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The Iran Primer

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Khamenei Consolidates Control Amid Other Power Shifts

Mehrzad Boroujerdi


Since Iran’s presidential election in 2009, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has evolved into a micromanager of Iranian politics. He curtailed President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his allies. He turned the lights off on Iran’s reformists. He emasculated all other major institutions, including parliament, the judiciary, the Experts Assembly and the 12-man Guardian Council. And he subdued the religious seminaries as the citadel of clerical power.

 
Today, neither the press nor other governmental bodies can effectively investigate any of the organs under the Supreme Leader. Nor can any institution overrule him. Iran is technically a semi-presidential system in which executive power is bifurcated between the president and the Supreme Leader. But during 23 years in office, Khamenei has amassed disproportionate power by manipulating institutions so he can bypass the democratic rules (based on French and Belgian law) enshrined in the Iranian constitution.
 
 Iran has undergone other key changes since the 2005 election of Ahmadinejad:
 
·        The most consequential competition in the Islamic Republic today is between two key factions of conservatives.  The old establishment traditionalists are losing ground to a new generation of conservative Young Turks who have even more humble backgrounds; they also hail largely from the security forces and veterans of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. There is no clear cut line between these two factions, however, as people freely move between them. 
 
·        Popular support for the regime has shrunk significantly due to the cumulative impact of economic discontent and troubled elections in 2005 and 2009. As a result, the theocracy has become increasingly reliant on Iran’s diverse security forces.
 
·        The number of clerics elected to office, such as parliament, has also increased the political leverage of security forces both within and on the political system.
 
·        Key reformists-- sidelined in the 2005 election and unofficially expelled from the game in the disputed 2009 election—basically opted to retain their legitimacy rather than have to cohabitate with their nemeses in power.
 
·        Yet newcomers are entering elite ranks. Iran’s factional infighting, political maneuvering, and theological acrobatics are helping newcomers to enter elite ranks. 
 
·        Iran’s political system is today more Byzantine than ever. It is characterized by hyper-politicization, a top-heavy state, parallel institutions, and lack of transparency.
 
Iran has some of the characteristics of both a “sultanistic” and “Praetorian” state, yet it is still premature to label the state completely one or the other. But the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) are the undisputed second power in Iran today. Its veterans, especially of the Iran-Iraq War, have increasingly permeated the bureaucracy, economy and government. They are in charge of the hydra-headed military-security institutions, and they champion the initial élan of the revolution.
 
This constituency largely shares the Supreme Leader’s security outlook, but also has the power to set the agenda. It will almost certainly retain influence for the foreseeable future, although the Revolutionary Guards do not have the requisite cultural capital or street credibility to appeal to the broad urban public.
 
As of mid-2012, the regime is more stable now than it was after the controversial 2009 election.  Its regional power has also been boosted thanks to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Having subdued their internal opponents, the Supreme Leader and his lieutenants now feel most threatened by the outside. As a result, chances of reaching a compromise with the United States before the U.S. presidential election in November 2012 are slim. And sanctions, while painful, will not lead the leadership to concede much ground on the nuclear issue. 
 

Mehrzad Boroujerdi is a Professor of Political Science at Syracuse University. He has compiled a database with detailed information on nearly 2,000 people in the political elite of Iran--from cabinet and parliament members to religious authorities, military officer, members of the judiciary and presidential advisers.

 

 

U.S. and Iran Weigh in on Syria

On June 7, the United States and Iran both weighed in on the deteriorating situation in Syria. The following are officials states from the White House and the Iranian mission to the United Nations.   

   White House Statement from the Office of the Press Secretary
 
The United States strongly condemns the outrageous targeted killings of civilians including women and children in Al-Qubeir in Hama province as reported by multiple credible sources.  This, coupled with the Syrian regime’s refusal to let UN observers into the area to verify these reports, is an affront to human dignity and justice.  There is no justification for this regime’s continued defiance of its obligations under the Annan Plan, and Assad’s continued abdication of responsibility for these horrific acts has no credibility and only further underscores the illegitimate and immoral nature of his rule.  
 
The future of Syria will be determined by the Syrian people, and the international community must come together in support of their legitimate aspirations.  We call once more on all nations to abandon support for this brutal and illegitimate regime, and to join together to support a political transition in Syria—one that upholds the promise of a future for which far too many have already died. 
 
Briefing by White House spokesman Jay Carney
 
The Assad regime is failing to live up to its obligations under the Annan plan, and that fact and its brutal, persistent attacks on its own people -- including the outrageous targeted killings of civilians, including women and children, in Hama Province report just recently -- make clear to the entire world and to the nations of the world that the Assad regime is illegitimate and needs to go. 
 
