The Iran Primer

 

      Iran is certain to be a central issue on Secretary of State Kerry’s agenda. The United States is reaching the moment of truth--one way or another--on Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. Iran’s technological capacity is getting to a critical point.

 

      On the other hand, Kerry is likely to face a large number of burning crises when he takes office. The conflict in Syria will be a pressing one. There are serious security issues in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well. Tensions between North and South Korea could boil over. The territorial dispute between China and Japan could intensify. So Kerry’s hands will be more than full. But Iran will be high on his agenda.

 

 

            The growing impact of economic sanctions is the main factor encouraging Iran to make a deal. The Iranians are clearly hurting as sanctions are causing serious distress. But the impact of sanctions may not be a deciding factor in Tehran’s final analysis. Iran has been under U.S. sanctions for three decades. It also survived high inflation and austerity during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. Other countries have endured sanctions for long periods as well.

 

            Maybe the country will suffer so badly economically that the leadership has no choice but to cry uncle. Iran’s Central Bank reported that the annual inflation rate hit 27.4 percent at the end of 2012, one of the highest official levels ever reported in Iran. And the actual rate could be three or four times higher than the official figure.

 

 

            The main obstacle to diplomacy is Iran’s refusal to give up, in any meaningful way, the capacity to build a nuclear weapon. The “capacity” to build a weapon is the knowledge of how to make and assemble the disparate parts and to have all the raw material—which differs from actually building a weapon.

 

            The kinds of deals that would be acceptable to Washington and Jerusalem--and London, Paris and others--would include inspection regimes and safekeeping mechanisms. This monitoring would make it hard—if not impossible—for Iran to acquire the capacity to build a future weapon. Such deals would have no value for the Islamic Republic.

 

            The intentions of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei or those around him are unknown. The U.S. intelligence community seems to have concluded that Tehran has not made the final decision to build a bomb. And I think there is serious reason to believe that they haven’t made a final irrevocable decision.

 

            But my estimate is the Iranians are unlikely to give up the capacity to produce a weapon in short order because they probably believe they need one. Almost any Iranian national security advisor would probably argue that a nuclear weapons capability is the only guarantor of independence and deterrence. Clearly Iran lives in a dangerous neighborhood, surrounded by many enemies prepared to act against it. So how could Iran prevent them from taking military action? The track record of the past decade is clear. If you have nuclear weapons, you have deterrence.  Pakistan has them and, they deter India. Afghanistan and Iraq did not, and America invaded. Libya gave up its nuclear capability and was invaded.

 

            Arguments about whether or not Tehran is prepared to stop short of building or testing a bomb are intense and important. But the Iranians may decide that the only way to ensure their retention of that capacity is to build a bomb.

 

 

            In the end, war is too costly, unpredictable and dangerous to be a practical option. And diplomacy shows no signs of imminent success.

 

            So the real challenge is that Kerry and Obama face their own policy trap—and the absence of other alternatives. They have said that containing a nuclear Iran is not an option—and is off the table. So if diplomacy fails, war is the only alternative. That stark choice is a mistake. 

 

            But there is a good chance that Kerry and Obama will bail themselves out of this trap by reopening the door to containment, although they would probably call it something else.

 

           

            The United States should make every effort to find a diplomatic solution, even if chances are slim. But I am pessimistic about a viable deal emerging. I think Iran wants to have a nuclear weapons capability, which is very understandable given events of the last decade in Iran’s part of the world. Countries that do not have a nuclear weapons capability get invaded by the United States and its allies—from Afghanistan to Iraq and Libya. Countries with the capability do not get invaded, most notably Pakistan but also North Korea.

 

            This strategic lesson has long been apparent to the Iranians. A nuclear weapon is the only real assurance of their independence and territorial integrity. The United States cannot escape the history of the last decade. All the well-meaning promises of statesman like John Kerry and Barack Obama are unlikely to convince the Iranians that they are better off in terms of their long-term security without a nuclear weapons capability.

 

 

 

Photo credit: U.S. Department of State via Wikimedia Commons

            Iran’s reformers transformed revolutionary politics between 1997 and 2005 under former President Mohammed Khatami. But today, the reformists’ ability to contest the presidential elections in any meaningful way appears slim. Conservatives have even taken to labeling them the “seditionist current,” despite the fact that most were among the original revolutionaries.

