David Perdue (R-GA)
Mark Kirk (R-IL)
Thom Tillis (R-NC)
Ted Cruz (R-TX)
Johnny Isakson (R-GA)
Jerry Moran (R-KS)
Dan Coats (R-IN)
Kelly Ayotte (R-NH)
Bill Cassidy (R-LA)
John Boozman (R-AR)
Jim Inhofe (R-OK)
Cory Gardner (R-CO)
Orrin Hatch (R-UT),
36 Republican Senators organized by Kelly Ayotte (R-NH)
Dear Mr. President,
As you know, in addition to Ambassador Samantha Power's determination two months ago, the United Nations Security Council's Panel of Experts on Iran has reportedly concluded that Iran's October 10 test of a ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear weapon violated United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1929. As we have repeatedly emphasized, condemnations of Iran's blatant disregard for its international obligations are not enough. A failure of your administration to follow tough statements with tangible consequences invites Iran to continue violating its obligations and threatens Americans and our allies.
M. Michael Rounds
As you know, on October 10, Iran conducted a test of a ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. Ambassador Power confirmed that the test was a "clear violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929." On October 14, we sent a letter to you asking what specific steps your administration planned to take in order to respond to this test. In that letter, we emphasized our concern that tough statements followed by inaction would further undermine U.S. national security. Almost two months later, we have not received a substantive response, and it is not clear whether your administration has taken any appropriate steps to hold Tehran accountable for its violation of its international commitments. Yesterday, not surprisingly, there were reports that Iran conducted another ballistic missile test on November 21, and we write again to ask how your administration will respond.
Thank you for your attention to this very serious issue.
Senator Mark Kirk
—Dec. 10, 2015, according to the Free Beacon
—Dec. 8, 2015, in a statement
—Dec. 8, 2015, in a statement
President Hassan Rouhani indicated that Tehran might free the Americans held in Iran if Washington releases Iranians held in the United States. "If the Americans take the appropriate steps and set them free, certainly the right environment will be open and the right circumstances will be created for us to do everything within our power and our purview to bring about the swiftest freedom for the Americans held in Iran as well," Rouhani told CNN on Sept. 27, 2015, when he was in New York for the U.N. General Assembly.
- Significantly reduce its enriched uranium stockpile;
- Cut and cap its capacity to enrich uranium;
- Radically modify the Arak heavy water reactor to block its ability to produce plutonium, and
- Allow for a much more robust system of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring to ensure that Iran meets the requirements of the agreement over the life of the JCPOA and beyond.
- The European Union will adopt a regulation terminating a previous decision that imposed nuclear-related sanctions.
- The United States will issue waivers to go into effect on implementation day lifting nuclear-related sanctions and terminating executive orders on nuclear-related issues.
- U.N. nuclear-related sanctions will be terminated as well, but subject to re-imposition in the event of noncompliance. A U.N. Security Council-mandated heavy arms embargo and ballistic missile restrictions will remain in place for five and eight years, respectively.
- For 10 years: a limit of 5,060 operational first-generation centrifuges and very limited research and development on more advanced machines;
- For 13 years: an overall cap (at the Implementation Day level) on Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity;
- For 15 years: a limit of 300 kilograms of low-enriched uranium; a ban on uranium enrichment beyond 3.67 percent; a ban on uranium enrichment at the underground Fordo site; a ban on heavy water reactors and spent fuel reprocessing; special IAEA access to suspect sites within 24 hours;
- For 20 years: continuous IAEA monitoring of centrifuge manufacturing sites;
- For 25 years: continuous IAEA monitoring of uranium mines and mills;
- Indefinitely: IAEA monitoring under the terms of the additional protocol; a permanent ban on any activities that could contribute to the design or development of nuclear weapons.
Daryl G. Kimball is the Executive Director of the Arms Control Association.
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Peaceful and efficient resolution of this issue is a testament to the critical role diplomacy plays in keeping our country secure & strong.— John Kerry (@JohnKerry) January 13, 2016
Happy to see dialog and respect, not threats and impetuousness, swiftly resolved the #sailors episode. Let’s learn from this latest example.— Javad Zarif (@JZarif) January 13, 2016
On Jan. 12, two NAVCENT Riverine Command Boat (RCB) crews were tasked with the mission of relocating two RCBs from Kuwait to Bahrain, with a planned refueling en route alongside the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Monomoy. The two RCBs were traveling together since they train and deploy in two-boat elements. They departed Kuwait at 9:23 a.m.(GMT). The planned transit path for the mission was down the middle of the Gulf and not through the territorial waters of any country other than Kuwait and Bahrain.
The two RCBs were scheduled to conduct an underway refueling with the USCGC Monomoy in international waters at approximately 2 p.m. (GMT). At approximately 2:10 p.m. (GMT) NAVCENT received a report that the RCBs were being queried by Iranians. At approximately 2:29 p.m. (GMT) NAVCENT was advised of degraded communications with the RCBs.
At 2:45 p.m. (GMT) NAVCENT was notified of a total loss of communications with the RCBs. Immediately, NAVCENT initiated an intensive search and rescue operation using both air and naval assets including aircraft from USS Harry S. Truman and the U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Coast Guard, U.K. Royal Navy and U.S. Navy surface vessels.
At the time of the incident, two carrier strike groups were operating nearby. USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group was 45 miles southeast of Farsi Island and Charles de Gaulle carrier strike group was 40 miles north of Farsi Island. NAVCENT attempted to contact Iranian military units operating near Farsi Island by broadcasting information regarding their search and rescue effort over marine radio, and separately notified Iranian coast guard units via telephone about the search for their personnel.