New Articles
Controversy Flares over Iran Arms to Iraq
July 12, 2011 | 11:27am
Semira N. Nikou
Tensions are deepening between Washington and Tehran over new claims about Iranian military aid to Iraqi militias. The Obama administration charges that the Iranian arms have been increasingly used in attacks against U.S. troops. The U.S. holds the radical militias responsible for the deaths of 18 American soldiers since June1 —the highest monthly death toll in two years.
New U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta repeatedly addressed Iran’s arming of Shiite militias in Iraq during his July 8-11 trip to Afghanistan and Iraq. The following are Panetta’s statements and Iran’s responses.
"We're very concerned about Iran and weapons they're providing to extremists here in Iraq…And the reality is that we've seen the results of that — in June, we lost a hell of a lot of Americans ... and we cannot just simply stand back and allow this to continue to happen." June 11 statement in Iraq
“We did lose an awful lot of troops last month, and we’re continuing to see attacks. And a lot of this that we think can be tracked to Iran and their supplying of weapons to insurgents here who are conducting these kinds of attacks. That raises a lot of concerns.” July 11 interview with NBC News
“I think it's very important to let them know that, you know, we do not appreciate their support for terrorism, here or anyplace else in the world. And they've been in engaging in basically not only equipping terrorists but supporting them…that's not just a responsibility that we have; I think it's a responsibility that the world has to send the signal to Iran that we're not going to tolerate that -- they can't just go around supporting terrorism in the world. The world is going to respond to that kind of behavior. If they want to be a member of the family of nations, they've got to act like it.” July 11 interview with NBC News
"We're seeing more of those weapons going in from Iran, and they've really hurt us." July 11 statement in Iraq
“We cannot just simply stand back and allow this to continue to happen…I assure you that this is not something we’re just going to walk away from, we’re going to take this on, straight on.” June 11 statement in Iraq
“I think the key right now is to go after them in Iraq and do what we can to prevent those weapons coming into Iraq and go after those groups that would make use of those weapons. That’s what the principal focus has to be on.” Afghanistan—July 10, 2011, in response to a question on how the United States can prevent Iran from selling weapons to Shiite extremists.
“Obviously, whatever we can do diplomatically to send that message, we ought to do that as well.” July 10 statement in Afghanistan
Iranian response
Ramin Mehmanparast, Foreign ministry spokesman
“It seems that the Americans do not have a favorable position in the region, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, so they are making every effort to continue their presence in these countries at any cost.” July 11
Ali Akbar Salehi Foreign minister
“[The United States] has been making such statements for 30 years. We don't consider the U.S. to be able to rule on what is right and what is wrong…The international community and nations do know that Iran usually meets its commitments." July 11
Hassan Danayeefar, Iran envoy to Iraq
"These comments are repetitious and display the United States' trouble in earning the attention of the Iraqi parliament and government for extending its presence in Iraq." July 10
Parviz Sorouri, member of the parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission
"The groups that wage terrorist attacks in Iraq today have all been created by the U.S…Evidence and documents display that most of the terrorist operations in Iraq have been carried out by the Al-Qaeda network which receives direct support and backup from the U.S.”
"All the groups that are killing Muslim people in Iraq are born by the US and intend to portray Iraq as insecure (country)." July 12 interview with the semi-official Fars News Agency
Ahmadinejad vs. the Revolutionary Guards
July 11, 2011 | 11:27am
Alireza Nader
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is in hot water these days. His challenge to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which began after he fired the minister of intelligence in April, has provoked the deepening wrath of Iran’s political and military elite. There is even talk of impeaching the president.
In the past, Ahmadinejad proved he is a survivor. He masterfully manipulated his way into Iran’s second most powerful position. Yet he now faces a challenge he may not be able to overcome. Khamenei has given the Revolutionary Guards the task of reining him in--and perhaps even helping select his replacement as president.
In a recent interview, Revolutionary Guards chief Gen. Ali Jafari said that his force is now in charge of dealing with the “deviant current” – the latest lingo used to describe Ahmadinejad, his controversial chief of staff Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei and others in his inner circle. Jafari also indicated that the Guards would help set the conditions for next year’s parliamentary elections as well as future elections .
Addressing the opposition, Jafari also said reformists who had not crossed the regime’s “red lines” would be allowed to run. This may include former President Mohammad Khatami, who recently asked the regime to “forgive” Iranians who protested after the disputed 2009 presidential election. Jafari’s comments reflected the growing power of the Guards as Iran’s political enforcer.
But Ahmadinejad is unlikely to go down without a fight. He shot back at Jafari by criticizing “illegal” border crossings used by government agencies to smuggle goods in and out of Iran, which is estimated to generate billions of dollars in illicit profits. Ahmadinejad implied that the smugglers were “brothers” with security and intelligence interests. His remarks have been widely interpreted in Iran as referring to the Guards, who are known to operate many jetties, crossings, and ports throughout the country. Jafari subsequently condemned these claims as “deviant.”
