an open break in ties between China and the United States. Many Iranians perceive China to be exploiting Iran economically while backing an increasingly brutal and repressive regime.

Finally, neither country is destined to remain an authoritarian state forever. Democratic forces in either country could precipitate the emergence of regimes less hostile to the United States—a more democratic Iran that may not pursue nuclear weapons or a China less interested in balancing against the United States. Given that such changes may be far in the future, the United States should continue to forestall an Iranian nuclear weapons capability and pressure China to reduce ties to Iran.

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP351.pdf

Alireza Nader, coauthor of Coping with a Nuclearizing Iran (RAND, 2011), is a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit institution that improves policy and decision-making through research and analysis.

Tags: China, Reports

Iran’s Calculations in New Diplomatic Talks

April 17, 2012 | 1:06pm

Alireza Nader

What did Iran get out of the talks with the six major powers--U.S., Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany--at the first diplomatic meeting in Istanbul?

Iran apparently took a constructive approach at the first round of talks, according to Western diplomats at the talks. Tehran's attitude at this point in time should come as no great surprise. The Islamic Republic is under tremendous economic and political pressure. U.S. sanctions against the Iranian Central Bank have caused major economic disruptions. The European embargo on Iranian oil, set to begin this July, will further weaken Iran's oil-dependent economy.

But the talks also demonstrate that the Iranian regime has substantial leverage over the so-called P5+1 major powers and the larger international community. Iran's nuclear program continues to make progress. Tehran is slowly approaching the point at which it can create nuclear weapons if the leadership chooses to do so. The lack of an effective military option may enhance Iran's bargaining position. Iranian leaders are aware of the costs of a military conflict – not just for Iran—as well as the costs for the United States and the international community. The talks are critical, and Iran holds the key to their success.

What did Iran’s position indicate about its willingness to compromise?

Not much, since Iran has not yet made any concessions. Iran has come to the negotiation table, but this is a smart diplomatic move rather than a sign of compromise. It is not yet clear whether Iran is interested in actual compromises, such as stopping the enrichment of uranium to a higher grade (20%) and shipping its current stockpile out of the country to be exchanged for fuel for Tehran’s research reactor.

If this stockpile remains in Iran, it can be used to make nuclear weapons in the future. Iran must also come clean regarding clandestine work directly related to nuclear weaponization. This would likely entail opening up sensitive military sites, such as Parchin, to international inspections. For Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, this compromise would be politically risky—and a difficult one to make.

What else is at stake in these talks beyond the dispute over Iran’s controversial nuclear program?

Plenty. Broadly speaking, the Iranian regime, including Khamenei, views the United States as being dedicated to undermining the Islamic revolution and overthrowing the Islamic Republic. The United States in turn is opposed to Iran's support for terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and has also condemned its widespread human rights abuses.

Both countries are vying for power and influence in the Middle East. The Arab Spring only sharpened the competition. Khamenei has portrayed the Arab uprisings as an "Islamic awakening" that will weaken the U.S. position in the Middle East.

But Iran's position in the Middle East may be at greater stake. The Syrian regime, Iran's closest ally in the region, faces a stubborn insurgency. Bashar al Assad's fall would deal a serious blow to Iranian power in the region. Meanwhile, Turkish and perhaps Saudi influence in the region has increased at Iran's expense. The Iranian regime cannot appear to be weak at this critical juncture. Its influence in the region, and ultimately its very survival, is at stake.

What lies ahead?

The negotiations may be long, arduous, and ultimately unsatisfactory. There is a deeply ingrained sense of opposition to the Islamic Republic as a political system among major elements of the U.S. political establishment. This antipathy is shared by many U.S. allies in the Middle East. Khamenei often states that the major issue between the United States and his regime is not the nuclear program, but U.S. opposition to the Islamic Republic.

