John S. Park
What does this agreement mean?
  On  September 1, Iran and North Korea signed a scientific and technological  cooperation agreement. According to the Iranian Labour News Agency, the  agreement calls for the two countries to
         ·set up joint laboratories and exchange programs for scientific teams;
         ·transfer technology in the fields of information technology, engineering, biotechnology,
        renewable energy and the environment;
         ·promote sustainable development of agriculture and food
  On  paper the cooperation between the two countries appears innocuous. In  practice these partnerships create an umbrella that could allow them to  conduct proliferation-linked activities.
  How is Iran important to North Korea today? How is North Korea important to Iran?
  The  two countries are becoming more important to each other because both  face increasing isolation from U.S.-led sanctions related to weapons  proliferation activities in Tehran and Pyongyang. The relationship—and  mutual reliance—is unique in the international community, since they  lack any common ideology, religion, geographic space or ethnicity.
  On  the surface, relations may appear to embody the old proverb that "the  enemy of my enemy is my friend." But the reality is that each has helped  the other cope during national emergencies. For Iran, North Korea was a  vital supplier of conventional arms during the Iran-Iraq War. For North  Korea, Iran was a long-standing linchpin in its procurement activities  in the Middle East and Eastern Europe — a role that China is  increasingly playing now as a result of a growing national economy with  more foreign companies setting up production facilities targeting the  Chinese market.
  At its core, the relationship  is one where Iran provides much-needed cash to North Korea in return for  missile parts and technology that are difficult to procure elsewhere.
  What are the practical implications of the scientific and technological agreement?
  With  both countries facing tough sanctions, the new agreement appears to be  an effort to create a formal mechanism through which they can procure  materiel and equipment. Many items are not specifically on sanctions  lists, but the expansive financial sanctions have led most foreign  institutions and intermediaries to be unwilling to run the risk of doing  business with Iran or North Korea. So the agreement can be seen as an  attempt by Iran and North Korea to legitimize their activities under the  innocuous heading of "civilian scientific and technological  cooperation."
  What does it mean for the international community?
  Private  Chinese companies are a critical enabler of key components in this  agreement. Procuring, developing and transporting components and  equipment will necessitate both Tehran and Pyongyang to make greater use  of unique Chinese intermediaries. 
  Sanctions  do have an impact in terms of raising transaction costs. While this  initial effect is a negative one for Tehran and Pyongyang, the secondary  effect is turning out to be a beneficial one for them. Cognizant of the  reduced areas of movement, private Chinese companies command higher  commission fees for conducting activities on behalf of Iranian and North  Korean state trading companies. 
  The number  of actual Iranian-North Korean deals may be declining, but the  sophistication of their transactions appears to be growing, thereby  making them less prone to detection. That does not bode well for U.S.  and Western efforts to curtail Iran’s suspected nuclear program or to  counter North Korea’s ongoing nuclear weapons development activities. 
  John  S. Park is a Junior Faculty Fellow with the Stanton Nuclear Security  Fellowship program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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