Mehdi Khalaji's Blog
Tehran’s Views on U.S. Politics, Nuclear Talks
June 8, 2012 | 5:04pm
Mehdi Khaliji
Iran’s ruling regime pays close attention to American politics in its own calculations about how to negotiate with Washington—and how to game the new diplomatic effort. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his inner circle, for example, believe that President Barack Obama needs to talk to Iran, but they also sense that the U.S. president will be unable to make any concessions because it might endanger his reelection bid.
So Tehran has concluded that Obama needs to prolong the talks and achieve minor goals to demonstrate that talks are making progress.
The regime also believes that reaching an agreement with Washington before the presidential election will be futile, since a new administration could change U.S. discourse and any agreement that is reached before the election.
As a result, the regime has concluded that both sides will benefit in delaying any substantive agreement until after the U.S. elections in November.
In the meantime, Khamenei continues to believe that neither the United States nor Israel is willing to attack Iranian nuclear facilities, at least before the U.S. election. So rather than seek a solution to the standoff, Iran’s short-term goal is to decrease diplomatic pressure, or at least prevent new sanctions before the election.
Historically, the Islamic Republic has viewed Republican presidents more favorably than Democratic ones. In 2008, nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani said publically that Iran would prefer that a Republican win the presidential election because Democrats incessantly pressured Tehran. In trying to game diplomatic talks in its favor, Iran could even employ the nuclear issue to influence the U.S. presidential election—in an attempt to replicate the impact of the 1979-1981 hostage crisis. President Jimmy Carter’s inability to resolve that crisis contributed to Ronald Reagan’s victory.
Khamenei’s calculations are based on his belief that resisting U.S. demands is the most effective response. His conclusion is based on the patterns of past diplomacy. Every time Iran has demonstrated flexibility or willingness to compromise, the West has pushed for even more concessions. But in recent years, Iran’s defiance and uncompromising positions have scared the West and forced it to consider Iran’s demands.
Khamenei also believes that if the West pressures Iran economically, then Iran should pressure the West in its own way—such as making direct and indirect threats to U.S. allies. On May 20, Major General Hassan Firouzabadi, the Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, warned that Israel was a serious danger to stability in the Middle East. And with a team of senior military officials, he traveled to three disputed islands in the Persian Gulf also claimed by the United Arab Emirates, an oil-rich sheikhdom and close U.S. ally.
Khamenei apparently wants to influence Western perceptions about diplomatic prospects by reactivating a former team of negotiators allied with Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was president from 1989 to 1997. Khamenei’s office may be encouraging them to publically engage in debates abroad about the nuclear issue to appear as if he is consulting with a broad range of political figures, even some who once defied him. In reality, however, Khamenei remains solely in charge of the decision-making on nuclear policy.
Iranian state media has been an interesting barometer of the regime’s intentions in the talks. In April, the media provided wide coverage of the opening round of diplomacy between Iran and the world’s six major powers in Istanbul. But it has not praised or publicized what happened at the Baghdad meeting in May to the same extent. And the state media has also not shown much enthusiasm about the Moscow meeting scheduled for mid-June.
Mehdi Khaliji is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, studied Shiite theology in the Qom seminary of Iran.
Assessing Iran’s Parliamentary Election
March 15, 2012 | 1:49pm
Mehdi Khalaji
Who were the winners and losers in this election?
The most important result of this election was the rise of a new generation of hardliners. It did not have a serious presence in parliament before the election. The new hardline faction is led by Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi. It has strong ties to the intelligence community and Revolutionary Guards (IRGC).
But the winners and losers were basically determined before the election. There were no surprises. The reformists and the candidates who supported President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad were the losers. The candidates who won were explicitly against Ahmadinejad and for Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. There are now two factions in parliament. One is the old generation of conservatives, and the other is a new generation of hardliners that has emerged in recent years.
How is this election different from previous elections?
This election was important because it was the first since the disputed 2009 election for president—and it was free of protests or incidents. It also provided clues about the presidential election due next year. For example, the poll marked a turning point for Ahmadinejad, whose political life is over. He and his faction won’t have a chance in the 2013 presidential election.
This election was important not so much because Khamenei’s power was consolidated; this has happened gradually. Previous parliaments were also obedient to Khamenei. The Majles now does not have any autonomy, and there is no separation of powers in Iran. The different branches of government basically all now work as extensions of Khamenei’s office.
What does Khamenei’s consolidation of power mean for the future of Iranian politics?
The Majles has been weakened by Khamenei over the past 20 years. The last Majles was completely in Khamenei’s hands. Despite clear disagreements with Ahmadinejad, the Majles was not able to put pressure on the president or hold him accountable because Khamenei supported Ahmadinejad. It was not initially willing to confirm eight cabinet ministers when Ahmadinejad was reelected president in 2009. But Khamenei then told parliament to confirm all the cabinet ministers. Parliament’s lack of political will was obvious.
