U.S. Sanctions Iran-Russia Drone Facilitators

On November 15, the United States imposed sanctions on Iranians and Russians involved in the export of drones used in Ukraine. The State and Treasury Departments designated three Iranian entities, a Russian paramilitary, two Russian nationals, and two transportation firms based in the United Arab Emirates. The United States is “determined to sanction people and companies, no matter where they are located, that support Russia’s unjustified invasion of Ukraine,” Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned in a statement

In late August, Iran started shipping drones to Russia, which had a weapons shortage from its war in Ukraine. Tehran’s decision to aid Russia reflected the deepening strategic alliance with Moscow. The new sanctions also highlighted the nexus of Iran and its allies in Russia and Syria on weapons. 

The United States “will continue to work to disrupt and delay these transfers and impose costs on actors engaged in this activity,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in a statement. The sanctions froze any assets under U.S. jurisdiction held by the designated entities and individuals and prohibited transactions with them. The following is a list of the sanctioned entities and individuals with statements from the State and Treasury Departments.

  • Shahed Aviation Industries Research Center: The Iranian company produced the Shahed-136 suicide drone used by Russia against Ukraine.
  • Qods Aviation Industries: The Iranian company produced the Mohajer-6 attack and reconnaissance drone used by Russia against Ukraine.
  • Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force: The military branch likely helped facilitate Iran’s supply of drones to Russia.
  • Wagner: The Russian private military company sought to acquire Iranian drones. It had reportedly deployed to warzones in Europe, the Middle East and Africa on behalf of Moscow.
  • Abbas Djuma and Tigran Khristoforovich Srabionov: The two Russian men were involved in Wagner’s acquisition of Iranian drones
  • Success Aviation Services FZC and i Jet Global DMCC: The transportation firms, based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), coordinated flights between Iran and Russia. Both had cooperated with Safiran, a sanctioned Iranian transportation company. i Jet had also assisted Cham Wings, a Syria-based airline, that helped move Syrian fighters to Russia.

 

Secretary of State Antony Blinken

Today we are imposing sanctions in response to Iran’s support of Russia’s unprovoked war against Ukraine, including Tehran’s transfer of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia, which are being used by Moscow to strike civilian infrastructure and cities.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken
Secretary of State Antony Blinken
The Departments of State and the Treasury are designating a total of three Iranian entities, including those manufacturing and delivering the UAVs supplied by Iran to Russia.  The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Aerospace Force, which likely helped facilitate Iran’s supply of military UAVs to Russia, is being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 Section 1(a)(ii)(F).  Qods Aviation Industries, which produces the Mohajer-6, is also being designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(ii)(F).  Shahed Aviation Industries Research Center, which produces the Shahed-series UAV variants, including the Shahed-136 one-way attack UAV that Russian forces used in recent attacks in Kyiv, Odesa, and the Kharkiv region of Ukraine, is being designated pursuant to Section 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13382.  The European Union and the United Kingdom sanctioned Shahed Aviation Industries last month.

In addition, Russian individuals and entities are being targeted.  The Department of State is designating Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section (1)(a)(1)(i) for operating in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy.  PMC Wagner was previously designated by Treasury in 2017 pursuant to E.O. 13660 for recruiting and sending soldiers to fight alongside separatists in eastern Ukraine.  The European Union, United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada have also sanctioned PMC Wagner.  Earlier this year, Wagner sought to purchase Iranian UAVs, almost certainly to support its operations in Ukraine – just one example of Wagner being used as a low cost, low-risk instrument of the Kremlin to advance its goals.  Treasury also designated two individuals, Abbas Djuma and Tigran Khristoforovich Srabionov, pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being involved in Wagner’s acquisition of Iranian UAVs to support combat operations in Ukraine.

Finally, today’s action also includes the designation of third-party entities involved in the transfer of Iranian UAVs to Russia for use in Ukraine, further demonstrating that the United States is willing to target international actors involved in supporting Russia’s war machine.  The Department of the Treasury is designating two entities, UAE-based Success Aviation Services FZC (Success Aviation) and i Jet Global DMCC (i Jet), pursuant to E.O. 14024.  Both Success Aviation and i Jet collaborated with U.S.-sanctioned Iranian firm Safiran Airport Services even after it was designated to coordinate flights between Iran and Russia, including flights for the Russian Airforce as well as those associated with transporting Iranian UAVs, personnel, and related equipment from Iran to Russia.  The actions against the UAE-based targets are being taken in cooperation with the UAE government.

The Iranian government’s military support to Russia fuels the conflict in Ukraine, and its transfer of these UAVs is in clear violation of UN Security Council resolution 2231.  The United States will continue to work to disrupt and delay these transfers and impose costs on actors engaged in this activity.