 

            The reformist bloc has also issued tough conditions for their participation in the elections—and not to call for a boycott that might discredit the vote both at home and abroad. They demanded release of their leaders and other political prisoners. They also called for guarantees that the poll will be free and transparent. Neither demand is likely to be met.

 

            The main reformist political parties have been proscribed by the ministry of interior, although they continue to have a shadowy existence. A congress of all reformist parties and groups was slated for mid-January to discuss election strategy, but it was called off after the authorities effectively banned the meeting by imposing onerous demands on the organizers. The regime required that they renounce Mousavi, Karroubi and the Green Movement and admit no members of reformist parties to the meeting.  

 

            Leading conservatives—including Majles deputies, senior clerics and Revolutionary Guards commanders—have increasingly denounced the reformist movement, its leaders and others who took part in the 2009 protests. Charges against reformists have become so serious that Reza Khatami, the former president’s brother and spokesman for his political party, had to publicly deny that the reformists want to overthrow the regime.

 

            Their aim is to reform, not to “overthrow” the government, the younger Khatami said. If reform proves impossible, he added, the reformists will simply go home and tend to their own business.

 

            Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former president and grand old man of Iranian politics, had earlier proposed a “coalition government” of all parties to address the country’s problems—a proposal promptly denounced by conservatives. They charged that it provided a back-door for reformers to return to power.

 

            Rafsanjani appears to be quietly urging Khamenei to embrace a compromise solution to Iran’s current political dilemma. He also has not yet ruled out another bid for the presidency himself. Theoretically, he could run. Parliament tried to bar candidates over age 75 from running—a move clearly aimed at Rafsanjani, who is 78—but the Council of Guardians failed to endorse the bill. The council, composed of 12 senior clerics and religious scholars, has veto power over legislative proposals. At a press conference in late January, Rafsanjani denied that he had any intention of running again. (He was president for two terms from 1989 to 1997, then lost to Ahmadinejad in 2009.) But he then added that he “would not hesitate for a second to enter the arena” if he felt he was needed.

 

            A few conservative leaders have also tried to repair the deep divide among factions that emerged from among the original revolutionaries, but so far to no avail. Habibollah Asghar-Owladi, a powerful conservative parliamentarian with close ties to the bazaar and business community, recently said that Mousavi and Karroubi were not leaders of the “seditious current,” even if they had been involved with it. He implied that the two could be returned to the fold.

 

            But within two weeks, Asghar-Owladi was forced to retract his overture. He did not mean to exonerate the two reformists, he insisted. They still had to made amends for their sins.

 

            The Friday prayer leader in Mashhad, who is a Khamenei appointee, also tried to open the door to reconciliation with Mousavi and Karroubi. He was soon pressured into an even more compliant retraction. The two reformist leaders should be put on trial, he said.

 

            Even moderate conservatives now insist that any reformists who want to return to the “embrace” of the revolution must first “apologize” and “ask forgiveness” for their past transgressions. The reformists must also distance themselves from other “seditionists.” A senior Revolutionary Guards commander recently described the 2009 protests as a greater threat to the Islamic Republic than the eight-year war with Iraq in the 1980s.  Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, head of the Council of Guardians, has also said that the so-called seditionists “should not even dream” of running for president.

 

            Debate about the detained reformist leaders may not be over, however. In late January 2013, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani repeated Ashgar-Owladi’s formulation that Mousavi and Karroubi could indeed return to the fold if they apologized. The comment from Larijani, a potential presidential candidate, may indicate that moderate conservatives—and perhaps even the supreme leader—hope to avoid another tainted election by freeing the opposition leaders. But any release appears to be conditioned on political submission—and public proof that Mousavi and Karroubi have been tamed and humiliated.

 

            Under these conditions, major politicians from the reformist camp are unlikely to run in the coming elections. Voters are more likely to have to choose from conservative candidates and possibly a candidate from the Ahmadinejad camp, if one is allowed to run. At the same time, little-known dark horses have emerged in past elections—and taken Iran in unexpected directions.

 

 

 

Photo credit: Mir Hossein Mousavi Facebook profile