At the same time, however, Khamenei is in a very difficult position. He has destroyed Iranian political institutions that might restrain him but that also could protect him by sharing responsibility for decisions. So when Khamenei weakens institutions, he alone then faces responsibility for every government action. This makes him vulnerable.
In the place of these institutions, he has empowered the Revolutionary Guards, which can be a double-edged sword because they have become so powerful and now they own up to half the country. The IRGC has become an enormous organization. At some point, they may have different political or economic interests than Khamenei does. They may try to impose their preferences on Khamenei--and at that point the supreme leader may not have others to turn to for support.
How is this election likely to change domestic politics and the regime’s foreign policy in Iran?
The current Majles is likely to be even more loyal to Khamenei, who likes to micro-manage the details of economic and domestic policies. Obviously, he is also the decision-maker behind foreign policy and the nuclear program. So I don’t expect any change in domestic or foreign policy after this election.
On the nuclear program, economic sanctions mainly target people affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards. Khamenei’s no-compromise policy hurts them economically, so some elements may revolt against Khamenei if the situation gets significantly worse.
Khamenei’s inner circle could even face a shake-up over the next six to nine months due to economic problems from sanctions. Iranian banks currently conduct 2.2 million international transactions annually. SWIFT, the global financial service, decided on March 15 to cut ties with Iran. This could be far more crippling for Iran's economy. SWIFT's annual report notes that 19 Iranian banks and 25 Iranian institutions use SWIFT, and that in 2010 they "sent 1,160,000 messages and received 1,105,000 messages." If these 2.2 million transactions stop completely, the Revolutionary guards will be hit the hardest, and they might pressure Khamenei to change his policy--or even try to politely push him out of the decision-making process.
Is the consolidation of power in Khamenei’s hands turning the Islamic Republic into an Islamic monarchy?
No, Iran is rather moving toward a more militarized government, not a monarchy. If Khamenei is gaining more power, it is because the Revolutionary Guards are gaining more power. So far they need each other, but the relationship may not continue under these harsh sanctions.
What is the outlook for the reformists?
It is difficult to talk about reformists in Iran now. When the reform movement started, there were 18 political groups who called themselves reformists. They had different political agendas. There was a spectrum of ideas and opinions. Some of them were loyal to the idea of Velayat-e Faqih (the rule of the jurisprudence), and others were critical of the idea. The only thing they had in common was that they supported former President Mohammed Khatami.
Especially since the 2009 election , reformists have ceased to exist politically. If there are some people who wish to reform the system, they have to redefine themselves, produce new ideas of political reform and reorganize. I don’t see that happening in today’s Iran. So I don’t think reformists have a future. They are completely broken ideologically and organizationally, and they have no leadership.
Khatami has always taken ambivalent positions. He does not have a clear idea of reform. He wants to be part of existing government but at the same time reform the system. Many people are also angry at him for voting in this election when other reformers called for a boycott. He was one of the main reasons for the reform movement’s failure. He failed to organize, and he has lost his power base. The people who are angry at Khatami now are the people who voted for him 16 years ago. I don’t think he will play an important role in Iran in the future. This is why he did not have a significant role in the Green Movement.
Mehdi Khalaji, a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, studied Shiite theology in the Qom seminary of Iran.
Iran on Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood
February 25, 2011 | 10:07am
Mehdi Khalaji
- For decades, the Muslim Brotherhood was the largest organized opposition party in Egypt. It is Islamist. What are its similarities and differences with Iran’s Islamic revolution?
The current revolt in Iran is against Islamism, but the recent uprising in Egypt is neither Islamist nor anti-Islamist. In Egypt, the Muslim brotherhood was able to find common interests with other political factions to force President Hosni Mubarak to resign.
Before rising to power, Iranian Islamists worked with leftists, nationalists and liberals to oust Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. After Ayatollah Khomeini consolidated power, however, the regime suppressed former allies, including other Islamist factions that did not accept his authority.
The difference between Iranian Islamists and Egyptian Islamists is that Islamism in Iran has been tested by the Islamic Republic and has failed. Islamist writings before the 1979 revolution promise to open up in politics, the economy, and culture. But few of these promises have been delivered three decades later. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has been outlawed, so has not had operated legally or freely let alone run the country.
Islamists around the world have many differences, but they also often share the common view that democracy is an instrument to gain power—but not always to share it with other parties. Strict Islamists reduce Islam to Islamic law. Some accept democracy but reduce it to elections rather than freedoms, such as equal rights for all citizens--men and women, Muslims and non-Muslims, heterosexuals and homosexuals--and freedom of expression, religion and political parties. So some elements of the Muslim Brotherhood are similar to some Iranian leaders in their talk of religious democracy.
- What contact has there been between the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran since the 1979 revolution, formally or informally?
