Iran's Logic in Iraq War vs. Nuclear Talks

            A comprehensive nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 may be possible prior to the November 24 deadline, despite widespread pessimism among analysts. In a new briefing, Seyedamir Hossein Mahdavi, a researcher at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University from 2013 to 2014, draws parallels between the conditions surrounding today’s nuclear negotiations and the conditions in 1988 when Iran agreed to accept a UN resolution to end the Iran-Iraq war. By examining the economic, religious, and ideological similarities between the two cases, Mahdavi concludes that Iranian leaders will likely be compelled to accept a nuclear deal. Just as the end of the Iran-Iraq war paved the way for renewed economic development, choosing the path of compromise in the nuclear negotiations would relieve sanctions and allow leaders to address the mounting economic crisis. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has referred to this as "heroic flexibility." The following are excerpts from the brief.

            To answer the myriad of questions surrounding the prospects of reaching a comprehensive agreement by the November deadline—or soon thereafter—requires insight into the Iranian regime’s decision-making process, insight that, for the most part, has eluded analysts due to the opaqueness of the Iranian political system. This Brief argues that a deeper insight is possible by comparing the circumstances and mechanisms that led to the Islamic Republic’s decision to end the war with Iraq in 1988 with those prevailing today.
            Using documents made public since 1988, this Brief demonstrates that although the political players have changed in the past two decades, there are important similarities between the conditions that prevailed and the logic that led to Iran’s decision to accept the UN proposal to end the war with Iraq and the conditions and logic that now affect its nuclear negotiations with the P5+1. The Brief makes this argument by comparing these two crises along three common dimensions: economic, religious, and ideological.
 
The Economic Dimension
 
            Iran’s economic crisis in 2012-13, when growth plunged to a low of negative 5.6 percent under crushing international sanctions, most resembles that of the final years of the Iran-Iraq war. Lack of resources during the second half of the 1980s had pushed the Iranian economy to an unmanageable brink. According to official Iranian reports, the dual necessity of fighting a prolonged war and providing for the population in the first decade after the 1979 revolution had created an unsustainable situation. According to former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iranian experts then estimated that in order to win the war against Iraq, several more years of fighting plus nuclear weapons were needed.
            Khomeini, who favored the prolongation of the war, suddenly shifted positions based on the warnings issued by economic experts, even though he never publicly acknowledged the economic constraints as reasons for accepting the ceasefire. Specifically, what seemed to have changed his mind was a letter he received from the head of the Budgeting and Planning Organization, which in addition to enumerating the myriad of economic problems the country was facing, claimed that the Islamic Republic had no choice now but to choose between “expanding the revolution” and “holding on to power.”
            Economic dilemmas have played the same role in the nuclear case as they did in forging the decision to accept peace with Iraq. To a large extent, Rouhani’s election reflected Khamenei’s acceptance of the need to deal with Iran’s deteriorating economy. In mid-2012, as the country experienced crippling recession and skyrocketing inflation three ministers from former President Mohammad Khatami’s reformist government (1997-2005) met with Khamenei and impressed upon him the dire state of Iran’s economic situation. This meeting seems to have set in motion a series of developments that eventually led Khamenei to support holding a competitive election in 2013 and to permit explicit criticism of the government’s nuclear policy—a subject which until then had been off-limits for public debate—that in turn set the stage for Rouhani’s success in the election.
            The strategy adopted by Khamenei echoes Khomeini’s historic phrase that “safeguarding the Islamic Republic is more obligatory than any religious duty.” The actions of both supreme leaders suggest that despite some of Iran’s ideologically motivated foreign policy maneuvers, macro foreign policy decisions are rooted in their economic ramifications and are based on practical considerations, namely the longevity of the regime.

The Religious Dimension
 
            As a Shi’a source of emulation (marja’), Khomeini combined his religious and political authority to reject the peace treaty signed by Imam Hassan. But the pro-peace camp in the government and parliament used the same Shi’a literature to sway Khomeini to accept the need to end the war. As debates and conflict over war or peace became more intense, Rafsanjani proposed a middle ground that was also predicated upon Shi’a teachings. At its core was the idea of peace after a victorious offensive on the enemy, a peace that was the result of triumph in the war followed by compromise—a combination of the different methods adopted by the two Imams. Fittingly, the last offensive in the Iran-Iraq war was called Karbala, in remembrance of Imam Hussein’s last battle.
            Khamenei has also used similar religious language to navigate between his own uncompromising rhetoric over the nuclear issue and the practical necessities of Iran’s economic situation. In 1996, in one of his most famous speeches titled “Lessons from Ashura,” Khamenei explicitly endorsed Imam Hussein’s policy of no-negotiations by stating that one was obliged to fight evil and that regardless of winning or losing, the outcome was victory. However, in 2013 when the economic conditions of the country had deteriorated in a fashion similar to that experienced during the final years of the Iran-Iraq war, Khamenei resorted to Imam Hassan’s peace, dubbing the new negotiating strategy of Iran as “heroic flexibility.”
 
The Ideological Dimension
 
            In today’s Iran, the political elite is roughly divided into two camps—representing the two poles of reconciliation and resistance—the “Worried” and the “Valiant.” By the end of the war with Iraq, the political elite was similarly divided between those favoring peace and those favoring the continuation of the war. The dominant inclination among the IRGC was to continue the war until victory, which was defined as capturing Karbala and toppling Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime. By contrast, most members of the executive branch and especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs defended the pursuit of a peace based on preserving national sovereignty.
            Despite the obvious differences between the two camps over the continuation of the war, it was Khomeini’s maneuvers that actually prevented either side from completely eliminating the other. As mentioned earlier, until the last year of the war, Khomeini explicitly defended the war’s continuation to the degree that even to this day, the Iranian public continues to believe that while Khomeini wanted to continue the war, politicians such as Rafsanjani imposed the ceasefire on him.
            This dual approach is being repeated today by the second Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic with regard to the nuclear negotiations. Much like Khomeini, Khamenei consistently defines himself publicly as a supporter of “resistance” over the nuclear issue, while giving Rouhani’s moderate foreign policy team permission to actively engage in negotiations.
 
Conclusion
 
            Today in the public mind, Rouhani is identified with peace much like Rafsanjani was in the late 1980s. If reaching peace with Iraq had failed and the war continued, it would not have been possible to advance Rafsanjani’s plans for economic development during the second decade of the Islamic Republic. Iran’s power would have depreciated, the economy would have deteriorated, and those advocating for war would have been emboldened enough to outmaneuver Rafsanjani and his pragmatic allies. Now it is Rouhani who hopes to save Iran by achieving a nuclear agreement and resolving the deep economic crisis brought upon by sanctions. Should a nuclear agreement be concluded, the government will likely be able to bring the economy out of recession in time for the 2015 parliamentary campaigns. By improving the standard of living of Iranians, Rouhani can become powerful enough to push back against his extremist opponents. But if the negotiations fail, and subsequently the hardliners win a majority in the 2015 elections, Rouhani’s government will not be able to fulfill its economic promises or implement its political and cultural agenda as both will be blocked by the new parliament.
 
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