Mehrzad Boroujerdi
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is better noted for its dense, jargon-filled technical reports than for grooming future political personalities. Yet former IAEA officials have recently catapulted into the political spotlight of two pivotal countries in the Middle East.
       Ali  Akbar Salehi, a former Iranian envoy to the U.N. nuclear watchdog, has  been appointed Iran’s foreign minister. And Mohamed ElBaradei, who  headed the IAEA until 2009, has now emerged as a leading opposition  leader in Egypt. The two men, who quarreled for years over Iran’s  nuclear program, are expected to play critical roles in their countries’ future. 
       Salehi  has academic and administrative pedigrees in Iran as well as extensive experience with the outside world. Born in Karbala, Iraq in 1949, he  earned an undergraduate degree in physics from the American University  of Beirut in 1971. He then spent five years at the Massachusetts  Institute of Technology working on a doctorate in nuclear engineering.
       In  Iran, Salehi climbed the academic ladder quickly. He worked at Isfahan  University then moved to Tehran’s Sharif University of Technology, which  is widely considered Iran’s MIT. He served for seven years as  chancellor in the 1980s and early 1990s.
       After  the 1997 election of reformist President Mohamed Khatami, Salehi was  appointed Iran’s envoy to the IAEA, where he earned a reputation as a  smart yet moderate negotiator during his seven year stint from 1997 to 2004.  From 2007 to 2009, he worked as deputy secretary general of the  Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Saudi Arabia. 
       In  2009, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appointed him to serve as one of  several vice presidents and to head Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization.
       Salehi  was born into a religious family and, true to his pious upbringing, his  dissertation on “Resonance Region Neutronics of Unit Cells in Fast and  Thermal Reactors” begins with the Koranic verse, “In the Name of God,  the Compassionate, the Merciful.”
      Other  members of Salehi’s family also have American connections. His brother  Javad, who was born in 1956, worked on a doctorate in electrical  engineering at the University of Southern California and is an acclaimed  specialist on fiber optic communications. In an ironic twist, the  younger Salehi and 124 colleagues at Sharif University of Technology  sent an open letter to Ahmadinejad in June 2009—the same year his  brother was appointed vice president and just days before the disputed  presidential elections—that was highly critical of Ahmadinejad’s style  of statecraft.
      Ali Akbar Salehi was confirmed by Iran’s unicameral parliament as foreign minister on January 30, 2011. He won 60 percent of the vote.
     Salehi  has lived in Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Austria and the United  States. He is also fluent in Arabic and English. He has become a  specialist in both the science and statecraft of Iran’s controversial  nuclear program. As a former envoy, he has extensive experience in  international diplomacy. And he has close ties with Islamic conference  Organization Secretary General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu.
     Given his background, he may have a stronger voice in articulating Iran’s positions than his predecessor Manoucher Mottaki, who was dismissed abruptly by Ahmadinejad while on a mission to Senegal. He served for five years as foreign minister. 
      Salehi  is more of a technocrat than an ideologue. He has worked with both  reformist and hardline administrations in Iran and has close friends in  both camps. Although he was handpicked by Ahmadinejad, his influence on  policy and his personal relationship with either the president or  Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei are not clear.
      Ahmadinejad criticized President Khatami’s administration for signing of the additional IAEA nuclear protocol in 2003. Yet he appointed Salehi who, as Iran’s IAEA envoy, signed the agreement. 
      Ahmadinejad  and Mottaki split in part over the president’s appointment of special  envoys for important regions of the world, basically usurping the role  of Iran’s diplomatic corps. It is not yet clear what role, if any, these  envoys will play now that Salehi is at the helm.
      Salehi  has negotiated political landmines in the past, but Iran’s top diplomat  now faces formidable tasks during the last two years of Ahmadniejad’s  second term.  His main tasks will be revitalizing the foreign ministry,  avoiding additional international sanctions--including circumventing  sanctions against him personally by the European Union--and defending  the regime’s controversial policies.
Read Mehrzad Boroujerdi's chapter on Iran's political elite in “The Iran Primer”
Mehrzad      Boroujerdi is associate professor of      political  science and director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program at       Syracuse University. As a  USIP      grantee, he is engaged in a study of political elite in  post-revolutionary      Iran and co-manages the Iran Data Portal at http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/.       
 