The United States may not be actively seeking to overthrow the Islamic Republic. But the campaign of sanctions--along with the mysterious sabotage of nuclear facilities and assassinations of nuclear scientists—may have convinced Iran's leaders that regime change is the ultimate goal. Beset by economic problems, political divisions, and domestic discontent, Iranian leaders may compromise – or appear to make compromises –to cushion the regime from the mounting internal and external pressures.

Click here to read Alireza Nader's previous article on Khamenei: The Nuclear Decision-maker

Tags: Diplomacy, Nuclear Program

Part II: Khamenei: The Nuclear Decision-maker

February 22, 2012 | 6:49pm

Alireza Nader

The fate of Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program—which now threatens yet another Middle East conflagration—rests in the hands of a single man: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Iranians are now gripped by a sense that their nation stands at a precipice. The Islamic Republic faces potentially devastating new international sanctions as well as possible Israeli military strikes on its nuclear facilities. Normally inured to insecurity, war and endemic crises, Iranians are now hoarding foodstuff and dollars, ready for the worst.

But where Iranians sense disaster, Khamenei may see opportunity.

During his February 3 Friday prayer speech, the supreme leader said that Tehran would not stop its nuclear program despite growing sanctions and other pressures. He chastised the United States for keeping “all options on the table,” and warned that any attack on Iran would be “10 times worse” for the United States.

His bold assertions reflect his unique calculations, which are critical in understanding how the growing crisis could play out. As supreme leader for almost a quarter century, he will ultimately make the final decision over whether to weaponize a program that Tehran claims is simply for peaceful nuclear energy.

For Khamenei, Iran’s crisis with the West is not the moment to back down. The reasons have as much to do with domestic politics as foreign policy. To him, the nuclear crisis represents a test of survival for the Islamic Republic--and even more for his own faltering leadership. How Khamenei fights this battle will not only determine Iran’s nuclear future, but possibly the fate of the entire revolutionary regime.

Khamenei is not an irrational actor, however. His intent in developing a nuclear weapons capability almost certainly is not to destroy Israel, but rather to guard against a foreign attack or counter an internal challenge. Acquiring a nuclear weapons capability might boost the regime’s image at home, a political benefit rarely taken into account in understanding Iran’s motivations.

Like most Iranian leaders, Khamenei may feel that a nuclear weapons capability is worth pursuing as long as the costs do not outweigh the benefits. He has acknowledged the pain of sanctions. His regime certainly feels the effect of Iran’s currency depreciation and Europe’s embargo of Iranian oil.

But the supreme leader may believe that other factors alleviate pressures on Iran. In his anniversary speech, Khamenei said that the West, specifically the United States, is in economic and geopolitical “decline.”

Khamenei also apparently believes that the Arab uprisings—which he described as an “Islamic Awakening”—have weakened America’s position in the Middle East. Despite evidence to the contrary, he also appears to think the uprisings have strengthened Iran’s influence as an alternative model for the region.

More basically for Khamenei, resistance to the United States has been a key pillar of the Islamic revolution since 1979. Iran’s suspected nuclear program may not merely be a form of military deterrence; it could also serve as a measure of Iran’s success as a revolutionary state and even a scientific achievement that can restore the country to international power. To him, compromising now, especially under intense pressure, would undermine the Islamic Republic.

The supreme leader rarely reveals the full extent of his thinking. His views can also be opaque. He is not known for scholarship or extensive writing, unlike his predecessor, revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Understanding his calculations is limited to his occasional sermons, public statements and the regime’s actions, over which he has near absolute authority.

Based on all three, however, Khamenei has implied that at least he may be willing to stand up to U.S. and international pressure on grounds that Iran can absorb the pain of sanctions—and that time on its side. He may even believe that his regime could benefit from an Israeli attack by rallying nationalist fervor.

At the same time, costs are beginning to grow. His leadership is increasingly questioned not only by ordinary people, but also reportedly by members of the elite, including the Revolutionary Guards. Khamenei may be ready for battle, but the army behind him may be much smaller than he believes.

