UN Report: Iran Shares Limited Information

June 1, 2015

On May 29, the U.N. nuclear watchdog released a new report on Iran’s implementation of Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards and compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that Iran “shared some information in relation to” possible military dimensions of its nuclear program. Iran had agreed in May 2014 to implement two practical measures on the outstanding questions, but has not yet completed either. “The Agency and Iran agreed to continue the dialogue on these practical measures and to meet again in the near future,” according to the report.

The U.N. watchdog also stressed the necessity for Iran to grant inspectors access to all sites, including military ones such as Parchin. Access to military sites has been a controversial issue in recent negotiations between Iran and the world’s six major powers.

The following are some key findings of the report, as outlined by the four experts from the Institute for Science and International Security; David Albright, Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, Andrea Stricker, and Daniel Schnur.
1) The average rate of monthly production of low enriched uranium (LEU) went up slightly, as did the average centrifuge performance of the IR-1 centrifuges in the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant.
2) With regard to the possible military dimensions (PMD) issue, Iran has “shared some information” in relation to one of the measures in the IAEA/Iran Framework for Cooperation. The IAEA and Iran agreed to continue the dialogue and meet again in the near future. However, no major breakthrough was reported. Moreover, Iran did not propose any new practical measures to resolve the PMD issue and has rebuffed requests by the IAEA to speed up the process of resolving outstanding issues.
3) Iran has a total inventory of 8,714 kg of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride and another 1,822 kg (uranium mass) 3.5 percent LEU in various chemical forms at the Enriched UO2 powder Plant (EUPP). In total, as of May 2015, Iran also has about 228 kilograms (kg) of near 20 percent LEU (uranium mass). Of this near 20 percent LEU, 61.5 kg are in uranium oxide powder, 44.9 are in TRR fuel assemblies, and 121.2 kg are in scrap and waste, and in-process (all in uranium mass).
4) During the last reporting period, Iran did not feed any additional LEU into the Enriched UO2 powder Plant. So far, Iran has fed 2,720 kg of LEUF6 into the EUPP. Thus, Iran has fallen behind in its pledge under the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) to feed any newly produced LEU hexafluoride into the EUPP. Its current deficit is 1,106 kg of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride, which will increase by a few hundred kilograms during May and June. Under the JPA, Iran must feed all of this LEU into the EUPP by the end of June.
5) After a lengthy delay, the EUPP has finally produced LEU dioxide. As of May 23, 2015, the plant had produced 151 kg of uranium in the form of UO2 enriched up to 5 percent uranium 235. The problem, according to Iranian officials, is that the last section of the plant that produces the LEU dioxide did not work properly. In total, Iran produced the 151 kg of LEU dioxide from 402.6 kg of uranium in the form of ammonium diuranate enriched up to five percent. 6) Most of the near 20 percent LEU fed into the line to make Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) fuel continues to end up as scrap or is in-process rather than in TRR fuel assemblies.
Click here for the full ISIS report.
Click here for the IAEA report.