 

Treasury Department

Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is sanctioning firms involved in the production or ongoing transfer to Russia of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which Russia has used in devastating attacks against civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. OFAC is designating Shahed Aviation Industries Research Center, the firm responsible for the design and production of Shahed-series UAVs being used by Russian forces in Ukraine. OFAC is also targeting Success Aviation Services FZC and i Jet Global DMCC for facilitating the transfer of Iranian UAVs to Russia. The U.S. Department of State is concurrently designating Russian Private Military Company “Wagner” (PMC Wagner) and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force (IRGC ASF) and Qods Aviation Industries pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024. To supplement the U.S. Department of State’s designation of PMC Wagner, OFAC is also designating two individuals for facilitating PMC Wagner’s acquisition of UAVs from Iran, Abbas Djuma and Tigran Khristoforovich Srabionov.

“As we have demonstrated repeatedly, the United States is determined to sanction people and companies, no matter where they are located, that support Russia’s unjustified invasion of Ukraine. Today’s action exposes and holds accountable companies and individuals that have enabled Russia’s use of Iranian-built UAVs to brutalize Ukrainian civilians,” said Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen. “This is part of our larger effort to disrupt Russia’s war effort and deny the equipment it needs through sanctions and export controls.”

Today’s action is being taken pursuant to E.O. 13382 and E.O. 14024 and follows OFAC’s September 8, 2022 designation of an Iranian air transportation service provider involved in the shipment of Iranian UAVs to Russia, as well as three companies and one individual involved in the research, development, production, and procurement of Iranian UAVs and UAV components for Iran’s IRGC and its Aerospace Force (IRGC ASF) and Navy. This also follows the October 20, 2022 decision by the European Union to impose sanctions on three Iranian military leaders and Shahed Aviation Industries Research Center for their role in the development and delivery of UAVs used by Russia in its war against Ukraine.

Today’s actions implement commitments to target international actors involved in supporting Russia’s war machine, as highlighted by OFAC Frequently Asked Questions 1091 and 1092 and reinforced by an October 14, 2022 meeting of senior officials in Washington representing ministries of finance and other government agencies from 33 countries, in which the participants acknowledged the significance of sanctions actions taken so far and discussed additional steps to further impair Russia’s military-industrial complex and critical defense supply chains.  The Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and State released an alert on that same day detailing the impact of international sanctions and export controls to date. Read the joint alert here.

Iranian UAV Producer

Shahed Aviation Industries Research Center (SAIRC), subordinate to the IRGC ASF, has designed and manufactured several Shahed-series UAV variants, including the Shahed-136 one-way attack UAV that Russian forces have used in recent attacks targeting civilian infrastructure in Kyiv, Odesa, and the Kharkiv region of Ukraine. SAIRC also developed the Shahed-129 medium-altitude reconnaissance and strike UAV for the IRGC ASF, and it is the lead contractor for the IRGC ASF’s Shahed-171 project.

SAIRC is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC ASF. The IRGC ASF, also known as the IRGC Air Force, was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on June 16, 2010 as a key element in the operational deployment of Iran’s ballistic missile capability.

Shipment of Iranian UAVs to Russia

UAE-based air transportation firms Success Aviation Services FZC (Success Aviation) and i Jet Global DMCC (iJet) collaborated with U.S.-sanctioned Iranian firm Safiran Airport Services (Safiran) to coordinate flights between Iran and Russia, including those associated with transporting Iranian UAVs, personnel, and related equipment from Iran to Russia. The actions against the UAE-based targets are being taken in cooperation with the UAE government. 

Success Aviation continues to cooperate with Safiran even after the latter’s designation, including to facilitate travel between Russia and Iran. iJet also continues to work with Safiran to coordinate Russian Air Force flights between Iran and Russia despite Safiran’s designation and exposure.

Safiran was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 on September 8, 2022 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation (GoR).

iJet has also worked with U.S.-sanctioned, Syria-based Cham Wings Airlines (Cham Wings). iJet has allegedly used its branch in Syria, known as Trade Med Middle East, to assist Cham Wings in facilitating the transport of Syrian fighters to Russia. Cham Wings was designated pursuant to E.O. 13582 on December 23, 2016 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, the Government of Syria and Syrian Arab Airlines, a U.S.-designated airline that Iran’s IRGC-Qods Force has used to transfer illicit cargo to Syria. 

Success Aviation and iJet are being designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled by, or for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the GoR.

PMC Wagner Facilitators

PMC Wagner is a Russian private military company with ties to the Russian government that has been used to engage in conflicts on the Russian government’s behalf around the world. PMC Wagner was previously designated pursuant to E.O. 13660 in 2017 for being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine. The European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Japan have also sanctioned PMC Wagner.

The State Department today is concurrently designating PMC Wagner pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy. In coordination with the State Department’s redesignation of PMC Wagner, OFAC is taking action against individuals facilitating the movement of Iranian UAVs to Russia.  Abbas Djuma (Djuma) and Tigran Khristoforovich Srabionov (Srabionov) were involved in PMC Wagner’s acquisition of Iranian UAVs to support combat operations in Ukraine.

Djuma is being designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods and services to or in support of, PMC Wagner. Srabionov is being designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, PMC Wagner.

Sanctions Implications

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the individuals and entities that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. OFAC sanctions generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.

In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the individuals or entities designated today may themselves be exposed to sanctions. Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for any of the individuals or entities designated today pursuant to E.O. 13382 could be subject to U.S. sanctions.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s FAQ 897.