On Oct. 8, the Institute for Science and International Security warned that Iran’s uranium enrichment pace is increasing and that its breakout times are shortening. The report also notes that the United States would likely detect an Iranian dash to build a nuclear weapon. But Iran’s recent activities at the Fordo facility are “increasing the chance of a military confrontation” with the United States or Israel. The following are excerpts from the executive summary with a link to the full report at the end.
Iran would need many additional months to manufacture a nuclear device suitable for underground testing and even longer to make a reliable warhead for a ballistic missile. Limited knowledge of the specifics of Iran’s enrichment program complicates efforts to predict its centrifuge performance in a breakout scenario. Accordingly, the predictions are often given in range format, where the range itself is intended to be a best estimate, not an absolute minimum or maximum. The estimates are intended to represent the minimum time Iran would require to produce one significant quantity of WGU (uranium enriched to 90 percent U-235). Various problems or delays of the type often encountered by Iran’s program could lengthen the necessary enriching time.
Currently, ISIS assesses that Iran would require at least 2-4 months to produce one SQ(the amount of uranium needed for a weapon) of WGU at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant and would need to utilize its stocks of 3.5 and near 20 percent LEU (low enriched uranium). The quickest estimates are 2 to 2.3 months, and they rely on an amount of near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride that was scheduled for conversion to another form as of August 2012. Growth in the stock of near 20 percent LEU reduces the time needed to break out, even though this stock is not currently large enough on its own to produce one SQ.
Although Iran’s breakout times are shortening, an Iranian breakout in the next year could not escape detection by the IAEA or the United States. Furthermore, the United States and its allies maintain the ability to respond forcefully to any Iranian decision to break out. During the next year or so, breakout times at Natanz and Fordow appear long enough to make an Iranian decision to break out risky. Therefore, ISIS assesses that Iran is unlikely to break out at Natanz or at Fordow in the near term, barring unforeseen developments such as a pre-emptive military strike.
Nonetheless, Iran’s current trajectory at Fordow is increasing the chance of a military confrontation, particularly given growing concern about the relatively short breakout time at this facility once the plant is fully operational and once Iran has accumulated significantly more near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride. To reduce the tensions caused by Iran’s increasing stocks of near 20 percent LEU and by the Fordow facility, a priority in the short term should be obtaining confidence building measures which would cap Iran’s enrichment of uranium to five percent and limit the number of enriching centrifuges at the Fordow site to no more than a few hundred. It is in the interest of all concerned to avoid escalation of the Iranian nuclear crisis, first by negotiating such confidence building measures and then by negotiating more lasting agreements which ensure Iran will not build nuclear weapons.
Click here for the full report.