Ironically, the Guards played a critical role in Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005 and 2009. Ahmadinejad was once even considered to be among the Guards' closest allies; he allowed them to amass political and economic power during his presidency. Ahmadinejad publicly suggested that he knows their secrets, as he hinted about smuggling. And he may air more inside information if he feels further threatened.
The Guards are known to be a fractured force. Some members support the reformists, while others are loyal to Ahmadinejad. However, top Guards appear to be solidly behind Khamenei, who has ensured leaders of the elite military wing that they will be powerful long-term guardians of Iranian politics. Khamenei and Jafari are unlikely to allow the political faction loyal to Ahmadinejad to win elections for parliament in 2012 and the presidency in 2013.
So Ahmadinejad may be willing to challenge the very top members of the political elite, including Khamenei and Jafari. But the Guards are also demonstrating that they are willing to exert their growing powers-- even against their own “brothers”-- to protect their prerogatives.
Alireza Nader is an international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, a non-profit institution that helps improve policy and decision-making through research and analysis. He is the author of "The Next Supreme Leader: Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran." (RAND, 2011).
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New Visa Restrictions for Human Rights Abuses
July 8, 2011 | 11:56am
On July 8, the United States imposed new visa restrictions on Iranians linked to human rights abuses in Iran. The following are details from the State Department
Statement by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton:
Today, the United States and the United Kingdom imposed visa restrictions on officials of the Government of Iran and other individuals who have participated in human rights abuses in Iran. And Canada has announced its support for increased measures against these perpetrators. Iranian officials subject to this visa ban include government ministers, military and law enforcement officers, and judiciary and prison officials. Today’s actions are an important reminder to Iran that the international community will continue to hold accountable those officials who commit human rights abuses and suppress the democratic aspirations of fellow citizens. Until the Iranian government brings human rights abusers to justice and protects its citizens, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and other partners will stand up on behalf of the Iranian people.
Read full statement:
Today, the United States and the United Kingdom imposed visa restrictions on, and Canada announced support for increased measures against, officials of the Government of Iran and other individuals who have participated in the commission of human rights abuses related to political repression in Iran. More than 50 Iranian officials would be subject to these new U.S. visa restrictions, including government ministers, military and law enforcement officers, and judiciary and prison officials. The restrictions cover those who have played a role in the ongoing repression of students, human rights defenders, lawyers, artists, civil society representatives, women’s rights leaders, and religious and ethnic minorities.
Secretary Clinton took this action pursuant to the authorities granted her under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which renders an alien inadmissible to the United States of America if the Secretary of State has a reasonable ground to believe the alien’s entry or proposed activities in the United States would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States. The Secretary has determined that such a reasonable ground to believe exists in the cases of these individuals, such that a legal basis would exist for visa refusal if any of these individuals were to apply. The Secretary of State has invoked this authority in the past, including against officials from Libya, Belarus, and Cote d’Ivoire for human rights-related abuses. Under the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the U.S. State Department already has been denying and revoking visas of individuals involved in proliferation and terrorism.
Under the INA, visa records are confidential, including the names of those subject to specific visa bans. So we cannot discuss specific cases. Any U.S. visas currently held by persons subject to this policy will be revoked and new visa applications will be refused. Today’s joint action serves as a reminder to the Iranian government that we will continue to hold its officials accountable for human rights abuses against the Iranian people.
U.S. on Iran’s Persecution of Religious Minorities
July 7, 2011 | 7:50am
State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland issued the following statement on persecution of religious minorities in Iran on July 6, 2011:
We are dismayed over reports that the Iranian courts are requiring Youcef Nadarkhani to recant his Christian faith or face the death penalty for apostasy – a charge based on his religious beliefs. If carried out, it would be the first execution for apostasy in Iran since 1990.
He is just one of thousands who face persecution for their religious beliefs in Iran, including the seven leaders of the Baha’i community whose imprisonment was increased to 20 years for practicing their faith and hundreds of Sufis who have been flogged in public because of their beliefs.
While Iran’s leaders hypocritically claim to promote tolerance, they continue to detain, imprison, harass, and abuse those who simply wish to worship the faith of their choosing.
We join the international community in continuing to call on the Iranian government to respect the fundamental rights of all its citizens and uphold its international commitments to protect them.
A Case for U.S.-Iran Diplomacy
July 5, 2011 | 9:10am
Interview with Roberto Toscano
Semira N. Nikou
Roberto Toscano served as Italy’s ambassador to Iran between 2003 and 2008.
- Along with five former European ambassadors to Iran, you wrote an open letter in June 2011 encouraging the United States and the European Union to engage Iran on its controversial nuclear program. Given the failure of diplomacy since 2003, what are the prospects of engagement--realistically?
Let me turn it around—what are the prospects of non-engagement? The strategies pursued until now are definitely not producing results. At the same time, centrifuges, doubts and tensions increase. The idea that prompted us former ambassadors to suggest a different approach was to see whether this stalemate can be overcome, and how.
We should have two priorities in addressing the nuclear issue. One is to prevent conflict--preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which by itself is a threat to international security, and preventing conflict that might arise around proliferation issues. Second is to follow a policy that does not diminish, but increases, chances for a democratic Iran.
