Interview with Michael Singh
Iranian  officials grabbed global headlines in recent days by threatening to  close the vital Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the  world’s traded oil passes. Iran sought to back up its threats by holding  a 10-day military exercise in the Persian Gulf and warning the  recently-departed USS John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group not to return  to the area.  The United States and European Union have brushed aside  Iran’s warnings, vowing to maintain freedom of navigation in the Gulf  and proceeding with plans to impose sanctions on Tehran’s oil trade.   This heated back-and-forth has roiled global oil markets and led to  heightened speculation about a US-Iran military confrontation. The  following is an interview with Michael Singh of the Washington Institute  on Near East Policy about the rising rhetoric.
  Could Iran actually close the Strait of Hormuz?
  It  is unlikely that Iran could close the Strait for a meaningful period of  time.  Any Iranian effort to seize control of the Strait would meet  swift and determined resistance from the US Navy, with the support of  U.S. allies in the region and beyond.  Iran’s regular navy and air force  are no match for their U.S. counterparts; both would almost certainly  be dispatched quickly in any outright confrontation.  Recognizing this,  Iran is more likely to use the asymmetric warfare capabilities of the  elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy to disrupt shipping through  the Strait and to harass U.S. forces.  The Revolutionary Guards could  use small boats (either individually or in “swarms”); influence mines  (which do not require that a ship run into them); midget submarines;  anti-ship cruise missiles; and even divers.  These tactics could be a  nuisance, but they are also unlikely to shutter the Strait. Yet they  would probably provoke a strong U.S. response.
  What would be the consequences of an Iranian attempt to close the Strait ?
  Iran  is unlikely to try to close the Strait for several reasons. The regime  surely recognizes its military disadvantage; it is also cognizant of its  own dependence on the Strait.  About 70 percent of Iran’s budget  revenues are generated by oil exports, all of which must transit the  Strait.  This fact alone would make a preemptive effort to close the  Strait self-defeating.
  If Iran nevertheless  sought to close the Strait – say, in response to an oil embargo rather  than preemptively – the consequences would extend well beyond the mere  military setback of the United States then forcibly reopening the  passage.  Global oil prices may sharply increase, though the extent and  duration of this increase would depend on the scope and intensity of the  conflict and the speed with which the United States could assert  dominance in the Gulf.
  The United States, the  presumable target of an Iranian move against the Strait, would probably  suffer like the rest of the world from the effects of rising oil prices.  But U.S. oil supplies would not be meaningfully imperiled.  The United  States imports 49 percent of the petroleum it consumes, and only 25  percent of those imports come from the Persian Gulf, far less than is  available in the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve.  China, however, is  heavily dependent on Gulf oil sources, particularly from Saudi Arabia.   China also happens to be Iran’s largest oil customer and provides Iran  with critical support in the form of weapons sales and diplomatic cover  at the United Nations.  Iran can ill afford to anger Beijing.
  Iran  would also need to consider the likelihood that United States and its  allies would not stop at reopening the Strait in response to an Iranian  attempt to close it; they might also target nuclear and military  installations on the Iranian mainland and perhaps even seek to topple  the Iranian regime.  The impediments to a preemptive U.S. attack –  including uncertainty about the aftermath, worries about oil markets,  and the desire for diplomatic support – would be rendered largely moot  by an Iranian offensive in the Gulf.
  As a  result of these factors, an Iranian effort to close the Strait of Hormuz  would likely have devastating strategic consequences for the Iranian  regime.
  What is Iran’s aim, then, in threatening to close the Strait and attack U.S. forces?
  The  Iranian regime – like the North Koreans and others – understands that  rattling a saber can be more beneficial than actually using it.  Iran’s  bellicose rhetoric and behavior are aimed at both domestic and  international audiences.
  Inside Iran, the  regime has struggled with internal divisions, a growing (if temporarily  suppressed) opposition and, perhaps most urgently, a crumbling economy.   The regime may calculate that provoking tensions externally can divert  domestic attention from these crises.  If this is its aim, however,  there is little evidence that it is succeeding.  Indeed, these actions  may prove counterproductive domestically, as they provide the regime’s  opponents with ammunition to accuse it of increasingly reckless and  damaging policies.  Some observers speculate that hardline groups in  Iran – for example, the Revolutionary Guards – may want an actual  (albeit limited) conflict to consolidate their domestic control. But so  far, the regime has preferred leveling threats and working through  proxies to maintain plausible deniability.
  Externally,  Iran may hope that its actions will produce several responses that will  prove useful.  First, it is relying on the United States to demonstrate  restraint to avoid conflict.  Iran has engaged in brazen provocations  in recent years—including mock attacks on U.S. vessels, the seizure of  Western hostages, and attacks on U.S. targets—that have provoked limited  Western response.  This restraint – along with the uncertainty about  the U.S. regional posture after withdrawal from Iraq– may prove  counterproductive by feeding Iranian commanders’ sense of impunity.
  Second,  the Iranian regime almost certainly understands that Western countries  are worried about an increase in global oil prices at a fragile time for  the global economy.  Tehran’s actions are meant to sharpen these fears  by increasing oil prices in the near-term and holding out the prospect  for sharper increases down the road.  The regime’s hope, presumably, is  that oil-dependent countries – both consumers and producers – will focus  on defusing the current crisis rather than on Iran’s nuclear  program--and may delay plans to sanction Iran’s oil exports or even urge  the United States to reduce its military posture in the Gulf.  But the  United States and European Union have thus far refused to play along,  brushing off Iran’s threats and moving forward with oil sanctions.
  Michael Singh is managing director of the Washington Institute and a former senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council. 
