Iran and the Arab Spring: Ascendancy Frustrated

 

 

The Arab Spring has yet to give way to the hoped-for glorious summer, but for Iran it has already turned into a ‘winter of discontent.’ Iran finds its revolutionary message diluted and overtaken by events. Characteristically, Tehran has raised the stakes by increasing its involvement in Syria and Yemen.

 

Widespread regional instability has not been conducive to the extension of either its power or influence, and Iran finds itself reacting – often defensively – to events rather than dictating them.

 

 

Increasingly in this decade, the Gulf States have begun to view Iran, not Israel, as their principal security concern…By now, Iran’s tactics were clear enough. Like the Soviet Union, Iran wanted to be in a position in which no regional issue could be decided without reference to it.

 

To ensure this, it would get involved in all issues, whether to hedge against an unwanted outcome, or to acquire bargaining chips to exchange for things of more direct interest to it. This implied a region-wide presence politically and investment across-the-board in Shi’a and Sunni groups (Hizbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad) or as in Iraq the Mahdi army, Al Dawa and SCIRI, and in Afghanistan anti- and pro- Taliban forces, including Al Qaeda. The instrument for this regional involvement has been the Qods Force of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC).

 

 

In theory, Iran under international pressure economically and politically, and with domestic preoccupations foremost, has three choices:

 

• Seek a (strategic) compromise on the nuclear issue to reduce the pressure;

• Lash out regionally to improve its bargaining position (e.g., up the ante in Syria or Yemen);

• Settle for riding out the pressure with tactical adjustments and ‘concessions,’ without yielding much of substance or foregoing its revolutionary role.

 

One complication for Iran is the degree to which its revolutionary foreign policy is hostage to domestic politics: can Iran afford in terms of its revolutionary identity – an intrinsic part of its legitimacy – to become a ‘normal’ state? Can it afford politically to abandon the ‘sense of embattlement’ which it utilizes domestically?

 

 

The Islamic Republic’s initial response to change in the region was positive. After all, upsetting the status quo, especially the reversal of a US client in Egypt, would – it was thought – rebound to Iran’s benefit. It could lead to a significant strengthening of Islamist forces in the region and reanimate hostility toward Israel. Furthermore, any weakening of important Arab states such as Egypt would magnify Iran’s regional influence…

 

 

For our purposes, the question is where does this leave Iranian influence and place in the region? It may appear paradoxical but while political Islam may be the big winner in these changes, Iran is one of the principal losers. That political Islam is likely to emerge as a central factor in the future politics of many countries should not surprise us…

 

Geo-strategically, the situation has also changed for the worse for Iran. The decline of Egypt’s power has left only Saudi Arabia to contain Iran. In this effort, it has two allies, Turkey and Israel.

 

Arab perceptions of Iran have evolved to seeing it taking the place of Israel as a major threat to the Arabs. They now see their Persian neighbor as “a hegemonic state that is attempting to implement aggressively interventionist and potentially expansionist policies…”

 

As poker players, the Iranians might seek to raise the stakes through bluff, to cover their vulnerability. As chess players, however, they would be advised to look to their primary long-range strategic goal – regime survival.

 

This will depend largely on domestic factors; Iran may be vulnerable but it is not about to collapse. The regime benefits from societal fractures that still give it a large- enough constituency to stay in power by force if necessary. What could change things is a combination of a significant, precipitate and sustained decline in oil prices, reduced production capacity, and the cumulative bite of sanctions.