February 25, 2016
The U.N. nuclear watchdog has released its first quarterly report on Iran’s nuclear program after the deal went into the implementation phase on January 16. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) noted that Iran briefly exceeded the 130 metric ton limit on its heavy-water stockpile as stipulated in the agreement. Tehran, however, reduced the 130.9 tons back below the limit by shipping out 20 metric tons. The report was short but detailed Iran’s compliance with specific aspects of the deal. The following are excerpts from the report.
Activities Related to Heavy Water and Reprocessing
Iran has not pursued the construction of the existing Arak heavy water research reactor (IR-40 Reactor) based on its original design.12 Iran has not produced or tested natural uranium pellets, fuel pins or fuel assemblies specifically designed for the support of the IR-40 Reactor as originally designed, and all existing natural uranium pellets and fuel assemblies remained in storage under continuous Agency monitoring (paras 3 and 10).
Iran has continued to inform the Agency about the inventory of heavy water in Iran and the production of heavy water at the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP)14 and allowed the Agency to monitor the quantities of Iran’s heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced at the HWPP (para. 15). On 13 and 14 February 2016, 20 metric tonnes of heavy water was verified and sealed by the Agency in preparation for its shipment out of Iran. On 17 February, the Agency verified that Iran’s stock of heavy water had reached 130.9 metric tonnes.15 The Agency confirms that, on 24 February 2016, the aforementioned 20 metric tonnes of heavy water had been shipped out of Iran, bringing the stock of heavy water in Iran to below 130 metric tonnes (para. 14).
Iran has not carried out activities related to reprocessing at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility or at any of the other declared facilities.
Activities Related to Enrichment and Fuel
Since Implementation Day, 5060 IR-1 centrifuges have remained installed in 30 cascades17 at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz (para. 27).
On 23 January 2016, Iran resumed the enrichment of UF6 at FEP.18 Since this date, Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U–235 (para. 28). Iran’s stockpile of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) has not exceeded 300 kg since Implementation Day (para. 56).
Since Implementation Day, 1044 IR-1 centrifuges have been maintained in six cascades in one wing of the facility at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) (para. 46). Iran has not conducted any uranium enrichment or related research and development (R&D) activities at FFEP, nor has there been any nuclear material at the plant (para. 45).
Since Implementation Day, all stored centrifuges and associated infrastructure have remained instorage under continuous Agency monitoring (paras 29, 47, 48 and 70). The Agency has continued to have regular access to relevant buildings at Natanz, including all of FEP and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment plant (PFEP), and performed daily access upon Agency request (para. 71).
Since Implementation Day, Iran has conducted its enrichment activities in line with itslong-term enrichment and R&D enrichment plan, as provided to the Agency on 16 January 2016 (para. 52).
Since Implementation Day, Iran has not operated any of its declared facilities for the purpose ofconverting fuel plates or scrap back into UF6, nor has it informed the Agency that it has built any new facilities for such a purpose (para. 58).
Centrifuge Research & Development, Manufacturing and Inventory
Since Implementation Day, no enriched uranium has been accumulated through enrichment R&D activities, and Iran’s enrichment R&D with and without uranium has been conducted using centrifuges within the limits defined in the JCPOA (paras 32–42).
Since Implementation Day, Iran has provided to the Agency declarations of Iran’s production and inventory of centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows and permitted the Agency to verify these (para. 80.1). The Agency has conducted continuous monitoring, including through the use of containment and surveillance measures, and verified that the declared equipment has been used for the production of rotor tubes and bellows to manufacture centrifuges only for the activities specified in the JCPOA (para. 80.2). Iran has not produced any IR-1 centrifuges to replace those that have been damaged or failed (para. 62) and the Agency has verified and monitored the production of other types of centrifuge and their rotor tubes and bellows (para. 61). All declared rotor tubes, bellows and rotor assemblies have been under continuous monitoring by the Agency, including those rotor tubes and bellows manufactured since Implementation Day (para. 70).
Iran has continued to permit the Agency to use on-line enrichment monitors and electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to Agency inspectors, and to facilitate the automated collection of Agency measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices (para. 67.1). Iran has issued long-term visas to Agency inspectors designated for Iran as requested and provided proper working space for the Agency at nuclear sites and facilitated the use of working space at locations near nuclear sites in Iran (para. 67.2).
Iran has continued to permit the Agency to monitor - through measures agreed with Iran, including containment and surveillance measures - all uranium ore concentrate (UOC) produced in Iran or obtained from any other source, and reported by Iran to the Agency. Iran also provided the Agency with all information necessary to enable the Agency to verify the production of UOC and the inventory of UOC produced in Iran or obtained from any other source (para. 69).
Click here for the full report.