Khamenei’s greatest vulnerability may be his reputation for stubbornness. His predecessor, Ayatollah Khomeini, was more inclusive in his decision-making and more willing to make tough choices. After eight years of war with Iraq, he opted to drink from a “poisoned chalice” and accept terms of a U.N. ceasefire to end a conflict in which more than 100,000 Iranians died.

But Khamenei is widely viewed as unwilling to take advice from anyone outside his shrinking inner circle. He has excluded the reformists from the political system and has slowly marginalized former president Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is considered more pragmatic and cautious on foreign policy. Many Iranians are increasingly concerned that the supreme leader is taking Iran down a dangerous path and is unwilling to turn back, whatever the pressures.

Alireza Nader, co-author of Coping with a Nuclearizing Iran (2011), is a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit institution for research and analysis.

Tags: Khamenei, Nuclear Program

Iran’s Growing State of Civil Disobedience

September 8, 2011 | 2:03pm

Alireza Nader

The Iranian regime faces a threat even more daunting than the 2009 Green Movement protests: a disparate yet potentially powerful civil disobedience movement motivated not just by politics, but by environmental, economic, and social issues. From demonstrations over the drying up of Lake Orumieh in northwestern Iran to organized youth water fights in Tehran, the resilience and spontaneity of protests in Iran have recently been on full display. But these protests differ from the 2009 protests. They are not necessarily motivated by Iran’s contentious factional politics, and they are not wedded to the agenda of Iran’s Islamist reform movement. Rather, they are the outpouring of popular frustration with daily life in Iran.

Lake Orumieh, one of the world’s largest saltwater lakes, is in danger of disappearing in the next few years. Environmental activists and even members of Iran’s parliament have blamed the government’s policies and its overall lack of interest for the lake’s dismal condition. The drying up of the lake could have serious environmental and economic repercussions for the region’s inhabitants. It is no surprise that the region’s Turkish-speaking population went into the streets in protest last week; Lake Orumieh is a symbol of Iranian Azerbaijan’s historical and cultural heritage. The drying up of the lake was also a convenient reason for Iran’s Azeris to express their discontent with the regime in Tehran. The Iranian government, fearing ethnic strife and separatism, responded with brute force and massive arrests, in typical fashion.

Civil disobedience, however, is not restricted to Iran’s ethnic minorities. Iranian youth have engaged in water fights – using plastic guns and balloons – in Tehran’s parks. These water fights, organized through social media sites such as Facebook, are meant to alleviate boredom but also to counter the Islamic Republic’s stifling social regulations. Iran’s Prosecutor-General, Gholam Hossein Mohsen Ejei, has called the water fights “a campaign orchestrated from abroad.” Identified “conspirators” have been duly detained, along with their toy guns.

The Islamic Republic has good reason to fear Iranians protecting a dying lake or trying to have fun on a hot summer day. The 2009 protests shook the regime to its very core; any gathering of a large group of people is suspected as a prelude to revolt. Iran is also surrounded by the dying embers of neighboring authoritarian regimes, from Libya to its close ally, Syria. The Iranian regime may have been successful in crushing the Green Movement that emerged in 2009, but recent acts of civil disobedience could be much harder to control. They are spontaneous and leaderless and not tied to the reform movement led by Mir Hussein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, who still profess loyalty to the same Islamic Republic that they helped create. More importantly, recent acts of civil disobedience are motivated by multiple factors, and not just a result of dissatisfaction with a particular election or opposition to a specific figure such as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

A typical Iranian has many reasons to disobey the government, whether he or she is young, an ethnic minority, a poor teacher or laborer, or a struggling student. The Azeri demonstrators are not merely motivated by a dying lake or ethnic aspirations. They are driven by the anger, frustration, and indignity felt by Iranians regardless of race, religion, or gender. The Islamic Republic has left many Iranians with no choice but to disobey. And they no longer have to await Mousavi and Karroubi’s orders to go into the streets.