On both counts, what we, the West, have done until now has been counterproductive. If you ask me about the chance of engagement now, I would stay it is slim. In 2003 and 2004…the position of the Unites States and Europeans was that Iran have zero centrifuges. The idea was, since you, Tehran, were a suspicious fellow, you had no more rights. But in international law, especially on non-proliferation, you need rules that are applicable to all.
The assessment of the majority of experts—both technical and political--is that what Iran wants is threshold capacity—to arrive at a stage where it can produce a nuclear weapon if it wants to. The same situation Japan is in, for instance.
We should prevent Iran’s development of nuclear weapons—and make its attainment of threshold capacity more difficult --by applying strategies that are realistic. There are several elements. One is to shift from the impossible goal of eliminating Iranian capability and instead increase control over Iran’s nuclear program. The shift would be from prohibition to enhanced controls.
For instance, Iran had adopted the Additional Protocol from 2003-05. It did not ratify but still applied the protocols. The difference between the present system and the Additional Protocol is that now inspectors still inspect Natanz regularly, but they cannot go to undeclared sites. And of course, the real guarantee is when they can go to undeclared sites. But the Additional Protocol is not universally ratified—meaning, not all signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty have ratified it. So the Additional Protocol has to be a part of the negotiations. It cannot be imposed as a rule because it is not a universal rule.
The nuclear issue has been singled out as being the only one of concern for us. There are many more—regional problems, Iranian policy in the Middle East and Afghanistan, etc. If you do not contextualize the nuclear issue…it will always be looked at as a zero-sum game.
Good diplomacy is when you give and take on a wider front…After all, I am not talking about a “grand bargain”—for which there are no conditions right now, especially given the recent regime and internal political situation—but at least an attempt to begin talking about the wide range of issues.
In 2003, there was a letter sent … to the United States. Not only did the United States not reply, but it reproached the Swiss ambassador for having transmitted the proposal. It was a very basic, generic proposal…but somebody should have answered, asking the Iranians to be more explicit. At that time, the idea was different—that there was an unstoppable wave of democracy after the fall of Saddam Hussein.
- What tangible steps can the United States and Europe take toward negotiations with Iran?
We have a prerequisite--which is unfortunately in the Security Council resolution--that enrichment should stop before negotiation [begins]. This is a bad idea because the result of a negotiation is required as a prerequisite to negotiations. It is very difficult to know how to get out of this. I am afraid we have painted ourselves into a corner.
- How has Iran’s political crisis affected the regime’s interest or position in negotiations on nuclear issues?
There is a common interest in not damaging the system—because in that case all in the regime would go under. But things could get out of control because President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is reckless.
The political confrontation between the supreme leader and the president is…not on whether the nuclear program should be maintained, but on how. The impression is that the Ahmadinejad-Mashaei gang would be more innovative—(Esfandiar Rahim Mashei is Ahmadinejad’s controversial chief of staff.) The supreme leader is more of the status quo. We do not know what exactly others want, but they are probably more willing to change. Having said that, there is no way that Ahmadinejad can prevail over the supreme leader, so this is all very theoretical.
The nuclear negotiations have changed several times…So the West should prove to be more imaginative—to test, provoke, and challenge. We should not let the status quo just lie there because it is festering; it can go wrong—also by mistake. I am afraid if we do not do something to address those issues, starting with the nuclear but not only the nuclear, conflict could arise out of carelessness, mistake. Just accidents.
- Since 2009, the Obama administration has gradually shifted from a policy of engagement to heightened pressure through sanctions on human rights and nuclear issues. How do sanctions affect the chances of future negotiations between the two countries?
The first problem is a sort of disconnect between the political dynamics in the two countries. I have no doubt that if Obama had been president at the same time as Khatami, something would have happened.
You do not have to overestimate your adversary. George F. Kennan had it right: You prevent your adversary—in his case the Soviet Union-- from shifting the competition with you onto a military field. From then on, you just have to let everything else play—your economy, open society, culture. The Soviet Union was not invaded, was not bombed, not isolated—and it was the Soviet Union! You mean that Iran is more powerful than the Soviet Union?
So why see this Iran as a devilish, all-powerful system that you either destroy or it will destroy you. Iran is not capable of even a match with Israel. Everyone is talking about the possible nuclear weapons in the future of Iran when Israel already has them.
- Do you distinguish between human rights sanctions and those against Iran’s nuclear program?
Yes. The difference is not in the effect of sanctions but their political significance. They have a different tag and political impact…People who want democracy in Iran have welcomed sanctions against human rights violators.
As far as sanctions against the nuclear program, Iranians—even democratic Iranians—are not so unified in approving them because of nationalism and because they think it is legitimate for the country to develop a nuclear energy program under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The idea of saying that since we [the West] do not trust you [Iran] the normal rules do not apply, is hard to sell—not only to the regime but also to the people.
The Islamists Are Coming
The Islamists Are Coming, edited by Robin Wright, surveys the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region more than any other political bloc. Yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.
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