U.N. Watchdog: Iran is Complying with Nuclear Deal

On August 30, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran was complying with its obligations under the nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It was the second quarterly report released by the watchdog since the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in May. On September 10, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano told the Board of Governors that it is “essential that Iran continues to fully implement those commitments.” The following are excerpts from the report. 


JCPOA Verification and Monitoring Activities

Activities Related to Heavy Water and Reprocessing

Iran has not pursued the construction of the Arak heavy water research reactor (IR-40 Reactor) based on its original design. Iran has not produced or tested natural uranium pellets, fuel pins or fuel assemblies specifically designed for the support of the IR-40 Reactor as originally designed, and all existing natural uranium pellets and fuel assemblies have remained in storage under continuous Agency monitoring (paras 3 and 10).

Iran has continued to inform the Agency about the inventory of heavy water in Iran and the production of heavy water at the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) and allowed the Agency to monitor the quantities of Iran’s heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced at the HWPP (para. 15). On 25 August 2018, the Agency verified that the plant was in operation and that Iran’s stock of heavy water was 122.9 metric tonnes. Throughout the reporting period, Iran had no more than 130 metric tonnes of heavy water (para. 14).

Iran has not carried out activities related to reprocessing at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility or at any of the other facilities it has declared to the Agency (paras 18 and 21).

Activities Related to Enrichment and Fuel

At the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, there have been no more than 5060 IR-1 centrifuges installed in 30 cascades, which remain in the configurations in the operating units at the time the JCPOA was agreed (para. 27). Iran has withdrawn 34 IR-1 centrifuges from those held in storage for the replacement of damaged or failed IR-1 centrifuges installed at FEP (para. 29.1).

Iran has continued the enrichment of UF6 at FEP.16 Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28).

Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). The quantity of 300 kg of UF6 corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium.

As of 18 August 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 139.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.

At the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), no more than 1044 IR-1 centrifuges have been maintained in one wing (Unit 2) of the facility (para. 46). On 14 August 2018, the Agency verified that 1020 IR-1 centrifuges were installed in six cascades. On the same date, the Agency also verified that five IR-1 centrifuges were installed in a layout of 16 IR-1 centrifuge positions and one IR-1 centrifuge was installed in a single position, for the purpose of conducting “initial research and R&D activities related to stable isotope production”. Throughout the reporting period, Iran has not conducted any uranium enrichment or related research and development (R&D) activities, and there has not been any nuclear material at the plant (para. 45).

All centrifuges and associated infrastructure in storage have remained under continuous Agency monitoring (paras 29, 47, 48 and 70).24 The Agency has continued to have regular access to relevant buildings at Natanz, including all of FEP and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), and performed daily access upon Agency request (para. 71). The Agency has also continued to have regular access to FFEP, including daily access upon Agency request (para. 51).

Iran has conducted its enrichment activities in line with its long-term enrichment and R&D enrichment plan, as provided to the Agency on 16 January 2016 (para. 52).

On 19 August 2018, the Agency verified that all irradiated TRR fuel elements in Iran have a measured dose rate of no less than 1 rem/hour (at one metre in air).

Iran has not operated any of its declared facilities for the purpose of re-converting fuel plates or scrap into UF6, nor has it informed the Agency that it has built any new facilities for such a purpose (para. 58).

Centrifuge Research & Development, Manufacturing and Inventory

No enriched uranium has been accumulated through enrichment R&D activities, and Iran’s enrichment R&D with and without uranium has been conducted using centrifuges within the limits defined in the JCPOA (paras 32–42).

Iran has provided declarations to the Agency of its production and inventory of centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows and permitted the Agency to verify the items in the inventory (para. 80.1). The Agency has conducted continuous monitoring, including through the use of containment and surveillance measures, and verified that the declared equipment has been used for the production of rotor tubes and bellows to manufacture centrifuges only for the activities specified in the JCPOA (para. 80.2). Iran has not produced any IR-1 centrifuges to replace those that have been damaged or failed (para. 62).

All declared rotor tubes, bellows and rotor assemblies have been under continuous monitoring by the Agency, including those rotor tubes and bellows manufactured since Implementation Day (para. 70). Iran has manufactured rotor tubes using carbon fibre that has been sampled and tested by the Agency, all of which has been subject to Agency containment and surveillance measures.

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