The Congressional Research Service issued a report on March 28 entitled “Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities.” It concludes that Iran could replace key centrifuge facilities within six months of a possible military strike. It also quotes sources who suggest that Israel might engage in follow-up attacks if it opts to adopt the military option and strike at suspected nuclear sites. The link to the full report is at the bottom of this excerpt.
Iran’s facilities for producing centrifuges and components would probably be important to Tehran’s ability to reconstitute its nuclear program after a military attack. Iran might have facilities that are unknown to Israel. IAEA inspectors had access to Iranian centrifuge workshops in order to verify an October 2003 agreement under which Iran suspended its enrichment program. However, the agency’s knowledge of Iran’s workshops has deteriorated since Iran ended this access in early 2006. Several months later, Wayne White, a former top Middle East intelligence analyst at the Department of State, expressed concern that Tehran could be moving some components related to its nuclear program.
More recently, a U.S. official told CRS in an April 2011 in-person interview that there “could be lots of workshops” in Iran. A former U.S. government official with direct experience on the issue told CRS via telephone on February 27, 2012 that Iran’s centrifuge production is widely distributed and that the number of workshops has probably multiplied “many times” since 2005 because of an increase in Iranian contractors and subcontractors working on the program. Perhaps referring to Iranian centrifuge workshops, former Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency Director Michael Hayden stated in January 2012 that neither the United States nor Israel knows the location of all key Iranian nuclear-related facilities.
An executive branch official said in a February 27, 2012 CRS telephone interview that Iran does not have sufficient spare centrifuges or components that would enable it to install new centrifuges immediately after an attack. However, the former official interviewed on February 27 added that most centrifuge workshops could probably be rebuilt or replicated within six months.
Perhaps anticipating that a military strike might not permanently set back Iran’s nuclear program, some Israeli officials reportedly acknowledge that Israel may feel compelled to mount periodic follow-up attacks that, in the words of one U.S. analyst, could seek to “demoralize the industry’s workforce, disrupt its operations, and greatly increase the costs of the program. Israeli leaders might hope that their attrition tactics, delivered through occasional air strikes, would bog down the nuclear program while international sanctions weaken the civilian economy and reduce political support for the regime.”
Amos Yadlin the former head of Israel’s military intelligence unit and one of the IAF pilots who carried out the 1981 Osirak strike, wrote in March 2012 that Iran might not fully resume its nuclear program if “military action is followed by tough sanctions, stricter international inspections and an embargo on the sale of nuclear components to Tehran.”
In contrast, a Israeli analyst wrote in January 2012, “If Israel attacks Iran now, does that mean Iran would never get nuclear weapons? No, it would merely postpone that outcome for at most a year or two more than it would take otherwise. And then it would ensure an all-out, endless bloody war thereafter.”
Former IAF commander Eitan Ben-Eliyahu, who flew in escort of the 1981 Osirak bombing mission, was cited by the Jerusalem Report in March 2012 as having the view that “the ultimate success of any military operation in Iran—no matter who carries it out—
will depend to a large extent on the follow-up diplomatic activity.”
To view the full report, click here.