Alireza Nader is an international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and the author of "The Next Supreme Leader: Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran" (RAND, 2011).

Online news media are welcome to republish original blog postings from this website in full, with a citation and link back to The Iran Primer website (www.iranprimer.com) as the original source. Any edits must be authorized by the author. Permission to reprint excerpts from The Iran Primer book should be directed to permissions@usip.org

Tags: Civil Disobedience, Lake Orumieh

Ahmadinejad vs. the Revolutionary Guards

July 11, 2011 | 11:27am

Alireza Nader

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is in hot water these days. His challenge to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which began after he fired the minister of intelligence in April, has provoked the deepening wrath of Iran’s political and military elite. There is even talk of impeaching the president.

In the past, Ahmadinejad proved he is a survivor. He masterfully manipulated his way into Iran’s second most powerful position. Yet he now faces a challenge he may not be able to overcome. Khamenei has given the Revolutionary Guards the task of reining him in--and perhaps even helping select his replacement as president.

In a recent interview, Revolutionary Guards chief Gen. Ali Jafari said that his force is now in charge of dealing with the “deviant current” – the latest lingo used to describe Ahmadinejad, his controversial chief of staff Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei and others in his inner circle. Jafari also indicated that the Guards would help set the conditions for next year’s parliamentary elections as well as future elections .

Addressing the opposition, Jafari also said reformists who had not crossed the regime’s “red lines” would be allowed to run. This may include former President Mohammad Khatami, who recently asked the regime to “forgive” Iranians who protested after the disputed 2009 presidential election. Jafari’s comments reflected the growing power of the Guards as Iran’s political enforcer.

But Ahmadinejad is unlikely to go down without a fight. He shot back at Jafari by criticizing “illegal” border crossings used by government agencies to smuggle goods in and out of Iran, which is estimated to generate billions of dollars in illicit profits. Ahmadinejad implied that the smugglers were “brothers” with security and intelligence interests. His remarks have been widely interpreted in Iran as referring to the Guards, who are known to operate many jetties, crossings, and ports throughout the country. Jafari subsequently condemned these claims as “deviant.”

Ironically, the Guards played a critical role in Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005 and 2009. Ahmadinejad was once even considered to be among the Guards' closest allies; he allowed them to amass political and economic power during his presidency. Ahmadinejad publicly suggested that he knows their secrets, as he hinted about smuggling. And he may air more inside information if he feels further threatened.

The Guards are known to be a fractured force. Some members support the reformists, while others are loyal to Ahmadinejad. However, top Guards appear to be solidly behind Khamenei, who has ensured leaders of the elite military wing that they will be powerful long-term guardians of Iranian politics. Khamenei and Jafari are unlikely to allow the political faction loyal to Ahmadinejad to win elections for parliament in 2012 and the presidency in 2013.

So Ahmadinejad may be willing to challenge the very top members of the political elite, including Khamenei and Jafari. But the Guards are also demonstrating that they are willing to exert their growing powers-- even against their own “brothers”-- to protect their prerogatives.

Read Alireza Nader's chapter on the Revolutionary Guards in "The Iran Primer"

Alireza Nader is an international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, a non-profit institution that helps improve policy and decision-making through research and analysis. He is the author of "The Next Supreme Leader: Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran." (RAND, 2011).

Online news media are welcome to republish original blog postings from this website (www.iranprimer.com) in full, with a citation and link back to The Iran Primer website (www.iranprimer.com) as the original source. Any edits must be authorized by the author. Permission to reprint excerpts from The Iran Primer book should be directed to permissions@usip.org

Tags: Ahmadinejad, Jafari, Khatami, Revolutionary Guards, Smuggling

The Islamists Are Coming

The Islamists Are Coming, edited by Robin Wright, surveys the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region more than any other political bloc. Yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.

United States Institute of Peace

The Iran Primer