And that is why it is so important for all the nations of the world to come together to take action, to bring about the democratic transition in Syria that the Syrian people demand and that is essential.  And it cannot take place when you have a tyrant like Assad in power who is ruthlessly murdering his own people in order to stay in power.     
 
Q:    Given all that, can you still justify sticking with the Annan plan?
 
MR. CARNEY:  What is clear is that if the Annan plan is to succeed, it will only be with the full weight of the international community's pressure placed on the regime.  We are prepared to work with any country, as long as that work begins with the basic premise that Assad and his regime must give way to a new democratic Syria.
 
And, look, I think we've been clear about our skepticism that the Annan plan can work.  It's an important step towards bringing the international community together.  And there are elements of the Annan plan that have helped make the world more aware of Assad's brutality, as well as in some areas reduced some of the violence -- although the violence continues at an appalling level -- as well as helping create a sturdier foundation for a political transition when that transition continues.
 
But, look, as I've been saying for a number of days now, we are appalled by the violence.  We think that violence should make it abundantly clear to every nation in the world that supporting the Assad regime and defending the Assad regime is a bad decision, because by doing so you align with a terrible tyrant whom history will judge poorly, to say the least.
 
  Statement by Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Khazaee at the United Nations
 
In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. Mr. Secretary General, Mr. President,At the outset, Mr. President, I would like to express my delegation’s appreciation to special envoy, Mr. Kofi Annan for his dedication and efforts as well as his well balanced statement today before General Assembly. On the Mission of Mr. Kofi Annan, I would like to say that there are a number of elements that undermine the success of his Mission. These include the non-compliance of armed groups to the ceasefire call. At the same time and even from the very beginning of the Syrian crisis, officials of some countries have taken  positions and made provocative statements which were more in line with undermining any possibility of a political settlement.
 
Moreover, an element has reappeared this time in Syria which is the violent and extremist groups with its massive terrorist operations and targeting indiscriminately the innocent people and causing the destruction of public buildings and property and abduction of innocent people.
 
The vivid example is what happened in Hulah and Hama . We all must condemn this terrorist act by terrorist groups and before rushing to any judgment that the Syrian Government is behind the killings and therefore the Kofi Annan’s plan is dead, we have to wait for the investigations to completer. 
 
The continuation of violence and leveling recriminatory allegations against one another not only does not solve any problem, rather it would only inflame the situation. Unless there are meaningful measures to curtail such destructive moves, there would be little chance for the success of a peaceful solution.
 
The more this crisis is prolonged; the more instability it creates for Syria and for the region as a whole with its adverse effects to the economy, energy market and overall prosperity for the people in the region. We need, therefore, to call on the opposition groups that the only way for the realization of political aspirations is through a peaceful Syrian-led political process.
There is also an urgent need for all those who are providing money, logistics and arms to the opposition groups to stop that immediately. They should know that the smoke from the fire in Syria will, in one way or another, pollute the region as a whole.
 
Mr. Kofi Annan plan is, in fact, a turning point in resolving the Syrian crisis. It moved the situation from a military phase to a political process. Therefore, this process should be maintained and strengthened so that we do not return back to square one.
Syrian government has taken some concrete steps within reform process including the parliamentary election and constitutional revisions.
 
We believe that the Special Envoy still can play a major role in facilitating an engagement of the Syrian political groups with the Government for a Syrian-lead political process. The reform process underway by the Government is a positive response to the aspirations of the Syrians. Our target should be concentrated on a process that will lead to a broader political reconciliation, strengthening national unity, ensuring public order, stability and prosperity of the Syrian people.
 
I should reiterate once again that the Islamic Republic of Iran is supportive of constructive, unbiased, impartial and peaceful Syrian-led political process and we stand ready to play our role in that process. We sincerely hope that Kofi Annan's mission leads to a prompt end to violence and continuation of the political process in Syria in resolving peacefully the crisis in Syria .
 
In conclusion, Mr. President, the representative of the Zionist regime made non-sense and baseless allegations against my country. The international community is fed up with this regime in its inhuman< aggressive, criminal record and terrorist activities in the region and elsewhere which is the main source of insecurity and instability in the Middle East.
 
This regime abuses every opportunity to take away the world's attention from its atrocities and statement in today's plenary should be observed in that context.
 
Tags: Iran, Syria

Iran Ratchets Up Tensions over Gulf Islands

Ted Wynne 
 
Longstanding tensions between Iran and its Arab neighbors are intensifying because of rival territorial claims over three strategic islands in the Persian Gulf--Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. Three high-profile visits since mid-April—by President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, Revolutionary Commander Mohammad Jafari, and a parliamentary delegation—provoked anger and anxiety among the six neighboring sheikhdoms in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
 
The Iranian president visited Abu Musa on April 11. The Iranian press reported that a parliamentary delegation visited all three islands on April 29 to commemorate “National Persian Gulf Day.” And the Revolutionary Guard commander reportedly visited all three on May 2. He was accompanied by the IRGC Navy commander Rear-Admiral Ali Fadavi and other senior military officials, according to Iranian media.
 