There has been regular contact between the Muslim Brotherhood and Iranian officials throughout since the 1979 revolution, both formally and informally. These contacts have taken place in several countries, including the Persian Gulf as well as in Tehran.
The most recent contact was the meeting of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei with Kamal al Halbavi, a senior member of the Brotherhood, in February in Tehran. Iran’s supreme leader has a special affection and sympathy for the Muslim Brotherhood. He has translated into Farsi several books by the late Sayyid Qutb, who was the leading militant ideologue of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s.
- Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Republic promote Islam as an ideology governing all aspects of life. How do the two differ on their views toward Islam’s role in politics and society?
The main goal of Islamist ideology is to implement Sharia, or Islamic law. When Ayatollah Khomeini ascended to power, however, he soon realized that a complex modern state like Iran could not be run only by Islamic law. He subsequently ruled that the interests of the regime trumped Islamic law when they are in conflict. Iran’s supreme leader therefore has the religious legitimacy to overrule religion in the interest of the revolutionary Islamic state. As a result, rule based on “the interests of the regime” is not an Islamic theocracy, but Shiite autocracy and absolutism.
In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood still advocates—according to its longstanding agenda-- Sharia law in Egypt. Iran passed from Islamic utopianism to Islamic tyranny. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, which has diverse factions, is still in the utopian phase.
- How did the Muslim Brotherhood respond to Iran’s 2009 post-election protests and the ensuing opposition Green Movement?
Silence. Islamist groups internationally supported the Iranian regime by their silence. Islamists cannot support secular democracies in the face of an Islamic government.
- How do Iran’s ties with the Brotherhood compare to Tehran’s relationship to Hamas, a Palestinian group with which Iran has supported since the early 1990s?
Iran, a largely Shiite country, has publicly backed and aided Hamas, a Sunni movement. In contrast, it would have been risky for the Brotherhood to have had public ties to Iran, especially as it ran candidates for Egypt’s parliament. But the Muslim Brotherhood is Iran’s main potential political ally in a new Egypt. Iran is pushing for the empowerment of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Iran has invested in various branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in other countries, such as groups in the Persian Gulf countries. The Muslim Brotherhood is the largest Islamist organization in the Arab world that ignores Arab nationalism and Sunni identity to facilitate alliances with Islamist movements outside the Arab world.
Mehdi Khalaji, a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, studied Shiite theology in the Qom seminary of Iran.
Leader reasserts authority during Qom trip
October 26, 2010 | 12:52pm
Mehdi Khalaji
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s fourth and longest official visit to Qom since he became supreme leader 21 years ago can be seen as a sign of his self-confidence in ending the unrest following the disputed 2009 presidential election. Khamenei reasserted his authority during a sometimes boisterous nine-day trip to Qom, a holy city and the center of Shiite scholarship in Iran.
Last year, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, one of the Islamic Republic's founding fathers and Khamenei’s former teacher, publically declared that Khamenei lacked the religious credentials to issue fatwas and was ineligible to be the country’s ultimate authority. In one of his last statements before his death in December, Montazeri said that the Islamic Republic was neither Islamic nor republic, but had instead become a military dictatorship. Montazeri, who lived in Qom, had effectively become the intellectual mentor to the opposition Green Movement.
At the peak of the post-election demonstrations, hundreds of thousands of Iranians attended Montazeri’s funeral ceremony. His death quickly turned into an unprecedented protest in Qom--a city that had been isolated from the national turmoil--against the regime and especially Khamenei.
Protesters shouted slogans critical of the supreme leader, including “Khamenei is a murderer, so his religious authority is not valid anymore.”After six months of unrest, Montazeri’s funeral in Qom reflected the scope of the challenge to Khamenei's legitimacy as supreme leader.
Since then, however, the regime has tightened its hold on Qom. Clerics who criticized the government for cracking down on protesters last year have been silenced. Some, like Ahmad Qabel, are still in prison. The websites of three ayatollahs have been blocked, their offices shut down, and their houses put under surveillance. The regime has also spent millions of dollars on the clerical establishment and religious institutions to generate support. For a wide variety of reasons, most of Iran’s clerics have for now opted to back the government.
In contrast to the December 2009 protests, thousands greeted Khamenei in Qom in October 2010. The majority of ayatollahs called on him, a sign of deference. The regime’s goal on the tightly controlled trip has been to show that Khamenei’s religious authority and legitimacy were not tarnished by the post-election turmoil.
The Iranian opposition has also tried to use the official visit to underscore divisions among the few clerics still willing to publicly criticize the regime. They do not necessarily reflect a common position, however. The opposition has criticized the Islamic Republic for not being enough of a "republic,” while the traditional clerics have quietly criticized the government for not being “Islamic” enough.
Mehdi Khalaji, a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, studied Shiite theology in the Qom seminary of Iran.
The Islamists Are Coming
The Islamists Are Coming, edited by Robin Wright, surveys the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region more than any other political bloc. Yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.
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