The following are excerpts from Congressional testimony at a Nov. 15 hearing on the Obama Administration’s policy toward Iran. The three analysts appeared before the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations Subcommittee.
Dr. Kenneth M. Pollack, Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution
Because of Iraq's intrinsic importance coupled with its significance to the vital Persian Gulf region, preventing Iran from achieving its maximal goals in Iraq will be crucial to America's interests in the region. Moreover, given the remarkable transformations sweeping the Arab world, it would be a terrible tragedy if Iran were able to exploit the volatility of the Arab Awakening to strengthen its position and undermine the stability of the Middle East. Here as well, Iran's ability to shape the outcome in Iraq will play a major role in determining how well Tehran is able to influence the wider political changes in the region. For all of these reasons, what happens in Iraq, and what happens regarding Iranian influence in Iraq, is one of the crucial questions facing the region today.
Unfortunately, the situation at present is not favorable to the interests of the United States and its allies in the region. Although it is both premature and beside the point to ask whether the United States "lost" Iraq or if Iran has "won" it, there is no question that Iran today has considerable sway in Iraq—far more than we or the Iraqis would like. Moreover, while it is certainly possible to imagine a course of action that the United States could pursue to reverse this state of affairs,under current circumstances it seems unlikely either that Washington would be willing to make the necessary effort or that if we were, that it would do more than marginally diminish Iran's influence in the short term. This is part of the reason that a realistic assessment of Iraq's likely near-term future can only be a relatively pessimistic one. Most plausible scenarios for Iraq's future at this point are unhappy, at least in the near term, and the best (or perhaps, the least bad) scenarios do not seem to be the most likely. Iraq is liable to get worse before it gets better—if it gets better—although there are certainly things that the United States can do to minimize both the duration and the depth of these difficult times, if we are willing.
Mr. Mark Dubowitz, Executive Director, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
The recent report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran‘s nuclear program has
raised legitimate questions about the effectiveness of sanctions to frustrate Tehran‘s nuclear
plans. Sanctions targeting Iran‘s energy, banking, and shipping sectors have cost the Islamic
Republic billions of dollars. These sanctions have led to the slow-motion demise of the Iranian
energy industry as Iranian oil production continues to materially decline. However, their
medium-to-long term impact is insufficient because Iran will likely cross the nuclear threshold
before these sanctions have time to work. There is also no evidence yet to suggest that economic pressure could make the Iranian regime rethink its decision to develop nuclear weapons.
For the West, however, sanctions have to be ―targeted. They cannot impose massive economic costs on a country‘s citizens. They can‘t inflict too much economic pain on international companies, or rattle voters with higher gasoline prices. Even against this Iranian regime, whose possession of nuclear weapons could lead to a cascade of proliferation resulting in a nuclear armed Middle East, the diminishment of American power, and a clerical regime even more willing to use terrorism, many in the West resist sanctions that are too ―”punishing” or ―”crippling.”
So are sanctions against the Iranian regime destined to fail?
I believe sanctions can still work. But they must hit harder at the heart of Iran‘s oil industry,
specifically oil sales, which account for between 50 and 75 percent of the national budget, and 80 percent of hard-currency export earnings, without causing a significant increase in global petroleum prices. Otherwise, Tehran can sell less oil and make more money while roiling global markets. This is a scenario we want to avoid.
Dr. Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution
Even as Iran‘s opposition remained largely dormant throughout the course of the early
months of the Arab spring, the political frictions within the regime have ramped up sharply. The longstanding resentment toward President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad harbored by the traditional stalwarts of the Iranian revolutionary regime exploded into public view. The outcome of this infighting has only reinforced the role of Iran‘s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as the country‘s paramount authority. The fierce contention has opened new fissures among the political elite, but this has not yet substantially eroded the regime‘s capabilities for maintaining authority in the short term.
Faced with profound popular dissatisfaction and intra-elite tensions at home, the turbulence
across the region has only reinforced the Iranian regime‘s determination to eradicate dissent and assert their influence across a changing Middle East. Despite their obvious vulnerabilities, Iran‘s dogmatic theocrats perceive the Arab uprisings in triumphal terms. From Tehran‘s vantage point, regional change has been a net positive so far. Several of the Islamic Republic‘s most determined regional adversaries were dispatched into exile, prison, or at minimum in a defensive crouch. This offers Tehran at least the possibility of new access in the Sunni Arab world, and the regime has sought to exploit the abiding uncertainty and undercurrents of mistrust for U.S. intentions that lie just beneath the surface of regional enthusiasm for change. The Arab spring has also ratcheted oil prices back up from a two-year downturn brought on by the global economic slowdown, and the instability premium will ensure Iranian revenues sufficient to ride out almost any pressures.
To be sure, the regional environment has also created new liabilities for Tehran. Whatever
soft power Iran could claim in its own neighborhood has surely faded by the Arab embrace of
democratic activism and government accountability. Iran‘s leaders have been exposed as tin-pot dictators, and their unflinching defiance of Washington rings far more hollow in a region where the mantle of heroism has been seized by the millions of ordinary citizens willing to risk their lives in pursuit of a better future. An even more immediate problem for Tehran is the violence in Syria, its only reliable Arab ally. Unrest in Syria jeopardizes the Islamic Republic‘s most trusted regional partner and its most reliable mechanism for resupplying its proxy Hezbollah and maintaining direct access into the political dramas of the Levant. Moreover, the scope and pace of Syria‘s devolution must be unnerving for Iranian leaders‘ confidence in their own capabilities for preserving control.