Abu Musa—only about 4.5 square miles, with a population of 2,000 -- is the only inhabited island. But it is about 10 miles from the narrow Strait of Hormuz, which is a chokepoint for 40 percent of the world’s seaborne oil. Iran maintains a military base for a few hundred troops and dated Silkworm HY-2 missiles, which have a range of about 125 miles. The Revolutionary Guard commander addressed troops during his visit.
 
The location gives the Islamic Republic a sensitive strategic position that is more an irritant than a tactical advantage. But in the eyes of the oil-rich Gulf states, Iran’s hold on the islands symbolizes Tehran’s expansionist agenda. For centuries, Iran controlled the islands, which were occupied by Britain in 1908. In 1971, during the shah’s rule, Britain negotiated a power-sharing agreement between Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over Abu Musa. But in 1992 Iran then took control of all three based on historic ownership before Britain. Most of Abu Musa’s infrastructure was also reportedly built by Iran.
 
After the latest tensions, the Gulf Cooperation Council condemned Ahmadinejad’s visit, only the second by a president since the 1979 revolution. At a GCC meeting in Riyadh on May 2, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Naif bin Abdul Aziz condemned Iran for “unacceptable” behavior and for violating UAE’s “legitimate claim” to the three “occupied islands.”
 
Ahmadinejad’s visit to Abu Musa prompted the United Arab Emirates, which does a huge volume of business with Iran through Dubai, to recall its ambassador from Tehran. The United States, Italy and France issued statements supporting regional stability and the UAE’s attempts to peacefully resolve the dispute.  
 
The Iranian moves and Gulf reaction come as the six-member council is considering ways to merge resources and powers—in reaction to both internal instability in Bahrain and fear of Iran’s regional intentions.
 
In response, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian told Press TV that the Ahmadinejad’s visit to Abu Musa was “an internal affair which has been made in the framework of his provincial tours.” But in a reflection of the strong nationalist sentiment underlying the issue, some Iranian legislators recently moved to have the street in front of the UAE Embassy in Tehran renamed “Abu Musa” Street. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ted Wynne is a researcher at USIP in the Center for Conflict Management.

Court Mandates U.S. Decision on Iran Opposition Group

On June 1, a U.S. District Appeals Court ruled that the Obama administration must finally decide within four months whether or not to remove the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK) from the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist groups. The decision was a partial victory for the controversial Iranian opposition movement. It has long pressured Washington through both a court petition and a high-profile public relations campaign to be taken off the list.

In a press statement after the decision, the State Department said its position on the MEK has been under review since a court mandate in 2010, but that it “intends to comply” with the new court’s order to determine the group’s legal or illegal status in the United States.
 
The State Department added that the MEK’s cooperation in relocating thousands of members from Camp Ashraf and the closure of that main paramilitary base in Iraq would be “key factors” in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s decision. The MEK has been slowly and reluctantly moving its members to a former U.S. military base further from the border with Iran.
 
Until the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the MEK ran most of its military operations against Iran out of Camp Ashraf, which is on Iraq’s border with Iran. The largest exile group contends it stopped using terror tactics in 2003 and should now be recognized as a legitimate Iranian opposition group.
 
The MEK, or the People’s Mujahedeen, was founded in 1965 as an urban guerilla group opposed to the monarchy of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. It had both Marxist and Islamist members, although members were reportedly were cult-like among themselves. They participated in the 1979 Revolution but later broke with it over ideology and direction. In 1981, it went underground, and many of its members went into exile. Its core members—estimated to number somewhere between 5,000-10,000 worldwide—are based largely in Iraq and Europe.
 
In the June 1 decision, the three-judge panel concluded that it would not make the decision about the group’s status—for now. It basically threw the decision back to the administration to figure out how to act within four months, until Oct. 1, after which the court may decide on the group’s status.
 
“In light of the national security and foreign policy concerns underlying the designation, we decline, at this time, to revoke the Foreign Terrorist Organization’s designation,” the court ruled. “Instead, we order the Secretary to either deny or grant PMOI’s petition not later than four months from the date this opinion issues.”
 
If Clinton “fails to take action within that period, the petition for a writ of mandamus setting aside the FTO [foreign terrorist organization] designation will be granted,” the court said.
 
The bitter relationship between both the United States and Iran with the MEK has a long history. The MEK reportedly killed six Americans in Iran in 1973, 1975 and 1976.  It was also linked with attempted kidnappings and assassination attempts on senior U.S. military and diplomatic officials, especially in the 1970s. The MEK is often described as a cult that incorporates both Islam and socialism.
 
In 1981, the MEK was held responsible for bombing the offices of the ruling Islamic Republic Party. The attack killed 70 high-ranking officials, including President Mohammad Ali Rajaei, Prime Minister Mohammad Javad Bahonar, and judiciary chief Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti. Since 1981, Iran has prosecuted many Mujahedeen-e Khalq supporters; it has also used that designation to arrest other political dissidents. Alleged MEK members have often been charged with moharebeh, or enmity against God, which can carry a death sentence. 
 
The Mujahedeen also backed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein throughout the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Between 1999 and 2003, Iraq gave the MEK millions of dollars to purchase weapons and fund attacks against Iranian embassies, high-ranking officials, and military targets, the U.S. State Department reported.
 
The timing of the U.S. court decision is awkward. The world’s six major powers have recently renewed diplomatic negotiations over Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Removing the MEK from the list could be a boost to the opposition group’s flagging standing, both in Iran and in the eyes of the world. Europe has already delisted the MEK. After the disputed 2009 presidential election, the MEK lost ground as the leading opposition group to the Green Movement, which mobilized millions of followers to the streets for months to challenge the context vote.
 

Washington and Tehran on Iran’s role in Syria

Ted Wynne

On May 29, the United States charged that Iran played a role in the weekend massacre of more than 100 Syrians, including dozens of children, in the northern city of Houla. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said a commander of Iran’s elite Quds Force was “bragging” about its support of the Shabiha militia that allegedly carried out the attack.  

Iranian officials countered that the Syrian opposition was behind the deaths of civilians generally—and that Iran's presence and influence in Syria had helped contain the scope of carnage. The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman said the attack had been carried out “to create chaos and instability” in Syria “to block the way to a peaceful resolution." The following are recent quotes from U.S. and Iranian officials. 

The United States
State Department Spokesperson Victoria Nunland, May 29 Press Briefing
“The Iranians have clearly provided support and training and advice to the Syrian army, but this shabiha thug force mirrors the same force that the Iranians used. The Basiji and the shabiha are the same type of thing, and clearly reflects the tactics and the techniques that the Iranians used for their own suppression of civil rights. . .
 
“It’s Assad and his regime who created this shabiha force to begin with. It very much models the Iranian Basiji model, where they hire young guys to indiscriminately wreak vengeance and do this kind of hand-to-hand violence. Whether he actually signed an order or whether he’s simply responsible for creating the force, giving it the kind of free will and impunity that allows this kind of thing to happen, it barely matters. . .
 
“Over the weekend we had the deputy head of the Qods Force saying publicly that they were proud of the role that they had played in training and assisting the Syrian forces; and look what this has wrought. . .We just find it interesting that it was on this very weekend that the deputy head of the Qods Force decided to take credit for the advice that they’re giving to Syria.
 
Iran
Ismail Ghani, deputy head of Quds Force, May 28 interview with Iranian Students News Agency
"If the Islamic republic was not present in Syria, the massacre of people would have happened on a much larger scale… Before our presence in Syria, too many people were killed by the opposition but with the physical and non-physical presence of the Islamic republic, big massacres in Syria were prevented."
 
Major General Hassan Firouzabadi, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, May 29 on Press TV
“We do not interfere in Syria’s internal affairs but we support Syria as the resistance front against Israel because one of our principles is the issue of Palestine…We have encouraged the country’s government to implement reforms and listen to its people’s demands.”
 
Iranian Majles (parliament), May 29 Official Statement
"The barbaric massacre of the innocent people of Houla, in Homs, is reminiscent of the merciless terrorist atrocities in Sabra and Shatila [in Lebanon in 1982] and is a blatant symbol of terrorist acts and mass murder in this juncture of human history."
 
“The U.S. should be held accountable for its incorrect policies in Syria.”
 
Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast, May 29 press conference
"We palpably feel the Zionist regime's hand in Syria's internal developments…
Any crime committed [in Syria] can be traced back to the regime's hirelings.
 
Mehmanparast on Press TV, May 28
"We are certain that foreign interference, terrorist and suspicious measures which have targeted the resilient Syrian people are doomed to fail… The attack has been carried out in order to create chaos and instability in Syria and its perpetrators are trying to block the way to a peaceful resolution."
 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a March 30 meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan
“Iran will defend Syria because it supports its policy of resistance against the Zionist regime [Israel], and is strongly opposed to any interference by foreign forces in Syria’s internal affairs. . .
 
Tags: Iran, Syria

The Islamists Are Coming

The Islamists Are Coming, edited by Robin Wright, surveys the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region more than any other political bloc. Yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.

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